Jubilee Hills Education Society vs Jubilee Hills Co-Operative House ...
2026 Latest Caselaw 719 Tel

Telangana High Court

Jubilee Hills Education Society vs Jubilee Hills Co-Operative House ... on 15 April, 2026

         IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
                         AT HYDERABAD
     THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI APARESH KUMAR SINGH
                              AND
            THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN

                   WRIT APPEAL No.425 of 2026
                          DATE:15.04.2026

Between:
Jubilee Hills Educational Society
                                                        ....Appellant
                                 And
Jubilee Hills Co-operative
House Building Society and 2 others
                                                    ....Respondents

                             JUDGMENT

Heard Sri Dama Seshadri Naidu, learned Senior Counsel

representing Sri Vivek Jain, learned counsel for the appellant;

Sri V.Hariharan, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri Rohit

Pogula, learned counsel for respondent No.1; Sri G.Bhaskar, learned

Government Pleader for Municipal Administration appearing for

respondent No.2 and Sri Midde Arun Kumar, learned Standing

Counsel for Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC)

appearing for respondent No.3 and perused the record.

2. This writ appeal is preferred under Clause 15 of the Letters

Patent, against the order dated 30.03.2026 passed by the learned

Single Judge in W.P.No.3281 of 2026. By the said order, the learned

Single Judge allowed the writ petition by setting aside the building

permit dated 20.11.2024 bearing No.6202/GHMC/KHB/2024-BP

granted by the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC) in

favour of the appellant (Education Society), and remanded the matter

to the GHMC Commissioner for fresh consideration of the objections

raised by respondent No.1.

Factual matrix

3. Respondent No.1 Society, being the owner and lessor of land

admeasuring Ac.6.02 Gts., situated at Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad,

earmarked in the approved layout for educational/school purposes,

executed a registered Lease Deed dated 21.08.1987 in favour of the

appellant Education Society for establishment and running of an

educational institution, presently known as Jubilee Hills Public

School. The said lease was granted for a fixed term of thirty years.

Under Clause 8 of the Lease Deed, the appellant, as lessee, was

expressly authorized to raise structures and undertake constructions

for educational purposes as per approved plans, without requiring

any further written consent from respondent No.1. Clause 15 further

conferred upon the appellant an enforceable option to seek renewal

of the lease for a further period of thirty years, subject to compliance

with Clauses 2 to 6, 12 and 13 of the Lease Deed.

4. Upon the expiry of the original lease term in August, 2017,

the appellant had exercised its right of renewal by addressing letters

dated 17.04.2015 and 27.04.2017 requesting extension of the lease

in terms of Clause 15. However, respondent No.1, instead of effecting

renewal issued letter dated 16.07.2018 imposing an extraneous and

unlawful precondition, namely surrender of 3,000 Sq Yds from the

school premises for its office expansion, which demand was not

accepted by the appellant.

5. Aggrieved by the unreasonable withholding of renewal and

apprehending interference with its peaceful possession, the appellant

instituted O.S.No.797 of 2018 before the Chief Judge City Civil Court

at Hyderabad (for short 'trial Court') seeking specific performance of

the Renewal Clause 15 in the Lease Deed dated 21.08.1987. In the

said suit, the trial Court granted an interim order dated 13.11.2018

directing maintenance of status quo, which order was subsequently

extended from time to time and continues to remain in force.

6. During pendency of the aforesaid civil proceedings, the

Managing Committee of respondent No.1 considered the issue of

renewal and passed a resolution on 30.09.2020 approving extension

of the lease in favour of the appellant. Pursuant thereto, a renewed

Lease Deed dated 12.10.2020 was executed between the parties for a

further term of thirty years on revised terms. The said document was

duly stamped, though not registered, and was subsequently

impounded under the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The

existence of the renewed lease deed was also within the knowledge of

members of respondent No.1 Society in subsequent general body

meetings.

7. The appellant, being in longstanding possession and running

the school for several decades, applied before the GHMC for building

permission for construction of additional floors, extension of existing

blocks, and construction of a sports block. Upon scrutiny of the

application, submission of requisite documents, payment of

prescribed charges and fees, and furnishing of an Undertaking-cum-

Indemnity Bond agreeing to abide by the result of the pending civil

suit and not to claim equities, GHMC granted Building Permit

No.6202/GHMC/KHB/2024-BP dated 20.11.2024. Thereafter, the

appellant commenced construction works and substantial progress

was made.

8. Respondent No.1 addressed a representation dated 17.08.2023

to GHMC requesting that no building permission be granted in

favour of the appellant without production of a No Objection

Certificate (NOC) of respondent No.1 and a valid lease deed.

Notwithstanding such objections, the municipal authority, upon

prima facie satisfaction regarding possession, entitlement and

compliance with statutory requirements, proceeded to grant the

building permit in favour of the appellant.

9. Aggrieved by the grant of building permission, respondent

No.1 instituted the underlying W.P.No.3281 of 2026 before this Court

challenging Building Permit No.6202/GHMC/KHB/2024-BP dated

20.11.2024. By order dated 30.03.2026, the learned Single Judge,

while observing that disputed questions of fact could not

appropriately be adjudicated in exercise of writ jurisdiction,

nevertheless proceeded to record findings touching upon the

genuineness, validity and enforceability of the renewed Lease Deed

dated 12.10.2020 vis-à-vis the Registration Act, 1908 and the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and ultimately set aside the Building

Permit and remanded the matter to GHMC for fresh consideration

after hearing the parties.

10. Aggrieved by the said order the appellant has preferred the

present writ appeal.

Submissions on behalf of appellants

11. Learned Senior Counsel representing learned counsel for the

appellant, assailed the impugned order and has advanced his

submissions as under:

i) That the learned Single Judge, having observed that disputed

questions of fact are not amenable to adjudication in

proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,

nevertheless proceeded to examine and render findings on the

genuineness, validity and enforceability of the renewed Lease

Deed dated 12.10.2020, particularly with reference to the

provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 and Section 107 of the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Such issue constitutes a mixed

question of fact and law and forms the very subject matter of

lis pending in O.S.No.797 of 2018 before the trial Court.

ii) That while considering an application for building permission,

the jurisdiction of the Municipal Commissioner is confined to

examining whether the applicant establishes a prima facie title,

possession or entitlement to proceed with construction, and

not whether the applicant holds an indefeasible or conclusive

title. Reliance is placed on the judgments of the erstwhile High

Court of Andhra Pradesh in Hyderabad Potteries Private

Ltd. v. Collector, Hyderabad 1 and T. Rameshwar v.

Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad 2,

wherein it has been held that municipal authorities cannot

assume the role of civil Courts in adjudicating title disputes

inter se rival claimants.

iii) That the GHMC was justified in granting permission upon

prima facie satisfaction, as the appellant had produced the

original registered Lease Deed dated 21.08.1987, the renewed

Lease Deed dated 12.10.2020, and material evidencing

continuous possession and operation of the school for nearly

four decades..

iv) That even assuming the renewed Lease Deed dated 12.10.2020

to be unregistered, the same does not ipso facto render the

1 2001 (3) ALT 200 2 2006 (3) ALD 337

appellant a trespasser. Under Section 106 read with Section

107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, where possession is

continued under an unregistered lease for a term exceeding

one year, the tenancy would operate as a tenancy from month

to month unless lawfully terminated in accordance with law.

Consequently, the appellant continues to retain a lawful right

to occupy and use the premises unless evicted through due

process.

v) That respondent No.1 had knowledge of the renewed Lease

Deed from 02.04.2023, as reflected in the General Body

Meeting wherein the issue of renewal was discussed, and such

proceedings were later confirmed in the meeting dated

24.09.2023. Despite such knowledge, respondent No.1 did not

institute any declaratory proceedings under Section 34 of the

Specific Relief Act, 1963 challenging the said deed. Further,

the Building Permission was granted on 20.11.2024,

construction activities were commenced, and only thereafter in

the year 2026 was the writ petition instituted, after substantial

construction had already progressed. Thus, the conduct of

respondent No.1 clearly amounts to acquiescence, delay and

laches disentitling it to discretionary relief under Article 226.

vi) That the learned Single Judge himself recorded, at paragraph

15 of the impugned judgment, that under Clause 15 of the

original Lease Deed the appellant was entitled to renewal at its

option, and that renewal was not dependent upon mutual

consent as contended by respondent No.1. Having thus

recognized the appellant's subsisting contractual right of

renewal, the learned Single Judge ought not to have interfered

with the building permission, which is merely incidental to the

appellant's lawful occupation and use of the premises for

educational purposes.

vii) That the appellant furnished an Undertaking-cum-Indemnity

Bond before GHMC expressly undertaking that it would abide

by the result of O.S.No.797 of 2018 and would not claim any

equities in respect of the constructions raised pursuant to the

building permit. In view thereof, no irreparable prejudice would

be caused to respondent No.1 if the Building Permission is

permitted to operate pending adjudication of the civil suit. On

the contrary, stoppage of ongoing educational infrastructure

works would seriously prejudice the students and institution.

Submissions on behalf of the respondent No.1

12. Learned Senior Counsel representing learned counsel for

respondent No.1 has supported the impugned order and advanced

his submissions as under:

i) That the original Lease Deed dated 21.08.1987 expired by

efflux of time on 20.08.2017. Thereafter, no valid and

registered deed of renewal came into existence. The alleged

renewed Lease Deed dated 12.10.2020 being unregistered is

hit by Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 and

does not create, declare or transfer any right, title or interest in

the immovable property. Consequently, the appellant has no

lawful estate in the property and continues in unauthorized

occupation.

ii) That in O.S.No.797 of 2018 the trial Court granted an order of

status quo on 13.11.2018, which was subsequently extended

and continues to operate. By applying for building permission,

obtaining the same and raising additional constructions, the

appellant has wilfully altered the nature of the property in

breach of the subsisting judicial order.

iii) That under Section 429 of the GHMC Act, 1955, the

Commissioner is empowered and obliged to call for title

documents and satisfy himself regarding the applicant's

entitlement. GHMC could not have acted on the basis of an

unregistered and disputed lease deed while ignoring the

admitted ownership of respondent No.1. Furthermore, the

objections/representation dated 17.08.2023 submitted by

respondent No.1 were not properly considered, rendering the

grant of building permission arbitrary, illegal and contrary to

statutory mandate.

iv) That Clause 8 of the original Lease Deed cannot be read in

isolation or beyond the tenure of the lease. Any right to

construct thereunder was co-terminous with the subsistence of

the lease. Upon expiry of the original term in 2017, and in the

absence of a valid renewal, the appellant could not unilaterally

assert a right to undertake fresh constructions without the

express consent of the owner/lessor, particularly when

renewal itself is seriously disputed and sub judice.

v) That the alleged minutes of the Managing Committee meeting

dated 30.09.2020 and the consequential renewed Lease Deed

dated 12.10.2020 are seriously disputed as forged, fabricated

and unauthorized documents. Respondent No.1 specifically

contended that at the relevant time a Person-in-Charge

Committee was functioning and the prior office bearers lacked

authority to execute any such deed. Though such disputed

issues may not be finally adjudicated in writ proceedings, the

same certainly disentitle the appellant from asserting any clear

prima facie right to secure construction permissions.

vi) That the subject land is a valuable asset belonging to the

respondent No.1-Housing Society. If large-scale constructions

are permitted and the appellant ultimately fails in the civil

proceedings, respondent No.1 would be left with a heavily

encumbered property and exposed to claims for compensation

or equities. Therefore, the balance of convenience lies in

preserving the existing state of affairs and maintaining status

quo until final adjudication.

Submissions on behalf of the respondent No.3

13. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent No.3-

GHMC has advanced his submissions as under:

i) That the building permission was granted strictly in

accordance with the governing statutory framework, applicable

Building Rules and G.O.Ms.No.168, Municipal Administration

Department, dated 07.04.2012, after scrutiny of the

application and documents furnished by the appellant,

including the original registered Lease Deed dated 21.08.1987,

the renewed Lease Deed dated 12.10.2020 (duly stamped and

impounded), and the Undertaking-cum-Indemnity Bond.

ii) That the role of the Commissioner is limited to a prima facie

scrutiny regarding title, possession and compliance with

building norms. The Commissioner cannot adjudicate complex

disputes between lessor and lessee or pronounce upon the

final validity of competing claims, which fall within the domain

of civil Courts.

iii) That the objections raised by respondent No.1 were available

on record; however, upon considering the long possession of

the appellant, the subsisting educational use, the lease

documentation placed on record and the undertaking

furnished, the Commissioner formed a bona fide prima facie

opinion that the appellant possessed sufficient entitlement to

seek building permission.

14. We have taken note of the respective contentions urged and

perused the material on record.

Consideration by this Court

15. In the present case, the learned Single Judge, at paragraph 13

of the impugned order, expressly observed that "this Court is not

inclined to delve into the aspect of genuinity/ validity of the resolution

dated 30.09.2020 or the renewed Lease Deed dated 12.10.2020, since

the same are subject matter of O.S.No.797 of 2018 and in view of fact

that this Court exercising the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India cannot decide disputed questions of fact".

16. However, notwithstanding the aforesaid self-imposed restraint,

the learned Single Judge proceeded, at paragraph 16 of the

impugned judgment, to hold that the renewed Lease Deed dated

12.10.2020 did not satisfy the requirements of Section 107 of the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Sections 17 and 49 of the

Registration Act, 1908, though stamp duty had been paid thereon.

The said para is extracted hereunder:

16. As per Clause-8 of lease deed, the lessee is empowered to raise structures for setting up of school/educational institution and there is no requirement for obtaining express written consent from the petitioner society. In the teeth of

the said clause, the contention of petitioner society that respondent No.3-Education society cannot raise structures without express consent of petitioner-society is untenable. However, the fact remains that the lease deed expired on 20.08.2017 and the same was renewed vide renewed lease deed dated 12.10.2020. As per Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, any lease exceeding more than one year is mandatorily registerable. It is pertinent to note that the renewed lease deed dated 12.10.2020 purported to have been executed by the petitioner-society in favour of respondent No.3-society does not satisfy the requirement of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act as well as Sections-17 and 49 of the Registration Act, though stamp duty is paid.

17. In our considered view, such an approach cannot be sustained

in law for the following reasons:

i. The learned Single Judge, having rightly concluded that

disputed questions regarding execution, validity and

enforceability of the documents cannot be adjudicated in writ

proceedings, ought not to have thereafter rendered findings on

the legal efficacy of the very same document. The validity and

enforceability of the renewed Lease Deed dated 12.10.2020 are

central issues in the pending civil suit. Any determination by

the writ Court would be premature and prejudicial to the

parties before the competent Court.

ii. For the limited purpose and considering the building

permission application, the municipal authority is not required

to adjudicate upon absolute title or final legal enforceability of

rival claims. Its enquiry is confined to prima facie satisfaction

regarding possession, entitlement and compliance with

municipal laws. Where an applicant is in long-standing,

admitted possession under an antecedent registered lease

deed, the mere absence of registration of a subsequent

instrument does not conclusively defeat such application for

municipal purposes.

iii. The appellant has been in continuous possession of the

subject property for several decades and has been operating an

educational institution therefrom. The learned Single Judge

himself recorded that the original Lease Deed dated

21.08.1987 and the appellant's possession thereunder were

not in dispute. In these circumstances, observation touching

final title or leasehold validity was unnecessary for deciding

the writ petition.

Accordingly, the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in

paragraph 16 of the impugned order, insofar as they relate to the

validity, legal efficacy or enforceability of the renewed Lease Deed

dated 12.10.2020, are liable to be set aside.

18. It is made clear that all questions concerning the execution,

authority, genuineness, registration, validity, enforceability and legal

consequences of the renewed Lease Deed dated 12.10.2020 shall

remain open for adjudication in O.S.No.797 of 2018 or in any other

competent proceedings, and shall be decided on their own merits,

uninfluenced by any observations contained either in the impugned

judgment or in the present judgment.

19. It is also pertinent to note that the extent of enquiry to be

undertaken by a municipal authority while considering an

application for grant of building permission is no longer res integra.

The Commissioner, while exercising powers under the GHMC Act

1955, does not sit as a civil Court to adjudicate disputed questions of

title, but such jurisdiction is administrative and regulatory in nature,

confined to examining whether the applicant has placed such

material as would prima facie disclose possession, entitlement to

apply, and compliance with the applicable building rules and

statutory requirements.

20. The principle is well settled by this Court in T. Rameshwar

(supra 2) that the Commissioner is required to consider objections

touching upon title in a pragmatic manner, confined to prima facie

considerations, and is not vested with the jurisdiction to adjudicate

questions of title inter se between the applicant and the objector.

21. Applying the aforesaid settled principle to the facts of the

present case, the material placed before respondent No.3-GHMC

disclosed the following circumstances:

a) the appellant produced the original registered Lease Deed

dated 21.08.1987, the execution whereof is not in dispute;

b) the appellant also relied upon the renewed Lease Deed dated

12.10.2020, which, though disputed and unregistered, was

duly stamped and subsequently impounded in accordance

with law;

c) the appellant has remained in continuous possession of the

subject land for nearly four decades and has been operating an

educational institution therefrom to the knowledge of

respondent No.1;

d) the appellant furnished an Undertaking-cum-Indemnity Bond

to GHMC agreeing to abide by the result of O.S. No.797 of

2018 and not to claim any equities on the basis of

constructions raised pursuant to the permission granted.

22. On the basis of the aforesaid material, the GHMC formed a

prima facie opinion that the appellant possessed a subsisting and

arguable right to seek building permission. Such an opinion cannot

be said to be irrational or perverse, and does not warrant

interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,

particularly when the core dispute relating to the lease is sub judice

before the competent civil Court.

23. Further, this Court is constrained to observe that respondent

No.1 had raised specific objections as early as 17.08.2023, inter alia

pointing out the expiry of the original lease, disputing the renewed

Lease Deed, and referring to the pendency of the civil suit. While the

municipal authority was not bound to accept such objections as

determinative of the matter, principles of administrative fairness

required that the objections be adverted to and that brief reasons be

recorded as to why the same were not accepted or why permission

was nevertheless being granted.

24. A perusal of Building Permit No.6202/GHMC/KHB/2024-BP

dated 20.11.2024 does not disclose any discussion whatsoever of the

objections raised by respondent No.1.

25. In this regard, it is to be noted that the Municipal

Commissioner acted within the permissible limits of prima facie

scrutiny and did not exceed jurisdiction by granting permission.

26. The appellant entered into possession pursuant to the

registered lease deed of 1987 and has continued in occupation of the

subject property for several decades, running a school therein. Even

assuming that the renewed lease deed of 2020 is ultimately held to

be ineffective for want of registration, the appellant's continued

possession would nevertheless require consideration in the light of

Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which may give

rise to a month-to-month tenancy. Until such time as the appellant's

rights are duly determined, lawfully terminated, and it is evicted in

accordance with due process of law, its possession cannot be

characterised as that of a trespasser merely on the ground that the

renewed lease deed is unregistered.

Conclusion

27. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view

that this Writ Appeal would be disposed of by modifying the order

dated 30.03.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in the

following terms:

i. The finding of the learned Single Judge whereby Building

Permit dated 20.11.2024 issued by the respondent No.3 has

been quashed is set aside.

ii. Respondent No.3-Corporation is directed to consider the

objections raised by respondent No.1 in its representation

dated 17.08.2023, and take decision in accordance with law,

after grating opportunity to parties, without being influenced

by any observations made by the learned Single Judge in the

order under appeal and by this Court. The said exercise shall

be completed within a period of eight (8) weeks from the date of

receipt of a copy of this judgment.

28. Accordingly, this Writ Appeal is disposed of. No costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, stand

closed.

_______________________________ APARESH KUMAR SINGH, CJ

______________________________ G.M.MOHIUDDIN,J Date:15.04.2026 ssp