[Cites 46, Cited by 0]
Telangana High Court
Kalva Murali Manohar Reddy vs Union Of India on 7 April, 2026
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
1
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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION No. 30596 of 2025
07thApril, 2026
Between:
1. Kalva Murali Manohar Reddy
... Petitioner
AND
1. Union of India, rep. by its Secretary,
Ministry of Road, Transport, and Highways, and others
... Respondents
ORDER:
The petitioner, Kalva Murali Manohar Reddy, a 72-year-old
agriculturist, approaches the Court seeking a writ of mandamus to declare
the actions of the respondent authorities as illegal and unconstitutional,
particularly their attempt to take possession of his agricultural land
measuring 11,481 sq. meters and an additional extent of approximately
508.237 sq. meters (elsewhere described as 574.138 sq. meters) in Survey
No. 497 of Nawabpet village, Chityal mandal. He challenges the validity
of the impugned award modification proceedings bearing No. J/69/2021-
NH-163-G dated September 5, 2024, which for the first time inserted his
name in relation to the subject land without prior statutory steps such as
notification under Section 3A, declaration under Section 3D, or notice of
award enquiry under Section 3G of the National Highways Act, 1956 read
with the RFCTLARR (Removal of Difficulties) Order dated August 28,
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2015. He contends that if these actions are not set aside, he will be
deprived of his land, livelihood, and property in violation of Articles 14,
19, 21, and 300A of the Constitution of India, and therefore seeks both
final relief quashing the proceedings and interim protection against
dispossession.
The case of the petitioner, precisely as per the writ affidavit, is that
he owns a total extent of Ac.08-35 guntas of agricultural land in Nawabpet
village, comprising Ac.06.07 guntas of ancestral land and Ac.02.28 guntas
of self-acquired land in Survey No. 497/1/2 and 497/1/2/1, for which a
pattadar passbook and title deed were issued in 2019. Although he resides
in Hanumakonda due to age and medical needs, he continues to supervise
cultivation. It is stated that, in the first week of April 2021, he learned from
fellow villagers about a proposed greenfield road. He subsequently became
aware of a Section 3A notification published on 25.03.2021, which vaguely
referred to acquisition of part of Survey No. 497, covering roughly 10
acres, without specifying pattadar names or sub-divisions. Due to this lack
of clarity, and after being informed by local officials that exact details
would emerge only after further survey and declaration, he did not file
objections under Section 3C.
1.1. A declaration under Section 3D was later issued in 2022,
though the petitioner states he remained unaware of it at the time. It was
only in 2023, when award enquiry notices were issued to other farmers,
that he discovered the ongoing acquisition process. It is stated that he was
not served any notice concerning Survey No. 497. Upon obtaining
documents, he found that while three pattadars were listed against Survey
No. 497, his name was absent; instead, his name was erroneously shown
against Survey No. 473 for an extent of 3,237 sq. meters, despite his
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having no land there. He further learned that awards had already been
passed in January 2024, specifically on 16.01.2024 and 09.03.2024,
without affording him any opportunity to participate in the enquiry or
present objections. Subsequently, sometime in 2024, a survey team entered
his land in his absence and made markings without prior notice, and upon
enquiry he was told that alignment changes were being made.
1.2. The petitioner recounts that despite requesting documents
from the office of the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA),
none were furnished; however, he secured copies of the award
proceedings, survey report, and modification orders, recently through other
affected persons who obtained records under the Right to Information Act.
These proceedings revealed that through a survey report dated 01.06.2024,
his name and land details were recorded for the first time, and thereafter,
through the impugned modification order dated 05.09.2024, his name was
substituted in place of the originally recorded pattadars for an extent of
11,481 sq. meters in Survey No. 497. Additionally, another modification
order dated 04.09.2024 inserted his name for an extra extent of 574.38 sq.
meters. He also discovered that a second set of notifications under Section
3A dated 19.04.2022 and declaration under Section 3D dated 07.10.2022
covered additional extents in the same survey number, yet even there his
name and sub-division details were omitted. According to him, this
establishes that his land was never properly subjected to acquisition
proceedings as mandated by law.
1.3. The petitioner emphasizes that no compensation was ever
determined or awarded for the structures, trees, and wells present on his
land, and that even award notices were issued in the names of third parties.
He asserts that the statutory process was fundamentally defective: the
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Section 3A notifications dated 02.03.2021 and 19.04.2022 lacked
specificity; the Section 3D declarations dated 22.02.2022 and 07.10.2022
omitted his name; the award enquiry notice dated 08.03.2023 excluded
him; and the awards dated 16.01.2024 and 09.03.2024 were passed without
reference to his ownership. It is contended that the subsequent
modification orderswere introduced without any fresh notification, notice,
or enquiry, thereby depriving him of his right to object and claim
compensation.
1.4. The petitioner alleges that the respondent authorities are now
proceeding under Section 3H to take possession of his land and threatening
to deposit compensation in Court, while contractors are entering his fields
and interfering with standing crops without any notice. It is contended that
these actions are arbitrary, and they deny him rehabilitation and
resettlement benefits. He further states that similarly situated adjacent
landowners have obtained interim stay orders from the Court, which
underscores the illegality of the respondents' actions.
1.5. The petitioner asserts that the respondents are attempting to
justify their actions by relying on the modification orders dated 04.09.2024
and 05.09.2024 as if they validly incorporate his land into the acquisition
process. The petitioner contends that the grounds taken by the respondent
authorities that such modifications were part of alignment corrections and
administrative adjustments, is not sustainable in law, as the post facto
inclusion of lands cannot cure the absence of prior statutory compliance,
including proper notification, declaration, and opportunity of hearing. The
petitioner therefore seeks quashing of the impugned proceedings and
protection from dispossession pending adjudication.
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2. A counter affidavit is filed by the 5th respondent-Revenue Divisional
Officer, Bhupalpally Division, essentially contending that the acquisition
of the petitioner's land for the construction of the NH-163G Greenfield
corridor was conducted strictly in accordance with the procedure
established under the National Highways Act, 1956 and the RFCTLARR
Act, 2013, and that any discrepancies in the petitioner's identification were
the result of a bona fide survey error that has since been lawfully rectified
through re-survey and modification proceedings. It is further asserted that
the petitioner failed to avail statutory remedies at the appropriate stages
and has approached the Court with the intention of obstructing a public
infrastructure project affecting 615 land losers, of whom the vast
majority--69 out of 84 awardees in Nawabpet village--have already
accepted compensation.
2.1. It is contended that the acquisition process commenced with a
Section 3A Gazette Notification issued vide S.O. No. 1016(E) dated
02.03.2021, covering land in Survey No. 497 to an extent of 11,481.000
square meters, based on a requisition by the Project Director, NHAI, PIU
Warangal. It is stated that notification was also published in newspapers on
25.03.2021, with an objection period of 21days (up to 14.04.2021), and the
petitioner did not file any objections under Section 3C. A Section 3D
declaration was subsequently published on 22.02.2022 for the same extent.
It later emerged during preparation of sub-division records that certain
extents had been omitted, leading to additional Section 3A notifications,
including one dated 19.04.2022, followed by corresponding additional
Section 3D declarations dated 07.10.2022, 28.02.2023, and 23.08.2023.
These notifications collectively covered a total extent of Ac.2.38½ guntas
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(11,989.237 square meters) in Survey No. 497, comprising 11,481.000
square meters initially and an additional 508.237 square meters.
2.2. It is stated that during the initial enjoyment survey, the
petitioner's name was mistakenly recorded against Survey No. 473 for an
extent of Ac.0.32 guntas (3,237 square meters), which constituted a bona
fide error arising from field-level confusion and lack of proper
informationduring survey operations. Based on this survey, Section 3G
award enquiry notices dated 08.03.2023 were issued, and although land
losers attended the enquiry, no documentary evidence was submitted.
Awards were then passed in two phases on 16.01.2024 and 09.03.2024,
with compensation determined in accordance with Sections 26 to 30 of the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013. Following this, Section 3E notices were issued to
awardees, including the petitioner (as recorded under Survey No. 473), to
receive compensation, but the petitioner did not come forward to accept it.
2.3. Subsequently, upon receipt of objections from certain
awardees after issuance of 3E notices--specifically complaints that extents
recorded in the enjoyment list were inaccurate--a re-enjoyment survey
was conducted in the presence of farmers and officials. The results were
published in the village and on official notice boards. This re-survey
revealed that the petitioner was in actual possession of land in Survey No.
497 to an extent of Ac.3.12 guntas, rather than Survey No. 473.
Consequently, modification orders dated 04.09.2024 were issued to reflect
his entitlement over Ac.2.38½ guntas within Survey No. 497, and for the
remaining Ac.0.13½ guntas, fresh acquisition steps were initiated through
an additional Section 3A Gazette Notification vide S.O. No. 5316(E) dated
09.12.2024, with the corresponding Section 3D declaration stated to be
pending. The respondent emphasizes that these corrective steps were
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undertaken transparently and in accordance with law, and that updated
Section 3G notices will be issued for the remaining extent upon completion
of the process.
2.4. The respondent further details that the names originally
published in the Section 3D declarations dated 22.02.2022 and
07.10.2022--namely Nerella Padma (9,510.450 sq. meters), Billa Raji
Reddy (1,416.450 sq. meters), and PingiliVideesha (1,062.337 sq.
meters)--were found, upon re-survey, not to be in possession of the land,
whereas the petitioner was. Therefore, modified orders were issued
reallocating the extent of Ac.2.38½ guntas (11,989.237 sq. meters) to the
petitioner. The respondent also notes that out of 84 awardees identified
after re-survey, 69 have received compensation, while 12 cases, including
that of the petitioner, are under litigation, two have been referred to the
Principal District Judge, Bhupalpally due to disputes, and one claimant
lacks title.
2.5. In rebuttal of the petitioner's allegations, the respondent
systematically denies any procedural illegality. It is asserted that the
petitioner's claim of lack of notice is incorrect, as Section 3A notifications
were duly published in two newspapers as required by law, and Section
3G(3) notices dated 08.03.2023 were both publicly displayed at the Gram
Panchayat office and individually served, albeit reflecting the petitioner's
name under Survey No. 473 due to the earlier survey error. The respondent
argues that the statutory framework does not require naming pattadars in
Section 3A notifications, as these are based on requisitioned survey
numbers and extents, with ownership details being incorporated at the
Section 3D stage. The petitioner's failure to file objections within the
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stipulated 21-day period following the 25.03.2021 publication is
highlighted as a critical omission.
2.6. Adverting to the petitioner's grievance regarding non-
payment for structures, trees, and wells, it is stated that during the initial
survey, some farmers obstructed enumeration of such assets, leading to
award of land value alone. However, the farmers later cooperated, and
valuations were conducted and a supplementary award covering structures
and trees was passed on 10.09.2025, which includes the petitioner's assets,
with payment to be disbursed upon receipt of funds from the competent
authority, and therefore the allegation that compensation was neither
determined nor offered is thus denied.
2.7. The respondent denies the claims of illegal interference with
possession and cultivation, asserting that neither officials nor contractors
have damaged crops or unlawfully entered the petitioner's land. It is
further contended that, by operation of Section 3D(2) of the National
Highways Act, upon publication of the declaration, the land vests
absolutely in the Central Government free from encumbrances, and under
Section 3D(4), such declarations are not subject to challenge, and therefore
it is contended that the petitioner's challenge is legally untenable.
2.8. It is contended that out of 615 affected landowners, only the
petitioner has approached the Court, intending to stall the acquisition
process rather than any genuine procedural grievance. It is contended that
the entire acquisition process--from notification to award, re-survey, and
modification--has been conducted in strict compliance with statutory
provisions, and that any initial discrepancies have been properly corrected;
and therefore prays to dismiss the writ petition and vacate the interim
order.
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3. A counter affidavit is filed by the Project Director, NHAI, essentially
contending that the entire land acquisition process relating to the
petitioner's land--measuring 11,481 square meters and an additional
508.237 square meters in Survey No. 497--was conducted strictly in
accordance with the National Highways Act, 1956 and the applicable
provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, and that the petition is
misconceived, devoid of merit, and an attempt to obstruct a project of
national importance. They further contend that the petitioner is not entitled
to any of the reliefs claimed, including rehabilitation and resettlement
benefits, and that even if there were grievances regarding compensation,
the petitioner has an effective alternative statutory remedy under Section
3G(5) of the Act, rendering the writ petition unsustainable.
3.1. Elaborating on the timeline of the acquisition proceedings, it
is contended that the NHAI initiated the acquisition process for
construction of a four-lane greenfield National Highway (NH-163G) from
Km. 63.779 to Km. 88.418 in the Bhupalpally Division, pursuant to its
statutory mandate under the National Highways Authority of India Act,
1988. A requisition for land acquisition, including the petitioner's land in
Nawabpet village, was sent under Section 3A(1) of the National Highways
Act, 1956, following which a notification was issued vide S.O. No.
1016(E) dated 02.03.2021. The substance of this notification was
published in the newspapers Mana Telangana (Telugu) and The Hindu
(English) on 25.03.2021, granting 21 days--until 14.04.2021--for filing
objections. It is stated that no objections were received from the petitioner
within this statutory period. Subsequently, to address missing extents, an
additional Section 3A notification was issued vide S.O. No. 1869(E) dated
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19.04.2022, with its substance published on 08.05.2022 in the same
newspapers.
3.2. Following this, declarations under Section 3D were issued
vide S.O. No. 814(E) dated 22.02.2022 and S.O. No. 4780(E) dated
07.10.2022, upon which, by operation of law, the land vested absolutely in
the Central Government free from all encumbrances. The respondents
highlight that a public notice under Section 3G(3) was issued in Mana
Telangana and The Hindu on 28.02.2023, calling upon all interested
persons to appear before the Competent Authority--the Revenue
Divisional Officer, Bhupalpally--on 18.03.2023 during office hours, along
with documentary proof of title. Thereafter, awards were passed after due
enquiry under Section 3G, specifically on 16.01.2024 and 09.03.2024.
3.3. It is stated that the total extent of petitioner's land acquired is
11,989.237 square meters, comprising 11,481.00 square meters notified
under the 02.03.2021 notification and 508.237 square meters under the
19.04.2022 notification. Initially, based on survey records, this land was
reflected in the name of Nerella Padma, wife of Lingaiah, and accordingly
included in the Section 3D declarations. However, during the award
enquiry, certain landowners failed to produce title documents, leading to
apportionment based on enjoyment as reported by the survey team.
Subsequently, upon verification, the petitioner's name was substituted in
place of the original awardee through a modified apportionment order
dated 05.09.2024, which forms part of the record. The respondents assert
that compensation, calculated in accordance with Sections 26 to 30 of the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013--incorporating 100% solatium, 12% additional
market value from the date of Section 3A notification to the date of award,
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and a multiplication factor of 1.5--has been duly determined and is ready
to be deposited as per the calculations of the Competent Authority.
3.4. It is contended that the petitioner's allegation that no notice
was given is not true. The respondent refers to the newspaper publications
dated 25.03.2021 and 08.05.2022, and the Section 3G public notice dated
28.02.2023 requiring appearance on 18.03.2023. They further deny that the
Section 3D declarations dated 22.02.2022 and 07.10.2022 were invalid or
based on defective reports, asserting instead that they were issued in strict
compliance with statutory requirements and that the petitioner has failed to
produce any proof to the contrary. The allegation that documents were not
furnished is also denied.
3.5. Addressing the petitioner's contention regarding improper
application of the RFCTLARR Act, the respondents contend that only
Sections 26 to 30 relating to determination of compensation are applicable
to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956, and not the entire
statute. They further assert that the petitioner's claim of benefits under the
Second and Third Schedules of the RFCTLARR Act is misconceived.
According to the respondents, the Rehabilitation and Resettlement
provisions, as introduced through the Removal of Difficulties Order dated
28.08.2015 (effective 01.09.2015), apply only to displaced or dislocated
families, and in the present case, the petitioner neither qualifies as
a"displaced family"under Section3(k) nor has he been relocated or
resettled, as only a small portion of his land has been acquired.
3.6. It is contended that there is no interference with possession
and standing crops, and that possession will be taken only after payment of
compensation in accordance with Section 3H of the Act and upon issuance
of appropriate notices. It is contended that any grievance regarding
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compensation must be pursued through the statutory mechanism of
arbitration under Section 3G(5), followed by recourse to the District Court
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, rather than
through a writ petition.
3.7. It is contended that the entire acquisition process--from the
initial Section 3A notification dated 02.03.2021 through subsequent
notifications, the Section 3G notice dated 28.02.2023, the awards dated
16.01.2024 and 09.03.2024, and the modified apportionment dated
05.09.2024--was conducted strictly in accordance with law. It is
contended that the petitioner has neither established any violation of
statutory procedure nor demonstrated entitlement to additional benefits.
The respondent therefore seeks dismissal of writ petition, apart from
vacating the interim relief granted earlier.
4. A reply affidavit is filed by the petitioner, in response to the counter
affidavit of the 5th respondent, essentially contending that the respondents
themselves have admitted to serious procedural lapses--particularly the
incorrect identification of survey numbers, extents, and ownership--and
that such "bona fide mistakes" cannot justify deprivation of his property,
which is protected under Article 300A of the Constitution.
4.1. It is contended that the respondent's own admission of
errors--such as wrongly reflecting his land in Survey No. 473 instead of
Survey No. 497 and subsequently correcting it through modification orders
dated 04.09.2024 and 05.09.2024--undermines the legality of the entire
process. He contends that once the foundation of acquisition, namely
identification of land and landowner, is flawed, the subsequent
proceedings, including awards dated 16.01.2024 and 09.03.2024, cannot
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stand. The petitioner contends that the respondent's claim that he failed to
submit documentary proof or objections is unsustainable, because such
failure was a direct consequence of the authorities' own defective
notifications, which neither mentioned his name nor accurately described
his land.
4.2. The petitioner further argues that the respondents have merely
recited the legal procedure under the National Highways Act, 1956 without
demonstrating actual compliance. He stresses that due to incorrect and
incomplete notifications under Sections 3A and 3D, coupled with lack of
proper communication, he was effectively deprived of his right to file
objections under Section 3C within the stipulated 21-day period. He
highlights that even the respondent's claim--that no objections were filed
within 21 days from the newspaper publication dated 25.03.2021--is
untenable, because the notification itself lacked essential details such as
pattadar names and correct survey particulars. He also points out that no
supporting records of objections or enquiry proceedings were filed by the
respondent to substantiate their claims.
4.3. It is contended that although survey and sub-division
verification were allegedly completed by November 2021, the authorities
issued multiple and overlapping notifications, including a Section 3A
notification on 19.04.2022 after already issuing a Section 3D declaration
on 22.02.2022, which is procedurally impermissible. He further states that
yet another Section 3A notification dated 09.12.2024 was issued for an
additional extent of Ac.0-13½ guntas, of which he had no prior knowledge
and which was not even furnished to him.
4.4. The petitioner also challenges the respondent's interpretation
of statutory requirements, particularly the claim that Section 3A
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notifications need not include pattadar names. He asserts that the law
requires a "brief description" of the land, which, as per NHAI guidelines,
includes ownership details, and that omission of such information deprived
him of meaningful notice. He emphasizes that given his residence outside
the village and absence of direct communication, mere newspaper
publication was insufficient, especially when the authorities themselves
resorted to additional modes like Gram Panchayat notices and personal
service in other contexts.
4.5. It is contended that the failure of respondent authorities to
assess structures and trees reflects incomplete and defective surveys. It is
contended that the supplementary award for such assets was passed only
on 10.09.2025--long after issuance of Section 3E notices in 2023--and
was never communicated to him; thereby rendering both the possession
notices and the supplementary award legally invalid.
4.6. It is contended that there are glaring contradictions in the
respondents' stance, as the respondents, on one hand, attribute errors to
lack of information from farmers, while on the other hand they admit to
issuing multiple notifications due to their own omissions in identifying
required extents. It is contended that all relevant records and survey
authority lie with the respondents, and therefore blaming landowners is
unjustified, and that even the respondent has admitted that award enquiry
notices dated 08.03.2023 contained incorrect survey details,thereby
reinforcing his claimthat he was never properlynotified.
4.7. It is contended that while the respondents insist on strict
compliance by landowners (such as filing objections within 21 days), they
themselves failed to ensure accurate notifications or effective
communication; and that in some instances, awards were passed for extents
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inconsistent with those mentioned in notifications. It is contended that
these defects deprived him of his statutory right to object and claim
compensation, and therefore the entire acquisition, including the impugned
modification orders, is illegal, arbitrary, and unconstitutional.
5. Heard Mr. Ch. Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners;
learned Standing Counsel for NHAI, learned Standing Counsel for
CALA,and Mr. B. Narasimha Sarma, learned Additional Solicitor General
of India. Perused the record.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner is the
absolute owner of agricultural land admeasuring Ac.08-35 guntas situated
in Nawabpet Village, Chityal Mandal, Jayashankar Bhupalapally District,
comprising Ac.06-07 guntas and Ac.02-28 guntas in Survey No.497, and
that he was kept completely in the dark regarding the acquisition
proceedings initiated for the proposed highway. It is submitted that
although a notification under Section 3A dated 02.03.2021 and another
dated 19.04.2022 were issued, only a vague part extent in Survey No.497
was notified without mentioning the names of pattadars or sub-division
details, thereby leaving the petitioner uncertain as to whether his land was
affected and to what extent. Counsel argues that this fundamental defect
deprived the petitioner of his valuable right to file objections under Section
3C within the prescribed time. It is further contended that the subsequent
Section 3D declarations issued in 2022, including those dated 22.02.2022
and 07.10.2022, were neither communicated to the petitioner nor did they
contain his name against Survey No.497, while erroneously reflecting his
name against Survey No.473, a land in which he has no interest, thereby
causing confusion and preventing him from asserting his rights.
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6.1. Learned counsel submits that no notice was ever served upon
the petitioner in respect of Survey No.497, including the award enquiry
notice dated 08.03.2023, and that the awards dated 16.01.2024 and
09.03.2024 were passed in the names of third parties without reference to
the petitioner's ownership. It is argued that the first time the petitioner's
name appeared in relation to the subject land was only in the survey report
dated 01.06.2024 and thereafter in the impugned modification orders dated
04.09.2024 and 05.09.2024, whereby his name was substituted in place of
three other pattadars for an extent of 11,481 sq. meters and additionally
inserted for 574.38 sq. meters, all without any fresh notification, notice, or
enquiry. Learned counsel emphasizes that such post facto inclusion is
wholly illegal and cannot cure the foundational defects in the acquisition
process.
6.2. It is further contended that the authorities acted in a negligent
and arbitrary manner by issuing multiple and overlapping notifications for
the same survey number in 2022, without ever properly identifying the
petitioner's land in accordance with revenue records, and by conducting
surveys in 2024 without prior notice to the petitioner. Learned counsel
submits that no compensation was ever determined or awarded for the
structures, trees, and other assets on the petitioner's land, and that even
award notices were issued in the names of third parties, thereby denying
the petitioner his statutory right to participate in the acquisition
proceedings and claim compensation. It is contended that the impugned
modification order dated 05.09.2024has been issued in complete violation
of statutory procedure and guidelines issued by the Ministry of Road
Transport and Highways, and without affording any opportunity of
hearing.
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6.3. Learned counsel further submits that the respondent
authorities are now attempting to take possession of the land and deposit
compensation in Court, while simultaneously interfering with the
petitioner's agricultural activities, despite there being standing crops on the
land. It is thus contended that the entire acquisition process, insofar as it
relates to the petitioner's land, is vitiated by lack of notice, incorrect
identification, denial of opportunity, and absence of lawful compensation
determination, and therefore the impugned proceedings are liable to be set
aside.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners relies on:
1) Akkala Chandrakala v. The State of Telangana 1;
2) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah 2;
3) B.K. Ravichandra v. Union of India 3;
4) Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur
Chenai 4;
5) K. Ramachandram v. State of Telangana 5;
6) Madi Satyavati v. State of Telangana 6;
7) Manorama Devi v. National Highways Authority of India 7;
8) Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao 8;
9) National Highways Authority of India v. P. Nagaraju alias
Cheluvaiah 9;
10)Ranivr Singh v. National Highways Authority of India 10;
W.P. No. 11486 of 2024 (Telangana High Court)
(2024) 10 SCC 533
(2021) 14 SCC 703
(2005) 7 SCC 627
W.P. No. 23939 of 2013 (Telangana High Court)
W.A. No. 676 of 2023 (Telangana High Court)
Neutral Citation No. 2023:AHC:240588 - DB (Allahabad High Court)
(1973) 1 SCC 500
(2022) 15 SCC 1
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11) Union of India v. Shiv Raj 11;
12) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh 12
7.1. In Akkala Chandrakala (supra), this Courtconsidered a
dispute over land acquisition for the development of National Highway
765DG. The petitioners, whose homes were being acquired, sought
Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) benefits under the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, while government authorities argued that such
benefits were not applicable to the road-widening project under the
National Highways Act, 1956. This Court, by interim order dated
12.11.2024, rejected the authorities' prayer to vacate an earlier stay order
and indicated that highway acquisitions remain subject to modern R&R
protections, and granted status quo until final hearing, while allowing
authorities to begin the formal process of determining and awarding R&R
compensation.
7.2. In Bimal Kumar Shah (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
broadened the understanding of the constitutional right to property under
Article 300-A of the Constitution of India by stating that lawful land
acquisition requires more than just public purpose and compensation. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court identified seven essential procedural sub-rights--
including the right to notice, the right to be heard, and the right to a
reasoned decision--along with requirements for an efficient process and
fair rehabilitation. Ruling against the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, the
2023 SCC OnLine All 5276
(2014) 6 SCC 564
1963 SCC OnLine SC 23
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Supreme Court held that any State action that ignores these safeguards is
invalid.
7.3. In B.K. Ravichandra (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
clarified the limits of Government power over private property. The
Supreme Court held that although the right to property is no longer a
fundamental right, it remains a constitutional safeguard under Article 300-
A of the Constitution of India, protecting both physical land and intangible
assets, and the government cannot occupy private land indefinitely without
proper legal authority, as prolonged possession amounts to unlawful
deprivation of property. Emphasizing the rule of law, the Court rejected
any notion that the State can act with "royal prerogative" and insisted that
all State actions must be backed by clear statutory authority. As a result,
the Court ordered the return of land that had been held by the government
for over thirty years and directed that fair compensation be paid to the
rightful owners.
7.4. In Darius Shapur Chenai (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court examined the procedural safeguards required under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 during the acquisition of private property. The
Supreme Court focused on whether the State had genuinely considered the
landowner's objections as required under Section 5-A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. It held that the right to object and be heard under
Section 5-A is a significant safeguard--comparable in importance to a
fundamental right--and must involve a real and careful consideration by
the government rather than a mere formality. The Court further ruled that
when such decisions are challenged, the government must produce its
records to demonstrate that a fair decision-making process was followed.
Since the State failed to provide adequate evidence or a proper counter-
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affidavit, the Court upheld the quashing of the acquisition, reinforcing that
laws allowing the taking of private property must be strictly interpreted to
prevent arbitrary state action.
7.5. In K. Ramachandram (supra), this Courtexamined whether
the government had followed the required statutory procedures while
attempting to acquire the petitioner's land; and held that although the
preliminary notification remained valid because it had been properly
extended, the later declaration was unlawful due to the authorities' failure
to prepare and publish mandatory rehabilitation and resettlement schemes
under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Finding that these
procedural safeguards are essential to protect the landowner's rights, the
declaration was quashed with a direction to the government to strictly
comply with the Act if it wishes to proceed with the acquisition, while also
encouraging both parties to pursue an amicable settlement through land
exchange or fair monetary compensation.
7.6. In Madi Satyavati v. State of Telangana 13, the Division
Bench of this Court dealt with a matter pertaining to land acquisition for a
railway project; and held that not only the mother, but also her three
daughters, qualify as an affected family under Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013; and modified a prior order to ensure that rehabilitation benefits
are determined for the daughters in addition to the mother's solatium and
allowed the appellants to seek a formal reference if they are dissatisfied
with the final monetary compensation, reinforcing that the rights of all
affected family members must be recognized in land acquisition cases.
W.A. No. 676 of 2023 (Telangana High Court)
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7.7. In Manorama Devi (supra), the Allahabad High Court
adjudicated a petition filed by Manorma Devi against the National
Highway Authority of India. The Allahabad High Court addressed her
claim for rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, which she had not
received despite being compensated for her land. The Court observed that
her grievance aligned with previous cases under the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, where affected landowners were entitled to
additional support. It directed the authorities to prepare a formal proposal
within six months to provide the petitioner with entitlements for housing,
employment, and relocation as outlined in the Second Schedule of the Act,
and granted legal relief consistent with earlier, similar judgments.
7.8. In Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court examined whether the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act
violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India by allowing the State to
acquire property at lower compensation rates than standard national laws.
The Supreme Court held that the Government cannot justify paying
different amounts for similar lands based solely on which authority
conducts the acquisition or the stated public purpose. Emphasizing the
principle of equal protection, the judgment affirmed that landowners are
entitled to consistent, market-value compensation regardless of the
acquiring body, and dismissed the appeal, ruling that discriminatory
treatment in compensation or statutory bonuses is unconstitutional.
7.9. In P. Nagaraju alias Cheluvaiah (supra), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court addressed the determination of fair compensation and
clarified the role of Courts in reviewing arbitral awards under Section 34
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court held that
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an arbitrator's failure to provide adequate and intelligible reasoning for
compensation constitutes a ground of "patent illegality," justifying judicial
intervention. Emphasizing equitable treatment for landowners, including
solatium and interest, the ruling aligned compensation practices with
constitutional protections and remanded the matter for recalculation of the
property's market value using proper evidence and updated guideline rates.
7.10. In Ranivr Singh (supra), the Allahabad High Court
addressed petitions by displaced families who claimed that the National
Highway Authority of India had failed to provide mandatory rehabilitation
and resettlement benefits under the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013. The Court held that the status of affected families must be properly
assessed, rejecting the authorities' contention that linear road projects
cause minimal disruption. It directed the competent authority to conduct a
thorough inquiry and submit a resettlement proposal to the District
Collector, ensuring that eligible landowners receive entitlements such as
housing units, employment opportunities, or relocation allowances as part
of their compensation.
7.11. In Shiv Raj (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered
the validity of land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894. The Supreme Court highlighted procedural lapses, including
violations of natural justice where objections were heard by one official
but the final report was issued by another without a fresh hearing. It also
examined the impact of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 on older
cases where the government delayed possession or failed to provide
compensation for over five years.
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7.12. InSinghara Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
addressed the admissibility of oral testimony regarding a defendant's
confession, arising from a Second-Class Magistrate's failure to follow
procedures under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
8. Per contra, learned counsel for the NHAI contends that the
acquisition proceedings have been carried out strictly in accordance with
law and that the petitioner has already been awarded adequate and lawful
compensation. It is submitted that a total extent of 11,989.237 square
meters belonging to the petitioner was duly notified through two Section
3A notifications, namely S.O. No. 1016(E) dated 02.03.2021 covering
11,481.00 square meters and S.O. No. 1869(E) covering the balance extent
of 508.237 square meters in Survey No. 497 of Nawabpet Village, and the
same was followed by valid Section 3D declarations. Learned counsel
contends that, based on survey records, the land was initially reflected in
the name of Nerella Padma, and since certain landowners failed to produce
title documents during the award enquiry, apportionment was finalized on
the basis of enjoyment as reported by the survey team. Upon verification,
the petitioner's name was rightly substituted in place of the original
awardee through a modified apportionment order dated 05.09.2024, and
compensation as determined by the competent authority is ready to be
deposited. It is further contended that if the petitioner has any grievance
regarding the quantum of compensation, an efficacious alternative
statutory remedy is available under Section 3G(5) of the National
Highways Act, 1956 before the Arbitrator-cum-District Collector, with
further recourse under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, and therefore the writ petition is not maintainable.
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8.1. Learned counsel also submits that the petitioner is not entitled
to any benefits under the Rehabilitation and Resettlement provisions of the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013, as he does not fall within the definition of a
"displaced family" under Section 3(k), having neither been relocated nor
resettled, and only a portion of his land has been acquired. It is contended
that the petitioner has failed to produce any evidence of loss of livelihood
or displacement so as to qualify as an "affected family" under Section 3(c),
and in any event, partial acquisition does not deprive him of his means of
sustenance, especially when he retains the remaining land. Learned counsel
further submits that the compensation awarded, being substantial and in
accordance with Sections 26 to 30 of the Act, is sufficient to enable the
petitioner to secure alternative arrangements if required, and that claims for
resettlement and rehabilitation must be supported by cogent evidence
demonstrating inadequacy of compensation, which is absent in the present
case. It is also contended that the provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013
relating to social impact assessment and rehabilitation are not
automatically applicable to acquisitions under the National Highways Act
unless specifically extended, and no such requirement arises in the present
case.
8.2. Learned counsel contends that the project in question is a
public infrastructure project of national importance and that any injunction
against such a project is barred under Section 20-A of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963, as it would cause undue delay and adversely affect public
interest, and that issues relating to compensation, even if assumed, cannot
be a ground to challenge the acquisition proceedings themselves, and
therefore the writ petition be dismissed as devoid of merit.
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9. Learned counsel for the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition
(CALA) contends that the entire acquisition process was carried out
strictly in accordance with the provisions of law, beginning with the
issuance of the Section 3A notification dated 02.03.2021 for an extent of
11,481 sq. mtrs in Survey No.497, while the total extent under acquisition
as per sub-division records was Ac.02-38½ guntas (11,989.237 sq. mtrs),
for which subsequent 3D declaration covered 11,481 sq. mtrs and the
balance 508.237 sq. mtrs was notified through additional 3A and 3D
notifications. It is submitted that although the petitioner's name was not
initially reflected in Survey No.497 due to a bona fide error in the survey
report, the same was duly rectified through a re-survey, and awards dated
10.01.2024 and 09.03.2024 were passed determining compensation in
accordance with Sections 26 to 30 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. Learned
counsel contends that despite issuance of Section 3G notices and conduct
of award enquiry, the petitioner neither filed objections to the 3A
notification nor participated in the enquiry nor submitted documentary
evidence, and even after issuance of Section 3E notices calling upon him to
receive compensation, he failed to do so. It is further submitted that upon
requests from certain land losers, a re-enjoyment survey was conducted,
which revealed that the petitioner's land measuring Ac.03-12 guntas was
actually situated in Survey No.497 instead of Survey No.473, leading to
issuance of modified orders dated 05.09.2024, wherein Ac.02-38½ guntas
was finalized and the remaining Ac.0-13½ guntas was covered under an
additional 3A notification dated 09.12.2024. Learned counsel also contends
that earlier 3D declarations dated 22.02.2022 and 07.10.2022 had
mistakenly recorded three other pattadars, which were later corrected
pursuant to re-survey. It is argued that all statutory requirements of
publication were complied with by issuing notifications in two local
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newspapers, including one vernacular, and by serving individual notices
dated 08.03.2023 under Section 3G to the petitioner's address, which were
duly received by his tenant as certified by the Tahsildar vide letter dated
28.11.2025. It is further submitted that out of 84 identified land losers in
Nawabpet village, 69 have already received compensation as per modified
orders, while compensation in respect of 12 persons is under dispute and
referred to the District Court. Additionally, a supplementary award dated
10.09.2025 determined Rs.15,07,096/- towards structures and trees in
Survey No.497. Learned counsel contends that out of 615 affected persons,
only the present petitioner has approached this Court with an intention to
stall the acquisition process, despite environmental clearance having been
granted on 05.07.2023. It is contended that the writ petition is devoid of
merit and liable to be dismissed.
10. Learned Additional Solicitor General relies on several judgments in
support of his contention that a writ remedy is not maintainable in the
instant case; particularly on Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of
Maharashtra 14 and contends that the Courts have to weigh the public
interest vis-à-vis the private interest while exercising the power and there
are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong, and
that quashing of acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress.
10.1. He also relies on Nerajala Nageswara Rao v. Union of
India 15, to contend that alternative remedy harsh one should not be
resorted in public purpose projects and larger public purpose prevails over
individual interest. He also relies on N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar
1997 (1) SCC 134
2017 SCC Online Hyd 250
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Jain16, to contend that construction of road is an infrastructure project and
keeping in view the intent of the legislature that infrastructure projects
should not be stayed, the High Court would have been well advised to hold
its hand to stay the construction of the infrastructure project.
10.2. He also relies on Bluepark Seafoods (P) Ltd v. District
Collector17 and contends that in case of acquisition for benefit of general
public, the landowner can stake claim for reasonable compensation and
nothing beyond that. Relying on NHAI v. Sayedabad Tea Company
Ltd 18, it is contended that National Highways Act is a special enactment
and a comprehensive code which provides an inbuilt mechanism for
initiating acquisition until culmination of the proceedings in determining
the compensation and its adjudication by arbitrator under Section 3-G(5) of
the NH Act.
10.3. He also relies on the judgment of the High Court of
Karnataka, at Bengaluru, in W.P.No.10103 of 2020 (LA-RES) and
batch, dated 19.07.2022, and contends that in the said case, the High
Court of Karnataka has set aside the awards passed by the CALA and
directed the authority to redetermine the compensation afresh, and if the
parties are aggrieved by the fresh awards passed by the CALA, the parties
can approach the arbitrator.
10.4. He also relies on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in
M/s Tirupati Developers v. The Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar
Haveli 19, and contends that the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the
Collector to give one opportunity to the appellant therein to submit its
2022 (6) SCC 127
2011 SCC OnLine AP 267
(2020) 15 SCC 161
Civil Appeal No.4952 of 2023, dated August 7, 2023
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objections, followed by personal hearing and thereafter pass appropriate
award after holding inquiry under Section 23 of the RTCTLARR Act, and
therefore similar dispensation may be shown in the present writ petition as
well in view of similarity of facts.
11. Having considered the respective contentions and perused the
record, it may be noted that the grievance of the petitioners essentially is
that multiple notifications under Sections 3A and 3D of the National
Highways Act were issued with incomplete information, inadequate
publication, and without providing proper landowner-wise details, maps, or
an effective opportunity to file objections with regard to the acquisition of
their agricultural lands for the proposed four-lane National Highway-163G,
and that their objections were not properly considered. It is also contended
that the authorities proceeded with the declaration and award process even
before obtaining environmental clearance, issued additional notifications
without informing the affected landowners, and passed incomplete
compensation awards without determining compensation for structures and
trees, and without granting rehabilitation and resettlement benefits as
required under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and the Removal of Difficulties
Order, 2015. They also allege denial of statutory entitlements, and attempts
by the authorities to forcibly take possession of their lands without paying
lawful compensation, thereby threatening their livelihood as small and
marginal farmers. It is also their grievance that the compensation cannot be
confined only to the land on the mere ground that the land is an
agricultural extent, and that compensation should also be granted for the
structures existing on the land, and rehabilitation and resettlement benefits
should be extended to the petitioners.
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11.1. On the contrary, the essential contention of the respondents
(NHAI and CALA authorities) is that the acquisition of the petitioners'
land for the construction of the four-lane National Highway-163G
(Mancherial-Warangal Greenfield Corridor) has been carried out strictly in
accordance with the procedure prescribed under the National Highways
Act, 1956 and the applicable provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, and
that all statutory steps--issuance of notifications under Sections 3A and
3D, consideration of objections under Section 3C, conduct of enquiry, and
passing of compensation awards under Section 3G--were duly followed.
According to them, adequate opportunity was given to the landowners, and
compensation has been determined and deposited as per law. It is also their
contention that the entire village or villages have not been acquired,
requiring the villagers, along with their houses, cattle, and livelihood, to be
shifted/relocated to an alternative location, or re-establish the village at
some other place entirely; but only such extent of land(s) that is under
alignment would go into the highway project, and only such limited
extents of land(s) were acquired, and therefore there cannot be any
contentions of displacement of persons requiring rehabilitation and
resettlement under the RFCTLARR Act because they are not "displaced
families". It is contended that any grievance regarding compensation must
be pursued through the statutory remedy of arbitration under Section 3G(5)
of the National Highways Act rather than through a writ petition, and the
petitioners' allegations are unfounded. They further contend that the
interim order restraining the project may be vacated since it delays a
project of national importance and public interest.
12. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the project concerns the laying
of a four-lane National Highway (Mancherial-Warangal Greenfield
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Corridor), and that land acquisition has been undertaken for the said
highway. In land acquisition for a National Highway of this nature,
connecting highways across States, the acquisition process or the laying of
the highway per se cannot be stalled indefinitely by taking recourse to the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Ultimately, the sole grievance that
can be agitated by the aggrieved persons is confined to the compensatory
benefits in lieu of the lands acquired, which is pecuniary in nature.
12.1 Further, the petitioners' grievance with regard to entitlement
to compensation for structures, trees, standing crops, or even alternative
rehabilitation/resettlement benefits is also justiciable, provided such
structures are legally permitted, and the CALA has certified that the
structures/crops, etc., have been affected in the land acquisition process, in
a way that resettlement and rehabilitation is necessary.
12.2 Be that as it may, in land acquisition for a public purpose,
unless there are proven malafides, neither is the acquisition liable to be set
aside, nor can the opinion of experts--either with regard to the alignment
of the highway or with regard to the determination of factual aspects such
as the extent of land acquired and the monetary compensation payable--be
substituted by exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226.
13. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Kushala Shetty20, wherein it
was held as follows:
"24. Here, it will be apposite to mention that NHAI is a
professionally managed statutory body having expertise in the
field of development and maintenance of National Highways. The
(2011) 12 SCC 69
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projects involving construction of new highways and widening
and development of the existing highways, which are vital for
development of infrastructure in the country, are entrusted to
experts in the field of highways. It comprises of persons having
vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway development
and maintenance. NHAI prepares and implements projects relating
to development and maintenance of National Highways after
thorough study by experts in different fields. Detailed project
reports are prepared keeping in view the relevant factors including
intensity of heavy vehicular traffic and larger public interest. The
Courts are not at all equipped to decide upon the viability and
feasibility of the particular project and whether the particular
alignment would subserve the larger public interest. In such
matters, the scope of judicial review is very limited. The Court can
nullify the acquisition of land and, in rarest of rare cases, the
particular project, if it is found to be ex facie contrary to the
mandate of law or tainted due to mala fides."
14. Further, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble
Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.774 of 2024, dated
07.08.2024, which is an appeal filed challenging a Notification for laying a
national highway. The Hon'ble Division Bench, by referring to various
precedent judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, more particularly
Kushala Shetty (supra), held as follows:
"12. In view of aforesaid enunciation of law, it is evident that the
projects involving construction of new highways and widening
and development of existing highways are vital for development of
infrastructure of the country. The projects have been entrusted to
the experts in the field of highways and it comprises of persons
having vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway
development and maintenance. The NHAI is implementing the
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project relating to development and maintenance after thorough
study by experts.
13. It is pertinent to note that in pursuance of the notification
issued under the Act, award has already been passed on
10.05.2022 and petitioners No.8 and 11 in W.P.No.24150 of 2021
have even received the compensation. The project is virtually
complete except for a small stretch."
15. In this connection, it is to be noted that under Section 3G of the
National Highways Act, determination of compensation is entrusted to the
Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA). Significantly, Section
3G(5) expressly provides that where the amount determined by the
Competent Authority is not acceptable to either of the parties, the matter
shall, on application, be referred to the Arbitrator appointed by the Central
Government--ordinarily the District Collector. Thus, the statute itself
creates a complete adjudicatory mechanism for redressal of disputes
relating to compensation.
16. Further, once the Arbitrator renders an award under Section 3G(5) of
the National Highways Act, 1956, such award is governed by the
provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; and the persons
aggrieved by the arbitral award has a further statutory remedy under
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the competent
Civil Court.
17. Though the existence of an alternative remedy is not a bar to
invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226, its invocation
comes with the rider that there should be exceptional circumstances,
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warranting invocation under Article 226 bypassing the statutory remedy. In
this context, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks 21, wherein
the Supreme Court held as follows:
"15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having
regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not
to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon
itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and
efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally
exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been
consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least
three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed
for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where
there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or
where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or
the vires of an Act is challenged."
18. In the instant writ petition, this Court does not find any violation of
fundamental rights per se, or any violation of the principles of natural
justice, or any jurisdictional error on the part of the respondent authorities;
nor does the writ petition challenge the vires of the Act passed by the
competent authority. Further, it is the specific unrebutted contention of the
respondents, borne out by the record, that out of 615 affected persons, only
the present petitioners are challenging the acquisition with the claim of
compensation for structures, trees, etc., and also rehabilitation and
resettlement benefits. Further, despite there being certain delay in
obtaining environmental clearance, the very acquisition notifications
cannot be set aside, as the issuance of notifications and their publication in
1998 (8) SCC 1
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Mana Telangana (Telugu) and The Hindu (English) newspapers, and
considering of objections are prima facie not in dispute. The contention of
the petitioners that the newspapers have little circulation and the
petitioners were not aware cannot be countenanced, as primarily they
submitted their objections.
19. Though the petitioners contend that they are entitled to certain
rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, it cannot be disputed that the
competent authority should have certified that the affected landowner has
been displaced. Furthermore, the petitioners have a two-step statutory
remedy, one under the National Highways Act, 1956 and, if still aggrieved,
the second under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and therefore
the petitioners are not remediless.
20. In light of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kushala
Shetty (supra), and Whirlpool Corporation (supra), and also the
judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench in W.A. No.774 of 2024, dated
07.08.2024, this Court does not find any exceptional circumstances to
entertain the writ petition bypassing the statutory mechanism provided
under the National Highways Act, 1956, followed by Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996.
21. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of, relegating the
petitioners to avail the statutory remedy under Section 3G(5) of the
National Highways Act, 1956 and thereafter, if necessary, under Section 34
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. No costs. Interim order dated
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13.10.2025 stands vacated. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall
stand closed.
________________________________
JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
07thApril, 2026
ksm
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