Sri T.P.S. Harsha, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1
Department appearing for respondent Nos.2 and 3.
2. This writ petition is filed challenging the order dated
17.05.2025 in Case No.D/234/2025 of 2nd respondent. Vide the
of all seven (7) registered gift settlement deeds.
3. 1st respondent, mother of the 1st petitioner, mother-in-law of
iii. She has explained as to how different transactions took place
iv. She has also narrated about withdrawal of money from her
v. 1st petitioner, her son, created dubious account on her name
payments from Reliance Smart. He has also used the said
dubious account to transfer funds from her other two accounts.
vi. Her son used to write a cheque for Rs.25,000/- every month
and used to get her signature on it. Very rarely, she used to ask
amount. She has narrated the said facts in paragraph No.5 of
the application and also mentioned in a tabular form.
vii. Thus, according to 1st respondent, a total amount of
pension account by the 1st petitioner, her son. Petitioners
bank accounts. She has also mentioned the said details in a
amount etc.
viii. 1st petitioner, her son, managed all financial transactions
ix. Petitioners obtained the aforesaid gift settlement deeds
fraudulently. 1st petitioner's son sketched out a plan for the
x. They are neglecting 1st respondent and not taking care of her
xi. 1st petitioner tried to hit her. 2nd petitioner started spreading
xii. She would like to re-claim her property and she should have
4. With the said contentions, 1st respondent sought to cancel
son, which is transacted fraudulently. She has also sought a
5. The petitioners herein filed counter before the 2nd
6. With the said submissions, the petitioners sought to
7. Vide impugned order dated 17.05.2025, in Case No.
8. Challenging the said order, the petitioners filed the present
9. 1st respondent filed counter contending as follows:-
10. With the aforesaid contentions, the 1st respondent sought
11. In support of their contentions, the petitioners placed
Sudesh Chhikara vs. Ramti Devi 1, Justice P.D. Dinakaran vs.
L.Rs. vs. Jain Society, Protection of Orphans India3, K.Lokesh V
Bangalore Dist. Maintenance and Welfare of parents and Senior
Ahmedabad 5, S. Vanitha vs. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru
Urban6, High court of Karnataka in C. Arasoji Rao Vs The
Bangalore Dist. Maintenance7, Sri Jayashankar vs. the Asst.
Seemol @ Sindhu vs. The Union of India9 and the Madras High
Court in Maheshwaran M. Vs The District Collector10, the
Telangana High Court in P. Rohit Saurya v. State of Telangana 11
and H. Deepika vs Appellate Tribunal 12.
down by the Bombay High Court in Ashwin Bharat Khater v.
C.P. v. C. Paranthaman 14, Palanimuthu v. The Principal
Officer, RDO Namakkal 15, S. Subramanian v. District
Collector16 Tajinder Singh Bakshi v. Daljit Kaur17, the Madras
High Court in S.Mala vs. District Arbitrator 18,
13. Learned Asst.Govt.Pleader for Women Development and
Child Welfare also supports the order passed by the 2nd respondent.
14. Both Sri Manu, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri
considered in the below mentioned paragraphs.
15. In the light of the said submissions, it is relevant to note
WP No. 10854 of 2023 Del HC
1. Where any senior citizen who, after the commencement
of this Act, has by way of gift or otherwise, his property,
subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the
basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor
and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such
amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of property
shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or
under undue influence and shall at the option of the
transferor be declared void by the Tribunal.
2. Where any senior citizen has a right to receive
maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part, thereof
is transferred, the right to receive maintenance may be
enforced against the transferee if the transferee has notice of
the right, or if the transfer is gratuitous; but not against the
transferee for consideration and without notice of right.
3. If any senior citizen is incapable of enforcing the rights
under sub-sections (1) and (2), action may be taken on his
behalf by any of the organization referred to in Explanation
to sub-section (1) of section 5.
16. Section 4 of the Act, 2007 is also relevant and it is
1. A senior citizen including parent who is unable to
maintain himself from his own earning or property owned
by him, shall be entitled to make an application under
section 5 in case of -
i. parent or grand-parent, against one or more of his
children not being a minor,
ii. a childless senior citizen, against such of his relative
referred to in clause (g) of section 2,
2. The obligation of the children or relative, as the case may
be, to maintain a senior citizen extends tothe needs of such
citizen so that senior citizen may lead a normal life.
3. The obligation of the children to maintain his or her
parent extends to the needs of such parenteither father or
mother or both, as the case may be, so that such parent may
lead a normal life.
4. Any person being a relative of a senior citizen and having
sufficient means shall maintain such senior citizen provided
he is in possession of the property of such senior citizen or
he would inherit the property of such senior citizen:
Provided that where more than one relatives are
entitled to inherit the property of a senior citizen, the
maintenance shall be payable by such relative in the
proportion in which they would inherit his property.
17. As per Section 23 of the Act, 2007, the following pre-
requisites are to be fulfilled:-
1. The transfer must have been made subject to the condition
that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic
physical needs to the transferor,
2. The transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and
physical needs to the transferor.
If the aforesaid conditions are not satisfied and the transfer shall be
deemed to have been made by way of fraud or coercion or undue
influence, such a transfer becomes voidable at the instance of the
transferor and the Maintenance Tribunal gets jurisdiction to declare
the transfer as void.
18. In Sudesh Chhikara (supra), in paragraph No.13, the
Apex Court held as follows:-
13. When a senior citizen parts with his or her property by
executing a gift or a release or otherwise in favour of his or
her near and dear ones, a condition of looking after the
senior citizen is not necessarily attached to it. On the
contrary, very often, such transfers are made out of love and
affection without any expectation in return. Therefore, when
it is alleged that the conditions mentioned in sub-section (1)
of Section 23 are attached to a transfer, existence of such
conditions must be established before the Tribunal.
19. The said principle was also reiterated by this Court in
P. Rohit Saurya v. State of Telangana 19 in W.P.No.30278 of 2023
on 08.04.2023.
20. In Urmila Dixit vs. Sunil Sharan Dixit20, the Apex Court
considered the scope and ambit of Section 23 of the Act, 2007.
21. In the above case, mother executed a gift deed in favour of
the son wherein it has been stated that the son, donee, maintains the
donor, the mother, and makes provision for everything till the end of
her life. A Vachanpatra/Promissory note was also executed by the
son to that effect in favour of the mother and if he does not do so, the
mother will be at liberty to take back the gift deed. However, the son
disputed execution of the said vachanpatra/promissory note and
according to him, it is fabricated.
22.The mother filed an application before the Maintenance
Tribunal seeking cancellation of the said gift settlement deed, the
Maintenance Tribunal allowed the said application and the gift
settlement deed was declared as null and void. The son preferred an
appeal which was also dismissed. He has filed a writ petition before
2025 supreme (online)(Tel) 4796
2025 INSC 20
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, wherein the learned
Single Judge confirmed the order passed by the Maintenance
Tribunal and Appellate Authority while observing that the son has
not approached the Court with clean hands and failed to serve their
parents who are senior citizens. Therefore, the orders passed by the
Maintenance Tribunal and Appellate Authority are held to be well
reasoned and in consonance with the Act, 2007.
23. Challenging the said order of the learned Single Judge, the
Son preferred Writ Appeal and the Division Bench of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court while setting aside the judgments of the learned
Single Judge, observed that Section 23 of the Act, 2007, is a
standalone provision, and the function of the Tribunal is only to find
out whether the condition in the gift deed or otherwise contains a
clause providing for basic amenities and whether the transferee has
refused or failed to provide them. There is no other jurisdiction
vested with the Tribunal. No condition is there in the gift deed therein
for maintenance of the transferor. The argument relating to the
affidavit therein cannot be accepted. If the intention of the parties
was such, the gift deed should have had a clause to the same effect.
24. On examination of the said facts and also relying on the
principle laid down in Sudesh Chhikara (supra) and other
judgments, the Apex Court disagreed with the view taken by the
Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court because it takes a
strict view of the beneficial legislation.
25. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below:-
23. The Appellant has submitted before us that such an
undertaking stands grossly unfulfilled, and in her petition
under Section 23, it has been averred that there is a
breakdown of peaceful relations inter se the parties. In such
a situation, the two conditions mentioned in Sudesh (supra)
must be appropriately interpreted to further the beneficial
nature of the legislation and not strictly which would render
otiose the intent of the legislature. Therefore, the Single
Judge of the High Court and the tribunals below had rightly
held the Gift Deed to be cancelled since the conditions for
the well-being of the senior citizens were not complied with.
We are unable to agree with the view taken by the Division
Bench, because it takes a strict view of a beneficial
legislation.
24. Before parting with the case at hand, we must clarify the
observations made vide the impugned order qua the
competency of the Tribunal to hand over possession of the
property. In S. Vanitha (supra), this Court observed that
Tribunals under the Act may order eviction if it is necessary
and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizen.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunals constituted
under the Act, while exercising jurisdiction under Section
23, cannot order possession to be transferred. This would
defeat the purpose and object of the Act, which is to provide
speedy, simple and inexpensive remedies for the elderly.
25. Another observation of the High Court that must be
clarified, is Section 23 being a standalone provision of the
Act. In our considered view, the relief available to senior
citizens under Section 23 is intrinsically linked with the
statement of objects and reasons of the Act, that elderly
citizens of our country, in some cases, are not being looked
after. It is directly in furtherance of the objectives of the Act
and empowers senior citizens to secure their rights promptly
when they transfer a property subject to the condition of
being maintained by the transferee.
26. In Illachi Devi (D) by L.Rs. (supra), the Apex Court in
paragraph No.40 held as follows:-
It is well settled principles of law that a plain meaning must be
attributed to the Statute. Also, a statute must be construed according
to the intention of the legislature. The golden rule of interpretation of
a statute is that it has to be given its literal and natural meaning. The
intention of the legislature must be found out from the language
employed in the statute itself. The question is not what is supposed
to have been intended but what has been said. (See Dayal Singh v.
Union of India, [2003] 2 SCC 593.
27. It is relevant to note that in Smt. Varinder Kaur vs. Smt.
Daljit Kaur 21, the Delhi High Court held that for attracting the
provisions of Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act, the deed in
question need not expressly contain a condition that transferee shall
provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the
transferor, especially in the context of execution of a gift feed.
28. In the said case also, there is no mention in the gift deed
that the son will provide basic amenities and basic physical needs to
the mother, especially in the context of a gift deed executed by a
senior citizen in favour of his or her son or daughter or even daughter
in law, it is not difficult to conclude that it is the love and affection
and care in the old age which impels such citizens to execute gift
deed.
29. The Division Bench placing reliance on the principle laid
down by the Apex Court in Sudesh Chhikara (supra) and other
judgments, held that while exercising the powers under Section 23(1)
of the Senior Citizens Act, on an application moved by a senior
LPA No.587 of 2025 and batch, order dated 18.09.2025
citizen seeking declaration that the deed is void, the Tribunal is
expected to look into all the relevant material and not only the bare
contents of the application so made.
30. In Justice P.D. Dinakaran (supra), the Supreme Court
reiterated that fairness in adjudication requires both actual and
perceived impartiality. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed
reliance on the said judgment to contend that the maintenance
tribunal did not follow the procedure laid down under the Act,
2007and the Rules made thereunder while adjudicating the
application filed by 1st respondent.
31. In Sri Jayashankar (supra), the High Court of Kerala in
paragraph No.6.1, clarified that the expressions "fraud" and
"coercion" employed in Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act,2007
cannot be expanded to encompass the broader notions of fraud or
coercion as understood in general civil law. It was held that a finding
of fraud requires a foundation of established facts, and the
allegations of fraudulent conduct must necessarily be proved by
cogent evidence.
32. In the present case, without any supporting material, 2nd
respondent levelled sweeping accusations of fraud and property-
grabbing against Petitioner No.1 and cancelled seven registered gift
settlement deeds. Such action, in the absence of evidence, is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, and unsustainable in law.
33. In Ashwin Bharat Khater (supra), the Bombay High
Court upheld the tribunal's power under Section 23 of the Senior
Citizens Act to annul gift deeds executed by a senior citizen in favor
of her son when such transfers were alleged to have been procured
under influence and resulted in neglect. The Court emphasized that
the protective object of the Act cannot be defeated by merely
pointing to the absence of an express clause of care in the deed, since
the welfare of parents is the core legislative purpose.
34. The 1st Respondent relies on this principle to contend that
even in the present case, where the mother alleged, deception and
subsequent neglect, the tribunal was competent to act under Section
23.
35. Easwaramoorthy C.P. (supra), the Madras High Court
held that the concept of "normal life" under Section 4(2) of the Act
must be construed broadly to include dignity, medical care, and
security, not merely food and shelter. The Court quashed a
settlement deed executed under coercion, reiterating that the Act is a
beneficial legislation meant to secure the life and dignity of aged
parents. The Respondent invokes this decision to argue that once a
senior citizen alleges exploitation and loss of dignity in transfers, the
tribunal is empowered to intervene.
36. Palanimuthu (supra), the Madras High Court upheld the
tribunal's cancellation of a partition deed where the senior citizen
was forced out of his residence, observing that the Act's provisions
are wide enough to protect residence and security of senior citizens.
37. The 1st Respondent relies on this authority to stress that the
tribunal has competence to interfere with property arrangements
when the effect is to deprive a parent of shelter and livelihood.
38. S. Mala (Supra) the Madras High Court held that even if
a settlement deed does not recites love and affection, where the
surrounding circumstances show that the transfer was coupled with
an expectation of care, Section 23 of the Act, 2007, can be invoked.
The Court further clarified that the Act, 2007 requires a beneficial
construction, and that conditions of care may be implied from the
relationship itself. This precedent is pressed into service by the 1st
Respondent to argue that her gift deeds, though silent on conditions,
were executed under the implicit understanding of care.
39. S. Subramanian (supra), the Madras High Court upheld
cancellation of a settlement deed under Section 23 of the Act, 2007,
holding that conditions of care may be express or implied, and that
neglect or coercion post-transfer justified annulment.
40. In the present case, the 1st Respondent contends that this
decision validates the tribunal's jurisdiction to set aside transfers
when an aged parent demonstrates neglect, even absent an express
recital of conditions.
41. In S. Vanitha (Supra), the Supreme Court harmonized
the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 with the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, upholding the tribunal's jurisdiction to order
eviction of a daughter-in-law from the senior citizen's house. The
Court emphasized the welfare objective of the Act and the need to
construe it purposively. The Respondent relies on this leading
authority to argue that the tribunal's protective jurisdiction must not
be read narrowly, and that eviction/cancellation orders serve the
Act's object.
42. In Tajinder Singh Bakshi (supra) v. Daljit Kaur22, the
Delhi High Court upheld the District Magistrate's order cancelling a
gift deed under Section 23 of the Act, 2007 where the circumstances
showed suspicious transfer and subsequent neglect of the mother.
The Court distinguished Sudesh Chhikara (Supra) on facts, holding
that where there is evidence of coercion or implicit conditions of
care, the tribunal may annul transfers. This case is relied upon by the
1st Respondent to contend that even where explicit conditions are
absent, surrounding circumstances can justify cancellation.
43. In the light of the aforesaid principles laid down in the
aforesaid judgments, it is relevant to note that as per Section 23 of
the Act, 2007, the aforesaid two pre-requisites have to be fulfilled i.e.
a) The transfer musthave been made subject to condition that the
WP No. 10854 of 2023 Del HC
transferee can provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs
to the transferor, b) The transferee refuses or fails to provide such
amenities and physical needs to the transferor.
44. The 1st respondent has to plead and prove the fraud and
coercion.
45. In the present case, the aforesaid registered gift settlement
deeds are dated 15.07.2016, 29.10.2016, 29.10.2016, 18.11.2016,
29.01.2018, and 01.08.2024. 1st respondent herein had filed the
aforesaid application before the 2nd respondent in January, 2025.
Thus, there is abnormal delay of nine (9) years in 1st respondent
approaching 2nd respondent.
46. As discussed supra, 1st respondent has filed the aforesaid
application before the 2nd respondent in January, 2025 to cancel the
aforesaid registered gift settlement deeds contending that the
petitioners obtained the same by playing fraud. 2nd respondent cannot
consider the said aspect of fraud. There was no dispute with regard to
the aforesaid properties till January, 2025. After 9 years, in January,
2025, 1st respondent claims that the petitioners obtained the aforesaid
registered gift settlement deeds by playing fraud. 1st respondent has
to prove the said fraud. Except stating that the petitioners obtained
the aforesaid registered gift settlement deeds by playing fraud, the 1st
respondent did not prove the said fraud. Except making bald
allegation that the petitioner ill-treated her, she failed to prove the
said ill-treatment. However, relying on the statements of the
daughters of the 1st respondent, 2nd respondent allowed the
application filed by the 1st respondent vide impugned order dated
17.05.2025.
47. As discussed supra, it is the specific contention of the
petitioners that 1st respondent has filed the said application before the
2nd respondent under the Act, 2007 at the instance of her daughters.
Even 2nd respondent has relied on the statements of the daughters of
1st respondent. 2nd respondent also stated in the impugned order that
the 1st petitioner, during hearing and in his written counter admitted
that he executed the gift deeds on the presumption that as the only
son in the family, he is entitled to the entire properties. During
interaction with the petitioner No.1, the Tribunal observed that he had
the belief that only male members of the family inherit their parents
property. Thus, 1st petitioner persistently maintained that he had
committed nothing wrong in transferring the properties and money to
himself and his family. However, he failed to produce any evidence
to prove that such transfers were carried out without the free consent
and knowledge of respondent No.1. The said finding of the 2nd
respondent is contrary to the record.
48. As discussed supra, in her application itself, 1st respondent
herein has specifically mentioned that the details of the transfers right
from 2014. Therefore, 1st petitioner cannot be expected to prove that
the said transfers were made by playing fraud without knowledge and
consent of the 1st respondent. In fact, burden lies on the 1st respondent
to prove that the said transfers and transactions are done fraudulently.
Whereas, 2nd respondent has thrown the burden on the 1st petitioner
which is unjustified.
49. 2nd respondent in the impugned order further irresistibly
concluded that the 1st petitioner had ill-intentions to grab the property
without the consent, either explicit or implied, of his mother. The said
findings are also contrary to the record. There is no consideration of
the abnormal delay in 1st respondent approaching the 2nd respondent.
In the impugned order, 2nd respondent further held that the bank
records clearly show that 1st petitioner used money from the joint
account to buy a car, pay college fees, and make payments to builders
and others. But he could not show any proof that he had his own
income through which he deposited money into that account. These
transactions match exactly with that of the petitioner. Even the said
findings are contrary to the record.
50. 2nd respondent failed to consider the abnormal delay in 1st
respondent approaching 2nd respondent. It is also apt to note that 2nd
respondent in the impugned order recorded that 1st petitioner
admitted that he is adamant, short-tempered, annoyed with his
mother and he refused to speak with her or reconcile.
51. In the light of the said findings, this Court called for the
original record from the 2nd respondent. Perusal of the note file
would reveal that he has recorded the versions of the parties in his
docket proceedings but he has not obtained the signatures of the
parties. However, the petitioners denied the same, more particularly
the said alleged admissions.
52. In the light of the said submissions, it is also apt to note
that Section 6 of the Act, 2007 deals with the jurisdiction and
procedure and sub-section 4 of Section 6 of the Act, says that all the
evidence to such proceedings shall be taken in the presence of the
children or relative against whom an order for payment of
maintenance is proposed to be made and shall be recorded in the
manner prescribed for summons cases.
53. As per Section 6 (6) of the Act, 2007, the tribunal before
hearing an application under Section 5 may, refer the same to a
conciliation officer and such conciliation officer shall submit his
findings within one month and if amicable settlement has been
arrived at, the tribunal shall pass an order to that effect.
54. Section 8 of the Act, 2007 says summary procedure as
case of inquiry and it is relevant, it is extracted below:-
8. Summary procedure in case of inquiry.--(1) In holding any inquiry
under section 5, the Tribunal may, subject to anyrules that may be
prescribed by the State Government in this behalf, follow such summary
procedure as it deems fit.
(2) The Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose
of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses
and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and
material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the
Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of section
195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974).
(3) Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, the Tribunal may,
for the purpose of adjudicating and deciding upon any claim for
maintenance, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge
of any matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry.
55. Rule 8 of the Telangana Maintenance and Welfare of
Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2011 (for short, 'the Rules')
deals with procedure in case of admission of claim and it says in
case, on the date fixed in the notice issued under Rule 6, the
opposite party appears and accepts his/her liability to maintain the
application and the two parties arrive at a mutual agreed settlement,
the tribunal shall pass an order accordingly.
56. Rule 10 of the Rules, deals with reference to conciliation
officer.
57. Rule 11 deals with proceedings by conciliation officer.
58. Rule 13 deals with action by the tribunal in other cases, it
is relevant and it is extracted below:-
13. Action by the Tribunal in other cases:-
(1) In case,
(1) the applicant(s) and the opposite parties do not agree for reference of
their dispute to a Conciliation Officer as per Rule 10, or
(ii) the Conciliation Officer appointed under Rule 10 sends a report under
sub-rule (3) of Rule 11, conveying inability to work out a settlement
acceptable to both the parties, or
(iii) no report is received from a Conciliation Officer within the stipulated
time limit of one month, or
(iv) in response to the notice issued under sub-rule (1) of Rule 12, one or
both the parties decline to confirm the settlement worked out by the
Conciliation Officer.
The Tribunal shall give to both the parties an opportunity of evidence in
support of their respective claims, and shall, after a summary inquiry as
provided in sub- section (1) of Section 8, pass such order as it deems fit.
(2) An order passed under Rule 7 or Rule 8 or under sub-rule (1) above
shall be a speaking one, spelling out the facts of the case as ascertained by
the Tribunal, and the reasons for the order.
(3) While passing an order under sub-rule (1), directing the opposite party
to pay maintenance to an applicant, the Tribunal shall take the following
into consideration:-
(a) amount needed by the applicant to meet his/her basic needs,
especially food, clothing, accommodation, and healthcare;
(b) income of the opposite party; and
(c) value of, and actual and potential income from the property, if any,
of the applicant which the opposite party would inherit and/or is in
possession of.
(4) A copy of every order passed, whether final or interim, shall be given
to the applicant(s) and the opposite party or their representatives, in
person, or shall be sent to them through a process server or by registered
post and a copy shall be communicated to the Maintenance Officer.
(5) The Tribunal may, during the pendency of the proceeding regarding
monthly allowance for the maintenance under this section, order such
child or relative to make a monthly allowance for the interim maintenance
of such Senior Citizens including parent and to pay the same to such
Senior Citizen including parent, specifying the manner in which the
amount is to be given as per the convenience of the applicant.
(6). A maintenance order made under this Act, shall have the same force
and effect as an order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) and shall be executed in the
manner prescribed for the execution of such order by that Code.
(7) On proof of mis-representation or mistake of fact or a change in the
circumstances of any person, receiving a monthly allowance under Section
9 of the Act, for the maintenance ordered under that section to pay a
monthly allowance for the maintenance, the Tribunal may make such
alteration, as it thinks fit, in
Provided that where it appears to the Tribunal that, in consequence of any
decision of a competent Civil Court, any order made under Section 9 of
the Act should be cancelled or varied, it shall cancel the order or, a the
case may be vary the same accordingly].
59. In the present case, 2nd respondent - Tribunal failed to
follow the said procedure. Though the 2nd respondent held that 1st
petitioner admitted the claim, he has not obtained the signature of
the 1st petitioner or other petitioners on the docket proceedings. On
admission of claim by the petitioners, 2nd respondent has to pass a
order. In the preset case, 2nd respondent failed to do so.
60. In 4th page of the impugned order, 2nd respondent
recorded that under newly inserted Sub Rule 3 of Rule 21 of the
Rules, 1st respondent citing negligence ad ill-treatment by her son
and daughter-in-law had filed the said application. During the 1st
and 2nd appearances on 15.02.2025 and 22.02.2025, 1st petitioner
orally admitted to the fraudulent withdrawal of funds etc.
61. In fact, Rule 21(3) of the Rules deals with eviction and it
is the District Collector who is having power to deal with eviction
and not the RDO, 2nd respondent herein. In the present case,
1st respondent had filed the aforesaid application before the 2nd
respondent seeking cancellation of registered gift settlement deeds
but not for eviction. If the 1st respondent admits the claim including
fraudulent withdrawal, 2nd respondent should have passed an order
considering the said admission. Instead, 2nd respondent adjourned
the matter. Thus, 2nd respondent did not follow the procedure laid
down under the Act, and Rules made thereunder.
62. In the impugned order, 2nd respondent referred the
written statements of daughters of 1st respondent, in 2nd paragraph of
page 7. The same is also in violation of the procedure laid down
under Rules.
63. It is also apt to note that to ascertain the correctness in
paragraph No.2 of the page No.4 of the impugned order, this Court
directed learned Asst. Govt. Pleader for Women Development and
Child Welfare, to produce original file in O.P. No. D/234/2015,
dated 15.03.2025 from 2nd respondent. She has produced the
original file. Perusal of the said file would reveal that 2nd respondent
reserved the matter on 15.03.2025.
64. Thereafter, there is an interesting note put up by Section
Assistant of 2nd respondent which is as follows:-
"Submitted:-
I (Sec. Asst.) have attended the survey training programme for
two months (17.03.2025 to 12.05.2025) and prepared draft
orders as per the dictation of R.D.O. sir and placed before for
kind perusal and approval."
65. Thus, 2nd respondent, being quasi-judicial Officer, instead
of preparing order on his own on consideration of the entire material,
entrusted the same to the Section Assistant who in turn, prepared
draft order and placed for perusal and approval of 2nd respondent.
Below the said note, there is signature of Section Assistant dated
15.05.2025. Though the Section Assistant stated that he has prepared
the draft order as per the dictation of the Revenue Divisional Officer
i.e. 2nd respondent, there is signature of DAO of 2nd respondent on
the said Note File. There is no need of submitting Note File and the
draft of the impugned order to DAO of 2nd respondent. It is an order
to be pronounced by 2nd respondent, a quasi - judicial authority, and
it is a confidential matter/order. Therefore, the entire approach of 2nd
respondent is in violation of the procedure laid down under the Act,
2007 and Rules made thereunder.
66. As discussed supra, there is no consideration of the
aforesaid pre-requisites of Section 23(1) of the Act, 2007 by the 2nd
respondent. Even in the impugned order, there is mention that 1st
respondent informed 2nd respondent that after cancellation of the gift
settlement deeds, she wants to partition the said property and
distribute the same to the 1st petitioner and her daughters. There is a
reference to the said effect in last paragraph of the page 5 of the
impugned order.
67. Vide the impugned order, 2nd respondent held that 1st
respondent has acquired schedule -'A' and 'B' properties through her
late husband and she is the absolute owner of the said properties.
Thus, 2nd respondent declared that the 1st respondent herein is the
absolute owner of the said properties. 2nd respondent is not having
jurisdiction/power to hold so. He cannot declare the 1st respondent as
absolute owner of schedule 'A' and 'B' properties while deciding
applications filed under the provisions of the Act, 2007.
68. In the impugned order, 2nd respondent also held that the 1st
petitioner, the son, of the 1st respondent sketched out a plan for the
last ten years, transferred both the properties on his name and his two
sons. This was done without knowledge of the 1strespondent on
obtaining her bank details, Aadhar card and passport etc. 1st
petitioner also did certain dubious transactions to show that as if he
has purchased the same from third party, and later transferred it to his
wife's name. The said findings of 2nd respondent are contrary to the
record and pleadings. 1st respondent never pleaded so. 2nd respondent
cannot give such finding while deciding an application filed by 1st
respondent under the provisions of the Act, 2007.
69. As discussed supra, 2nd respondent without considering
the object of the Act, 2007 and pre-requirements of Section 23(1) of
the Act, 2007, principle laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid
judgments, ordered for cancellation of the said documents and
directed the petitioners to return the sum of Rs.1,63,35,600/- to the
1st respondent holding that the same were transferred fraudulently.
70. He has also further held that if the petitioners fails to
return the said money, 1st respondent may approach concerned
District Police Officials for recovery of money and initiate criminal
proceedings against them. The said findings of 2nd respondent in the
impugned order are also contrary to the object of the Act, 2007 and
procedure laid down under the Act and Rules made thereunder. He
has to decide the application filed by 1st respondent for maintenance
and cancellation of the registered gift deeds. He cannot transgress his
jurisdiction/power and direct the petitioners to deposit the said
amount, failing which, he cannot observe that 1st respondent may
approach the Police officials.
71. As discussed supra, the impugned order is an appealable
order in terms of Section 16(1) of the Act, 2007. Though the
impugned order is an appealable order, the present writ petition is
maintainable since the 2nd respondent failed to follow the procedure
laid down under the Act, 2007 and Rules made thereunder and the
impugned order is without jurisdiction. 2nd respondent has entrusted
preparation of the impugned order to Section Assistant and before
pronouncement of the same, Section Assistant, DAO of 2nd
respondent has perused the said impugned order on 15.05.2025 itself.
In fact, the DAO of 2nd respondent is not expected to know the result
of the impugned order which was pronounced later on 17.05.2025.
Whereas, Section Assistant, DAO of 2nd respondent signed on the
Note File on 15.05.2025 itself. Thus, the entire procedure adopted by
the 2nd respondent is contrary to the procedure laid down under the
Act, 2007 and the Rules made thereunder. Thus, despite availability
of the alternative remedy of appeal in terms of Section 16(1) of the
Act, 2007, the present writ petition is maintainable. The said
principle is also laid down by the Apex Court in Assistant
Commissioner of State Tax vs. Commercial Steel Limited 23 and
Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks 24.
72. Further, there is no endorsement in Note File that the
impugned order was pronounced on 17.05.2025. Section Assistant
cannot submit the draft order to the DAO and DAO cannot go
through the same and sign.
73. Viewed from any angle, the impugned order is contrary to
the procedure laid down under the Act, 2007 and is liable to be set
aside.
(2021) 14 SCC 694
(1998) 8 SCC 1
74. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, this writ petition is
allowed. The impugned order dated 17.05.2025 passed by the
Revenue Divisional Officer, is set aside.
Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this
writ petition, shall stand closed.
__________________________
JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN
Date:26.09.2025.
Note: Registry is directed to return
the original file produced by R.2
to the concerned under proper
acknowledgment.
b/o.vvr
