Telangana High Court

V.Narasimhulu, vs The Presiding Officer, Indsutrial ... on 18 November, 2025

                                   1



* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO

                     + W.P.No.13551 OF 2013

% 18 --11--2025

# B.Narasimhulu
                                                            ...Petitioner

$ The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-I, Hyderabad.
                                                        ... Respondent

! Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri G.Rajesh, learned counsel for the
                              petitioner.

^Counsel for Respondents : Sri R.Anurag,
                           learned Standing Counsel for TGSRTC.

<Gist :

>Head Note :

? Cases referred

1.   1991 Supp (1) SCC 504
                                       2




          IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
                           HYDERABAD
                              ****
                         W.P.No.13551 OF 2013

Between:

B.Narasimhulu
                                                               ...Petitioner

$ The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-I, Hyderabad.
                                                        ... Respondent

JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 18.11.2025


     THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO


1.     Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
       may be allowed to see the Judgments?           :           yes


2.     Whether the copies of judgment may be
       Marked to Law Reporters/Journals?              :           yes


3.     Whether His Lordship wishes to
       see the fair copy of the Judgment?             :           yes




                                 ___________________________________________
                                 NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO, J
                                  3



 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO

                 WRIT PETITION No.13551 OF 2013

ORDER:

This writ petition is filed aggrieved by the Award

dated 12.03.2004 passed by the 1st respondent in

I.D.No.113 of 2001.

2. Heard Sri G.Rajesh, learned counsel appearing for

the petitioner and Sri R.Anurag, learned Standing

Counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent.

3. The brief facts of the case are as follows :-

[

(a) The petitioner was initially appointed as a

Conductor on 20.12.1986 on daily wage basis and

subsequently his services were regularized with effect

from 15.07.1987. The petitioner claims to have performed

his duties diligently for over 17 years, without any

adverse remarks until the incident that led to his

removal.

(b) On 03.05.1999, while the petitioner was

discharging his duties as a Conductor on Bus bearing

No.AP-9Z-2826 on the route from Women's College to

Bacharam 'X' Road, a surprise check was conducted by

the checking officials of the Divisional Enforcement

Squad at Stage No.17/18, Bacharam 'X' Road and alleged

that the petitioner was involved in cash and ticket

irregularity and accordingly, a charge memo was issued

to the petitioner on the same day. The petitioner

submitted his explanation on 03.05.1999. Not satisfied

with the explanation submitted by the petitioner, he was

placed under suspension on 10.05.1999, and a charge-

sheet was served on him on the same day framing the

following charges :-

"(i) Charge No.1: You have failed to complete ticket issues within one fare stage which constitutes misconduct in terms of Reg.28 (vi) (a) of APSRTC Employees Conduct Regulations, 1963.

(ii) Charge No.2: You have collected the fare of Rs.2.50 E2 who boarded your bus at Kavadipally and bound for Bacharam X Road ex-stages 15 to 17/18 issued bearing ticket Nos.227/697224 of Rs.3.00 and 330/636196 of Rs.2.00 which was already sold in the trip from Banda Ravirala 16.10 hrs late departure 18.30 hrs operating to Abdullapuramettu and the same were already accounted din SR which shows respondent-issued which constitutes

misconduct under Regulation 28(xxiii) of APSRTC Employees Conduct Regulations, 1963."

charge-sheet on 21.05.1999 denying the said charges.

Thereafter, the 2nd respondent ordered an enquiry. The

Enquiry Officer submitted a report on 15.07.1999 holding

that the petitioner was guilty of both the charges. The

petitioner submitted his objections to the enquiry report

on 27.03.1999, but the disciplinary authority issued a

show-cause notice proposing removal from service. The

petitioner again submitted a detailed explanation on

03.08.1999, denying all the allegations. Not satisfied with

the explanation submitted by the petitioner, the

disciplinary authority passed an order dated 07.08.1999,

removing the petitioner from service. Aggrieved thereby,

the petitioner filed an appeal on 23.08.1999, which was

rejected by the Appellate Authority on 29.09.1999. A

review petition was also filed before the Regional Manager

and the same was rejected on 18.07.2000. Aggrieved by

the order dated 18.07.2000, the petitioner filed

I.D.No.688 of 2000 before the Labour Court, which was

later transferred to the Industrial Tribunal-I, Hyderabad,

and renumbered as I.D.No.113 of 2001. The Tribunal

vide its Award dated 12.03.2004 while setting aside the

order of removal, directed reinstatement of the petitioner

as a fresh conductor, without continuity of service and

back wages.

(d) Thereafter, the award was implemented, and

the petitioner was reinstated into service afresh on

04.07.2004. However, aggrieved by the Award dated

12.03.2004 insofar as not granting continuity of service

and back wages, the present writ petition is filed.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner

submits that the Tribunal while setting aside the order of

removal, ought to have directed the respondents to

reinstate the petitioner into service with continuity of

service, attendant benefits and back wages. The Tribunal

failed to provide any cogent reasons for reinstating the

petitioner afresh instead of granting continuity of service,

other benefits and back wages. Therefore, the Award

passed by the Tribunal is wholly unjust and arbitrary.

Therefore, appropriate orders be passed in the writ

petition by granting the relief sought by the petitioner

and allow the writ petition.

5. The respondent filed a counter affidavit stating as

follows :-

       (a)    The    petitioner,       who    was     working   as    a

Conductor,         committed     serious        cash     and    ticket

irregularity on 03.05.1999 and therefore, he was issued

charge-sheet and suspended w.e.f. 10.05.1999. An

enquiry was conducted by the Chief Inspector

(Enquiries), Hyderabad Division, who submitted his

report on 15.07.1999. After considering the enquiry

report and the petitioner's submissions, a show cause

notice for removal was issued to the petitioner on

28.07.1999. Subsequently, the petitioner was removed

from service vide order dated 07.08.1999.

(b) The petitioner's departmental appeal and

revision petition were rejected by the appellate authority

and the Regional Manager respectively. Thereafter, the

petitioner raised I.D.No.688 of 2000 before the Labour

Court-I, Hyderabad, which was transferred to the

Industrial Tribunal-I/Hyderabad and numbered as

I.D.No.113 of 2001. The Industrial Tribunal, by taking a

lenient view by award dated 12.03.2004, set aside the

removal order and directed reinstatement of the

petitioner without continuity of service and without back

wages. The petitioner was reinstated w.e.f. 07.07.2004

accordingly.

seniority and service benefits are to be reckoned only

from the date of reinstatement and not from the original

appointment date. Moreover, the petitioner has

approached this Court with a delay of nine years after the

award of the Industrial Tribunal and therefore, the writ

petition is liable to be dismissed.

6. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the

respondents submits that since the petitioner committed

serious cash and ticket irregularity on 03.05.1999, he

was placed under suspension with effect from 10.05.1999

and after conducting a detailed enquiry, a show-cause

notice of removal was issued to the petitioner on

28.07.1999. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent passed the

order dated 07.08.1999 imposing the punishment of

removal from service and the same was confirmed by the

appellate authority and the revisional authority.

However, by award dated 12.03.2004, the Tribunal by

taking a lenient view, set aside the removal order and

directed reinstatement of the petitioner afresh without

continuity of service and without back wages. Therefore,

there are no merits in the writ petition and the same is

liable to be dismissed.

7. This Court, having considered the rival

submissions made by the learned counsel for the

respective parties, is of the considered view that a perusal

of the record certain facts made it clear that the

petitioner during his service, he was involved in various

cash and ticket irregularity cases, for which, his

increments were deferred for seven times, suspended

three times, security deposit forfeited once and removed

from service once.

8. The above track record of the petitioner confirms

that it is not a first case to consider his case. During his

entire service, there are several irregularities and

punishments were suffered by the petitioner. Even

though, he doesn't want to learn anything from his earlier

mistakes and continued the same in the rest of his

service also. As per the Tribunal Award, the allegations

levelled against the petitioner are proved that he failed to

give correct tickets and reissued used tickets. It is also

established that the petitioner failed to complete the

ticket issues within the fare stage. Ultimately, the

Tribunal taken a lenient view and set aside the removal

order dated 07.08.1999 and directed to reinstate the

petitioner into service afresh without continuity of service

and without back wages. The said award was passed by

the Labour Court on 12.03.2004. After a lapse of nine

years, the petitioner approached this Court questioning

the award passed by the Tribunal.

9. In support of his contentions, learned Standing

counsel for the 2nd respondent relied upon the Division

Bench judgment of this Court in W.A.Nos.1660 of 2018

and 593 of 2016, dated 13.12.2021, wherein with regard

to delay, while relying upon the judgment of the Apex

Court in KALWANT SINGH GILL Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB1,

the Full Bench held at para Nos.71 to 77 as follows :-

71. On the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court, referred to above, the relevant considerations that may be taken into account in determining the issue of delay and laches may be summarized thus :

(1) Though no period of limitation is prescribed for the writ Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or to file a writ petition, a person aggrieved should approach the Court without loss of time. In appropriate cases, where there is delay and the same has properly been explained with cogent reasons, Court may condone the delay as an exception to meet the ends of justice. But, it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters.

(2) Courts have evolved rules of self-imposed restraints or fetters where the High Court may not enquire into belated or stale claim and deny relief to a party if he is found guilty of laches. One who is tardy, not vigilant and does not seek intervention of the Court within a reasonable time from the date of accrual of cause of action or alleged violation of the constitutional, legal or other right, is not entitled to relief under Article 226.

(3) No hard and fast rule can be laid down for universal application and every case shall have to be decided on its own facts.

1991 Supp (1) SCC 504

(4) There is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts.

(5) There is no lower limit or upper limit and it will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose.

(6) The principle on which the Court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners.

(7) Where there is remiss or negligence on the part of a party approaching the Court for relief after an inordinate and unexplained delay, in such cases, it would not be proper to enforce the fundamental right. As a general rule if there has been unreasonable delay the Court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party in exercise of the extraordinary power of mandamus.

(8) There is no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction Court can take into account delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ Court.

(9) Though the High Court in exercise of the power under Article 226 in its discretion grant relief in cases where the fundamental rights are violated, but, in such cases also, High Court, to meet the ends of justice, shall refuse to exercise its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of a party who has been guilty of laches and where there are other relevant circumstances which indicate that it would be inappropriate to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction.

(10) The maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil Court must be brought may ordinarily taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured.

(11) If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Courts have applied the rule of delay with greater rigor in service matters.

(12) The benefit of a judgment cannot be extended to a case automatically. The Court is entitled to take into consideration the fact as to whether the petitioner had chosen to sit over the matter and wake up after the decision of the Court if it is found that the petitioner approached the Court with unreasonable delay, the same may disentitle him to obtain a discretionary relief. Long delay disentitles a party to the discretionary relief under Articles 32 and 226 and persons who had slept over their rights for long and elected to wake up when they had the impetus from the judgment of similarly placed persons.

(13) Where during the intervening period rights of third parties have crystallized, it would be inequitable to disturb those rights at the instance of a person who has approached the Court after long lapse of time and where there is no cogent explanation for the delay.

(14) Where the appellate authority acting within its jurisdiction condoned the delay after being satisfied with the facts stated in relation thereto, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution should not ordinarily interfere with the order.

72. An analysis of the case law discussed above would amply make it clear that issue of a writ of a mandamus or certiorari is largely a matter of sound discretion and will not be granted if there is negligence or omission on the part of the person to assert his right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party. Therefore, burden lies on the workman who has to establish that in spite of his best efforts and diligence he was prevented from approaching the authority within the period of limitation provided for or the Writ Court within a reasonable period of time if the workman is not able to satisfactorily explain with cogent reasons for the delay he is not entitled to seek for condonation of the delay. It is true that the punishment imposed cannot be

sustained in law because of the illegality crept in it in not conducting a prior enquiry. But, still the workman is under a statutory obligation to challenge the same within the time provided by the statutory rules or regulations or within a reasonable period of time before the writ Court if delay of 5 to 18 years is condoned for no reason or fault on the part of the authority, the proceedings which had attained finality are to be set aside. Setting aside of such order at a belated stage and allowing of a stale claim, may, as rightly held by the Division Bench in Esa Ali's case (supra), inspite the workman to seek for consequential benefits of promotion as well, in which event, the rights of the third parties would adversely be affected for no fault of theirs. A workman who is tardy and not diligent for years in availing a statutory remedy or in approaching the Court of law, in our view, cannot be encouraged or permitted to contend that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court the punishment cannot be sustained in law, therefore, delay to any extent is to be condoned automatically in exercise of the power conferred on the appellate or revisional authorities or by the writ Courts in exercise of the discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Courts can come to the aid of a person who is diligent and vigilant but unable to approach the authority or Court of law for redressal of his grievance in spite of his best efforts and reasons beyond his control but not to a person who is tardy and negligent or slept over the matter in availing the statutory or legal remedies.

73. No doubt in the present cases the punishment awarded cannot be sustained in law in view of the law aid down by the Supreme Court in Kulwant Singh Gill's case (supra) and in the light of the Regulations, but, a specific period having been prescribed in the Regulations of the Corporation, as stated earlier, the same need to be adhered to. The proviso under Regulation 23 empowers the appellate authority to entertain an appeal even after expiry of the period of limitation provided if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not submitting the appeal in time. A similar power may also be exercised under Regulation 29. If the authority is not satisfied with the explanation offered by the workman in challenging the orders of punishment, this Court, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226, cannot interfere unless the conclusion arrived at by the authority that the explanation offered by the workman is not justified or

germane or no prudent person would have come to such a conclusion. In appropriate cases where the appeal or revision is filed within a reasonable period of delay, it is always open to the appellate or revisional authority to condone the delay on valid explanation put forth by the workman in not approaching the authorities within the time specified, in which event, the writ Court should not interfere with the order. In our opinion, when Regulations provided a period of two months for filing an appeal and six months for a revision, delay of 5 to 18 years in approaching the authority would certainly be fatal to the case of a workman unless properly explained with cogent reasons.

74. It is true that in some cases where the delay is five years or so the Supreme Court inclined to condone the delay but under different circumstances when the fundamental rights are violated or where the delay is not directly attributable to the party seeking the relief or where the rights of the third parties are not intervened or in matters where seniority of employees is not finalized, the Court, would be justified to grant the relief; but not as a general rule of practice. Therefore, in our considered opinion, Kulwant Singh Gill's case (supra), does not confer or clothe an automatic right with the employee to challenge the order of the authority at any time or whenever he wishes. The principles laid down by the Apex Court governing the condonation of delay will certainly and equally have application even in cases where challenge is made to an order imposing the punishment contrary to the Regulations or the ratio in Kulwant Singh Gill's case (supra), where the employee had slept over the matter and had not chosen to challenge it within a reasonable period of time. It may also be noticed that in service matters, the Courts have applied the rule of delay with greater rigor.

75. We, therefore, agree with the view taken by the Division Bench in Sd. Esa Ali's case (supra).

76. We answer the reference accordingly.

77. As already noted, in some cases, it was urged that no orders are passed on the appeals or revisions filed by the petitioners. In the light of the conclusions drawn above, the writ appeal and the respective writ petitions are to be disposed of by the appropriate Benches. Registry may place the matters before the appropriate Benches for

disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the principles laid down in this judgment."

10. With the above said observations of the Apex

Court, it is clear that while condoning the delay under

various circumstances, the Courts can follow the above

observations and also observed that delay of five years or

so, the Supreme Court inclined to condone the delay, but

under different circumstances when the fundamental

rights are violated or where the delay is not directly

attributable to the party seeking the relief or where the

rights of the third parties are not intervened or in matters

where seniority of employees is not finalized, the Court,

would be justified to grant the relief; but not as a general