Telangana High Court
Dr. Nishant Bhimrao Labhane, vs National Institute Of Technology on 21 March, 2025
Author: Abhinand Kumar Shavili
Bench: Abhinand Kumar Shavili
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE ABHINAND KUMAR SHAVILI
AND
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
WRIT APPEAL No.349 of 2024
JUDGMENT:
(per Hon'ble Sri Justice Laxmi Narayana Alishetty)
This Writ Appeal is filed aggrieved by the order, dated
04.08.2023, passed by learned single Judge of this Court in
W.P.No.5088 of 2021.
2. Heard Sri Ramesh Kadiri, learned counsel for the appellant
and Sri T.Mahender Rao, learned Standing Counsel appearing for
respondents.
3. The brief factual matrix of the case is that the appellant was
appointed as Assistant Professor Grade-II on contract basis in
National Institute of Technology, Warangal and he reported to duty
on 04.11.2019. While so, on a complaint dated 14.07.2020 made by
a lady research scholar through e-mail to the Chairman of Internal
Complaints Committee regarding sexual harassment by the
appellant, the Internal Complaints Committee has examined and
recorded the statement of the complainant, given an opportunity to
the appellant to putforth his submissions, looked into the whatsapp
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messages and e-mails alleged to have been sent by the appellant to
the lady research scholar, which are found to be objectionable, and
taking into consideration all the above, the Committee vide report
dated 16.07.2020 has concluded that the appellant indulged in acts
of sexual harassment against the lady research scholar and further
advised the Institution to take stringent action against him; that a
memorandum dated 10.08.2020 was issued to appellant alleging
that on many occasions, he was not accessible and did not do the
work assigned to him in time and created problems in conducting
the academic/administrative operations of the department and
further, it was observed that Internal Complaints Committee
concluded that he indulged in acts of sexual harassment against the
lady research scholar; that appellant has submitted his explanation
on 13.08.2020 to the said memorandum; that respondent No.1
passed order dated 13.08.2020, observing that the appellant has not
brought out any material to prove his innocence or accusation that
all the allegations made against him were false and terminated the
services of the appellant.
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4. Challenging the order of termination, dated 13.08.2020, the
appellant filed Writ Petition 5088 of 2021 before this Court, which,
on contest, was dismissed vide orders dated 04.08.2023.
Challenging the said order, the present Writ Appeal is filed.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the
complaint was given on 14.07.2020 in respect of incident which
allegedly took place on 19.03.2020 and as per Section 9(1) of
Sexual Harassment of Women at Work Place (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, an aggrieved women or
complainant is required to make complaint within three months
from the date of incident. As such, in the instant case, the
complaint is beyond the time stipulated under the said Act and
therefore, the same should not have been entertained.
5.1. Learned counsel further contended that as per Rule 26 of
First Statute under the National Institute of Technology Act, 2007,
a procedure has been prescribed for suspension, penalties and
disciplinary proceedings. However, in the present case, no such
procedure has been followed before terminating the services of the
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appellant, therefore, the termination proceedings dated 13.08.2020
are unsustainable.
5.2. Learned counsel further contended that before terminating an
employee on the ground of misconduct and allegation of sexual
harassment, the authorities ought to have conducted regular
departmental enquiry, however, in the present case, no such regular
enquiry was conducted; and that before initiating the disciplinary
proceedings, no charge sheet was issued and the termination orders
were passed on the same day on which the explanation was
submitted by the appellant. Learned counsel further contended that
the aforesaid contentions raised by the appellant were not
considered by the learned single Judge and the learned single Judge
has erroneously dismissed the Writ Petition without taking into
consideration the fact that no proper procedure was followed by the
respondents-institution and that further, no proper opportunity was
given to the appellant.
6. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents-
institution inter alia contended that the Internal Complaints
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Committe submitted a report to the effect that in view of
unsatisfactory work and conduct and his indulgence in sexual
harassment of a lady research scholar by the appellant, stringent
action was advised to be taken against him and accordingly, order
of termination dated 13.08.2020 was passed.
6.1. Learned Standing counsel further contended that the
appointment of the appellant was on contract basis for a period of
one year and hence, as per the terms and conditions of appointment
letter, his services are liable to be terminated if the same are not
found to be satisfactory, without notice and without assigning any
reasons therefor and therefore, it is not open to the appellant to
contend that no enquiry was conducted and no proper procedure
was followed in terminating his services.
6.2. Learned Standing Counsel further contended that the learned
single Judge has appreciated the facts and circumstances of the
case from a proper perspective and further, the learned single Judge
observing that the very appointment of the appellant is on contract
basis and inspite of the same, the respondents have terminated the
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services of the appellant after giving him an opportunity of
submitting his explanation for show cause notice, rightly dismissed
the Writ Petition filed by the appellant. Therefore, the impugned
order warrants no interference by this Court.
7. Learned single Judge, in the light of the judgment of
Division Bench of this Court in M/s Gail (India) Limited and
others Vs. Dr.Duraisamy Baskaran1 and the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Medha Kotwal Lele Vs. Union of
India 2, wherein it is held that report of Internal Complaints
Committee is deemed to be an enquiry report in a disciplinary
action under the Civil Service Conduct Rules, observed that it is
not open for the appellant to contend that he was terminated from
service without conducting regular enquiry.
7.1. Further, learned single Judge by taking into consideration
Clause-6 of terms and conditions of the appointment letter, dated
28.10.2019, observed that the respondent-institution is empowered
to terminate the services of appellant without assigning any reasons
2023 LawSuit(TS) 132
2013(1) SCC 297
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since his appointment is only on contract basis, that too, for a
period of one year and accordingly, declined to interfere with the
termination order.
8. The appellant's challenge to the termination order is two-
fold, firstly, that the complaint alleged to be given by a lady
research scholar against him is time barred since it is given after a
period of three months from the date of alleged misconduct,
therefore, the Internal Complaints Committee has no jurisdiction to
initiate action against him; secondly, the Internal Complaints
Committee has not followed the procedure contemplated in First
Statute of National Institute of Technology Act, 2007, i.e., regular
departmental enquiry was not conducted before passing the order
of termination; and hence, the order of termination is per se illegal
and is in utter violation of Rules and the guidelines of the
respondents-institution.
9. As regards the first ground raised by the appellant, it is
relevant to refer to Section 9(1) of the Sexual Harassment of
Women at workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act,
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2013, for better appreciation and the same is extracted as
hereunder:-
"An aggrieved woman or complainant is required to
make complaint within three months from the date of
incident and in case there has been series of incidents,
three months of the last incident."
10. Now, adverting the aforesaid Section to the present case, it
is discernible from record that sexual harassment by the appellant
against the lady research scholar was on 19.03.2020, which was
referred to in the report of the Internal Complaints Committee.
Apart from the said incident, it is borne out from record that after
the aforesaid incident of sexual harassment on the part of appellant,
there were series of e-mails, dated 08.07.2020, 09.07.2020 and
12.07.2020, from him to the complainant which contained
objectionable messages, and the harassment and misconduct of the
appellant continued and can be perceived from the said messages.
Thus, though the incident referred to by the Internal Complaints
Committee had occurred on 19.03.2020, subsequently, there had
been series of e-mails from the appellant to the complainant, the
last of which was on 12.07.2020 and the lady research scholar has
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given complaint through e-mail on 14.07.2020. Therefore, the
contention of the appellant that the complaint made by the victim
i.e., the lady research scholar against him is time barred shatters to
ground and is unsustainable.
11. As regards the second contention of the appellant that no
regular departmental enquiry was conducted before passing the
order of termination, it is relevant to refer to the terms and
conditions of the appointment letter dated 28.10.2019 of the
appellant, whereunder as per Clause-5 thereof, the post is on
contract basis for a period of one year from the date of appointment
and after one year, the contract will be renewed subject to
satisfactory performance for further periods and further, as per
Clause-6 thereof, during the period of contract, the appointing
authority has the power to extend the period of contract or
terminate the services, without notice or without any cause
assigned.
12. Thus, the appointment of the appellant is governed by the
terms and conditions of the appointment order, which are deemed
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to have been accepted by the appellant. As per the terms and
conditions of appointment order, the appellant is a contract
employee and does not fall within the meaning of 'regular
employee'. The National Institute of Technology Act, 2007,
governs the service matters of the regular employees and are not
applicable to contract employees. Therefore, the appellant who is a
contract employee in the respondent-institution does not come
within the purview of the aforesaid Act.
13. Further, in the appointment order, though it is specifically
mentioned that the appointing authority has power to terminate the
services of the appellant without any notice and without assigning
any reasons therefor, vide Clauses-5 and 6 of the terms and
conditions, the respondent-institution had issued show cause
notice to the appellant on 10.08.2020, to which a reply/explanation
was given by him on 13.08.2020 and not satisfied with the same,
the services of the appellant were terminated. Hence, in the face of
the above, it is not open for the appellant to contend that he was not
given an opportunity of hearing. As such, there is no violation of
principles of natural justice by the respondents-institution.
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14. Furthermore, it is apposite to note that the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Medha Kotwal Lel Vs. Union of India 3 held that the
report of the Internal Complaints Committee shall be deemed to be
an enquiry report in a disciplinary action under the Civil Service
Conduct Rules. The said judgment was followed by a Division
Bench of this Court in M/s Gail (India) Limited and others Vs.
Dr.Duraisamy Baskaran4. In the light of the aforesaid judgments,
as rightly observed by the learned single Judge, it is not open for
the appellant to contend that he was terminated from service
without conducting regular enquiry. The respondents-institution
have acted transparently and passed the order of termination, which
is in accordance with the terms and conditions of appointment
order of the appellant.
15. In the light of the foregoing discussion, reasons and in the
light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Medha
Kotwal Lele's case (cited supra), this Court is of the considered
opinion that the appellant failed to point out any illegality or
irregularity committed by the learned single Judge in passing the
(2013) 1 SCC 297
2023 LawSuit (TS) 132
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impugned order warranting interference by this Court and as such,
the Writ Appeal merits no consideration and is liable to be
dismissed.
16. Accordingly, this Writ Appeal is dismissed.
17. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall
stand closed. No costs.
_______________________________
ABHINAND KUMAR SHAVILI, J
___________________________________
LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY, J
Dated:21 .03.2025
dr
