Telangana High Court
M/S. Rks Trading Company vs The Deputy State Tax Officer on 7 March, 2025
THE HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL
AND
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE RENUKA YARA
WRIT PETITION No.7083 of 2025
ORDER:
(Per the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice Sujoy Paul)
Sri K.Raji Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
Sri Venkatram Reddy Mantur, learned counsel for the petitioner
and Swaroop Oorilla, learned Special Government Pleader for
State Tax appearing for the respondents.
2. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that
pursuant to the show cause notice dated 27.02.2025, the
petitioner promptly preferred its objections/reply on 01.03.2025
(Annexure P5). Respondent No.1, in turn, passed the impugned
order dated 04.03.2025 (Annexure P1). Learned Senior Counsel
for the petitioner submits that a plain reading of the impugned
order shows that respondent no.1 has merely reproduced the
objections of the petitioner and without assigning a singular
reason as to why the said objections did not suit him, rejected the
objections by the impugned order. No reasons are assigned and
therefore, the impugned order may be set aside.
3. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further submits
that pursuant to the show cause notice, the petitioner's vehicle
and goods have been seized by respondent No.1. If the petitioner
prefers an application for releasing the said vehicle and goods,
respondent No.1 be directed to decide the application,
expeditiously.
4. Learned Special Government Pleader for State Tax appearing
for the respondents fairly submits that the impugned order is not
a reasoned order and therefore, the same may be set aside. He
further undertakes that if the petitioner prefers and application for
release of the vehicle and goods, it shall be decided within three
working days.
5. We have heard the parties on this aspect.
6. Since the impugned order is not a reasoned order, it runs
contrary to the principles laid down in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd.
v. Masood Ahmed Khan 1. The Supreme Court in the said case
emphasized the need of assigning reasons in administrative,
(2010) 9 SCC 496
quasi-judicial and judicial proceedings. The relevant portion reads
as under:
"12. The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in
support of its decision came up for consideration before this
Court in several cases. Initially this Court recognised a sort of
demarcation between administrative orders and quasi-judicial
orders but with the passage of time the distinction between the
two got blurred and thinned out and virtually reached a
vanishing point in the judgment of this Court in A.K.
Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262].
13...
14. The expression "speaking order" was first coined by Lord
Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. The Lord
Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of the writ of certiorari,
referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and
pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking
order.
15. This Court always opined that the face of an order passed
by a quasi-judicial authority or even an administrative authority
affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be like
the "inscrutable face of a sphinx".
47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record
reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions
affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of
its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the
wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it
must also appear to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on
any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or
even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the
decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding
extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component
of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural
justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative
bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior
courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule
of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned
decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood
of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason
is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as
different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All
these decisions serve one common purpose which is to
demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been
objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the
litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial
accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough
about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to
know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of
precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and
succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is
not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non
of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in
decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-
makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to
broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial
Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37] .)
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the
broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said
requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and
was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz
Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29
and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] ,
wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and
intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions".
(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in
setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development
of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the
essence and is virtually a part of "due process."
7. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order, dated
04.03.2025, is accordingly set aside. If the petitioner prefers an
application for release of the vehicle and goods, as undertaken by
the learned Special Government Pleader for State Tax, respondent
No.1 shall consider and decide the said application within three
working days from the date of preferring such application. Liberty
is reserved to the respondents to pass a fresh speaking order on
the objections of the petitioner.
8. With the aforesaid and without expressing any opinion on
the merits of the case, the writ petition is disposed of. No order
as to costs.
Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.
_________________________
SUJOY PAUL, ACJ
__________________________
RENUKA YARA, J
07.03.2025
sa/vs
