Telangana High Court
S. Siddharth vs The State Of Telangana on 25 July, 2025
Author: Juvvadi Sridevi
Bench: Juvvadi Sridevi
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
*****
CRIMINAL PETITION No.6179 of 2023
Between:
S.Siddharth ... Petitioner
AND
The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Public Prosecutor, High
Court, Hyderabad and another
...Respondents
DATE OF ORDER: 25th July, 2025
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
1 Whether Reporters of Local
newspapers may be allowed to Yes/No
see the Judgment?
2 Whether the copies of judgment
may be marked to Law Yes/No
Reporters/Journals
3 Whether HER Lordship wish to
see the fair copy of the Yes/No
Judgment?
___________________
JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J
* THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
+ Criminal Petition No.6179 of 2023
% Date: 25th July, 2025
Between:
S.Siddharth ... Petitioner
AND
The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Public Prosecutor, High
Court, Hyderabad and another ...Respondents
! Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri N. Naveen Kumar
! Assistant Public Prosecutor for
the Respondent No.1-State: Smt.S.Madhavi
>HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1. (2024) 6 SUPREME COURT CASES 181
2. 1992 SCC (SUPP) 1 335
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
CRIMINAL PETITION No.6179 OF 2023
O R D E R:
This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioner-
accused seeking to quash the proceedings against him in
C.C.No.3610 of 2023 on the file of the learned XII
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Nampally,
Hyderabad, registered for the offences under Section 67 of
the Information Technology Act (for short 'the Act') and
Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC').
02. Heard Sri N. Naveen Kumar, learned counsel
for the petitioner-accused and Smt.S.Madhavi, learned
Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State-respondent No.1.
No representation on behalf of the unofficial respondent.
Perused the record.
03. The brief case of the prosecution is that the
petitioner-accused had intentionally made sexist and
derogatory remarks on Twitter against women who have
attained significant achievements in their respective fields.
It is alleged that the petitioner-accused had tweeted as:
"Subtle cock champion of the world... Thank God we have
protectors of India. (Sic) Shame on you #Rihanna". The
said tweet is alleged to be defamatory in nature and
specifically aimed at Ms. Saina Nehwal, thereby tarnishing
her reputation and undermining the dignity of a woman who
has not only represented India at international platforms but
has also brought glories for the country. Hence, the
respondent No.2 requested for necessary action against
the petitioner-accused.
04. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
the petitioner-accused has no involvement in the alleged
offence. It is contended that the impugned tweet was made
by the petitioner-accused in exercise of his right to freedom
of speech and expression, without any malice or ill intent.
In order to avoid any misunderstanding, the petitioner,
acting bona fide, issued a clarification on 10.01.2022
regarding the jovial remark made in reference to Ms. Saina
Nehwal, stating that the comment was intended as a
reference to the idiom "cock-and-bull story" and not
otherwise. The clarification read as follows: "COCK & BULL
-- That's the reference. Reading otherwise is unfair and
leading! Nothing disrespectful was intended, said or
insinuated. Period." Furthermore, Ms. Saina Nehwal, in a
press statement published in the New Indian Express
(Online Edition) dated 13.01.2022, acknowledged that the
petitioner had apologized for the comment and expressed
satisfaction with the same. It is further submitted that the
respondent No.2 has no locus standi to lodge the present
complaint. There is no incriminating material on record to
substantiate the allegations made against the petitioner-
accused. The contents of the FIR as well as charge sheet
do not disclose the necessary and essential ingredients
required to constitute the offences under Section 67 of the
Act and Section 509 of the IPC.
05. With the above submissions, learned counsel
for the petitioner-accused while praying for the quashment
of criminal proceedings relied upon a decision of the
Honourable Supreme Court in Apoorva Arora and
another v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and
another 1, wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.41 to 43,
52 to 54 that:
(2024) 6 Supreme Court Cases 181
"41. The specific material which the High Court
found to be obscene, i.e., that which tends to
deprave and corrupt impressionable minds,
was "foul, indecent and profane" language.
Nothing more. The High Court has equated
profanities and vulgarity with obscenity, without
undertaking a proper or detailed analysis into
how such language, by itself, could be sexual,
lascivious, prurient, or depraving and
corrupting. It is well-established from the
precedents cited that vulgarity and profanities
do not per se amount to obscenity. While a
person may find vulgar and expletive-filled
language to be distasteful, unpalatable, uncivil,
and improper, that by itself is not sufficient to
be 'obscene'. Obscenity relates to material that
arouses sexual and lustful thoughts, which is
not at all the effect of the abusive language or
profanities that have been employed in the
episode. Rather, such language may evoke
disgust, revulsion, or shock. The reality of the
High Court's finding is that once it found the
language to be profane and vulgar, it has in
fact moved away from the requirements of
obscenity under Section 67 of the IT Act. The
High Court failed to notice the inherent
contradiction in its conclusions.
42. Third, the High Court has erred in the legal
approach followed by it while assessing
whether the material is obscene. In Samaresh
Bose (supra), this Court has laid down, in great
depth and detail, the process and method that
must be followed to objectively judge whether
the material is obscene. The court must
consider the work as a whole and then the
specific portions that have been alleged to be
obscene in the context of the whole work to
arrive at its conclusion. Further, the court must
first step into the position of the creator to
understand what he intends to convey from the
work and whether it has any literary or artistic
value. It must then step into the position of the
reader or viewer who is likely to consume the
work and appreciate the possible influence on
the minds of such reader. However, the High
Court has not followed this judicial process
before arriving at its conclusion, which is as
follows:
"43. Coming back to case at hand,
the specific complaint of petitioner is
that in Episode 05 of Season 01,
airtime starting from 5 minutes and
24 seconds onwards upto 6 minutes
and 40 seconds as well as from 25
minutes and 28 seconds upto 25
minutes and 46 seconds, the
language of male and female
protagonist is full of obscenity, vulgar
words and expletives, without there
being any warning or filter imposing
restriction of age of viewers to whom
the content should be visible. The
language used in Episode 05 of
Season 01 was heard by this Court,
and the level of obscenity of the
language and sentences used was
such that this Court cannot
reproduce it in the judgment itself for
the purpose of adjudication. The
language used in the web series at
the abovementioned time referred to
a sexually explicit act in spoken
language. It is not just an expletive,
but is profane and vulgar language
being used referring to a sexually
explicit act which certainly cannot be
termed common or commonly
accepted language. Rather the
female protagonist in the series itself
is heard objecting to the male
protagonist and expressing her
disgust over use of this language by
repeating the same language herself
to the male protagonist. In answer to
that, the male protagonist further
uses more vulgar expletives and
indecent language which is bound to
disgust a normal prudent man, if
heard in public. Later in the said
episode, the female protagonist uses
the same obscene, sexually explicit
language to others and the male
protagonist is seen enjoying and
appreciating her conduct. The male
protagonist uses words describing
male and female genitalia and
sexual act, thus by words, painting
pictures of sexually explicit act which
brings it under ambit of arousing
prurient feelings by so doing. There's
no escape from the same by saying
that the said act was not done,
shown or filmed. Depiction does not
connote filming alone but conveying
by a medium, which in this case is
spoken language. Therefore, the
content as discussed above will
attract the criminality as laid down
under Section 67 as well as 67A of
IT Act."
43. It is evident from the above passages that
the High Court has taken the meaning of the
language in its literal sense, outside the
context in which such expletives have been
spoken. While the literal meaning of the terms
used may be sexual in nature and they may
refer to sexual acts, their usage does not
arouse sexual feelings or lust in any viewer of
ordinary prudence and common sense. Rather,
the common usage of these words is reflective
of emotions of anger, rage, frustration, grief, or
perhaps excitement. By taking the literal
meaning of these words, the High Court failed
to consider the specific material (profane
language) in the context of the larger web-
series and by the standard of an "ordinary man
of common sense and prudence". When we
notice the use of such language in the context
of the plot and theme of the web-series, which
is a light-hearted show on the college lives of
young students, it is clear that the use of these
terms is not related to sex and does not have
any sexual connotation. Neither did the creator
of the web-series intend for the language to be
taken in its literal sense nor is that the impact
on a reasonable viewer who will watch the
material. Therefore, there is a clear error in the
legal approach adopted by the High Court in
analysing and examining the material to
determine obscenity.
52. The facts of the present case certainly do
not attract Section 67A as the complainant's
grievance is about excessive usage of vulgar
expletives, swear words, and profanities. There
is no allegation of any 'sexually explicit act or
conduct' in the complaint and as such, Section
67A does not get attracted.
53. Section 67A criminalises publication,
transmission, causing to publish or transmit -
in electronic form - any material that contains
sexually explicit act or conduct. Though the
three expressions "explicit", "act", and
"conduct" are open-textured and are capable of
encompassing wide meaning, the phrase may
have to be seen in the context of 'obscenity' as
provided in Section 67. Thus, there could be a
connect between Section 67A and Section 67
itself. For example, there could be sexually
explicit act or conduct which may not be
lascivious. Equally, such act or conduct might
not appeal to prurient interests. On the
contrary, a sexually explicit act or conduct
presented in an artistic or a devotional form
may have exactly the opposite effect, rather
than tending to deprave and corrupt a person.
54. No offence of publication or transmission of
any material in electronic form, which is
obscene, lascivious, or appealing to prurient
interest, and/or having the effect of tending to
deprave and corrupt persons, as provided
under Section 67 of the IT act, is made out.
Equally, no case of publication or transmission
of material containing sexually explicit act or
conduct, as provided under Section 67A, is
made out from the bare reading of the
complaint. It is settled that a court must
exercise its jurisdiction to quash an FIR or
criminal complaint when the allegations made
therein, taken prima facie, do not disclose the
commission of any offence."
06. On the other hand, learned Assistant Public
Prosecutor appearing for the State-respondent No.1
contended that there are triable issues and factual aspects
to be examined by the learned trial Court and it is not a fit
case to quash the proceedings against the petitioner at this
juncture and the matter is to be decided after conducting
trial by the learned trial Court and prayed to dismiss this
Criminal Petition.
07. In view of the facts and circumstances of the
case, it is relevant to extract Section 67 of the Act and
Section 509 of the IPC, which reads as under:
Section 67 of the Act: Punishment for
publishing or transmitting obscene material in
electronic form- Whoever publishes or
transmits or causes to be published or
transmitted in the electronic form, any material
which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient
interest or if its effect is such as to tend to
deprave and corrupt persons who are likely,
having regard to all relevant circumstances, to
read, see or hear the matter contained or
embodied in it, shall be punished on first
conviction with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to
three years and with fine which may extend to
five lakh rupees and in the event of second or
subsequent conviction with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend
to five years and also with fine which may
extend to ten lakh rupees.
Section 509 of IPC: Word, gesture or act
intended to insult the modesty of a woman.--
Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of
any woman, utters any word, makes any sound
or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending
that such word or sound shall be heard, or that
such gesture or object shall be seen, by such
woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such
woman, shall be punished with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years, and also with fine.
08. Having regard to the submissions made by
both sides and upon perusal of the material available on
record, it is evident that the present complaint arises out of
a tweet dated 06.01.2022 made by the petitioner-accused
in response to an earlier tweet dated 05.01.2022 posted by
Ms. Saina Nehwal concerning the alleged security lapse in
the convoy of the Prime Minister. The petitioner-accused is
stated to have retweeted the said post with the following
comment: "Subtle cock champion of the world... Thank
God we have protectors of India. (Sic) Shame on you
#Rihanna." Alleging that the said tweet was defamatory in
nature and derogatory towards Ms. Saina Nehwal, the
respondent No.2, a third party and unconnected with the
incident, has filed the present complaint against the
petitioner-accused.
09. In order to attract the offence under Section 67
of the Act, there must be specific allegations pertaining to
the publication or transmission of obscene material in
electronic form, which is lascivious in nature, appeals to the
prurient interest, or has the tendency to deprave and
corrupt persons who are likely to read, see, or hear the
content. Similarly, for the offence under Section 509 of the
IPC to be made out, there must be a clear allegation that
the accused uttered words, made gestures, or exhibited
any act intended to insult the modesty of a woman. In the
absence of such foundational allegations, the essential
ingredients of the aforementioned offences cannot be said
to be satisfied.
10. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner-
accused subsequently issued a clarification by way of a
tweet dated 10.01.2022, wherein he stated that his earlier
comment was intended to be interpreted as a reference to
a "cock-and-bull" story and not otherwise. The clarification
reads as follows: "COCK & BULL -- That's the reference.
Reading otherwise is unfair and leading! Nothing
disrespectful was intended, said or insinuated. Period." In
response thereto, Ms. Saina Nehwal issued a press
statement, as reported in the New Indian Express (Online
Edition) dated 13.01.2022, wherein she stated that she was
satisfied with the clarification and apology tendered by the
petitioner-accused in respect of the said comment.
11. It is a well-settled principle of law, as affirmed
by various judicial pronouncements, that the mere use of
vulgar, profane, or intemperate language does not, in itself,
amount to "obscenity" within the meaning of the law. While
such language may be regarded by some as offensive,
distasteful, uncivil, or inappropriate, such subjective
perceptions are not sufficient to attract the legal definition of
'obscenity'. In legal parlance, obscenity refers to material
which has the tendency to deprave or corrupt the minds of
those likely to read, see, or hear it by arousing prurient
interest or sexually explicit thoughts. In the present
context, the alleged use of abusive or expletive-laden
language does not satisfy this threshold, as it neither
evokes nor is intended to evoke any sexual or lustful
imagery or connotation.
12. In order to attract the alleged offences under
Section 67 of the Act and Section 509 of IPC, there must
be publication, or transmission of obscene material that
outrages the modesty of a woman or is intended to do so.
However, upon a careful and meticulous examination of the
material available on record, it is evident that the
controversy stems from an exchange of tweets between the
petitioner-accused and Ms. Saina Nehwal, wherein a tweet
made by the petitioner-accused intended in a jocular
manner was allegedly misconstrued. The petitioner-
accused promptly issued a clarification dated 10.01.2022,
explaining the context and denying any intent to cause
offence. It is further borne out from the record that Ms.
Saina Nehwal, in a public statement reported in the New
Indian Express (Online Edition) dated 13.01.2022,
expressed satisfaction with the petitioner's apology and
stated that she was not troubled by the remark. Apart from
the statement of the respondent No.2, who is a third party
and not personally aggrieved, there is no material on record
to suggest that Ms. Saina Nehwal herself felt outraged or
insulted by the said tweet. In such circumstances, even if
the contents of the FIR and charge sheet are taken at face
value and accepted in their entirety, they do not disclose
the essential ingredients required to constitute offences
under Section 67 of the Act and Section 509 of IPC.
13. In State of Haryana and others v. Ch.Bhajan
Lal and others 2 the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held
that:
"In the exercise of the extra-ordinary power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
the following categories of cases are given by
way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guide myriad kinds of cases wherein
such power should be exercised:
(1) where the allegations made in the First
Information Report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the
accused;
(2) where the allegations in the First
Information Report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the
Code;
(3) where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or 'complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same
1992 SCC (SUPP) 1 335
do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the
accused;
(4) where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code;
(5) where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused;
(6) where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code
or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress
for the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge."
14. In the present case, as discussed hereinabove,
the material on record reveals that the controversy arose
from an exchange of tweets between the petitioner-
accused and Ms. Saina Nehwal. Notably, the respondent
No.2, who is a third party and not personally aggrieved by
the alleged act, has lodged the present complaint without
any locus standi. A perusal of the charge sheet fails to
disclose any specific instance of obscene content having
been published that would amount to outraging the
modesty of a woman, as contemplated under the relevant
provisions of law. Furthermore, no independent witnesses
including Ms. Saina Nehwal herself or any representative
from the Twitter platform were examined by the
investigating agency to substantiate the allegations levelled
against the petitioner-accused. In the absence of such
material, even if the allegations contained in the FIR and
the charge sheet are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety, they do not, prima facie, disclose the
commission of any cognizable offence against the
petitioner-accused. Therefore, the present case falls within
the parameters of point No.3 of Ch.Bhajan Lal's case cited
supra.
15. In view of the aforementioned facts and
circumstances and having regard to the well-settled
principles of law enunciated by the Honourable Supreme
Court in the decisions referred supra, this Court is of the
considered view that the essential ingredients necessary to
constitute the offences under Sections 67 of the Act and
509 of the IPC are not made out against the petitioner-
accused. Hence, the continuation of the criminal
proceedings against the petitioner-accused amounts to
abuse of process of law and the same are liable to be
quashed.
16. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is allowed
and the criminal proceedings against the petitioner-accused
in C.C.No.3610 of 2023 on the file of the learned XII
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Nampally,
Hyderabad, are hereby quashed.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if
any, shall stand closed.
__________________
JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J
Dated: 25-JUL-2025
KHRM
