Telangana High Court
Shri. Pujari Ratnakar Suresh ... vs Cbi, Acb, Hyderabad on 28 January, 2025
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.8129 OF 2024
ORDER:
This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioner/accused
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for
short 'Cr.P.C.') to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.1 of 2024 on
the file of Principal Special Judge for CBI Cases, Nampally,
Hyderabad. The offence alleged against the petitioner is under
Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended
in 2018) (for short 'P.C.Act').
2. The facts of the case are that a written complaint was
lodged by Sri T. Jagadeeswara Rao on 29.06.2022 alleging that
the complainant met Suresh at his office chamber, Sri
Suresh/petitioner herein initially demanded an amount of Rs.10
lakhs for extending the currency of work under agreement dated
11.01.2019 being carried out by the complainant, beyond
30.06.2022 and directed the complainant to pay Rs.5 Lakhs as
first instalment at his residence at Nacharam, Hyderabad in the
evening of 29.06.2022 and also to submit a request letter
seeking extension of currency under 17A (ii) of GCC. As the
complainant did not want to pay bribe, he gave a written
complaint to the Superintendent of Police, CBI, ACB,
Hyderabad. Accordingly, trap was laid and petitioner was
caught red handedly while demanding and accepting the
amount of Rs.5 Lakhs from the complainant.
3. Heard Sri Chetluru Srinivas, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Sri Srinivas Kapadia, learned Special Public
Prosecutor appearing for CBI for the respondent.
4. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that
Section 5 of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1956 (for
short 'DSP Act') provides for the powers and jurisdiction of the
members of DSP Act for investigation under any of the offences
specified under notification under Section 3 may be extended to
any State. However, Section 6 of the DSP Act states that
nothing contained in Section shall be deemed to enable any
member of Delhi Special Police Establishment to exercise
Powers and jurisdiction in any area in a state, not being a Union
Territory or railway, or without the consent of the Government
of that State.
5. Learned counsel further contended that petitioner is
working in the State of Telangana and the Government of
Telangana, vide G.O.Ms.No.51 Home (Special) Department dated
30.08.2022, withdrew all previous general consents issued by
the State Government under Section 6 of the DSP Act. It clearly
states in G.O, that consequent to withdrawal of all previous
general consents issued earlier, including the notification issued
in G.O.Ms.No.160, Home (SC) Department dated 23.09.2016,
prior consent of Government of Telangana is required to be
taken on a case to case basis for investigation of any offence or
class of offences under Section 3 of the DSP Act, but in the
present case, no such consent was obtained by the investigating
officer for the investigation conducted from 30.08.2022 till filing
of charge sheet. As such, the investigation and charge sheet are
vitiated. His further contention is that CBI has registered
another case against the petitioner on the allegation of
possessing disproportionate assets. In the said case, CBI has
obtained individual consent and the second contention of
petitioner is that P.C. Act was amended in the year 2018 and
Section 17-A was introduced which contemplates previous
approval of Union Government in the case of employees of
Central Government before conducting any enquiry or inquiry or
investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed by
a public servant under the P.C.Act. No such mandatory
approval was obtained by the CBI as it is not the case of arrest
on the spot and arrest has taken place after one day, and
sufficient time was available between the date of FIR and date of
arrest. If an offence is registered merely on the basis of written
complaint of complainant, then disastrous consequences can be
culled upon on public servant thereby exposing them to
registration of offence and filing of charge sheet. A written
complaint can be made by any person who bore grudge or
prejudice against a public servant. The third contention of
petitioner is that there must be demand and the same should be
corroborated with the evidence submitted by CBI. In the instant
case, there is no such demand and corroboration. In support
of his contention, he relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Suraj Mal Vs State (Delhi Admin) 1, wherein
it was held that mere recovery of tainted money divorce from the
circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to convict
the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not
reliable. In the present case, substantive evidence of
corroboration of demand is not available with the prosecution.
The crucial question would be that whether the petitioner had
1 1979 4 SCC 725
demanded any amount as gratification to show any official
favour.
6. The forth contention of learned counsel for the petitioner
is that even if the allegations in the charge sheet on its face
value is taken to be true, no prima-facie case is made out by the
respondent. He relied on the judgment in State of Haryana
and Others Vs Bhajan Lal and Others 2 and contended that the
voice recorder and other devices are not legally valid and the
same cannot be taken as corroborative evidence. Admittedly, it
is borne out of charge sheet and that the alleged conversion is
not audible and the same cannot be considered. Hence, the
prosecution becomes a futile exercise as the material available
do not show the offences are made out against the petitioner.
7. The further contention of petitioner is that the case file
pertaining to extension of currency in favour of complainant is
not on the table of petitioner. Therefore, petitioner has no
opportunity to obtain any favour from the complainant to attract
the ingredients of Section 7 of the P.C.Act. The letter of
extension should come through the office of Deputy Chief
Engineer, moreover, the complainant was issued slow progress
2 1992 Supp. 1 SCC 335
notice on 11.04.2022 to make good the progress, by the Deputy
chief Engineer who has to share his views and forward the said
letter for approval to the Chief Engineer. Further, the Deputy
Chief Engineer has also issued a letter wherein, it is stated that
the progress of work is poor and the contractor has been
deliberately postponing the work. The Deputy Chief Engineer
has reminded the contractor to submit corrected Quality
Assurance Plan and summoning the accused is a serious matter
and criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of
course. In the instant case, not even small evidence was
collected by the prosecution which charges the petitioner for the
offence punishable under Section 7 of the P.C.Act. Charge sheet
was filed on 02.02.2024, the case was posted for consideration
on 04.03.2024, charges were framed on 30.04.2024 within less
than two months of filing charge sheet. No opportunity was
given to the petitioner to make submissions on framing of
charges or filing a petition for discharge. It is further submitted
that the cases of the year 2009 are still pending while the
present which is of the year 2024 is posted for trial in July,
2024.
8. While advocating to quash the proceedings against the
petitioner, in support of the above contentions, he relied on the
judgments rendered in the cases of Anvar PV Vs. PK Basheer
and Others 3, Narendra Mishra Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 4,
Pepsi Foods Limited and Another Vs. Special Judicial
Magistrate and Others 5 whereunder, in paragraph Nos.3, 4, 16
and 28 it was held as under:
"3. There are two appellants, the second appellant
is the Managing Director of the first appellant. The
respondents are three. First respondent is the court
where the appellants along with others have been
summoned for having committed offences under
Sections 7/16 of the Act. The second respondent is
the complainant and the third respondent is the
State of Uttar Pradesh.
4. The allegation in the complaint is that the
complainant was sold a bottle of beverage under the
brand "Lehar Pepsi" which was adulterated. The
bottle was purchased by the complainant on 13-9-
1993. He filed the complaint on 6-5-1994. After
recording preliminary evidence the Magistrate
passed orders summoning the appellants and
others on 9-5-1994. It appears that when the
summons reached the appellants they immediately
approached the High Court seeking the aforesaid
reliefs. The High Court, however, refused to
entertain the writ petition on the ground that the
appellants should approach the first respondent for
their discharge under Section 245 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (for short "the Code") if the
complaint did not disclose commission of any
offence by the appellants and the Court considered
the charge to be groundless. The High Court did not
approve of the appellants approaching it under writ
jurisdiction when sufficient remedy was available
under the Code. The High Court was also of the
opinion that it could not be said at that stage that
3 (2014) 10 SCC 473
4 2022 LawSuit (MP) 226
5 (1998) 5 SCC 749
the allegations in the complaint were so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent man could ever reach a just conclusion
that there existed no sufficient ground for
proceedings against the accused. On the plea of the
appellants that the provisions of Section 13(2) of
the Act read with Rule 9-A of the Rules framed
under the Act were violated and on that account
the inquiry or trial stood vitiated the High Court
said that the appellants could well approach the
court for that purpose and that it was no stage for
the High Court to record its finding. Yet another
plea of the appellants that provisions of Sections
203 and 245(2) of the Code did not provide an
adequate remedy for a person charged on flimsy
grounds and that in view of the decision of this
Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : JT (1990) 4 SC
650] the Court should interfere also did not find
favour with the High Court. It was of the opinion
that Bhajan Lal case [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : JT (1990) 4 SC 650] pertained
to a cognizable offence where the police had taken
cognizance of the matter and in a complaint case
the Magistrate was empowered to discharge the
accused at any stage of the trial if it was found that
the charge was groundless.
16. The complainant (second respondent) is a
student. He says that he is appearing in
examinations in various State and Central Services.
On 13-9-1993, he went to a shop known as "The
Flavours Fast Food and Cool Corner" and
purchased 500 ml chilled bottle of "Lehar Pepsi" for
drinking. Nitin Sachdeva is stated to have (accused
named as No. 1) sold the bottle to the complainant.
After he had consumed the beverage contained in
the bottle, the complainant felt a strange taste. On
observation, he found that the bottle contained
many white particles. The complainant felt giddy
and nauseated. One Divya Trivedi was present at
the shop as a customer. Another shopkeeper by the
name Lal Bahadur Singh who owned a shop
opposite to the one from where the complainant
purchased the "Lehar Pepsi" bottle was also
present. They were shown the bottle by the
complainant. The beverage was put in two glasses
to see the white particles clearly and Nitin
Sachdeva accepted the presence of the particles.
Suspecting adulteration, the complainant told Nitin
Sachdeva that he would take a sample of the
beverage for analysis. He thereupon gave notice to
Nitin Sachdeva, purchased three clean and dry
empty new plastic jars from nearby Suri Stores and
filled up the same with the beverage and which,
according to the complainant, were sealed as per
rules, wrapped in the paper and tied with thick
yarn. Nitin Sachdeva signed the jars and put stamp
of his shop thereon. The complainant obtained the
stamp of the shop "The Flavours Fast Food and
Cool Corner" on a separate paper and one jar of the
sample with stamp used on the sample was
deposited by the complainant in the office of the
State Public Analyst, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow on
20-9-1993 for analysis. The complainant says that
the three jars were sealed in the presence of the
witnesses and he also recorded their statements in
writing including that of Nitin Sachdeva. The
complainant also made a report to the police on 13-
9-1993 itself about the incident.
28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is
a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into
motion as a matter of course. It is not that the
complainant has to bring only two witnesses to
support his allegations in the complaint to have the
criminal law set into motion. The order of the
Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect
that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case
and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine
the nature of allegations made in the complaint and
the evidence both oral and documentary in support
thereof and would that be sufficient for the
complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to
the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent
spectator at the time of recording of preliminary
evidence before summoning of the accused. The
Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence
brought on record and may even himself put
questions to the complainant and his witnesses to
elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the
allegations or otherwise and then examine if any
offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the
accused."
9. In addition, reliance was also placed upon the following
judgments:
• State of Karnataka vs. L.Muniswamy and Others 6, in
paragraph Nos.9 to 11 it was observed as follows:
9. Learned counsel for the State Government relies
upon a decision of this Court in R.P. Kapur v. State
of Punjab [(1960) 3 SCR 388 : AIR 1960 SC 866 :
(1961) 1 SCJ 59 : 1960 CrLJ 1239] in which it was
held that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction
under Section 561-A of the Code of 1898, the High
Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to
whether the evidence in the case is reliable or not.
That may be so. But in the instant case the
question is not whether any reliance can be placed
on the veracity of this or that particular witness.
The fact of the matter is that there is no material on
the record on the basis of which any tribunal could
reasonably come to the conclusion that the
respondents are in any manner connected with the
incident leading to the prosecution.
Gajendragadkar, J., who spoke for the Court
in Kapur case observes in his judgment that it was
not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any
inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of
the High Court's inherent jurisdiction. The three
instances cited in the judgment as to when the
High Court would be justified in exercising its
inherent jurisdiction are only illustrative and can in
the very nature of things not be regarded as
exhaustive. Considerations justifying the exercise of
inherent powers for securing the ends of justice
naturally vary from case to case and a jurisdiction
as wholesome as the one conferred by Section 482
ought not to be encased within the strait-jacket of a
rigid formula.
10. On the other hand, the decisions cited by
learned counsel for the respondents in Vadilal
Panchal v. D.D. Ghadigaonkar [AIR 1960 SC 1113 :
1960 Cri LJ 1499 : 62 Bom LR 915] and Century
Spinning & Manufacturing Co. v. State of
Maharashra [AIR 1972 SC 545 : 1972 Cri LJ
3291972 SCC (Cri) 495] show that it is wrong to say
6 (1977) 2 SCC 699
that at the stage of framing charges the court
cannot apply its judicial mind to the consideration
whether or not there is any ground for presuming
the commission of the offence by the accused. As
observed in the latter case, the order framing a
charge affects a person's liberty substantially and
therefore it is the duty of the court to consider
judicially whether the material warrants the
framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the
decision of the prosecution that the accused be
asked to face a trial. In Vadilal Panchal case,
Section 203 of the old Code was under
consideration, which provided that the Magistrate
could dismiss a complaint if after considering
certain matters mentioned in the section there was
in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding
with the case. To an extent Section 327 of the new
Code contains an analogous power which is
conferred on the Sessions Court. It was held by this
Court, while considering the true scope of Section
203 of the old Code that the Magistrate was not
bound to accept the result o f an enquiry or
investigation and that he must apply his judicial
mind to the material on which he had to form his
judgment. These decisions show that for the
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against an accused the court
possesses a comparatively wider discretion in the
exercise of which it can determine the question
whether the material on the record, if unrebutted,
is such on the basis of which a conviction can be
said reasonably to be possible.
11. We are therefore in agreement with the view of
the High Court that the material on which the
prosecution proposes to rely against the
respondents is wholly inadequate to sustain the
charge that they are in any manner connected with
the assault on the complainant. We would,
however, like to observe that nothing in our
judgment or in the judgment of the High Court
should be taken as detracting from the case of the
prosecution, to which we have not applied our
mind, as against Accused 1 to 9. The case against
those accused must take its due and lawful
course."
• In the case of Subramanian Swamy Vs. Manmohan
Singh and Another 7 whereunder, in paragraph Nos.73
and 74 it was observed as follows:
"73. It was pointed out by the Constitution Bench of this
Court in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar [(1987) 1 SCC
288 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 82] , SCC at p. 315: (SCC para 14)
"14. ... It is now settled law that a criminal proceeding is not a
proceeding for vindication of a private grievance but it is a
proceeding initiated for the purpose of punishment to the
offender in the interest of the society. It is for maintaining
stability and orderliness in the society that certain acts are
constituted offences and the right is given to any citizen to set
the machinery of the criminal law in motion for the purpose of
bringing the offender to book. It is for this reason that in A.R.
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 277]
this Court pointed out that: (SCC p. 509, para 6)
'6. ... Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society
being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for
larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot
be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a
straitjacket formula of locus standi....'"
74. Keeping those principles in mind, as we must, if we look at
Section 19 of the PC Act which bars a court from taking
cognizance of cases of corruption against a public servant
under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Act, unless the
Central or the State Government, as the case may be, has
accorded sanction, virtually imposes fetters on private citizens
and also on prosecutors from approaching court against
corrupt public servants. These protections are not available to
other citizens. Public servants are treated as a special class of
persons enjoying the said protection so that they can perform
their duties without fear and favour and without threats of
malicious prosecution. However, the said protection against
malicious prosecution which was extended in public interest
cannot become a shield to protect corrupt officials. These
provisions being exceptions to the equality provision of Article
14 are analogous to the provisions of protective discrimination
and these protections must be construed very narrowly. These
(2012) 3 SCC 64
procedural provisions relating to sanction must be construed
in such a manner as to advance the causes of honesty and
justice and good governance as opposed to escalation of
corruption."
• In Panalal Damodar Rathi Vs State of Maharashtra 8,
reliance was placed in paras 8, 9 and 11, which reads as
under :
8. There could be no doubt that the evidence of the
complainant should be corroborated in material
particulars. After introduction of Section 165-A of the
Penal Code, 1860 making the person who offers bribe
guilty of abetment of bribery, the complainant cannot be
placed on any better footing than that of an accomplice
and corroboration in material particulars connecting the
accused with the crime has to be insisted upon. It has to
be borne in mind that the marked notes were recovered
from the possession of the second accused and not the
appellant. It is the case of the prosecution that the
marked notes were paid to the second accused for the
purpose of being handed over to the appellant. The
evidence of the complainant regarding the conversation
between him and the accused has been set out earlier.
As the entire case of the prosecution depends upon the
acceptance of the evidence relating to the conversation
between the complainant and the appellant during
which the appellant demanded the money and directed
payment to the second accused which was accepted by
the complainant, we will have to see whether this part of
the evidence of complainant has been corroborated. The
prosecution relies on the testimony of PW 3, the panch
witness, as corroborating the evidence of the
complainant on this aspect. It may be reiterated that
according to the complainant when he asked the
appellant to relieve him from the case and to see that he
was given a lesser sentence, the appellant asked him if
he had brought the money and the complainant told him
that he had and the appellant asked the complainant to
pay the money to Dalvi, the second accused, and asked
the second accused to receive the money from the
8 (1979) 4 Supreme Court Cases 526
complainant. On this aspect the evidence of PW 3 is as
follows:
"They saw the appellant coming out of the court
hall and the complainant informed them that he was the
Police Prosecutor. Then there was a talk between the
complainant and the appellant in the verandah. The
witness was at a distance of 3 to 4 feet from them and
was in a position to overhear the conversation.
According to the witness he heard the appellant asking
the complainant 'Have you come', the complainant then
said 'Yes'. The witness further heard the appellant
saying that he would see that heavy punishment is not
inflicted and the case as it is, was difficult. The
complainant had then asked the appellant whether his
work will be achieved. The appellant assured him in the
affirmative. The appellant told the complainant to give
what was to be given to the second accused."
9. It will be seen that the version of the complainant
that the appellant asked the complainant whether he
had brought the money and that the complainant told
him that he had and that the appellant asked him to pay
the money to the second accused is not spoken to by the
panch witness PW 3. According to panch witness on the
complainant asking the appellant whether his work will
be achieved, the appellant assured him in the affirmative
and the appellant told the complainant what was to be
given to the second accused. It is significant that PW 3
does not mention about the appellant asking the
complainant whether he had brought the money and on
the complainant replying in the affirmative asking the
complainant to pay the money to the second accused.
Omission by PW 3 to refer to any mention of money by
the appellant would show that there is no corroboration
of testimony of the complainant regarding the demand
for the money by the appellant. On this crucial aspect,
therefore, it has to be found that the version of the
complainant is not corroborated and, therefore, the
evidence of the complainant on this aspect cannot be
relied on.
11. We are conscious of the fact that both the trial
court as well as the appellate court accepted the
evidence of the complainant and PW 3 and found the
appellant guilty. Though this Court normally will not
interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts
below, we feel that on the material placed before us it
will be hazardous to base a conviction. The marked
notes were not recovered from the appellant. The
prosecution case is that the money was paid to the
second accused to be handed over to the appellant. The
complicity of the appellant is sought to be established by
the conversation that took place between the
complainant and the appellant in the presence of PW 3.
The version regarding the conversation as given by the
complainant and PW 3 is not consistent. In the
circumstances, we are constrained to give the benefit of
doubt. In doing so we make it clear that we are not
convinced about the innocence of the appellant. We feel
on the material before us, though there is grave
suspicion, the guilt of the accused has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt. In the
circumstances, we are constrained to give the benefit of
doubt to the appellant. In the result, we allow the
appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence and acquit
the appellant."
• In State of Kerala and another Vs C.P.Rao 9, in
para 7 and 10, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as
under :
• "7. In the background of these facts, especially the non-
examination of CW 1, was found very crucial by the High
Court. The High Court has referred to the decision of this
Court in Panalal Damodar Rathi v. State of
Maharashtra [(1979) 4 SCC 526 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 121] wherein
a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that when there was
no corroboration of testimony of the complainant regarding
the demand of bribe by the accused, it has to be accepted that
the version of the complainant is not corroborated and,
therefore, the evidence of the complainant cannot be relied on.
In the aforesaid circumstances, the three-Judge Bench
in Panalal Damodar Rathi case [(1979) 4 SCC 526 : 1980 SCC
(Cri) 121] held that there is grave suspicion about the
appellant's complicity and the case has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. (See SCC para 11.)"
10. In C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [(2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2
SCC (Cri) 1] , this Court while dealing with the case under the
9 (2011) 6 Supreme Court Cases 450
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, by referring to its previous
decision in Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1979) 4 SCC 725
: 1980 SCC (Cri) 159] held that mere recovery of tainted
money, divorced from the circumstances under which it is
paid, is not sufficient to convict the accused when the
substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The mere
recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution
against the accused. In the absence of any evidence to prove
payment of bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily
accepted the money knowing it to be bribe, conviction cannot
be sustained. (See SCC para 18.)"
10. Relying on the above judgments learned counsel for the
petitioner prayed to quash the proceedings initiated against the
petitioner.
11. On the other hand, the learned Special Public Prosecutor
appearing for the respondent would submit that no sanction is
required for proceeding with the case and no permission is
required for spot arrest, though learned counsel for the
petitioner submit that sanction was not obtained under Section
17-A of the P.C. Act, it is not necessary for the trap case and the
said section itself says that no such approval is necessary for
cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of
accepting or demanding to accept any undue advantage for
himself or for any other person. In the present case also,
petitioner was trapped and was arrested on the spot on
30.06.2022 and there is no illegality in his arrest.
12. Learned Special Public Prosecutor further submits that
the contention of petitioner that as he is a Central Government
employee, prosecution has to take permission from the Central
Government, whereas in a trap case, no sanction is necessary
for prosecuting the accused as he was caught red handedly.
Therefore, there is no illegality in prosecuting the accused.
Whether there is any file pending before the accused for which
official favour is sought, and with regarding to audio recordings,
it can be adjudicated during the course of trial. In a petition
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C, the Court cannot go into the said
aspects and it is the duty of trial Court to decide the same. As
such, prayed this Court to dismiss this petition.
13. Having regard to the submissions made by both the
counsel and the material on record, the first contention of
learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no sanction
under Section 17-A of the P.C.Act, which is mandatory and the
same reads as under :
"17A. Enquiry or Inquiry or investigation of offences
relatable to recommendations made or decision taken by
public servant in discharge of official functions or duties.--
No police officer shall conduct any enquiry or inquiry or
investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed
by a public servant under this Act, where the alleged offence is
relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by
such public servant in discharge of his official functions or
duties, without the previous approval--
(a) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time
when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in
connection with the affairs of the Union, of that Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time
when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in
connection with the affairs of a State, of that Government;
(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent
to remove him from his office, at the time when the offence
was alleged to have been committed:
Provided that no such approval shall be necessary for cases
involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of
accepting or attempting to accept any undue advantage for
himself or for any other person:
Provided further that the concerned authority shall convey its
decision under this section within a period of three months,
which may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such
authority, be extended by a further period of one month.]"
14. The contention of learned Special Public Prosecutor is
that as it is a trap case and petitioner was arrested on the spot,
sanction is not necessary. The first proviso of Section 17-A says
that no such approval is necessary for cases involving arrest of a
person on the spot on the charge of accepting or attempting to
accept any undue advantage for himself or for any other person.
As such, there is no illegality in arresting the petitioner and no
sanction is required. Though learned counsel for the petitioner
contended that G.O.Ms.No.160, Home (SC) Department dated
23.09.2016, was issued stating that prior sanction of
Government of Telangana is required to be taken on a case to
case basis for investigation of any offence or class of offences
under Section 3 of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946
by the Delhi Special Police established in the State of Telangana,
there is no dispute that for each case, the CBI has to take
permission from the State Government on case to case basis,
whereas in the present case, it is a trap case. Hence, there is no
illegality and no prior sanction is required to be taken. Hence,
there is no force in the contention of petitioner on the aspect of
sanction.
15. Further, the second contention of petitioner is that there
must be demand and the same should be corroborated with the
evidence submitted by the CBI. In the instant case, there is no
such demand and corroboration for demand. The further
contention is that the voice records and other devices are not
legally valid and the same cannot be taken as corroborative
evidence. Going through the said contentions, this Court is of
the considered opinion that these contentions are inappropriate
to consider when exercising jurisdiction for the following
reasons;
i. Firstly, the requirement of corroboration depends
on the evidence presented which is a determination for the trial
Court. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to encroach
upon the trial Court's jurisdiction. Similarly, the authenticity
and reliability of digital evidence is also the matter for the trial
Court to decide. Consequently, this Court finds no merit in
these contentions.
[[ ii. The another contention is that there is no favour
pending with the petitioner and the complainant was issued
slow progress notice dated 11.04.2022 by the Deputy Chief
Engineer. The petitioner herein is the Chief Engineer and the
letter of extension was received from the office of Deputy Chief
Engineer, as such, there is no file pending before the petitioner
and the complainant himself is not working in accordance with
the contract and his performance was poor. The contention of
petitioner is that there is no file pending with him, and he is no
way concerned with extension of currency. The power of
quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very
sparingly and with circumspection and that too in rarest of rare
cases. The Court will not be justified in embarking upon an
enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the
extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer on arbitrary
jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims. This
Court cannot conduct mini trial while dealing with quash
petitions. It is for the trial Court to adjudicate those factual
aspects.
16. In the present case petitioner was red handedly caught by
the CBI. Therefore, the said contentions of petitioner cannot be
considered and all these allegations against the petitioner
require trial. Hence, the criminal petition merits no
consideration and the same is liable to be dismissed.
17. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is dismissed.
Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.
_______________
K. SUJANA, J
Date : 28.01.2025
Rds
