Telangana High Court

Smt. M.Lakshmi Devi vs The State Of Ap., Through Its P.P And ... on 14 February, 2025

                                       1



     THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE E.V. VENUGOPAL

       CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.2228 OF 2016

O R D E R:

      This    Criminal        Revision       Case      is    filed     by     the

petitioner/complainant        aggrieved        by    the    judgment        dated

10.01.2014 in Criminal Appeal No.1043 of 2012 on the file of the

learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad (for short, "the

appellate Court") confirming the judgment dated 19.04.2012 in

C.C.No.53 of 2009 on the file of the learned XIV Additional

Judge-cum-XVIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,

Hyderabad (for short, "the trial Court").

2. Heard Mr.Kiran Kumar, learned counsel representing

Ms.Mogili Anaveni, learned counsel for the petitioner,

Mr.E.Ganesh, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for

respondent No.1-State.

3. The brief facts of the case are that respondent

No.2/accused approached petitioner/complainant for hand loan

of Rs.15,00,000/- to meet his domestic needs, promising to repay

the same after his retirement. As such, the complainant gave the

said amount as hand loan to the accused. When the complainant

demanded the accused to return the money, he issued cheque

dated 04.02.2005 for an amount of Rs.15,00,000/-. On

presentation, the said cheque was returned unpaid with an

endorsement, "insufficient funds". Then the complainant issued

legal notice dated 02.03.2005 to the accused demanding him to

pay the amount due. In spite of receipt of the said notice, the

accused neither paid the amount nor issued any reply. Therefore,

the complainant filed the present complaint against the accused

for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act (for short, "NI Act").

4. The trial Court vide judgment dated 19.04.2012 in

C.C.No.53 of 2009 found the petitioner not guilty of the offence

under Section 138 of NI Act and acquitted him. Aggrieved by the

same, the petitioner preferred an Appeal.

5. The appellate Court, vide impugned judgment, dismissed

the Appeal confirming the judgment passed by the trial Court.

Assailing the same, the petitioner preferred the present Revision.

6. On behalf of the complainant, the trial Court examined the

complainant herself as PW1 and marked Exs.P1 to P6. On behalf

of the defence, DWs.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.D1 to D5 were

marked. Upon careful scrutiny of the oral and documentary

evidence, the trial Court observed that there is no whisper about

the execution of any document viz., either promissory note or an

acknowledgment/receipt under which the complainant has given

hand loan of Rs.15,00,000/-. A reasonable prudent man does not

believe that any person had lend such a huge amount of

Rs.15,00,000/- as hand loan without keeping any documentary

evidence as security. In the cross-examination of PW1, it was

elicited that except the document filed by him no other document

is available on record evidencing the said transaction. Therefore,

relying on the decisions passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Krishan Janardhan Bhat Vs. Dattatreya G. Hegde 1, Rangappa

Vs. Mohan 2, the decision passed by this Court in G.Veeresham

Vs. S.Shiva Shankar and another 3, P. Narasimha Reddy, Vs.

D.L. Narsimha Rao 4 and the evidence available on record, the

trial Court observed that there was no legally enforceable debt

and that no case was made out against the accused. Hence, the

trial Court rendered its judgment.

7. In the appeal, the appellate Court, upon re-appreciating the

evidence available on record observed that the complainant failed

to prove or probablise the existence of a legally enforceable debt.

(2008) ALD (Criminal) page 485

(2010) 11 SCC 441

2007 (2) ALD (Criminal) 420 (AP)

2004 (2) ALD (Criminal) 303 AP

Moreover, the amount under the cheque was Rs.15,00,000/- and

the complainant failed to show the source from which she could

raise such huge an amount. Therefore, the appellate Court, vide

impugned judgment, observed that the cheque was not issued in

discharge of legally enforceable debt and rendered its judgment.

8. It is well settled law that in an appeal against acquittal, the

appellate Court is circumscribed by the limitation that no

interference has to be made with the order unless the approach

made by the trial Court to the consideration of evidence is

vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by

it is such, which could not have been possibly arrived at by any

Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is therefore, to be

characterized as perverse. There is no embargo on the appellate

Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is

based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered

with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is

further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs

through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is

that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the

case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his

innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be

adopted.

9. In Mrinal Das Vs. State of Tripura 5 the Apex Court held

as under:

"It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact, is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its own conclusion. The appellate court can also review the

(2011) 9 SCC 479

conclusion arrived at by the trial Court with respect to both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed."

10. In Maloth Somaraju Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 6 the

Apex Court held that there can be no two opinions that merely

because the acquittal is found to be wrong and another view can

be taken, the judgment of acquittal cannot be upset. The

appellate Court has more and serious responsibility while dealing

with the judgment of acquittal and unless the acquittal is found

to be perverse or not at all supportable and where the appellate

Court comes to the conclusion that conviction is a must, the

judgment of acquittal cannot be upset. The appellate Court has

(2011) 8 SCC 635

to examine as to whether the trial Court, while upsetting the

acquittal, has taken such care.