Telangana High Court
A.R.Vilasitha vs The State Of Telangana on 3 February, 2025
Author: P. Sam Koshy
Bench: P.Sam Koshy
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA : HYDERABAD
***
WRIT PETITION No.36516 of 2024
Between:
A.R. Vilasitha, aged 47 years:
D/w Sri R Rajaiah, Occ: Junior Civil Judge,
(Under dismissal) R/o Flat No 402,
Sri Lakshmi Residency, Road No.3,
Opp PRM School Lane, Boduppal,
Hyderabad 500939: Mobile No. 897898774
email id: [email protected]
Petitioner
VERSUS
The State of Telangana,
Law (LA, LA &J Home courts.A2)
Department rep. by its Secretary to Government,
Legal Affairs, Legislative Affairs & Justice,
Government of Telangana, Secretariat,
Hyderabad and Others.
Respondents
ORDER PRONOUNCED ON: 03.02.2025
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? : Yes
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes
3. Whether His Lordship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes
__________________
P.SAM KOSHY, J
Page 2 of 10
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
+ WRIT PETITION No.36516 of 2024
% 03.02.2025
# Between:
A.R. Vilasitha, aged 47 years:
D/w Sri R Rajaiah, Occ: Junior Civil Judge,
(Under dismissal) R/o Flat No 402,
Sri Lakshmi Residency, Road No.3,
Opp PRM School Lane, Boduppal,
Hyderabad 500939: Mobile No. 897898774
email id: [email protected]
Petitioner
VERSUS
The State of Telangana,
Law (LA, LA &J Home courts.A2)
Department rep. by its Secretary to Government,
Legal Affairs, Legislative Affairs & Justice,
Government of Telangana, Secretariat,
Hyderabad and Others.
Respondents
! Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Mr. Dr. K. Lakshmi Narasimha,
learned counsel for the petitioner.
^Counsel for the respondent(s) : learned Government Pleader for Law &
Legislative Affairs appearing on behalf
of respondent No.1.
Mr. G. Vidya Sagar, learned Senior
Counsel representing Ms. Udaya Sri,
learned Standing Counsel appearing
on behalf of respondent No.2.
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1) (2014) 4 SCC 108
2) (2007) 2 SCC 112
3) (2006) 11 SCC 464
4) (2015) 1 SCC 347
Page 3 of 10
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
WRIT PETITION No.36516 of 2024
ORDER:
(per the Hon'ble Sri Justice P. Sam Koshy)
The instant Writ Petition has been filed by the petitioner
challenging the order passed by respondent No.1 vide G.O.Ms.No.20,
dated 02.04.2019, and also challenging the consequential order
passed by respondent No.2 vide ORDER ROC.NO.731 & 1525/2016-
Vigilance Cell, dated 09.04.2019, declaring it to be illegal, arbitrary,
contrary to law and wholly without jurisdiction.
2. Heard Dr. K. Lakshmi Narasimha, learned counsel for the
petitioner, learned Government Pleader for Law & Legislative Affairs
appearing on behalf of respondent No.1 and Mr. G. Vidya Sagar,
learned Senior Counsel representing Ms. Udaya Sri, learned Standing
Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2.
3. There is no dispute of the impugned order having been served
upon the petitioner promptly. Though the impugned order was served
promptly in April, 2019, the instant Writ Petition has been filed on
30.10.2024 i.e. after a gap of more than 5½ years. When the matter
was initially taken up for admission and upon the Bench putting up a
query so far as the delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching
the Writ Court, the petitioner took time to address the same and
meanwhile filed an additional affidavit. In the additional affidavit, the
petitioner has primarily put the blame for not filing the Writ Petition
promptly upon the different Counsels she had approached and
consulted; all of whom according to the petitioner did not co-operate in
prompt filing of the petition. The additional ground that the petitioner
has taken is also that of the financial distress she went into after
having lost her employment and the effects of the Covid-19 Pandemic
that took place during the period 2020-2022.
4. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner in the additional
affidavit has referred to a series of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the delay
laches have to be considered more pragmatically and with a liberal
view and also held that the delay or limitation in condone delay
petitions or the requests should not be rigidly applied particularly
when the petition pertains to enforcement of fundamental right or
where the petitioner / litigant has been subjected to great injustice.
5. Having heard the contentions put forth by the learned counsel
for the petitioner, admittedly considering the date of dismissal and the
date of filing, there is a delay of more than 5½ years. 5½ years gap is
not a small period for a person to agitate his / her grievance before
any Court of law. What needs to be appreciated at this juncture is that
the petitioner in the instant case was working as a Judicial Officer in
the State of Telangana. The petitioner is a person who is fully aware of
the rights and remedies available to her subsequent to the order of
dismissal from service having been passed and she is also supposed to
know law well. Therefore, the plea of ignorance and also not being
aware of her legal remedies cannot be sustained.
6. From the explanation that has been given in the additional
affidavit also, the first explanation provided is that after the impugned
order having been served upon the petitioner and she having been
dismissed from service with effect from 09.04.2019, she re-located
herself and came to Hyderabad and started staying with her elderly
parents. The further explanation so provided also shows that for the
first time she approached an Advocate in January, 2022. This itself
shows that for a period of around 3 years, she did not avail any legal
recourse or supposed to avail legal recourse during the intervening
period and now she is trying to take advantage of the Covid-19
Pandemic that took place in between. The Covid-19 Pandemic or for
that matter the lockdown also was imposed roughly after 11 months of
the impugned order was passed, which by itself is a long period of time
for any person to approach Writ Court ventilating their grievance,
particularly when the impugned order is one that of dismissal from
service and moreover it is difficult to accept the contention of the
petitioner, that she could not approach the Writ Court only because
she did not get a favorable support from any of the lawyers she had
consulted before filing of the present Writ Petition. When the petitioner
had approached one lawyer who for whatsoever being the reason had
not filed the petition promptly, the petitioner being a Judicial Officer
ought to have been cautious enough to ensure that she files a petition
immediately either by engaging another lawyer or by filing a petition
herself. The explanation so provided by the petitioner is not justifiable
or plausible explanation for the inordinate delay of more than 5½
years.
7. Apparently when there is a clear laxity on the part of the
petitioner in asserting her right and trying to rekindle the cause of
action which the petitioner herself had forsaken for a long period,
discretion cannot be exercised in favour of such a person.
8. It is by now well settled proposition of law that though for filing a
Writ Petition no fixed period of limitation is prescribed, nonetheless it
has to be filed promptly, if not within a reasonable period of time. In
the said circumstances when a petition, that too, of an Ex-Judicial
Officer who is fully conversant of the laws and the legal remedies
available to her, approaches Writ Court after a gap of more than 5½
years agitating her dismissal from service it clearly reflects the
petitioner to be guilty of delay laches. The Writ remedy should not be
permitted to be invoked by such indolent person and cannot now be
permitted to take advantage of her own deliberate act of not
approaching the Court promptly that too at this belated stage. The
Writ remedies are always available to somebody who is ever vigilant
and not indolent at all.
9. It would be relevant at this juncture to refer to the judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan
Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others vs. T.T. Murali
Babu 1 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with the aspect of
delay laches in paragraph No.16 has held as under, viz.,
"16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be
lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the
explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The
court should bear in mind that it is exercising an
extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional
court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but
simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary
principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate
reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure,
the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise
(2014) 4 SCC 108
whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or
not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain
circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in
most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite
disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court.
Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant
-- a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely,
"procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second,
law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix.
Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis."
10. Earlier also in the case of State of Uttaranchal Forest
Development Corpn. and Another vs. Jabar Singh and Others 2
wherein an order of termination itself was challenged, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held at paragraph No.43 as under, viz.,
"43. We are unable to countenance the above submission
of Mr Mehta and Mr Sangal insofar as it relates to the non-
maintainability of the writ petition and the delay and
laches. It is not in dispute that the effective alternative
remedy was not availed of by many of the workmen as
detailed in paragraphs supra. The termination order was
made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were
admittedly filed in the year 2005 after a delay of 10 years.
The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in
entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition
has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ
petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on
(2007) 2 SCC 112
the ground of laches. We have already referred to the
decision of this Court in U.P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S.
Pandey [(2005) 8 SCC 264]. This Court speaking through
Arijit Pasayat, J. has held in categorical terms that writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be
entertained when the statutory remedy is available under
the Act unless exceptional circumstances are made out."
11. In the case of U.P. Jal Nigam and Another vs. Jaswant Singh
and Another 3 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to extend the
benefit to the petitioners applying the principle of delay latches. It was
held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that when a person who is not
vigilant of his rights and acquiesces into a situation, his Writ Petition
cannot be heard after a couple of years on the ground that a similar
relief has been granted to some other persons who were vigilant
enough and had approached the Court timely and got the relief.
12. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others vs. Arvind
Kumar Srivastava and Others 4 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while
laying down the legal principles of delay latches had held in paragraph
No.22.2 as under, viz.,
"22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised
exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as
acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the
wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same
and woke up after long delay only because of the reason
(2006) 11 SCC 464
(2015) 1 SCC 347
that their counterparts who had approached the court
earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such
employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment
rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be
extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters
and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be
a valid ground to dismiss their claim."
13. In view of the judicial precedents touching the aspect of delay
latches referred to in the preceding paragraphs and upon seeing the
inordinate delay of more than 5½ years, coupled with the fact, the
weak justification and explanation which is not plausible or
satisfactory in any manner forces this Bench to hold that the instant
Writ Petition suffers from delay laches and deserves to be dismissed.
14. The instant Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
15. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand
closed.
__________________
P.SAM KOSHY, J
_________________________________
NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA, J
Date: 03.02.2025
Note: LR Copy to be marked.
B/o.GSD
