[Cites 3, Cited by 0]
Telangana High Court
M/S.Kan Enterprises, vs M/S. Kesari Marine Service on 4 December, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR
WRIT APPEAL No.1276 OF 2025
DATE: 04.12.2025
Between:
M/s.Kan Enterprises
.....Appellant
AND
M/s.Kesari Marine Service and Two Others
.....Respondents
Mr. G.Vidya Sagar, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr. M.Avinash Reddy,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant.
Mr. S.S. Prasad, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr.S.N. Chidambara Sastry,
learned counsel for the respondent No.1.
Mr. Dominic Fernandes, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent
No.2.
JUDGMENT:
(Per Hon'ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya)
1. The Writ Appeal arises out of an order passed by a learned
Single Judge of this Court on 07.11.2025 in W.P.No.16559 of
2025 filed by the respondent No.1 herein. The Writ Petition was
filed for a Writ of Mandamus against the respondent No.2/The
Indian Oil Corporation Limited ('IOCL') with reference to
proceedings dated 06.06.2025 by which IOCL upheld the
cancellation of the Letter of Acceptance ('LoA') dated 20.02.2025
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
issued to the writ petitioner. The appellant herein was awarded a
Work Order on 18.08.2025 after cancellation of the LoA issued in
favour of the writ petitioner.
2. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge allowed
the Writ Petition by upholding the cancellation of the
LoA/Contract being in violation of an earlier order passed by
another learned Single Judge on 07.05.2025. The order dated
07.05.2025 was passed in a Writ Petition filed by the respondent
No.1 herein (W.P.No.15034 of 2025). By the impugned order
dated 07.11.2025, the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ
Petition and set aside the Speaking Order passed by IOCL on
06.06.2025 and directed IOCL to take necessary action for
permitting the writ petitioner to continue with its contractual
obligations as per the LoA and Work Order.
3. The appellant, who was awarded the work on 18.08.2025,
is aggrieved by the impugned order and has challenged the same
in the present Appeal.
4. We have heard learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellant, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
No.1 (writ petitioner) and learned Standing Counsel appearing for
the respondent No.2/IOCL.
5. The appellant and IOCL assail the impugned order on the
ground that the learned Single Judge reinstated the writ
petitioner solely on the earlier order dated 07.05.2025. Senior
Counsel appearing for the appellant and Standing Counsel
appearing for the respondent No.2/IOCL submit that the earlier
order disposed of the Writ Petition filed by the respondent No.1
by directing IOCL to consider the grievance of the writ petitioner
as expressed in its representation dated 01.04.2025 and pass an
appropriate order within a specific time frame after providing an
opportunity of personal hearing to the writ petitioner. It is also
submitted that the learned Single Judge re-read the conditions in
the tender documents in favour of the writ petitioner which a
Writ Court cannot be permitted to do. Counsel refer to several
documents showing that the writ petitioner admitted to the delay
in complying with the terms of the tender.
6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ
petitioner/the respondent No.1 herein seeks to sustain the
impugned order on the ground that IOCL acted in haste in
passing the Speaking Order dated 06.06.2025 which was in
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
violation of the orders of status-quo granted in the first round of
litigation. Senior Counsel lays emphasis on the order dated
07.05.2025 to urge that the learned Single Judge had opined on
the action of IOCL being arbitrary and that such opinion could
not be disturbed by IOCL by way of the Speaking Order dated
06.06.2025. In essence, Senior Counsel submits that IOCL
reiterated its earlier decision dated 01.04.2025 in cancelling the
LoA issued in favour of the writ petitioner.
7. We have considered the oral as well as written submissions
made on behalf of the parties and considered the relevant
material which have been placed on record.
8. A brief timeline of relevant events is required to be given for
understanding the effect of the two rounds of litigation initiated
by the writ petitioner/respondent No.1 herein.
i. IOCL issued the LoA to the writ petitioner by email dated
20.02.2025. This was confirmed by an e-mail on
21.02.2025.
ii. The writ petitioner wrote back to the IOCL on 03.03.2025
that it applied for clearance of its Barge from Kakinada
Port.
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
iii. IOCL issued the Work Order to the writ petitioner on
12.03.2025 for transporting white and black oil bunker
supply to coastal and foreign run vessels stationed at Vizag
Port through tanker Barges.
iv. IOCL sent an e-mail on 21.02.2025 requesting to arrange
initial deposit within 13 days of LoA dated 20.02.2025 and
stating that the Barge had to be placed within 30 days from
the LoA i.e., by 21.03.2025.
v. IOCL once again sent another e-mail to the writ petitioner
on 21.03.2025 stating that IOCL has to position the Barge
within 30 days from the LoA i.e., by 21.03.2025 failing
which the LoA would be liable for cancellation.
vi. On 22.03.2025, the writ petitioner stated that it had
resubmitted its application for clearance.
vii. On 28.03.2025, the writ petitioner sent an e-mail informing
IOCL that its Barge had arrived at Vizag Port.
viii. On 29.03.2025, the writ petitioner sent an e-mail informing
IOCL that the survey of its Barge at Vizag Port was
completed.
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
ix. On 01.04.2025, the writ petitioner updated IOCL about the
status of the Barge. The e-mail sent by IOCL cancelling the
LoA was also received by the writ petitioner.
x. The writ petitioner filed W.P.No.15034 of 2025 on
07.05.2025 challenging IOCL's e-mail dated 01.04.2025
and 21.02.2025.
xi. The Writ Petition was disposed of by an order dated
07.05.2025 directing IOCL to consider the grievance of the
writ petitioner as stated in the writ petitioner's
representation dated 01.04.2025 and reconsider the
impugned decision by providing an opportunity of personal
hearing to the writ petitioner and pass appropriate orders
within a stipulated time frame. The Court restrained the
respondents therein from taking coercive steps against the
writ petitioner and its Barge till IOCL passed appropriate
orders on the writ petitioner's representation.
xii. IOCL passed a Speaking Order on 06.06.2025 after giving a
personal hearing to the writ petitioner. IOCL upheld
cancellation of the LoA issued to the writ petitioner.
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
xiii. The writ petitioner filed W.P.No.16559 of 2025 on
01.07.2025 and obtained an interim order of status-quo
from a learned Single Judge of this Court.
xiv. The interim order granted earlier was extended by a
subsequent order dated 18.07.2025. The interim order was
again extended on 06.08.2025 till 11.08.2025.
xv. IOCL issued the Work Order to the appellant on
18.08.2025.
xvi. The Writ Petition was finally disposed of by the impugned
order on 07.11.2025.
9. It is necessary to refer to the order dated 07.05.2025
passed by a learned Single Judge in the first Writ
Petition/WP.No.15034 of 2025, since all the parties have
extensively referred to the said order. The impugned order dated
07.11.2025 also relies on the said order in cancelling IOCL's
Speaking Order by which cancellation of the LoA issued to the
writ petitioner was upheld.
10. The first Writ Petition was filed against the e-mail
communication of IOCL's dated 01.04.2025 cancelling the LoA
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
issued to the writ petitioner and for allowing the writ petitioner to
complete the contract work as per the LoA dated 20.02.2025.
The learned Single Judge disposed of the Writ Petition by
directing IOCL to consider the grievance of the writ petitioner as
put forth in its representation dated 01.04.2025 after providing
an opportunity of personal hearing to the writ petitioner within a
specified time frame.
11. However, the order dealt with the merits of the dispute in
detail and opined, inter alia, that although the LoA was issued to
the writ petitioner on 20.02.2025, the Work Order was only
issued on 12.03.2025 and admittedly the writ petitioner could
hence only commence work thereafter. The learned Single Judge
further opined that the action of IOCL in cancelling the Work
Order on the ground of the writ petitioner failing to offer the
Barge for inspection before the due date i.e., on 21.03.2025, was
arbitrary and unreasonable. The order dated 07.05.2025 further
records that the cancellation was against the principles of
natural justice since the petitioner was not provided an
opportunity of personal hearing.
12. Notably and notwithstanding the aforesaid opinion, the
learned Single Judge directed IOCL to consider the grievance
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
raised by the writ petitioner in the representation and come to a
decision thereon within the time frame fixed by the Court. The
writ petitioner was protected from coercive steps till IOCL arrived
at a decision.
13. The second Writ Petition/WP.No.16559 of 2025, which was
filed against the Speaking Order of IOCL dated 06.06.2025, was
allowed by the learned Single Judge essentially on the premise
that the cancellation of the writ petitioner's LoA was upheld in
disregard of the opinion expressed by the Court in the order
dated 07.05.2025. In paragraph 12 of the impugned order, the
learned Single Judge notes that IOCL's action of cancelling the
Contract on the very same ground of delay "... is blatant violation
of the order of this Court." IOCL was accordingly directed to take
consequential action for permitting the writ petitioner to continue
with its contractual obligations as per the LoA and Work Order
as expediously as possible. IOCL was directed to consider the
writ petitioner's representation and arrive at a decision after due
compliance of the principles of natural justice.
14. The Speaking Order dated 06.06.2025 was passed
pursuant to the order dated 07.05.2025. The writ petitioner has
not raised any complaint with regard to not being heard by IOCL.
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
The Speaking Order elaborately deals with each of the grounds
raised by the writ petitioner in his representation by way of a
tabulated statement accompanied by the IOCL's response. The
Speaking Order also deals with the writ petitioner's contention
that the Barge-readiness within 30 days i.e., by 21.03.2025 as
unreasonable. IOCL's response to the aforesaid grievance by
stating that the tender terms cannot be tinkered with and the
condition was in line with the tender specifications. The
Speaking Order states that the writ petitioner was bound by the
tender conditions and also admitted to the delay in placing the
Barge by 21.03.2025 i.e., 30 days of LoA. IOCL accordingly
upheld the direction of the LoA cancellation by way of the
Speaking Order.
15. Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner/the
respondent No.1 herein has strenuously argued that the
Speaking Order should be set aside as being contrary to the
opinion expressed by the Court in the first round of litigation i.e.,
in the order dated 07.05.2025. We disagree with this argument.
16. The order dated 07.05.2025 contained several opinions but
culminated in a direction on IOCL to consider the grievance
raised by the writ petitioner. Once the Writ Petition was disposed
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
of in the manner that it was, it would be unreasonable of a party
to presume that the decision of IOCL would go in its favour or be
in line with the views expressed in the order dated 07.05.2025.
The presumption could only arise if the Court had interfered with
IOCL's e-mail dated 01.04.2025, by which the LoA issued to the
writ petitioner was cancelled. The Writ Petition was however
disposed of merely by directing IOCL to revisit the matter and
consider the writ petitioner's representation within a specific time
frame.
17. In this context, we must point out that when a Writ Petition
is disposed of by a Court with a direction on the concerned
authority to consider a representation and pass a reasoned order,
the said authority is invited to arrive at a decision based on an
independent application of mind. Indeed, it would be an exercise
in futility if the authority is directed to decide on the controversy
but within the stranglehold of the Court's observations. In other
words, a direction on the authority to decide on a representation
presumes that the authority would apply its mind on the issue
under consideration without being tethered to the views
expressed by the Court. The views may be relevant only to the
extent of opening a legal proposition or the law relevant to the
subject for the authority to consider for arriving at the decision.
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
Weighing down the concerned authority with the Court's opinions
results in duplication of the decision-making process and is
antithetical to the direction itself. The litigant is forced to travel
down multiple paths only to find itself back to the starting point.
18. In that sense, the premise of the writ petitioner's argument
that IOCL committed an error in reiterating its earlier view on
cancellation of the LoA is patently incorrect. We reiterate that
IOCL could not be put within any form of strictures to decide the
issue in a particular way. That would only amount to replicating
the Court's views which became observations simipliciter once
IOCL was directed to arrive at a fresh decision.
19. Therefore, the reason given in the IOCL's Speaking Order
being in violation of the order passed in the earlier order dated
07.05.2025 is, with respect, erroneous. In essence, the Speaking
Order of IOCL dated 06.06.2025 erased the order dated
07.05.2025 to the extent of the opinions/observations contained
therein. The Speaking Order constitutes a new cause of action
for the purpose of the second Writ Petition/WP.No.16559 of
2025. Thus, harking back to the order dated 07.05.2025 was
entirely misplaced and irrelevant.
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
20. We now come to the merits of the matter. Clause 14 (17)(d)
of the Notice Inviting Tender issued by IOCL provides that the
"...bidder undertakes to position the offered Barge ready in all
aspects along with required licences within 30 days of issuance of
LoI/LoA at Vizag Port." Clause B(4) of the Special Conditions of
Contract further provides that IOCL reserves the right to cancel
the LoA/LoI if the party fails to get the Barge inspected by IOCL
and get ready in all aspects within 30 days of issuance of LoI.
The undertaking given by the writ petitioner (Bidder) provides
that the Bidder will place the Barge along with the licences and
documents within 30 days of issuing the LoA/LoI failing with
IOCL reserves the right to cancel of the LoA/LoI. The LoA issued
by IOCL on 20.02.2025 provides that all the tender documents
and conditions stipulated therein form part of the Work
Order/Contract. IOCL's e-mail dated 21.02.2025 attaching the
LoA categorically stipulates that the Barge needs to be placed
within 30 days of the LoA.
21. All the above documents categorically reflect that placing
the Barge along with required licences within 30 days of issuance
of LoA was an essential condition of the tender document which
was accepted by the petitioner without demur. The writ
petitioner also received communications from IOCL with regard
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
to the stipulated condition without raising any objection at any
point of time. The condition of placing the Barge within 30 days
of the LoA is intrinsically linked to the performance of the work,
namely, for Bunker supply of oil through tanker Barges to
foreign/coastal run sea vessels.
22. It is undisputed that the writ petitioner did not place the
Barge within 30 days of the LoA i.e., by 21.03.2025. The LoA
was issued on 20.02.2025. This would be evident from the
e-mail sent by the writ petitioner on 28.03.2025 stating that the
writ petitioner's Barge arrived at Visakhapatnam Port and
berthed today i.e., on 28.03.2025 and is ready for procedural
inspections. This was followed by the writ petitioner's e-mail on
29.03.2025 stating that the survey of its Barge at
Visakhapatnam Port was completed. In the proceedings of
personal hearing held, the writ petitioner's oral submissions
recorded in the proceedings dated 29.05.2025 before the IOCL
specifically states the following:
"3. That Shri Tummalapalli Venkata Ramakrishna
further submits that their barge was ready in all respects
by 28.03.2025 however as per the LOA they were required
to place the barge by 21st March 2025.
4. That Shri Tummalapalli Venkata Ramakrishna
submits that they have been delayed by 06 (six) days in
placing the barge ready in all respects as per the tender
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
requirements and that the delay of 06 (six) days be
condoned by the competent authority."
23. Hence, there is little doubt factually that the writ petitioner
failed to place the Barge within 30 days of LoA i.e., by
21.03.2025. The writ petitioner's contention, as expressed by
Senior Counsel, that the Barge was ready by 28.03.2025, is
hence of no consequence. The writ petitioner failed to comply
with the tender condition as on 21.03.2025.
24. The argument of the writ petitioner, as accepted by the
learned Single Judge, in respect of the Work Order being the
deciding factor is also not acceptable. The argument is
completely inconsistent with the Tender conditions set by IOCL
and accepted by the writ petitioner without any objection. The
specific condition in the Tender Notice i.e., Clause 14(17)(d)
stipulates that the Bidder shall offer the Barge ready along with
the required licences within 30 days of issuance of LoI/LoA at
Vizag Port. IOCL's right of cancelling the LoA/LoI on the Bidder
failing to fulfil the aforesaid stipulation is reflected in Clause B(4)
of the Special Conditions of Contract. The Bidder's undertaking
also reflects the same stipulation, i.e., 30 days of issuance of
LoA/LoI failing which IOCL reserves right to cancellation of
LoA/LoI. The Tender document does not contain any clause
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
which mentions "30 days from the Work Order". The document
does not substitute or replace "LoA/LoI" with "Work Order".
Therefore, reading 30 days from issuance of the Work Order
would be inconsistent with the Tender document and would read
a term into the Tender conditions which was conspicuously
absent.
25. It is admitted that the tender conditions were immutable
and remain so till today. We hence disagree with the view of the
learned Single Judge in respect of treating the Work Order issued
on 12.03.2025 as the starting point for the calculation of 30
days.
26. Judicial Review of decisions taken by authorities in support
of Conditions of Tender operates within extremely narrow
confines. The consensus arrived at by the Courts is that Courts
should not interfere with the decisions of the author of the tender
document since the concerned authority is best suited to decide
the said issue. The Courts in judicial review should not meddle
with such decisions unless the decision is demonstrably arbitrary
or reflects favouritism or the operation of extraneous factors in
the decision-making process: Noble Resources v. State of Orissa 1.
(2006) 10 SCC 236
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
27. It is equally well settled that the process of
decision-making forms the fulcrum of the judicial review and not
the decision itself. The scope of interference is even more
curtailed in contractual matters which involve interpretation of
the Conditions of the Tender documents. Courts should hold
back from expressing their opinion on matters of interpretation of
Tender conditions since they are un-equipped to
second-guess the suitability of the tenderer: Agmatel India (P)
Limited v. Resoursys Telecom 2.
28. Judicial Review of administrative action aims to prevent
arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable action on the part of
persons and authorities and to keep bias and mala fides at bay.
Courts should be mindful of the fact that evaluating tenders and
awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions and the
decision with regard to the best person for the job should be left
to the tender-issuing authority. Courts should not interfere even
on a procedural aberration or error in assessment unless there is
a clear breach of the principles of natural justice or the decision-
making process is vitiated by mala fides: Jagdish Mandal v.
(2022) 5 SCC 362
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
State of Orissa 3 . Courts should also not find fault with every
decision with a magnifying glass in its hands and should only
restrict itself to examining whether the decision-making process
complies with the procedure contemplated by the tender
conditions: N.G. Projects Limited v. Vinod Kumar Jain 4. In fact, in
N.G. Projects Limited (supra), the Supreme Court held that if the
Court finds that the Tender has been granted in a mala fide
manner, the Court should relegate the parties to seek damages
for the wrongful exclusion rather than injunct the execution of
the contract.
29. It is nobody's case that the tender process was not
conducted in a transparent manner or in accordance with the
Tender terms and conditions. The writ petitioner did not
challenge the terms of the tender conditions including the
condition of the Barge being made ready within 30 days of the
LoA/LoI. Hence, the Speaking Order dated 06.06.2025
justifiably rejected the writ petitioner's objection as an
afterthought. Most important, the writ petitioner proceeds on the
basis of the Work Order being the starting point of the 30 days
which is completely incongruous to the tender terms. The
(2007) 14 SCC 517
(2022) 6 SCC 127
MB,J & GPK,J
Wa_1276_2025
impugned order dated 07.11.2025 erroneously accepted the said
condition, thus, importing a term in the tender document which
was not there in the first place. The self-imposed limits of writ
jurisdiction does not permit the Court to incorporate a new term
in the tender document or to alter the terms in a manner suitable
to only one party in the contract.
30. The above reasons persuade the Court to interfere with the
impugned order.
31. W.A.No.1276 of 2025, along with all connected
applications, is accordingly allowed and disposed of by setting
aside the order dated 07.11.2025 in W.P.No.16559 of 2025.
__________________________________
MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J
_____________________________
GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, J
DATE: 04.12.2025
TJMR
