Telangana High Court
Naresh Tejvath vs The State Of Telangana on 22 October, 2024
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA
I.A.NOs.2 AND 3 OF 2024
IN/AND
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.6890 OF 2024
COMMON ORDER:
This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.') to quash
the proceedings against the petitioner/accused in S.C.No.688 of
2023 pending on the file of Special Sessions Judge FTC for
Atrocities against Women-I, Hyderabad. The offences alleged
against the petitioner are under Sections 376 (2), 417 and 420
of Indian Penal Code (for short 'I.P.C').
2. The facts of the case are that on 16.03.2023 at 21.00
hours the defacto complainant-2nd respondent lodged a report
stating that petitioner was introduced through her friend on
07.05.2021 and they both fell in love and promised to marry
her. Believing his words, petitioner brought the 2nd respondent
to a room on 11.02.2023 at Bapunagar and made false promise
that he will marry her and participated in sexual intercourse
with her forcibly. It is further stated that the petitioner
thereafter rejected her to marry and now he is going to marry
another girl. As such, she requested to take necessary against
the petitioner. Basing on the said complaint, the police
registered a case for the above offences, investigated and filed
charge sheet.
3. Heard Sri Baglekar Akash Kumar, learned counsel for the
petitioner, Sri E.Ganesh, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor
appearing for the 1st respondent-State and Sri Bhanothu
Hussain.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that after
filing charge sheet, petitioner and the 2nd respondent have
entered into compromise on 13.01.2024, wherein the 2nd
respondent agreed to withdraw the case, in order to lead her
own life. He relied on the judgment in Kapil Gupta Vs State
(NCT of Delhi) 1, wherein the proceedings were quashed for the
offence under Section 376 of I.P.C, in view of the compromise
between the accused and defacto complainant. He also relied
on the judgment in Shambhu Kharwar Vs State of U.P., 2
wherein the offence under Section 376 of I.P.C, was quashed on
the ground that consensual relationship does not amounts to
rape. In the instant case, a reading of the complaint would
show that there is consensual physical relationship between the
1 (2022) 15 SCC 44
2 2022 SCC online SC 1032
parties, as such, he prayed the Court to quash the proceedings
against the petitioner.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the
written complaint given by the 2nd respondent does not amount
to rape as the complaint averments itself shows that she
participated in sexual intercourse on her own will and after
giving complaint the 2nd respondent wanted to withdraw the
case in view of the memorandum of understanding entered into
between the parties to lead her own life. Hence, prayed the
Court to quash the proceedings against the petitioner.
6. On the other hand, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor
would submit that as the offence committed by the petitioner is
a heinous offence, the same cannot be compounded and prayed
to dismiss this criminal petition.
7. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Public
Prosecutor, the main contention of learned counsel for the
petitioner is that the act done by the petitioner does not amount
to rape as there is willingness and the victim is aged about 23
years and it is a consensual relationship. In support of his
submission, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme court in Major Amrit Yadav
vs. State of Telangana 3, wherein in paragraph Nos.10, 11 and
12 it was held as follows:
"10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Shambhu Kharwar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
held as under:
"13. In this backdrop and taking the
allegations in the complaint as they stand, it is
impossible to find in the FIR or in the charge
sheet, the essential ingredients of an offence
under IPC. The crucial issue which is to be
considered is whether the allegations indicate
that the appellant had given a promise to the
second respondent to marry which is at the
inception was false and on the basis of which
the second respondent was induced into a
sexual relationship. Taking the allegations in
the FIR and the charge sheet as they stand, the
crucial ingredients of the offence under IPC are
absent. The relationship between the parties
was purely of a consensual nature. The
relationship, as noted above, was in existence
to subsist during the term of the marriage and
after the second respondent was granted a
divorce by mutual consent."
11. A bare reading of the complaint would
indicate that the 2nd respondent had sexual
relation over a period of four years with this
petitioner consensually. In the said
3 2023 SCC OnLine TS 601
circumstances, when the 2nd respondent/de
facto complainant is not willing to prosecute the
case against the petitioner in the Court, the
proceedings would only result in wastage of
trial Court's time. Both on facts when the
allegations did not make out any offence of rape
or cheating and also when the parties are
inclined to compromise the matter, only for the
reason there being mention of rape in the
charge sheet and the parties have
compromised, intervention of this Court under
inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.,
cannot be denied.
12. Considering the said report of the
Secretary, Telangana High Court Legal Services
Committee, Hyderabad, and in view of the
compromise entered between the petitioner and
respondent No.2, I.A.Nos.2 and 3 of 2022 are
allowed. Consequently, the criminal petition is
allowed and the proceedings in P.R.C.No.74 of
2022 on the file of the XXII Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate at Secunderabad, are
hereby quashed against the
petitioner/accused."
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kapil Gupta's case
referred to supra 1 wherein in paragraph No.16 it is held as
under:
"16. In that view of the matter, we find that
though in a heinous or serious crime like rape,
the Court should not normally exercise the
powers of quashing the proceedings, in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the present
case and in order to give succor to respondent
No.2 so that she is saved from further agony of
facing two criminal trials, one as a victim and
one as an accused, we find that this is a fit
case, wherein the extraordinary powers of this
Court be exercised to quash the criminal
proceedings."
9. Though, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that
it is a consensual relationship, the said consent was given
under the promise of marriage. When the victim consented
under the promise of marriage, it cannot be said that it is a
consensual relationship and it amounts to rape. The further
contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that as the
victim herself wanted to withdraw the case in view of the
memorandum of understanding, continuation of proceedings is
nothing but abuse of process of law, whereas, the offence
committed by the petitioner is under Section 376 of I.P.C.
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in The State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan 4, held as under:
"i) that the power conferred under Section 482
of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings
4 2019 (5) SCC 403
for the non-compoundable offences under
Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil
character, particularly those arising out of
commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationship or family disputes and
when the parties have resolved the entire
dispute amongst themselves;
ii) such power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involved heinous and
serious offences of mental depravity or offences
like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences
are not private in nature and have a serious
impact on society;
iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised
for the offences under the special statutes like
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in
that capacity are not to be quashed merely on
the basis of compromise between the victim and
the offender;
iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the
Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of
heinous and serious offences and therefore are
to be treated as crime against the society and
not against the individual alone, and therefore,
the criminal proceedings for the offence under
Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which
have a serious impact on the society cannot be
quashed in exercise of powers under Section
482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties
have resolved their entire dispute amongst
themselves. However, the High Court would not
rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the
charge is framed under this provision. It would
be open to the High Court to examine as to
whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is
there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved,
would lead to framing the charge under Section
307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to
the High Court to go by the nature of injury
sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on
the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of
weapons used etc. However, such an exercise
by the High Court would be permissible only
after the evidence is collected after investigation
and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed
and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not
permissible when the matter is still under
investigation. Therefore, the ultimate
conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the
decision of this Court in the case of Narinder
Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and
to be read as a whole and in the circumstances
stated hereinabove;
v) while exercising the power under Section 482
of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings
in respect of non-compoundable offences,
which are private in nature and do not have a
serious impact on society, on the ground that
there is a settlement/compromise between the
victim and the offender, the High Court is
required to consider the antecedents of the
accused; the conduct of the accused, namely,
whether the accused was absconding and why
he was absconding, how he had managed with
the complainant to enter into a compromise
etc."
11. In the light of the submissions made by both the learned
counsel and a perusal of the material available on record, it
appears that petitioner was charged for the offences punishable
under Sections 376 (2), 417 and 420 of I.P.C., among which
Section 376 (2) of IPC is non-compoundable. The main
contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the
matter was compromised between the parties and filed
compromise petitions to that effect and as per the law laid down
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Major Amrit Yadav's case
referred to supra 3 and Kapil Gupta's case referred to supra 2,
the extraordinary powers of the Court can be exercised to quash
the criminal proceedings when the parties have compromised,
though in a heinous or serious crime like rape, as such, the
proceedings against respondent No.2 are liable to be quashed.
12. As seen from the record, there are serious allegations
against the petitioners and the offence under Section 376 (2) of
I.P.C is heinous offence. Further, the judgments rendered by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Major Amrit Yadav's
case referred to supra 3 and Kapil Gupta's case referred to
supra 2, exercised the extra ordinary jurisdiction, therefore,
considering the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Laxmi Narayan's case referred to supra 4 and also
considering the fact that one of the offence alleged against the
petitioner is heinous in nature, this Court is not inclined to
quash the proceedings against the petitioner in the aforesaid
crime merely on the ground that the parties have entered into
compromise.
13. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I.A.Nos.2 and 3 of
2024 are dismissed. Consequently, the present Criminal
Petition is disposed of directing the trial Court to conclude the
trial in S.C.No.688 of 2023 and dispose of the matter, as
expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three (3)
months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
Miscellaneous petitions, pending, if any, shall stand closed.
_______________
K. SUJANA, J
Date :22.10.2024
Rds
