Telangana High Court
Kishore Verma Pothuri vs The State Of Telangana on 13 August, 2024
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO
+ W.P.No.9783 OF 2024
% 13--08--2024
# Kishore Verma Pothuri and another
...Petitioners
$ The State of Telangana and others.
... Respondents
! Counsel for the Petitioners : Sri Koppula Gopal
^Counsel for Respondents : Learned Government Pleader for Civil
Supplies for respondent Nos.1 to 3
Sri Mahadev Anyarambhatla,
for respondent Nos.4 and 5.
<Gist :
>Head Note :
? Cases referred
1. (2008) 10 SCC 345
2. (2015) 11 SCC 661
2
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
HYDERABAD
****
W.P.No.9783 OF 2024
Between:
Kishore Verma Pothuri and another
...Petitioner
The State of Telangana and others. ...
Respondents
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 13.08.2024
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? :
yes
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
Marked to Law Reporters/Journals? :
yes
3. Whether His Lordship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? :
yes
____________________
SUJOY PAUL, J
_______________________________________________
NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO, J
3
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO
WRIT PETITION No.9783 of 2024
ORDER:
(per Hon'ble Sri Justice Namavarapu Rajeshwar Rao)
This writ petition is filed seeking the following relief:
".....to issue a writ, order or direction more
particularly one in the nature of Writ of Certiorari
calling for records pertaining the order
dt.17-11-2023 passed in C.C.No.69 of 2019 on the
file of Hon'ble State Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission, State of Telangana at Hyderabad,
respondent No.2, which was confirmed in First
Appeal No.97 of 2024 dated.18-03-2024 on the file
of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission, New Delhi is being illegal, arbitrary,
and violation of Articles 14 and 300 of Constitution
of India and consequently set aside the same by
declaring respondent No.2 has no jurisdiction.....".
2. Heard Sri.Koppula Gopal, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioners, the learned Government Pleader for
Civil Supplies appearing for respondents 1 to 3, and Sri
Mahadev Anyarambhatla, learned counsel for respondents
4 and 5.
3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
(i) The 1st petitioner is the absolute owner and possessor
of house bearing No.2-107/2/1, Plot No.28, admeasuring
256 sq. yards in Sy.Nos.305 and 309/B situated at
Sreeramnagar Colony, Gangaram, Chandanagar Village,
Serlingampally, GHMC, Ranga Reddy District. The 2nd
petitioner is the father of the 1st petitioner, who is a
resident of the USA and issued a GPA in favour of the 2nd
petitioner. The 2nd petitioner obtained residential building
permission from GHMC by mortgaging 10% of the built up
area as per GHMC norms in 2017.
(ii) While the construction work was in progress, the 4th
respondent approached the 2nd petitioner to purchase a
flat. After due negotiations, the 2nd petitioner agreed to sell
one flat for an amount of Rs.35,00,000/- to the 4th
respondent on 28.12.2017. In token thereof, an amount of
Rs.14,80,000/- was paid towards advance sale
consideration. However, respondent No.4 failed to arrange
the balance amount. Later, he requested the return of the
advance amount, and it was returned to him on
20.09.2018 before the witnesses namely, Smt. K.Padma
W/o. Gopala Krishna Raju and Sri V. Nageswara Rao,
S/o.Venkatarao.
(iii) While things stood thus, respondents 4 and 5 filed
C.C.No.69 of 2019 before the 2nd respondent-State
Commission under Section 17(1)(a)(i) of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 (for short 'the Act') against the
petitioners seeking a direction to the petitioners to execute
the registered sale deed with regard to the scheduled flat in
favour of respondents 4 and 5 and further sought a sum of
Rs.20,000/- per month as house rent to respondent Nos.
4 and 5 from October 2018 till the date of execution of the
registered sale deed and the delivery of vacant physical
possession of the scheduled flat.
(iv) The 2nd respondent, while allowing C.C.No.69 of 2019
on 17.11.2023, observed as follows:-
"Based on the foregoing discussion, we are of the emphatic
view that opposite parties 1 and 2 have been deficient in their
services, thereby depriving the complainants from owning a
flat inspite of paying a substantial amount, therefore, the
opposite parties 1 and 2 are liable not only to execute the
Sale Deed but also to pay compensation for making the
complainant wait for around 5 years, which might have
caused severe hardship and mental agony to the complainant.
10) In the result, complaint is allowed in part with
following directions:
i). the complaint no.1 is directed to deposit the balance sale
consideration in this Commission within 15 days from the
date of receipt of this order, upon which the opposite parties
1 and 2 are directed to execute the Sale Deed in favour of the
complainant No.1 as per the terms and conditions of
Agreement (Ex.A1) for Flat No.101, 1st floor, admeasuring
975 sq.fts in Sree Nilayam, within one month of such deposit
of amount by the complainant;
ii). Opposite parties 1 and 2 are directed to pay
compensation of Rs.25,000/- for the hardship and mental
agony caused to the complainants;
iii). Opposite parties 1 and 2 are directed to pay costs of
Rs.25,000/-;
iv. Further, the complainants are bound to bear the
registration charges and applicable taxes.
v. Complaint against opposite party no.3 is dismissed."
(v) Challenging the said order, the petitioners have filed
F.A.No.97 of 2024 before the 3rd respondent-National
Commission. The 3rd respondent, after appreciation of
evidence available on record, dismissed F.A.No.97 of 2024
vide judgment dated 18.03.2024, confirming the order
passed by the 2nd respondent in C.C.No.69 of 2019, dated
17.11.2023 by observing as follows:-
"We have considered the arguments of the counsel for the
appellants. The appellants were served in the complaint and
filed Vakalatnama on 24-06-2019. However, they did not
appear before the State Commission either on 26-06-2019 or
on 07-08-2019. On 07-08-2019 their right to file written
version was closed. The pandemic and consequent lockdown
was imposed on 22-03-2020. In the meantime, there were
several dates but the appellants did not appear before the
State Commission nor they have given any reason for their
non appearance on 26-06-2019 or on subsequent dates
although their right to file written version was closed on
07-08-2019. In the application they have merely stated that
due to misunderstanding between us and previous counsel,
the previous counsel could not appear before the State
Commission and they engaged a new counsel. It may be
mentioned that this application was filed on 29-08-2023.
There is more than four years delay in filing this application.
In such circumstances, the State Commission has not
committed any illegality in rejecting the application of the
appellants for recalling the order dated.03-03-2021.
9. So far as the case of the appellants that the
complainants have taken back their consideration and got the
agreement cancelled is concerned, according to the
appellants Rs.15.80 lacs have been returned is cash but no
proof relating to receiving of this heavy amount has been
filed. It is also not liable to be believed that the builder will
return this heavy amount in cash. In normal circumstances,
the builder used to refund money through cheque, which is
also requirement of Income Tax Act, 1961. It is an
afterthought and in absence of any written reply in this
respect and evidence it is not liable to be believed. Order of
the State Commission does not find any illegality or infirmity
so as to interfere in the appellate jurisdiction and the appeal
deserves to be dismissed.
Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have filed the
present writ petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the
order of the 2nd respondent-State Commission is contrary
to law and facts on record. The 2nd respondent grossly
erred in not examining the validity of Ex.A1-photostat copy
of the Agreement of Sale-cum-receipt and the other
documents, viz., Exs.A-2 to A-7. The complainant in
C.C.No.69 of 2019 is not a consumer as per Section 5(1)(a)
of the Act, and the petitioners also do not come under the
term 'establishment', as defined under Section 2(19) of the
Act.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners further
submits that the sale agreement executed by the
petitioners does not come under the definition of 'service'
as contemplated under Section 2(42) of the Act, since the
petitioners are not a registered partnership/private limited
company, which is involved in the activity of construction
of apartments, and that the 1st petitioner is merely the
owner of the land admeasuring 256 sq. yards at Sreeram
Colony, Gangaram, Chandanagar Village, Serilingampally
Mandal, Rangareddy District. The 2nd petitioner obtained
permission to construct a multi-storied building and
offered to sell one of the flats to the respondents 4 and 5,
for want of funds. The petitioners are not involved in the
regular trading of construction activity, and therefore, the
complaint itself is defective, and the State Commission
ought to have rejected the complaint filed by respondents 4
and 5.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners further
submits that the petitioners filed an application on
28.09.2023 in C.C.No.69 of 2019 for recalling the ex-parte
order dated 03.03.2021 and the said recall application was
dismissed on 30.08.2023. The complaint was allowed on
07.11.2023 after hearing only the complainant's
arguments, which is illegal and arbitrary. Further, the
petitioners suffered an ex-parte order only due to the
negligence of the counsel on record. The 2nd Respondent-
State Commission ought to have allowed their recall
petition and given an opportunity to the petitioners to be
heard, and the same would not have caused any prejudice
to respondents 4 and 5.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits
that respondents 4 and 5 have not disclosed to the State
Commission the fact that the amount of Rs.15,00,000/-
was returned by the petitioners by cancelling the sale
agreement, and they obtained the order behind the back of
the petitioners, which is malicious and untenable. Further,
even the appeal in F.A.No.97 of 2024 which was preferred
by the petitioners before the 3rd respondent, was
erroneously dismissed without considering the petitioners'
grievance. Therefore, appropriate orders be passed by
allowing the writ petition and setting aside the impugned
orders.
8. On 24.04.2024, this Court granted stay of the order
dated 17.11.2023 in C.C.No.69 of 2019 passed by the 2nd
respondent.
9. Respondents 4 and 5 filed a counter-affidavit along
with an application in I.A.No.2 of 2024 seeking to vacate
the interim order passed by this Court on 24.04.2024.
10. Learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 contended
that the petitioners' application for setting aside the ex-
parte order dated 03.03.2021 was rejected on 30.08.2023
on the ground that the said I.A. was not maintainable since
the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission does
not have the power to set-aside or to review its own orders.
Against the said order, an appeal was filed by the
petitioners before the 3rd respondent, and the 3rd
respondent has rightly considered the fact that a counsel
had put in his appearance on behalf of the petitioners on
24.06.2019. However, as nobody was present, the State
Commission proceeded ex-parte on the next date of hearing
i.e., on 07.08.2019. Since nobody appeared on behalf of the
petitioners and no written response was filed despite the
expiry of 45 days from the date of service of notice, the
State Commission forfeited the right of the petitioners to
file a reply. The evidence of respondents 4 and 5 was filed
on 27.11.2019, and because of the Covid-19 pandemic, the
case was adjourned. In fact, the petitioners were given an
opportunity to file evidence in rebuttal to the evidence of
respondents 4 and 5. However, the petitioners failed to file
their evidence, and therefore, their right to file evidence
was also forfeited by the order dated 03.03.2021. The
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, in its
judgment dated 18.03.2024, has categorically held that
despite the petitioners being given an opportunity to file
their evidence, they never availed the opportunity. The
National Commission has further categorically stated in its
judgment that the application was filed on 29.08.2023 and
there is a delay of more than four years. Therefore, there is
no illegality or irregularity in the orders passed by the State
Commission.
11. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.4
and 5 further submits that the petitioners, for the very first
time, took a plea before the National Consumer
Commission that an amount of Rs.15.8 lakhs was returned
by the petitioners to respondents 4 and 5. However, no
proof to such effect is filed. Hence, the National
Commission rightly held that such a plea could not be
believed since a builder would not return such a huge
amount in cash.
12. Learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 further
submits that it is well settled that in any litigation, it is the
party's duty to be in contact with his counsel and pursue
the matter. Hence, it is no defence to state that the right to
file their evidence was closed because of some
misunderstanding between the petitioners and their
counsel.
13. Learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 further
submits that respondents 4 and 5 are covered by the
definition of 'Consumer' under Section 2(d)(ii) of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The word 'Service' is
defined under Section 2(o) of the Consumer Protection Act,
1986, including the facilities in connection with banking,
financing, insurance, transport, house construction, etc. In
the present case, while the flat in question is under
construction, the petitioners agreed to sell the same in
favour of respondents 4 and 5. Admittedly, there is no
dispute that respondents 4 and 5 paid the major amount of
the sale consideration on the date of agreement itself and
the balance was also sanctioned by way of bank loan.
Respondents 4 and 5 were willing to pay the balance sale
consideration. Thus, despite the readiness and willingness
of respondents 4 and 5, the petitioners failed to comply
with their obligation by not executing the registered sale
deed in favour of respondents 4 and 5 and not delivering
possession of the flat to them, which is a clear case of
deficiency in service.
14. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.4
and 5 further submits that the State Commission is
competent to pass the impugned order, which is binding on
the petitioners. Having been negligent for over a period of
four years, and in fact, being bound by the agreement, it is
not open for the petitioners to contend that they are not
bound to execute the registered sale deed and deliver
possession of the flat. Thus, even on merits, the petitioners
do not have any case, but they only intend to prolong and
delay the proceedings unnecessarily without any
justification. Therefore, there are no merits in the writ
petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.
15. Per contra, learned counsel for the petitioners
contended that the matter is purely civil in nature. The
complainant is not a "consumer" within the meaning of
Section 5(1)(a) of the Act, and the petitioners are also not
an "establishment", as defined under Section 2(19) of the
new Act. Therefore, the complaint itself is not
maintainable. The petitioners are not involved in the
construction of apartments on a regular basis. Therefore,
appropriate orders be passed by allowing the writ petition
and by setting aside the impugned orders.
16. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents 4
and 5 submits that both the State Commission as well as
the National Commission have rightly passed the
impugned orders and hence, there are no merits in the writ
petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.
17. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for
respondents 4 and 5 relied upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in FAQIR CHAND GULATI Vs. UPPAL
AGENCIES PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANOTHER 1 to
contend that the present case comes under the ambit of
the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and that the Act gives
shelter to a claim of this nature. In the head note of the
above said judgment, it is stated as follows:-
"A. Consumer Protection - Services Housing Building
construction agreement between landowner and builder -
Agreement requiring builder to construct an apartment
building on owner's land and share the constructed area
with owner in consideration of entire cost incurred and
services rendered by him - Deficiencies/defects in
constructed share of landowner Consumer complaint by
landowner against builder on basis of Maintainability of
Issue whether the said agreement/ activity was a joint
venture and consequently there was no hiring/availment of
services of builder and therefore the landowner and the
builder could not be said to be a "consumer" and a "service
provider" respectively Considering the terms of the
agreement in question and the usual features of such
agreements [i.e. bar against landowner in relation to
interference with construction activity in any manner, lack
of control or participation of landowner in management of
said activity, absence of sharing of profits and losses by
landowner, etc.], held, the agreement in question was not a
(2008) 10 Supreme Court Cases 345
joint b venture in the legal sense - It was basically an
agreement for construction of a house (ground floor) for
landowner for consideration in the form of sale of an
undivided share in the land to builder and grant of
permission to him to construct and own the upper floors
Hence, in such a case, the landowner would be a
"consumer" and the builder would be a "service provider" -
However, where the agreement between the landowner and
the builder/fund provider is a true joint venture, the position
would be different Thus, the present consumer complaint,
held, was maintainable - Matter remitted to District Forum
for fresh adjudication on merits Protection Act, 1986-Ss.
2(1)(d), c(iii), (g) & (0), 12 and 14."
"18. This Court next considered the meaning of the word
"service". Thereafter, this Court dealt with the question whether
"service" included housing construction, even before the
inclusion of "housing construction" in the definition of "service"
by Act 50 of 1993 with effect from 18-6-1993. This Court
observed : (M.K. Gupta case [(1994) 1 SCC 243] , SCC pp. 254 &
256-57, paras 4 & 6)
"4. What is the meaning of the word 'service'? Does it
extend to deficiency in the building of a house or flat? Can
a complaint be filed under the Act against the statutory
authority or a builder or contractor for any deficiency in
respect of such property. The answer to all this shall
depend on understanding of the word 'service'. The term
has variety of meanings. It may mean any benefit or any
act resulting in promoting interest or happiness. It may be
contractual, professional, public, domestic, legal,
statutory, etc. The concept of service thus is very wide.
How it should be understood and what it means depends
on the context in which it has been used in an enactment.
...
***
6. What remains to be examined is if housing construction or
building activity carried on by a private or statutory body was
service within meaning of clause (o) of Section 2 of the Act as it
stood prior to inclusion of the expression 'housing construction'
in the definition of 'service' by Ordinance No. 24 of 1993. As
pointed out earlier the entire purpose of widening the definition
is to include in it not only day to day buying and selling activity
undertaken by a common man but even such activities which are
otherwise not commercial in nature yet they partake of a
character in which some benefit is conferred on the consumer.
Construction of a house or flat is for the benefit of person
for whom it is constructed. He may do it himself or hire
services of a builder or contractor. The latter being for
consideration is service as defined in the Act. ... If the
service is defective or it is not what was represented then
it would be unfair trade practice as defined in the Act.
Any defect in construction activity would be denial of
comfort and service to a consumer. When possession of
property is not delivered within stipulated period the
delay so caused is denial of service. Such disputes or claims
are not in respect of immovable property as argued but
deficiency in rendering of service of particular standard, quality
or grade. Such deficiencies or omissions are defined in sub-
clause (ii) of clause (r) of Section 2 as unfair trade practice. If a
builder of a house uses substandard material in construction of
a building or makes false or misleading representation about the
condition of the house then it is denial of the facility or benefit to
which a consumer is entitled to claim value under the Act. When
the contractor or builder undertakes to erect a house or flat then
it is inherent in it that he shall perform his obligation as agreed
to. A flat with a leaking roof, or cracking wall or substandard
floor is denial of service. ... A person who applies for
allotment of a building site or for a flat constructed by
the development authority or enters into an agreement
with a builder or a contractor is a potential user and
nature of transaction is covered in the expression 'service
of any description'. It further indicates that the definition
is not exhaustive. The inclusive clause succeeded in
widening its scope but not exhausting the services which
could be covered in earlier part. So any service except when
it is free of charge or under a constraint of personal service is
included in it. Since housing activity is a service it was covered
in the clause as it stood before 1993."
It further held:
"20. There is no dispute or doubt that a complaint under the Act
will be maintainable in the following circumstances:
(a) Where the owner/holder of a land who has entrusted the
construction of a house to a contractor, has a complaint of
deficiency of service with reference to the construction.
(b) Where the purchaser or intending purchaser of an
apartment/flat/house has a complaint against the
builder/developer with reference to construction or
delivery or amenities."
(emphasis supplied)
18. Learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 also relied
upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in KAMLESH
AGGARWAL Vs. NARAIN SINGH DABBAS AND
ANOTHER 2, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held as
follows :-
"18. Further, it is needless to observe in this order that apart
from initiating proceedings under Section 27 of the Act, the
alternative right is also available to the appellant to execute the
order of the District Forum by invoking the provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 under Order 21 read with Rule 32 for
seeking direction to the respondents to get sale deed in respect
of Plot No. 114, Village Khoda, Ghaziabad executed by
Navchetna Sahkari Awas Samiti Ltd. and register the same
before the Sub-Registrar and put her in possession of the same
in accordance with the aforesaid provisions. The execution of the
decree in the aforesaid terms is permissible in law in view of the
provisions of Sections 13(4), (6) and (7) of the Act, as the
provisions of Order 21 read with Rule 32 of the Code of Civil
Procedure are applicable to the District Forum to follow the
procedure for execution of the order passed by it."
(2015) 11 SCC 661
19. The above judgments very clearly lay down the
applicability of the Act in cases where there is a housing
construction/sale of flat. In this connection, it is
appropriate to extract Section 2(1)(c)(iii) of the Act, which
defines a 'complaint'. The same reads as follows:-
iii) The services hired or availed of or agreed to be hired
or availed of by him suffer from deficiency in any
respect;
(emphasis supplied)
20. The sole criteria mentioned in the aforesaid clause to
determine the scope of a 'complaint' is when the services
availed by a 'consumer' suffers from deficiency in any
respect.
21. Further, Section 2(1)(d) of the Act defines the term
'consumer', and it reads as follows:-
d) "consumer" means any person who,-
i) buys any goods for a consideration which has
been paid or promised or partly paid and partly
promised, or under any system of deferred payment
and includes any user of such goods other than the
person who buys such goods for consideration paid
or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or
under any system of deferred payment, when such
use is made with the approval of such person, but
does not include a person who obtains such goods for
resale or for any commercial purpose' or
ii) [hires or avails of] any services for a
consideration which has been paid or promised
or partly paid and partly promised, or under
any system of deferred payment and includes any
beneficiary of such services other than the person
who (hires or avails of) the services for consideration
paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised,
or under any system of deferred payment, when
such services are availed of with the approval of the
first mentioned person {but does not include a
person who avails of such services for any
commercial purposes)
(emphasis supplied)
22. Sub-clause (ii) of the foregoing clause (d) has
specified the scope of the term 'consumer', and it
accommodates any person who has availed of any 'services'
for a consideration, either partly or fully paid, or through a
deferred payment system. Hence, there is no apparent
reason to believe that respondents 4 and 5, who have not
availed such services for any commercial purposes, would
be excluded from such a wide definition.
23. It is also relevant to extract Section 2(1)(o) of the Act,
which reads as follows:-
'service' means service of any description which is made
available to potential (users and includes, but not limited
to, the provision of) facilities in connection with
banking, financing insurance, transport,
processing, supply of electrical or other energy,
board or lodging of both, (housing construction)
entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news
or other information, but does not include the
rendering of any service free of charge or under a
contract of personal service;
(emphasis supplied)
24. A plain reading of the above clause shows that the
term 'service' has categorically included the service of
"housing construction". Thus, it is clear that in the present
case, the petitioners have rendered a 'service' to
respondents 4 and 5, who are 'consumers', and that there
is a 'deficiency in service', which has clearly been made
out.
25. This Court, having considered the rival submissions
made by the learned counsel for the respective parties, and
in view of the foregoing discussions, is of the considered
view that neither the 2nd respondent State Commission nor
the 3rd respondent National Commission suffer from any
lack of jurisdiction or vires in passing the orders in
C.C.No.69 of 2019 dated 17.11.2023, and consequently in
First Appeal No.97 of 2024 dated 18.03.2024. The State
Commission and the National Commission have fairly
considered and thoroughly examined the maintainability of
the complaint under the Act. Learned counsel for
respondents 4 and 5 rightly relied upon the aforesaid
judgments to contend that the nature of the transaction
between the respondents 4 and 5 and the petitioners fall
under the ambit of 'service' as defined in Section 2(1)(o) of
the Act. Further, it is also clear that the respondents 4 and
5 fall within the definition of a 'consumer' as defined under
Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act. Having considered the entire
material available on record, rival contentions and the
findings recorded by the State Commission and the
National Commission, this Court does not find any reason,
much less a valid reason warranting interference of this
Court with the concurrent findings recorded by both the
Commissions. Hence, there are no merits in the writ
petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.
26. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. Interim
order granted by this Court on 24.04.2024 shall stand
vacated. No costs.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand
closed.
________________
SUJOY PAUL, J
_____________________________________
NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO, J
13th August 2024
Note:
L.R.copy to be marked
(B/o)
Prv
