Telangana High Court
Mr.N.Ravindranath Reddy Another vs The State Of Telangana Another on 26 April, 2023
Bench: G.Anupama Chakravarthy
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE G. ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY
CRIMINAL PETITION Nos.
16096, 16097 and 16105 of 2014
COMMON ORDER :
These criminal petitions are filed by the petitioners seeking
to quash FIR.Nos.1078, 1079 and 1080 of 2014 registered against
them on the file of Rajendranagar Police Station, for the offences
punishable under Sections 419, 420, 447, 468, 471 and 506 r/w.
Section 120-B of IPC.
2. As the subject matter of all these criminal petitions is one
and the same, all these petitions are heard together and are being
disposed of by this common order.
3. One K. Susheela i.e. respondent No.2 in all the three quash
petitions, filed private complaints before the VIII Metropolitan
Magistrate, Cyberabad, Ranga Reddy District, contending that she
is the daughter-in-law of one K. Narayana and K. Yellamma. One
K. Sarojini, K. Sriramulu, K. Suresh, K. Mallesh, K. Prabhavathi,
K. Shiva Leela and L. Shakunthala, including herself, are the legal
heirs of K. Narayana, who was the protected tenant in respect of
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the total land admeasuring Ac.3-31 gts. (Ac.1-03 gts. in Sy.No.102,
Ac.1-17 gts. in Sy.No.114 and Ac.1-11 gts. in Sy.No.116), situated
at Narsingi village, Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District.
It is the specific contention of respondent No.2 in her private
complaint that the Land Reforms Tribunal, Hyderabad West, has
issued ownership certificate under Section 38-E of the A.P.
(Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 in
favour of her father-in-law K. Narayana on 15.05.1975. After his
death, all his legal heirs through one B. Satyanarayana, filed an
application before the Deputy Collector and Tahsildar,
Rajendranagar Mandal for demarcation of the said lands. After
issuing notices to the neighbouring pattadars and also to petitioner
No.1/accused No.1, they attended on 05.07.2008 and claimed
ownership of the lands in Sy.No.102 admeasuring Ac.1-03 gts.
under the registered sale deed bearing document No.5642 of 2003,
dated 14.08.2003, which was executed by one Muppa Srinivasulu
and Kamma Narsimulu. It is the further contention of the
complainant that accused No.1 has purchased the same from the
said persons, who had purchased the said land vide document
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No.5416 of 2001, dated 11.10.2001 from one G. Ramachandraiah
and others and that the legal heirs of the protected tenant K.
Narayana executed a ratification deed vide document No.13586 of
2006, dated 05.10.2006 at Sub-Registrar's office, Rajendranagar.
After verifying the ratification deed, it was alleged that accused
Nos.1 to 5 colluded with each other and created forged documents
by impersonating the legal heirs of K. Narayana by cheating with
fictitious documents in their favour and accused Nos.4 and 5 are
witnesses to the said ratification deed. It is further alleged by the
de facto complainant that accused Nos.1 to 3 trespassed into the
land and threatened the complainant and other legal heirs to grab
the land.
4. On receipt of the above private complaint, the VIII
Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad, referred the matter under
Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., to the Station House Officer,
Rajendranagar, who in turn, registered the same as a case in Crime
No.1080 of 2014 on 10.11.2014 for the offences punishable under
Sections 419, 420, 447, 468, 471 and 506 r/w. 120-B of IPC.
Likewise, for the lands in Sy.No.114 to an extent of Ac.1-17 gts.,
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and for the lands in Sy.No.116 to an extent of Ac.1-11 gts. also, the
other two FIRs. i.e. FIR.Nos.1078 and 1079 of 2014 are also
registered by Rajendranagar Police against the same accused, who
are the petitioners in these quash petitions.
5. Heard learned Senior Counsel Sri D. Prakash Reddy for
petitioners, Sri S. Ganesh, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor
appearing for respondent No.1 and learned Senior Counsel Sri V.
Ravinder Rao, appearing for respondent No.2.
6. It is the specific contention of the quash petitioners that one
L. Shakunthala and K. Shiva Leela, who are the daughters of K.
Narayana and K. Yellamma, filed an application before the Deputy
Collector and Tahsildar, Rajendranagar, for grant of succession
certificate and issuance of pattadar passbooks and title deeds in
their favour and the same was dismissed on merits vide
Proceedings No.A/990/2011, dated 08.02.2013 and the Deputy
Collector and Tahsildar, Rajendranagar held that the lands in
Sy.Nos.102, 114 and 116 along with the other lands situated in
Narsingi village, were converted from agricultural use zone to non-
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agricultural use zone vide G.O.Ms.No.322 (M&U) Development
(4) Department, dated 19.04.2005. The layout for the said lands
was made and plots were disposed of to several individuals and
purchasers of some of the plots have also got regularized the plots
from HMDA and the said lands have become non-agricultural
lands, and as such, Section 2(4) of the A.P. Rights in Land and
Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971, is not applicable for the said lands,
which became non-agricultural lands. It was further held that even
after issuance of ownership certificate under Section 38-E of the
A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
neither the protected tenant nor his legal heirs have initiated any
action for implementation of ownership certificate for the last more
than 30 years, and after lapse of three Decades, they have
approached the authority for issuance of Pattadar passbooks, title
deeds and restoration of possession, and accordingly, dismissed the
application.
7. Being aggrieved by the dismissal order, they preferred an
appeal before the Special Grade Deputy Collector and Revenue
Divisional Officer, Rajendranagar, who, vide order dated
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26.02.2014, set aside the orders of the Tahsildar and remanded the
matter to the Deputy Collector/Tahsildar for fresh inquiry.
Thereafter, the Deputy Collector/Tahsildar, vide proceedings in
Case No.D/990/2011, dated 27.05.2014, without issuing any notice
or giving opportunity to the petitioners, directed the primary
authorities to issue pattadar passbooks and title deeds. Aggrieved
by the same, the petitioners herein have filed revision before the
Joint Collector, who has suspended the proceedings of the Deputy
Collector, Rajendranagar, and the matter is still pending.
8. It is the specific contention of the quash petitioners that
suppressing all these facts, the de facto complainant/K.Susheela
filed private complaints, basing on which, the present FIRs. are
registered. It is the further contention of the petitioners that the
alleged 38-E certificate issued in favour of K.Narayana, has not
seen the light of the day and for the first time after three Decades,
the legal heirs of K.Narayana filed application for grant of
succession certificate as well as for issuance of pattadar passbooks
and title deeds. The de facto complainant/K.Susheela claims to be
one of the legal heirs, but did not join with the other legal heirs in
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the said application. There was a dispute among the legal heirs of
the alleged protected tenant and the suit for partition was also filed.
The dispute is purely civil in nature and the legal heirs of K.
Narayana are not in possession of the property, therefore, the
allegation of impersonation/forging the signatures of K. Narayana
does not arise.
9. It is further contended that one K. Janardhan and K. Shankar
approached the petitioners stating that they are the legal heirs of
K. Narayana and they are willing to execute a ratification deed.
Believing the same, the petitioners, to avoid litigation, have paid
amount to the said persons, who are the grandsons of K. Narayana
and ratification deed was executed. The petitioners have purchased
the said land for lawful consideration from the rightful owners, and
as such, the allegations of collusion, impersonation and fraud are
totally false, and therefore, prayed to quash the FIRs. It is further
contended that the legal heirs of Narayana have to obtain
succession certificate from the competent Court under Section 40
of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
1950. Unless and until the same is obtained, the de facto
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complainant/K.Susheela is not entitled to file any complaint and
the very complaints made are not maintainable, and accordingly,
prayed to quash the FIRs. registered against the petitioners.
10. Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
petitioners, contended that accused Nos.2 and 3 sold the property
to one Ravinder Reddy and the alleged ratification deed has been
executed by 11 persons. It is the specific contention of the learned
Senior Counsel that Smt K.Susheela/the de facto complainant alone
has preferred complaint that the ratification deed was impersonated
and the other persons have not come forward to file any complaint
against the petitioners, therefore, the version of the de facto
complainant is not believable. It is further contended that on
perusal of the private complaint itself, it is evident that the
petitioners are in possession of the property even as on today and
the complaint is silent as to how the petitioners have come into
possession if the complainant and her family members are the
protected tenants and legal heirs of K. Narayana. It is also
contended by the learned Senior Counsel that O.S.No.458 of 2009
is still pending on the file of IV Additional District Judge, Ranga
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Reddy. The contents of plaint in the said suit disclose that the
de facto complainant along with six others, have filed the suit
against the petitioners herein and others and the prayer portion
clearly reveals that the suit is filed for preliminary decree for
partition, partitioning the suit schedule property into 36 equal
shares and to allot 1/36 share to plaintiff No.1, 7/36 share to
plaintiff Nos.2 and 3, 7/36 share to plaintiff Nos.4 and 5, 7/36
share to plaintiff Nos.6 and 7 and 7/36 share to defendant Nos.1
and 5. It is also the specific contention of the learned Senior
Counsel for petitioners that if the case of the de facto complainant
is that none of the family members have executed the ratification
deed, as to why only respondent No.2/de facto complainant has
filed the private complaint and other aggrieved parties have not
come forward for filing any complaint against the petitioners, is not
at all explained by the de facto complainant.
11. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior Counsel for
petitioners has relied on the following judgments of the Apex
Court;
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(1) In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & others1,
wherein, it is held;
".....the High Court is entitled to quash a
proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that
allowing the proceeding to continue would be
an abuse of the process of the Court or that the;
ends of justice require that the proceeding
ought to be quashed. The saving of the High
Court's inherent powers, both in civil and
criminal matters, is designed to. achieve a
salutary public purpose which is that a court
proceeding ought not to be permitted to
degenerate into weapon of harassment or
persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled
object behind a lame prosecution, the very
nature of the material on which the structure of
the prosecution rests and the like would justify
the High Court in quashing the proceeding in
the interest of justice. The ends of justice are
higher than the, ends of mere law though justice
has got to be. administered according to laws
made by the, legislature. The compelling
necessity for making these observations is that
without a proper realisation of the object and
pur- pose of the provision which seeks to. save
the inherent powers of the High Court to do
justice between the State and its. subjects, it
would be impossible. to appreciate the width
and contours of that salient jurisdiction."
(2) In G. Sagar Suri & another v. State of U.P. &
others2, wherein, it is held:
"Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has
to be exercised with a great care. In exercise of
1
(1977) 2 SCC 699
2
(2000) 2 scc 636
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its jurisdiction High Court is not to examine the
matter superficially. It is to be seen if a matter,
which is essentially of civil nature, has been
given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal
proceedings are not a short cut of other
remedies available in law. Before issuing
process a criminal court has to exercise a great
deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious
matter. This Court has laid certain principles on
the basis of which High Court is to exercise its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code,
Jurisdiction- under this Section has to be
exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice."
(3) In Nilesh N. Shah & another v. The Officer in-
charge/Investigating Officer, Panjim Police Station
& another3, wherein, it is held;
"In Sussanne Khan (supra), this Court held while
dealing with the quashing of the offence under Section
420 I.P.C. that it was necessary to examine the said
Agreement to find out the nature of the services
sought from the Petitioner by the Respondent no. 3
before examining the complaint to ascertain whether
the ingredients of an offence of cheating stood
satisfied based on the allegations therein. A reference
was made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court
in ARCI v. Nimra Cerglass Technics (P) Ltd., (2016) 1
SCC 348 where the Hon'ble Apex Court had observed
at Para 22 and 23 thus:
"22. By an analysis of the terms and conditions of the
agreement between the parties, the dispute between
the parties appears to be purely of civil nature. It is a
3
2017 SCC OnLine Bom 2903
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settled legal proposition that criminal liability should
not be imposed in disputes of civil nature. In Anil
Mahajan v. Bhor Industries Ltd., this Court held as
under :
"6. ... A distinction has to be kept in mind between
mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating. It
depends upon the intention of the accused at the time
of inducement. The subsequent conduct is not the sole
test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to
criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent,
dishonest intention is shown at the beginning of the
transaction.
****
8. The substance of the complaint is to be seen. Mere
use of the expression 'cheating' in the complaint is of
no consequence. Except mention of the words
'deceive' and 'cheat' in the complaint filed before the
Magistrate and 'cheating' in the complaint filed before
the police, there is no averment about the deceit,
cheating or fraudulent intention of the accused at the
time of entering into MoU wherefrom it can be
inferred that the accused had the intention to deceive
the complainant to pay. ... We need not go into the
question of the difference of the amounts mentioned in
the complaint which is much more than what is
mentioned in the notice and also the defence of the
accused and the stand taken in reply to notice because
the complainant's own case is that over rupees three
crores was paid and for balance, the accused was
giving reasons as above-noticed. The additional
reason for not going into these aspects is that a civil
suit is pending inter se the parties for the amounts in
question."
23. In Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd., this
Court observed that civil liability cannot be converted
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into criminal liability and held as under : (SCC pp.
748-49, paras 13-14)
"13. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice
of a growing tendency in business circles to convert
purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is
obviously on account of a prevalent impression that
civil law remedies are time consuming and do not
adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors.
Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes
also, leading to irretrievable breakdown of
marriages/families. There is also an impression that if
a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal
prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent
settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and
claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by
applying pressure through criminal prosecution should
be deprecated and discouraged. In G. Sagar Suri v.
State of U.P. this Court observed :
'8. ... It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially
of a civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal
offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of
other remedies available in law. Before issuing
process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of
caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This
Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which
the High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this
section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice.' 14. While no one with a legitimate cause or
grievance should be prevented from seeking remedies
available in criminal law, a complainant who initiates
or persists with a prosecution, being fully aware that
the criminal proceedings are unwarranted and his
remedy lies only in civil law, should himself be made
accountable, at the end of such misconceived criminal
proceedings, in accordance with law. One positive
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step that can be taken by the courts, to curb
unnecessary prosecutions and harassment of innocent
parties, is to exercise their power under Section 250
CrPC more frequently, where they discern malice or
frivolousness or ulterior motives on the part of the
complainant. Be that as it may."
(4) In Inder Mohan Goswami & another v. State of
Uttaranchal & others4, wherein, it is held;
"The court must ensure that criminal
prosecution is not used as an instrument of
harassment or for seeking private vendetta or
with an ulterior motive to pressure the accused.
On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are
of the opinion that it is neither possible nor
desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that
would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High
Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide
has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and
with caution and only when it is justified by the
tests specifically laid down in the Statute itself
and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the
settled legal position, the impugned judgment
cannot be sustained."
(5) In Mohammed Ibrahim & others v. State of Bihar
& another5, wherein it is held;
"This Court has time and again drawn attention
to the growing tendency of complainants
attempting to give the cloak of a criminal
offence to matters which are essentially and
purely civil in nature, obviously either to apply
pressure on the accused, or out of enmity
(2007) 12 SCC 1
(2009) 8 SCC 751
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towards the accused, or to subject the accused
to harassment. Criminal courts should ensure
that proceedings before it are not used for
settling scores or to pressurise parties to settle
civil disputes. But at the same, it should be
noted that several disputes of a civil nature may
also contain the ingredients of criminal offences
and if so, will have to be tried as criminal
offences, even if they also amount to civil
disputes. [See: G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P.
[2000 (2) SCC 636] and Indian Oil Corporation
vs. NEPC India Ltd. [2006 (6) SCC 736]. Let
us examine the matter keeping the said
principles in mind."
(6) In B. Malla Reddy & others v. State of Telangana6,
wherein, it is held as under:
"18. Reading Section 40 of the Act and the
Tenancy Rules together, it must be held that
though under Section 40 of the Act, Tahsildar
has no power to decide questions of succession
to the protected tenancy, in the event of
acquisition of rights, Tahsildar can conduct
verification under Rule 14 of the Rules and
order amendments in the register of mutations.
Such a procedure is also contemplated under
Section 4 of the A.P. Rights in Land and
Pattadar Pass Book Act, 1971 and Rule 18 of
the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Book
Rules, 1989. The enquiry contemplated for
amending mutation in the event of acquisition
of rights either by survivorship or succession is
altogether different from adjudicating the
question of succession. Even while dealing with
the application for recording for amendment of
entries in the mutation register, if there is a
2021 SCC OnLine TS 895
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dispute by the applicant, the MRO should
relegate such party to the Civil Court.
19. This Court in an unreported judgment in
W.P. No. 7430 of 2000 held that the
question as to who are the legal heirs of a
deceased protected tenant has to be
decided by a competent Court of civil
jurisdiction. A similar view was
expressed in another unreported
judgment in W.P. No. 7018 of 2000. The
decisions cited by the learned Counsel
for the petitioner nowhere lay down that
the Tahsildar/MRO is conferred with the
power to decide questions of succession.
By the very nature of enquiry involved in
such application, the Tahsildar/MRO is
not competent to decide questions of
succession."
21. Even assuming, what is contended by
petitioners is true and Section 38-E
certificates were not issued to those two
persons and lands in issue were not
alienated, no third party interests are
created, petitioners have to first assert
their right to succeed to tenancy of their
ancestors on the subject lands by availing
the civil law remedy, if so available.
Until and unless the Civil Court grants
the declaration holding that petitioners
are entitled to succeed to the tenancy
rights on land, hitherto, standing in the
name of protected tenant, they cannot go
to the next stage. The Writ Petitions are
misconceived. They are accordingly
dismissed, leaving it open to the
petitioners to work out civil law remedy,
subject to law of limitation. Pending
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miscellaneous applications, if any
pending, stand closed."
(7) In Randheer Singh v. State of U.P. and others7,
wherein, it is held;
"In this case, it appears that criminal
proceedings are being taken recourse to as a
weapon of harassment against a purchaser. It is
reiterated at the cost of repetition that the FIR
does not disclose any offence so far as the
Appellant is concerned. There is no whisper of
how and in what manner, this Appellant is
involved in any criminal offence and the charge
sheet, the relevant part whereof has been
extracted above, is absolutely vague. There can
be no doubt that jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly for the
purpose of preventing abuse of the process of
any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice. Whether a complaint discloses criminal
offence or not depends on the nature of the
allegation and whether the essential ingredients
of a criminal offence are present or not has to
be judged by the High Court. There can be no
doubt that a complaint disclosing civil
transactions may also have a criminal texture.
The High Court has, however, to see whether
the dispute of a civil nature has been given
colour of criminal offence. In such a situation,
the High Court should not hesitate to quash the
criminal proceedings as held by this Court in
Paramjeet Batra (supra) extracted above."
12. On the other hand, it is the specific contention of the learned
Senior Counsel Sri V. Ravinder Rao, appearing for respondent
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No.2 that there is no need for all the 11 persons to file private
complaint against the petitioners, and it is sufficient if any one of
the parties files complaint. It is also contended that while dealing
with the quash petitions, the High Court has to meticulously go
through the record and sparingly dispose of the quash petitions and
further there is no bar of filing a criminal petition in view of
pendency of civil suit. As there is impersonation while executing
the ratification deed, the present FIRs. are lodged against the
petitioners. Accordingly, he prayed to dismiss the quash petitions
as the same are devoid of merits and there is every necessity for the
investigating officer to investigate into the cheating, forgery and
other offences and it is a matter of fact to be tried before the Court
to prove the alleged offences.
13. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior Counsel
relied on the following judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court :
(1) In Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of West Bengal &
others8, wherein, it is held:
"7. This Court has consistently held that the
revisional or inherent powers of quashing the
proceedings at the initial stage should be
(2002) 1 SCC 555
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exercised sparingly and only where the
allegations made in the complaint or the FIR,
even if taken it at the face value and accepted in
entirety, do not prima facie disclose the
commission of an offence. Disputed and
controversial facts cannot be made the basis for
the exercise of the jurisdiction. In R.P. Kapur v.
State of Punjab this Court held:
"It is well established that the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised
to quash proceedings in a proper case either to
prevent the abuse of the process of any court of
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted
against an accused person must be tried under
the provisions of the Code, and the High Court
would be reluctant to interfere with the said
proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not
possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any
inflexible rule which would govern the exercise
of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may
indicate some categories of cases where the
inherent jurisdiction can and should be
exercised for quashing the proceedings. There
may be cases where it may be possible for the
High Court to take the view that the institution
or continuance of criminal proceedings against
an accused person may amount to the abuse of
the process of the court or that the quashing of
the impugned proceedings would secure the
ends of justice. If the criminal proceedings in
question is in respect of an offence alleged to
have been committed by an accused person and
it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance of the said
proceeding the High Court would be justified in
quashing the proceedings on that ground.
Absence of the requisite sanction may, for
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instance, furnish cases under this category.
Cases may also arise where the allegations in
the First Information Report or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the
offence alleged; in such cases no question of
appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter of
merely of looking at the complaint or the First
Information Report to decide whether the
offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such
cases it would be legitimate for the High Court
to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to
allow the process of the criminal court to be
issued against the accused person. A third
category of the cases in which the inherent
jurisdiction of High Court can be successfully
invoked may also arise. In cases falling under
this category the allegations made against the
accused person do constitute an offence alleged
but there is either no legal evidence adduced in
support of the case or evidence adduced clearly
or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In
dealing with this class of cases it is important to
bear in mind the distinction between a case
where there is no legal evidence or where there
is evidence which is manifestly and clearly
inconsistent with the accusation made and cases
where there is legal evidence which on its
appreciation may or may not support the
accusation in question. In exercising its
jurisdiction under S. 561A the High Court
would not embark upon an inquiry as to
whether the evidence in question is reliable or
not. That is the function of the trial magistrate,
and ordinarily it would not be open to any part
to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction
and contended that on a reasonable appreciation
of the evidence the accusation made against the
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accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated
that is the nature and scope of the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 561A in
the matter of quashing criminal proceedings,
and that is the effect of the judicial decisions of
the point (Vide: In re: Shripad G. Chandavarkar
AIR 1928 Bom 184, Jagar Chandra Mozumdar
V. Queen Empress. ILR 26 Cal 786, Dr.
Shankar Singh v. State of Punjab 56 Pun LR
54: , Nripendra Bhusan Roy v. Gobinda
Bandhu Majumdar and Ramanathan Chettiyar
v. Sivarama Subramania ILR 47 Mad 722:
(AIR 1925 Mad. 39)."
9. Criminal prosecution cannot be thwarted
at the initial stage merely because civil
proceedings are also pending. After referring to
judgments in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal ,
Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi this Court
in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh
Agarwal & Ors. [1999 (8) SC 687] held:
"Time and again this Court has been pointing
out that quashing of FIR or a complaint in
exercise of the inherent, powers of the High
Court should be limited to very extreme
exceptions (vide State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi ].
In the last referred case this court also pointed
out that merely because an act has a civil
profile is not sufficient to denude it of its
criminal outfit. We quote the following
observations:
"10. It may be that the facts narrated in the
present complaint would as well reveal a
commercial transaction or money transaction.
But that is hardly a reason for holding that the
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offence of cheating were committed in the
course of commercial and also money
transaction."
15. We have already noticed that the nature and
scope of civil and criminal proceedings and the
standard of proof required in both matters is
different and distinct. Whereas in civil
proceedings the matter can be decided on the
basis of probabilities, the criminal case has to
be decided by adopting the standard of proof of
"beyond reasonable doubt". A Constitution
Bench of this court. dealing with the similar
circumstances, in M.S. Sheriff & Anr. v. State
of Madras & Ors. held that where civil and
criminal cases are pending, precedence shall be
given to criminal proceedings. Detailing the
reasons for the conclusions, the court held:
"As between the civil and the criminal
proceedings we are of the opinion that the
criminal matters should be given precedence.
There is some difference of opinion in the High
Courts of India on this point. No hard and fast
rule can be laid down but we do not consider
that the possibility of conflicting decisions in
the civil and criminal courts is a relevant
consideration. The law envisages such an
eventuality when it expressly refrains from
making the decision of one court binding on the
other, or even relevant, except for certain
limited purposes, such as sentence of damages.
The only relevant consideration here is the
likelihood of embarrassment.
Another factor which weighs with us is that a
civil suit often drags on for years and it is
undesirable that a criminal prosecution should
wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all
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about the crime. The public interests demand
that criminal justice should be swift and sure;
that the guilty should be published while the
events are still fresh in the public mind and that
the innocent should be absolved as early as is
consistent with a fair and impartial trial.
Another reason is that it is undesirable to let
things slide till memories have grown too him
to trust.
This however, is not a hard and fast rule.
Special considerations obtaining in any
particular case might make some other course
more expedient and just. For example, the civil
case or the other criminal proceeding may be so
near its end as to make it expedient to stay it in
order to given precedence to a prosecution
ordered under S. 476. But in this case we are of
the view that the civil suits should be stayed till
the criminal proceedings have furnished."
(2) In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Surendra Kori9,
wherein, it is held:
"The High Court in exercise of its powers under
Section 482 CrPC does not function as a Court
of Appeal or Revision. This Court has, in
several judgments, held that the inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, though
wide, has to be used sparingly, carefully and
with caution. The High Court, under Section
482 CrPC, should normally refrain from giving
a prima facie decision in a case where the entire
facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when
the evidence has not been collected and
produced before the Court and the issues
involved, whether factual or legal, are of wide
(2012) 10 SCC 155
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magnitude and cannot be seen in their true
perspective without sufficient material. In
M.M.T.C. and Another v. Medchl Chemicals &
Pharma (P) Ltd. and Another (2002) 1 SCC
234, this Court held as follows:
"The law is well settled that the power of
quashing criminal proceedings should be
exercised very stringently and with
circumspection. It is settled law that at this
stage, the Court is not justified in embarking
upon an enquiry as to the reliability or
genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the complaint. The inherent powers do
not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court
to act according to its whim or caprice....." In
State of Orissa and Another v. Saroj Kumar
Sahoo (2005) 13 SCC 540, this Court held as
follows:
"Exercise of power under Section 482 of the.
Cr.P.C. in a case of this nature is the exception
and not the rule. The Section does not confer
any new powers on the High Court. It only
saves the inherent power which the Court
possessed before the enactment of the Cr.P.C. It
envisages three circumstances under which the
inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely,
(i) to give effect to an order under the Cr.P.C.,
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is
neither possible nor desirable to lay down any
inflexible rule which would govern the exercise
of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative
enactment dealing with procedure can provide
for all cases that may possibly arise.
Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart
from express provisions of law which are
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necessary for proper discharge of functions and
duties imposed upon them by law. That is the
doctrine which finds expression in the section
which merely recognizes and preserves inherent
powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether
civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any
express provision, as inherent in their
constitution, all such powers as are necessary to
do the right and to undo a wrong in course of
administration of justice on the principle
"quando lex aliauid alicui concedit, concedered
videtur et id sine guo resipsae esse non potest"
(when the law gives a person anything it gives
him that without which it cannot exist). While
exercising powers under the section, the court
does not function as a court of appeal or
revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section
though wide has to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with caution and only when such
exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in the section itself....." This Court,
again, in Eicher Tractors Ltd. v. Harihar Singh
(2006) 12 SCC 763, held as follows:
"When exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would
not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether
the evidence in question is reliable or not or
whether on a reasonable appreciation of it
accusation would not be sustained. That is the
function of the trial Judge."
(3) In Arun Bhandari v. State of Uttar Pradesh &
others10, wherein, it is held;
"At this stage, we may usefully note that some
times a case may apparently look to be of civil
(2013) 2 SCC 801
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nature or may involve a commercial transaction
but such civil disputes or commercial disputes
in certain circumstances may also contain
ingredients of criminal offences and such
disputes have to be entertained notwithstanding
they are also civil disputes. In this context, we
may reproduce a passage from Mohammed
Ibrahim and others v. State of Bihar and
another: -
"8. This Court has time and again drawn
attention to the growing tendency of the
complainants attempting to give the cloak of a
criminal offence to matters which are
essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously
either to apply pressure on the accused, or out
of enmity towards the accused, or to subject the
accused to harassment. Criminal courts should
ensure that proceedings before it are not used
for settling scores or to pressurize parties to
settle civil disputes. But at the same time, it
should be noted that several disputes of a civil
nature may also contain the ingredients of
criminal offences and if so, will have to be tried
as criminal offences, even if they also amount
to civil disputes. (See G. Sagar Suri v. State of
U.P. and Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India
Ltd.)"
In this context we may usefully refer to a
paragraph from All Cargo Movers (I) Pvt. Ltd.
V. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain & Anr.:
".....Where a civil suit is pending and the
complaint petition has been filed one year after
filing of the civil suit, we may for the purpose
of finding out as to whether the said allegations
are prima facie cannot notice the
correspondence exchanged by the parties and
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other admitted documents. It is one thing to say
that the Court at this juncture would not
consider the defence of the accused but it is
another thing to say that for exercising the
inherent jurisdiction of this Court, it is
impermissible also to look to the admitted
documents. Criminal proceedings should not be
encouraged, when it is found to be mala fide or
otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
Superior Courts while exercising this power
should also strive to serve the ends of justice."
In Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and
others, while dealing with a case where the
High Court had quashed an F.I.R., this Court
opined that the facts narrated in the complaint
petition may reveal a commercial transaction or
a money transaction, but that is hardly a reason
for holding that the offence of cheating would
elude from such a transaction. Proceeding
further, the Bench observed thus: -
"11. The crux of the postulate is the intention of
the person who induces the victim of his
representation and not the nature of the
transaction which would become decisive in
discerning whether there was commission of
offence or not. The complainant has stated in
the body of the complaint that he was induced
to believe that the respondent would honour
payment on receipt of invoices, and that the
complainant realised later that the intentions of
the respondent were not clear. He also
mentioned that the respondent after receiving
the goods had sold them to others and still he
did not pay the money. Such averments would
prima facie make out a case for investigation by
the authorities."
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We have referred to the aforesaid decisions in
the field to highlight about the role of the Court
while dealing with such issues. In our
considered opinion the present case falls in the
category which cannot be stated at this stage to
be purely civil in nature on the basis of the
admitted documents or the allegations made in
the FIR or what has come out in the
investigation or for that matter what has been
stated in the protest petition. We are disposed to
think that prima facie there is allegation that
there was a guilty intention to induce the
complainant to part with money. We may
hasten to clarify that it is not a case where a
promise initially made could not lived up to
subsequently. It is not a case where it could be
said that even if the allegations in entirety are
accepted, no case is made out. Needless to
emphasise, the High Court, while exercising
power under Article 226 of the Constitution or
Section 482 of the CrPC, has to adopt a very
cautious approach. In Central Bureau of
Investigation v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava, IAS
and another, the Court, after referring to Janata
Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Raghubir Saran
(Dr.) v. State of Bihar, has observed that the
powers possessed by the High Court under
Section 482 of the IPC are very wide and the
very plentitude of the power requires great
caution in its exercise. The court must be
careful to see that its decision in exercise of this
power is based on sound principles and such
inherent powers should not be exercised to
stifle a legitimate prosecution. This Court has
further stated that it is not proper for the High
Court to analyse the case of the complainant in
the light of all probabilities in order to
determine whether a conviction would be
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sustainable and on such premises arrive at a
conclusion that the proceedings are to be
quashed. It has been further pronounced that it
would be erroneous to assess the material
before it and conclude that the complaint could
not be proceeded with. The Bench has opined
that the meticulous analysis of the case is not
necessary and the complaint has to be read as a
whole and if it appears that on consideration of
the allegations in the light of the statement
made on oath of the complainant that the
ingredients of the offence or offences are
disclosed and there is no material to show that
the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or
vexatious, in that event there would be no
justification for interference by the High
Court."
(4) In C.P.Subhash v. Inspector of Police, Chennai &
others11, wherein, it is held:
"It was on the basis of the above information
that the complainant filed a complaint against
the respondents alleging commission of
offences punishable under Sections 468 and
471 of the IPC. Crime No.41/10 was
accordingly registered in the Central Crime
Branch, Chennai Suburban, St. Thomas Mount
for the said offences against respondents 2, 3
and 4. Aggrieved, the respondents filed
Criminal O.P. No.15917 of 2010 for quashing
of the FIR as also investigation in connection
therewith which petition was heard and allowed
by a Single Judge of the High Court of Madras
by an order dated 15th February, 2011 quashing
registration of the case as also the proceedings
based on the same. The High Court called in aid
(2013) 11 SCC 559
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two precise reasons for doing so. Firstly, the
High Court held that the allegations made in the
complaint even if accepted in their entirety did
not prima facie constitute an offence or make
out a case against the respondents herein.
Secondly, the High Court held that no Court
could, in view of the bar contained in Section
195 Cr.P.C., take cognizance of offences in
question except on a complaint in writing made
by the court or the public servant concerned.
The present appeal assails the correctness of the
said order passed, as already noticed above.
Appearing for the appellant, Mr. K.K.
Venugopal, learned senior counsel, argued that
the High Court had fallen in a palpable error in
interfering with the ongoing investigation. The
complaint filed by the appellant, argued the
learned counsel, made specific allegations
against the respondents which could not be
brushed aside without a proper verification of
the correctness thereof in the course of
investigation. In support of his submission he
placed reliance upon the decision of this Court
in State of Karnataka and Anr. v. Pastor P.Raju
(2006) 6 SCC 728. He urged that the High
Court could not interfere with an ongoing
investigation except under compelling
circumstances or where the complaint did not
make out any case even if the allegations made
therein were taken at their face value. He
further contended that the High Court was in
error in relying upon Section 195 of Cr.P.C.
while quashing the investigation. Section 195,
argued Mr. Venugopal, was applicable to cases
in which the alleged fabrication of the
document had taken place while the same was
in the custody of the court. That was not the
position in the case at hand. Reliance in support
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of that contention was placed by Mr.
Venugopal upon a Constitution Bench decision
of this Court in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah
and Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah and Anr.
(2005) 4 SCC 370.
In the light of the above, the High Court was
wrong in quashing the FIR on the ground that
the allegations did not constitute an offence
even when the same were taken to be true in
their entirety. It was also, in our view, wrong
for the High Court to hold that the respondents
were not the makers of the documents or that
the filing of a civil suit based on the same
would not constitute an offence. Whether or not
the respondents had forged the documents and
if so what offence was committed by the
respondents was a matter for investigation
which could not be prejudged or quashed by the
High Court in exercise of its powers under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India."
(5) In Gangadhar Kalita v. State of Assam & others12,
wherein, it is held:
"The present appellant challenged the First
Information Report by filing a petition under
Section 482 of the Code on the ground that the
dispute between the parties is of civil in nature.
It is also pleaded by the appellant that a title
suit No. 477 of 2008 has already instituted by
Birendra Kumar Das. It is also urged that
another suit No. 293 of 2009 was filed before
the Court of Civil Judge No. 3, Guwahati, by
the informants (respondent Nos. 3 and 4)
(2015) 9 SCC 647
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seeking cancellation of the power of attorney in
question.
However, after hearing the parties, the High
Court was not impressed with the arguments
advanced on behalf of the accused (appellant),
and observed that since the allegations made
against him make out a cognizable offence, and
the allegations are serious in nature, as such, it
declined to interfere with the criminal
proceedings. The High Court further opined
that the complainant has not acted mala fide of
the Deed. In Arun Bhandari v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and others, this Court has held that if
the allegations in the First Information Report
are not frivolous, mala fide or vexatious, it
cannot be simply quashed for the reason that
civil suit is also pending in the matter.
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 33 of said case are
reproduced below: -
"2. The factual score as depicted is that the
appellant is a non-resident Indian (NRI) living
in Germany and while looking for a property in
Greater Noida, he came in contact with
Respondent 2 and her husband, Raghuvendra
Singh, who claimed to be the owner of the
property in question and offered to sell the
same. On 24-3-2008, as alleged, both the
husband and wife agreed to sell the residential
plot bearing No. 131, Block Cassia Fistula
Estate, Sector Chi-4, Greater Noida, U.P. for a
consideration of Rs 2,43,97,880 and an
agreement to that effect was executed by
Respondent 3, both the husband and wife
jointly received a sum of Rs 1,05,00,000 from
the appellant towards part-payment of the sale
consideration. It was further agreed that
Respondents 2 and 3 would obtain permission
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from the Greater Noida Authority to transfer
the property in his favour and execute the deed
of transfer within 45 days from the grant of
such permission.
3. As the factual antecedents would further
reveal, the said agreement was executed on the
basis of a registered agreement executed in
favour of Respondent 3 by the original allottee,
Smt Vandana Bhardwaj to sell the said plot.
After expiry of a month or so, the appellant
enquired from Respondent 3 about the progress
of delivery of possession from the original
allottee, but he received conflicting and
contradictory replies which created doubt in his
mind and impelled him to rush to Noida and
find out the real facts from the Greater Noida
Authority. On due enquiry, he came to know
that there was a registered agreement in favour
of the third respondent by Smt Vandana
Bhardwaj; that a power of attorney had been
executed by the original allottee in favour of
Respondent 2, the wife of Respondent 3; that
the original allottee, to avoid any kind of
litigation, had also executed a will in favour of
Respondent 3; and that Respondent 2 by virtue
of the power of attorney, executed in her favour
by the original allottee, had transferred the said
property in favour of one Monika Goel who had
got her name mutated in the record of the
Greater Noida Authority. Coming to know
about the aforesaid factual score, he demanded
refund of the money from the respondents, but
a total indifferent attitude was exhibited, which
compelled him to lodge an FIR at Police Station
Kasna, which gave rise to Criminal Case No.
563 of 2009.
xxx xxx xxx
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Applying the aforesaid parameters we have no
hesitation in coming to hold that neither the FIR
nor the protest petition was mala fide, frivolous
or vexatious. It is also not a case where there is
no substance in the complaint. The manner in
which the investigation was conducted by the
officer who eventually filed the final report and
the transfer of the investigation earlier to
another officer who had almost completed the
investigation and the entire case diary which
has been adverted to in detail in the protest
petition prima facie makes out a case against
the husband and the wife regarding collusion
and the intention to cheat from the very
beginning, inducing the appellant to hand over
a huge sum of money to both of them. Their
conduct of not stating so many aspects, namely,
the power of attorney executed by the original
owner, the will and also the sale effected by the
wife in the name of Monika Singh on 28-7-
2008 cannot be brushed aside at this stage."
No doubt, where the criminal complaints are
filed in respect of property disputes of civil in
nature only to harass the accused, and to
pressurize him in the civil litigation pending,
and there is prima facie abuse of process of law,
it is well within the jurisdiction of the High
Court to exercise its powers under Section 482
of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings.
However, the powers under the section are
required to be exercised sparingly. In
Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of W.B. and
others, this Court has observed as under: -
"This Court has consistently held that the
revisional or inherent powers of quashing the
proceedings at the initial stage should be
exercised sparingly and only where the
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allegations made in the complaint or the FIR,
even if taken at their face value and accepted in
entirety, do not prima facie disclose the
commission of an offence. Disputed and
controversial facts cannot be made the basis for
the exercise of the jurisdiction.""
14. Perused the record.
15. On perusal of the record, it is evident that the dispute relate
to the land to an extent of Ac.3-31, situated in Sy.Nos.102, 114 and
116 of Narsingi village of Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy
District. Three FIRs. have been registered against the same
accused i.e. the petitioners herein, vide FIR.Nos.1078, 1079 and
1080 of 2014 on the file of Rajendranagar Police Station for the
offences punishable under Sections 419, 420, 447, 468, 471 and
506 r/w. 120-B of IPC. The record reveals that accused No.1
claimed to have purchased the property in Sy.No.102 admeasuring
Ac.1-03 gts., vide registered document bearing No.7632/2003,
dated 14.08.2003 and accused Nos.2 and 3 i.e. K. Prasad and
N.Venkateshwarlu were said to have purchased the property under
registered sale deed document bearing No.2935 of 2001, dated
04.06.2001 from one Garlapati Rajulu and another. K. Narayana,
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who is the father-in-law of the de facto complainant, died in the
year 1982.
16. It is the specific contention of respondent No.2 that the
alleged ratification deed was not executed by any of the legal heirs
of K. Narayana. After verifying the ratification deed, dated
05.10.2006 vide document No.13587 of 2006, the complainant and
other legal heirs came to know that it was forged and created and
that they, being the legal heirs of K.Narayana, never executed any
ratification deed. It is also the contention of the complainant that
after getting the lands demarcated and after applying for succession
certificate, they all sold the lands in Sy.Nos.102, 114 and 116 to
Dr. M. Satchidananda Rao under three registered sale deeds.
17. Even as per the contents of the complaint, after the alleged
ratification deed dated 05.10.2006, the petitioners have used said
ratification deed as genuine before the Deputy Collector/Tahsildar,
Rajendranagar and got their names mutated, vide proceedings No.
A/990/2011, dated 08.02.2013. Pending issuance of Succession
Certificate in favour of the legal heirs of K. Narayana, they sold the
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property to Dr. M. Satchidananda Rao on 21.01.2013, and later, the
Succession Certificate was issued to the legal heirs of K. Narayana
on 27.05.2014. Admittedly, Dr. M. Satchidananda Rao filed a suit
against the petitioners and others i.e. O.S.No.605 of 2015 on the
file of III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy at
L.B.Nagar, for declaration of title and for recovery of possession.
It is the specific contention in the complaint before the trial Court
that the defendants are claiming as owners of the suit schedule
property and the plaintiffs, after purchasing the property, have
come to know that these persons are claiming the property through
the alleged created rectification deed. As the alleged ratification
deed was impersonated, the vendors of the plaintiffs have filed
private complaints, basing on which, the present FIRs. have been
registered. The prayer in the suit i.e. O.S.No.605 of 2015 was for
declaration of title and for recovery of possession in respect of land
admeasuring Ac.3-35 gts. in Sy.Nos.102, 114 and 116 of Narsingi
village of Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. An
interlocutory application was filed by Dr. M. Satchidananda Rao
before the trial Court, which was dismissed. Being aggrieved by
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the same, Dr. M. Satchidananda Rao has filed CMA.Nos.14 and 15
of 2021, which were disposed of by Hon'ble Division Bench of
this Court on 06.04.2021, wherein, the Division Bench has dealt
with each and every aspect very meticulously and have observed
that applications were filed before the revenue authorities for
Succession Certificate to declare them as legal heirs of Late K.
Narayana, that too, after a lapse of 30 years. It is also noted that
the suit schedule property was originally agricultural land, but it
was converted into residential zone in the year 2005, but the sale
deeds filed by Dr. M. Satchidananda Rao shows that it was
agricultural land. It is also observed by the Division Bench that the
dispute with regard to the subject property was pending before the
Joint Collector and the revenue records does not show the vendor
of the appellants as owner of the suit schedule property. It is also
observed that the proceedings before the revenue authorities clearly
disclose that the respondents i.e. the petitioners herein were in
possession of the suit schedule properties since 2001. It is also
observed by the Division Bench of this Court that the appellant,
who claimed to be the legal heir of the protected
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tenant/K.Narayana, does not seemed to have taken steps under the
A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950
with regard to issuance of Succession Certificate, pattadar
passbooks and restoration of possession for more than 30 years and
they had only approached the Deputy Collector and Tahsildar of
Rajendranagar in 2008 after the land ceased to be agricultural land
and the revenue authorities have not recognized the vendors of the
appellants as owners of the suit schedule property, and therefore,
dismissed the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal Nos.14 and 15 of 2021.
18. Admittedly, there is a civil dispute pending between both the
parties and the parties are agitating before the Deputy Collector
and Tahsildar for issuance of Succession Certificate. It is to be
noted that pending issuance of Succession Certificate, the de facto
complainant and others have sold the suit schedule property to one
Dr. M. Satchidananda Rao, and till date, the petitioners are in
possession of the suit schedule property. The suit is pending
before the competent Civil Court. After a span of 30 years, the
present FIRs. have been registered basing on the private complaints
made by the de facto complainant/K. Susheela, who is alleged to be
GAC, J
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the daughter-in-law of K. Narayana. It is the specific contention
that the revenue authorities have recognized the said K. Narayana
as 'protected tenant'. But, the said order has not been placed
before this Court in order to recognize the 2nd respondent as a
rightful owner of the property. In the absence of the documents,
this Court cannot recognize the 2nd respondent as the rightful owner
of the property. The judgments relied on by both the Senior
Counsel, in principle, are binding on this Court while dealing with
quash petitions, but in the absence of proof as to the "protected
tenant", for the legal heirs of K. Narayana, a private complaint
itself is not maintainable. Further, the other 10 executants of the
ratification deed have not come forward to file any complaint
against the petitioners. Therefore, this Court is of the considered
view that it is a fit case to quash the FIRs.
19. For the aforesaid reasons, all these quash petitions are
allowed and FIR.Nos.1078, 1079 and 1080 of 2014 registered
against the petitioners on the file of Rajendranagar Police Station,
for the offences punishable under Sections 419, 420, 447, 468, 471
and 506 r/w. Section 120-B of IPC, are hereby quashed.
GAC, J
Crl.P.Nos.16096, 16097 & 16105 of 2014
Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand
closed.
________________________________
G.ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY, J
Date: 26.04.2023
ajr
