Telangana High Court

Radhika Jaiswal D/O. Sri.R.Dilip ... vs The High Court Of Judicature At ... on 30 December, 2021

Bench: Satish Chandra Sharma, N.Tukaramji

  THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA
                                        AND
                THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N. TUKARAMJI


                   WRIT PETITION No.8588 of 2017


ORDER:     (Per the Hon'ble the Chief Justice Satish Chandra Sharma)




        The petitioner before this Court, who is a Judicial

Officer, has filed the present writ petition being aggrieved

by the order of punishment dated 13.10.2016, by which

a punishment of withholding of two increments with

cumulative effect has been inflicted upon her.

        The facts of the case reveal that the petitioner was

appointed as a Junior Civil Judge on 01.09.2010.

Thereafter, she was transferred to different places and

while she was posted at Ranga Reddy District as

Principal Junior Civil Judge - cum - VIII Metropolitan

Magistrate, Cyberabad at Rajendranagar, Ranga Reddy

District, a charge sheet was served upon her dated

16.03.2015. The following charges were levelled against

her:-

        "STATEMENT   OF   ARTICLES  OF  CHARGES
        FRAMED AGAINST Mrs. RADHIKA JAISWAL,
        PRINCIPAL  JUNIOR   CIVIL  JUDGE-CUM-VIII
        METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE, CYBERABAD AT
        RAJENDERNAGAR,    RANGAREDDY   DISTRICT,
        TELANGANA STATE.

        ARTICLES OF CHARGE No.1:
                That you Mrs. Radhika Jaiswal, Principal Junior
        Civil    Judge-cum-VIII            Metropolitan          Magistrate,
                                2




  Cyberabad at Rajendernagar, Rangareddy district, as
  such,    insisted   the   officials   at   Police     Station,
  Rajendernagar, which comes under the territorial
  jurisdiction of your court, for providing a driver for
  your private car and had utilized the services of Sri
  M.Venkatesh, Home Guard-Driver 1522, to drive your
  personal car for official and unofficial purposes,
  unauthorizedly, even though, the police are not bound
  to provide a driver for private car and misused your
  official position and acted in such a manner, which a
  judicial officer ought not to have done, which act of
  yours if proved or established would amount to grave
  misconduct, unbecoming of a judicial officer within the
  meaning of Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct)
  Rules 1964.
  BASIS OF CHARGE:
1.

Report sent in Dis.No.5740, dated 16.07.2014, from the Principal District Judge, Rangareddy.

2. Detailed special report sent in Dis.No.5922, dated 22.07.2014 from the Principal District Judge, Rangareddy.

ARTICLES OF CHARGE No.2:

That you Mrs. Radhika Jaiswal, Principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at Rajendernagar, Rangareddy district, as such, having been advised by the Principal District Judge, Rangareddy and Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Cyberabad orally, to discontinue the services of the home guard as your personal driver, you did not mend your ways and continued to avail the services of home guard for driving your personal car for official and unofficial purposes, unauthorizedly and misused your official position and acted in such a manner giving a go-bye to the advice of the superiors, which a judicial officer ought not to have done, which act of yours if proved or established would amount to grave misconduct, unbecoming of a judicial officer within the

meaning of Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1964.

BASIS OF CHARGE:

1. Report sent in Dis.No.5740, dated 16.07.2014, from the Principal District Judge, Rangareddy.

2. Detailed special report sent in Dis.No.5922, dated 22.07.2014 from the Principal District Judge, Rangareddy.

ARTICLES OF CHARGE No.3:

That you Mrs. Radhika Jaiswal, Principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at Rajendernagar, Rangareddy district, while working as Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kamareddy, Nizamabad district, from 01.01.2011 till your transfer, had also availed the services of a Home Guard-Driver, as provided by the police department to drive your personal car for official and unofficial purposes, unauthorizedly and misused your official position and acted in such a manner, which a judicial officer ought not to have done, which act of yours if proved or established would amount to grave misconduct, unbecoming of a judicial officer within the meaning of Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1964.

BASIS OF CHARGE:

1. Report sent in Dis.No.5740, dated 16.07.2014, from the Principal District Judge, Rangareddy.

2. Detailed special report sent in Dis.No.5922, dated 22.07.2014 from the Principal District Judge, Rangareddy.

ARTICLES OF CHARGE No.4:

That you Mrs. Radhika Jaiswal, Principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at Rajendernagar, Rangareddy district, as such, as against the High Court's circular instructions issued in Roc.No.2399/OP.Cell.E/2011, dated 8-8-

2011 and subsequent instructions issued from time to time to all the Judicial Officers in the State to maintain the timings of the bench strictly from 10:30 a.m., to 2:00 p.m., and from 2:30 p.m., to 5:00 p.m., despite the oral instructions of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Cyberabad and without applying for half-a-day's leave for leaving earlier or going late to the court, have applied for permission to leave the court one hour earlier at 4:00 p.m., on 10-04-2014, permission to go to the court one hour late at 11:30 a.m., and leave one hour earlier at 4:00 p.m., on 17- 05-2014 and leave the court half-an-hour earlier at 4:30 p.m., on 03-06-2014, thus, in utter disobedience to the High Court's circular instructions acted in such a manner amounting to dereliction of duties, which a judicial officer ought not to have done, which act of yours if proved or established would amount to grave misconduct, unbecoming of a judicial officer within the meaning of Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1964.

BASIS OF CHARGE:

1. Report sent in Dis.No.5740, dated 16.07.2014, from the Principal District Judge, Rangareddy.

2. Detailed special report sent in Dis.No.5922, dated 22.07.2014 from the Principal District Judge, Rangareddy.

3. High Court's circular instructions issued in Roc.No.2399/OP.Cell.E/2011, dated 8-8-2011.

HYDERABAD Date: 16-03-2015 REGISTRAR (VIGILANCE)"

The petitioner submitted a detailed and an

exhaustive reply denying all the charges on 01.04.2015

and the disciplinary authority, not being satisfied with

the reply submitted by the petitioner, appointed an

Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer conducted a

detailed and an exhaustive enquiry and submitted a

report on 04.01.2016 exonerating the petitioner of all the

charges. Meaning thereby, the Enquiry Officer gave a

clean chit to the petitioner. The disciplinary authority

i.e., the High Court, disagreeing with the findings arrived

at by the Enquiry Officer, issued a show cause notice on

12.05.2016 and the petitioner again submitted a detailed

reply to the show cause notice issued by the High Court

and finally an order was passed on 13.10.2016 inflicting

the punishment of withholding of two increments with

cumulative effect.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued before

this Court that the first three charges were in respect of

an allegation stating that the petitioner has utilised the

services of Home Guard as driver, who was provided by

the Police Department, to drive her personal car for

official and unofficial purposes. He has argued before

this Court that the driver was never examined at any

point of time in the departmental enquiry and there was

a total denial on the part of the petitioner in respect of

the aforesaid allegations. Therefore, the Enquiry Officer

has given a clean chit to the petitioner in respect of the

three charges and by no stretch of imagination, based

upon the same material, the High Court could have

disagreed with the findings arrived at by the Enquiry

Officer.

The appreciation of evidence adduced in a

departmental enquiry cannot be done by the High Court.

However, if the findings are perverse, the same can

certainly be interfered with. In the present case, the

Enquiry Officer, after examining all the witnesses, has

arrived at a conclusion that the charges in respect of

utilisation of services of driver are not established at all.

One P.W.2 - Sri D.Nagarjun, was examined before the

Enquiry Officer and it was his statement on the basis of

which, the High Court has held the charges proved. The

statement of P.W.2 - Sri D.Nagarjun, reveals that while

he was working as I Additional District Judge-cum-

Metropolitan Sessions, Ranga Reddy District, it was

brought to his notice that the charged officer has utilized

the services of a Home Guard driver. There was no

complaint of any kind by P.W.2 - Sri D.Nagarjun, to any

authority in respect of the aforesaid allegation. There

was no complaint by the Police in the matter, there was

no complaint by the driver in the matter and the driver

was also not examined and therefore, the High Court

could not have proved the charges merely on the basis of

hearsay evidence.

In the considered opinion of this Court the Enquiry

Officer was justified in giving a finding that the charges

in respect of utilising the services of driver are not

substantiated by evidence on record. In respect of the

other charge, which was relating to late arrival and early

departure, the Enquiry Officer has held that the charged

officer did inform the authorities and therefore, again he

has given a clean chit to the charged officer. Even in the

note of dissent, the High Court has observed that the

charged officer did apply for grant of permission for late

arrival and early departure and the early departure was

to consult a doctor, as an appointment was given by the

doctor immediately after the Court hours.

In the considered opinion of this Court, the note of

dissent is again not based upon any cogent material

which was made available to the disciplinary authority by

the Enquiry Officer and therefore, this Court is of the

opinion that the disciplinary authority has certainly erred

in law and on facts in arriving at a different conclusion

on the same set of facts and circumstances and also on

the same set of evidence.

Resultantly, as it is a case of no evidence, this Court

can certainly interfere with the departmental enquiry and

the findings arrived at by the disciplinary authority.

The Apex Court in the case of Yoginath D. Bagde v.

State of Maharashtra1 has held as under (paragraphs

44, 47 and 51):-

"44. We fail to appreciate the approach of the Disciplinary Committee which has gone by surmises and conjectures rather than by the evidence-on- record. The statements of Dr Naranje and that of Mr Bapat, Advocate have not been taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Committee and it has relied upon the statement of the complainant alone to come to the conclusion that Mr Bapat, Advocate had assured acquittal provided the complainant withdrew his transfer petitions.

47. These facts will indicate that the accused (Deepak Trimbakrao Deshmukh) had taken the Court, where the two sessions trials were pending against him, for a ride. He had adopted similar tactics in the Court of Sessions Judge, Wardha, and again in the Court of Ist Additional District and Sessions Judge, Wardha, where these two cases were transferred, and yet again in the Court of the appellant where these sessions trials came to be ultimately transferred.

51. It was lastly contended by Mr Harish N.

Salve that this Court cannot reappraise the evidence which has already been scrutinised by the enquiry officer as also by the Disciplinary Committee. It is contended that the High Court or this Court cannot, in

(1999) 7 SCC 739

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution, act as the appellate authority in the domestic enquiry or trial and it is not open to this Court to reappraise the evidence. The proposition as put forward by Mr Salve is in very broad terms and cannot be accepted. The law is well settled that if the findings are perverse and are not supported by evidence on record or the findings recorded at the domestic trial are such to which no reasonable person would have reached, it would be open to the High Court as also to this Court to interfere in the matter. In Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [(1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429 : JT (1998) 8 SC 603] this Court, relying upon the earlier decisions in Nand Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar [(1978) 3 SCC 366 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 458 : AIR 1978 SC 1277 : (1978) 3 SCR 708] , State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723 : (1964) 3 SCR 25] , Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain [AIR 1969 SC 983 : (1969) 2 LLJ 377] , Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel [(1976) 1 SCC 518 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 92 : AIR 1976 SC 98 : (1976) 2 SCR 280] as also Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [(1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131 : AIR 1984 SC 1805 : (1985) 1 SCR 866] laid down that although the court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer in a departmental enquiry, it does not mean that in no circumstance can the court interfere. It was observed that the power of judicial review available to a High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and the courts can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse."

In the light of the aforesaid judgment, this Court is

of the opinion that as the charges have not been proved

based upon the evidence adduced during departmental

enquiry, the findings arrived at by the disciplinary

authority are perverse findings.

Resultantly, the order passed by the High Court

dated 13.10.2016 is hereby quashed. The petitioner

shall be entitled for all the consequential benefits flowing

out of this order.

The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The

miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand

closed. There shall be no order as to costs.