[Cites 16, Cited by 0]

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

The State Of Rajasthan vs Smt. Nirma Katara on 20 January, 2026

Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati

Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati

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      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                  D.B. Spl. Appl. Writ No.1498/2025

1.       The State Of Rajasthan, through its Principal Secretary,
         Department Of Forest, Government Of Rajasthan, Jaipur,
         Rajasthan.
2.       The Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest,                        Forest
         Department,   Government   Of   Rajasthan,                        Jaipur,
         Rajasthan.
3.       The Deputy Conservator Of Forest, District Banswara,
         Rajasthan.
                                                                    ----Appellants
                                      Versus
Subhash Dindor S/o Ramesh Dindor, aged about 24 years, R/o
Kothari Post Kushalpada, Tehsil Kushalgarh, District Banswara,
Rajasthan.
                                                                   ----Respondent
                                Connected With
                  D.B. Spl. Appl. Writ No.1480/2025
1.       The State Of Rajasthan, through its Principal Secretary,
         Department Of Forest, Government Of Rajasthan, Jaipur,
         Rajasthan.
2.       The Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest,                        Forest
         Department,   Government   Of   Rajasthan,                        Jaipur,
         Rajasthan.
3.       The Deputy Conservator Of Forest, District Banswara,
         Rajasthan.
                                                                    ----Appellants
                                      Versus
Smt. Nirma Katara D/o Dhirji Katara W/o Sukram Damor, aged
about 35 years, R/o Bagaycha, Tehsil Kushalgarh, District
Banswara, Rajasthan.
                                                                   ----Respondent

                                Connected With
                  D.B. Spl. Appl. Writ No.1501/2025
 1.      The State Of Rajasthan, through its Principal Secretary,
         Department Of Forest, Government Of Rajasthan, Jaipur,
         Rajasthan.
 2.      The Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest, Forest
         Department,   Government   Of   Rajasthan, Jaipur,
         Rajasthan.
 3.      The Deputy Conservator of Forest, District Banswara,
         Rajasthan.
                                                                   ----Appellants
                                      Versus


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 Sukram Damor S/o Ramesh Damor, aged about 30 years, R/o
 Bagaycha, Tehsil Kushalgarh, District Banswara, Rajasthan.
                                                                   ----Respondent

                                Connected With
                    D.B. Spl. Appl. Writ No.1500/2025
     1.      The State Of Rajasthan, through its Principal Secretary,
             Department Of Forest, Government Of Rajasthan,
             Jaipur, Rajasthan.
     2.      The Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest, Forest
             Department, Government Of Rajasthan, Jaipur,
             Rajasthan.
     3.      The Deputy Conservator Of Forest, District Banswara,
             Rajasthan.
                                                                    ----Appellants
                                      Versus
     Shila Panda D/o Kanhaiyalal, aged about 30 years, R/o Village
     Mukam Post Magarda, Tehsil Sajjangarh, District Banswara,
     Rajasthan.
                                                                   ----Respondent



For Appellant(s)            :     Mr. Mahaveer Bishnoi, AAG
For Respondent(s)           :     Ms. Dolly Jaiswal
                                  Mr. Hemank Vaishnav


          HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHAH Judgment

1. Date of conclusion of arguments 12.01.2026

2. Date on which judgment was reserved 12.01.2026

3. Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced: Full Judgment

4. Date of pronouncement 20.01.2026

Per Mr. Sandeep Shah, J:

1. The present set of Special Appeals (Writ) have been filed by

the State of Rajasthan being aggrieved by the order dated

02.04.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court,

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whereby, while admitting the writ petitions, the termination orders

were stayed and the matters were directed to be listed for final

hearing. The learned Single Judge further directed that the period

between 24.07.2024 and 15.04.2025 shall be notionally counted

in the service of the original writ petitioners and that they shall be

entitled to their pay w.e.f. 15.04.2025. It was also ordered that

there shall be no break in the service of the petitioners. The Court

further directed that even on completion of the probation period,

the petitioners shall not be confirmed and paid regular salary

unless specifically permitted by the Court.

Factual Matrix:

2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the brief facts of the present

cases are that pursuant to a recruitment advertisement issued in

the year 2020, the writ petitioners submitted their applications

and, after clearing the written examination, they were appointed

vide order dated 15.12.2023 on the post of Forest Guard under

the appellant-Department. As per the Rajasthan Forest

Subordinate Service Rules, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as "the

Rules of 2015" for brevity), the appointments were on probation

for a period of two years. The appointment orders contained a

specific stipulation, i.e., condition No.11, clarifying that in case the

services of the appointed candidates were not found satisfactory

during probation/training period, or if they were found incapable

of holding the post, their services could be terminated

immediately. An identical provision has been incorporated under

Rule 45 of the Rules of 2015.

3. After joining service, an FIR dated 30.06.2024 came to be

lodged against all the writ petitioners for offences punishable

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under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC, read with

Section 66-D of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act,

2008 as well as Sections 3, 4, 6, 7 & 10 of the Rajasthan Public

Examination (Measures for Prevention of Unfair Means in

Recruitment) Act, 2022.

4. The Investigating Agency, i.e., the Special Operations Group

(S.O.G.), arrested the writ petitioners and after police remand,

they were sent to judicial custody. Thereafter, the S.O.G. filed a

charge-sheet against the petitioners along with other accused

persons for the alleged offences, recording a positive finding

regarding their involvement in leaking the question paper, on the

basis of which, they had secured recruitment. Upon filing of the

charge-sheet, the Deputy Conservator of Forest, Banswara, i.e.,

the appellant, issued a show cause notice dated 10.07.2024 to the

petitioners, invoking Rule 45 of the Rules of 2015 and Condition

No.11 of the appointment order and also referring to the charge-

sheet submitted by the Investigating Agency. It was noted therein

that the arrest and culmination of investigation revealed

misconduct on the part of the petitioners and that their services

were not found satisfactory during the probation period.

5. Upon receipt of the notice (while under arrest), the

petitioners submitted their replies asserting their innocence and

contended that they had not committed the alleged offences. It

was further emphasized that unless a conviction is recorded, the

misconduct cannot be treated as proved. Thereafter, the Deputy

Conservator of Forest, Banswara, passed the order dated

24.07.2024, wherein, while referring to the contents of the

charge-sheet and taking aid of Rule 45 of the Rules of 2015 and

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Condition No.11 of the appointment orders, the services of the

petitioners, who were probationers, were terminated, while

observing that in view of the attendant circumstances, their

conduct was not found satisfactory during the probation period.

6. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners filed writ petitions,

primarily challenging the termination on the ground that

submission of charge-sheet by investigating agency does not

amount to culmination of criminal proceedings and that no regular

departmental inquiry was conducted prior to termination, thereby

violating the principles of natural justice.

7. After entering appearance, the appellant-State filed its reply

asserting that since the petitioners were probationers, there was

no requirement of holding a regular inquiry and that the

termination orders were rightly passed in exercise of powers

vested under Rule 45 of the Rules of 2015 and Condition No.11 of

the appointment orders.

8. The learned Single Judge thereafter heard the matter and

vide impugned order dated 02.04.2025, admitted the writ

petitions, observed that since the allegations pertained to

malpractice and the petitioners being beneficiaries of a leaked

question paper, a regular inquiry following the principles of natural

justice was necessary. It was further observed that unless a

disciplinary inquiry or fact-finding exercise under the relevant

rules was conducted, termination of service could not be

sustained. The learned Single Judge also held that the recitals in

the impugned order rendered it punitive and stigmatic.

Consequently, the effect and operation of the termination orders

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were stayed and the appellants were directed to permit the writ

petitioners to join service on or before 15.04.2025.

9. The learned Single Judge further directed that the period

between 24.07.2024 and 15.04.2025 shall be notionally counted

as service and that the petitioners shall be entitled to pay with

effect from 15.04.2025, with no break in service. Aggrieved by the

said directions, the present appeals have been filed.

Argument on behalf of appellants-State:

10. Challenging the order impugned, Mr. Mahaveer Bishnoi,

learned Additional Advocate General, asserted that the termination

order cannot be termed punitive and is a simpliciter termination of

probationers permissible under Rule 45 of the Rules of 2015 and

Condition No.11 of the appointment orders. He submitted that the

order is neither stigmatic nor does it record any finding on the

criminal allegations. The order merely refers to the pendency of

criminal proceedings and records that the conduct of the

petitioners was not found satisfactory. He further asserted that no

plea regarding the termination being stigmatic or punitive was

raised in the writ petitions and, therefore, the learned Single

Judge erred in examining that aspect. Emphasis was also laid on

the seriousness of the allegations, namely leakage of examination

papers, constituting fraud, for which no inquiry was required.

11. The learned Additional Advocate General further asserted

that there was no occasion available to stay the effect and

operation of the termination order, as the same amounted to grant

of final relief by the learned Single Judge, at the interim stage and

the same was not at all permissible under law. The learned

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Additional Advocate General referred to the prayer made in the

writ petitions as well as stay petitions and submitted that the final

prayer has been allowed by the learned Single Judge, inasmuch as

order of reinstatement and grant of notional benefits and counting

of period of service has been allowed, while being oblivious of the

fact that the case in hand was a case, wherein serious allegations

have been levelled against the petitioners and post investigation,

the Special Operational Group (S.O.G.) has found the offences to

be proved against the petitioners.

12. To buttress his submission, the learned Additional Advocate

General relied upon judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in the case of, State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Sandeep

Kumar Balmiki & Ors., (2009) 17 SCC 555, State of Haryana

v. Suman Dutta, (2000) 10 SCC 311 as also order passed by

the Division Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan & Ors. v.

Mahaveer Prasad Yadav & Ors. (2016) SCC OnLine Raj

4707.

Argument on behalf of counsel for the respondents:

13. Per contra, Ms. Dolly Jaiswal and Mr. Hemank Vaishnav,

learned counsel for the respondents-writ petitioners, supported

the order passed by the learned Single Judge and asserted that

since the order impugned referred to the charge-sheet submitted

by the Investigating Agency and imputed stigma, the learned

Single Judge has rightly stayed the same. Learned counsel

submitted that the order impugned in writ petition being stigmatic

and punitive, the same could not be sustained and considering the

same by the learned Single Judge had stayed the same. Learned

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counsel relied upon judgment passed by Division Bench of this

Court, in D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.70/2019 (Tarachand v.

Rajasthan State Road Transport Coporation & Ors.) and submitted

that even in case of probationer, if the termination order is

facetiously stigmatic, it has to be preceded with by an inquiry and

due opportunity of hearing. Learned counsel also submitted that

since no inquiry was conducted and simpliciter a notice was given

and there being no allegation of the services not being

satisfactory, the impugned termination order was rightly stayed by

the learned Single Judge, while admitting the appeal.

Analysis:

14. This Court, having considered the facts of the case, is of the

opinion that since the adjudication on the matters on merits are

pending consideration before the learned Single Judge, it would

not be appropriate to delve into the intrinsic merits at this stage.

However, the issue requiring consideration by us is whether the

final relief could have been granted by way of an interim order.

15. For this purpose, reference to the prayer made in the writ

petitions and the stay applications is relevant, which reads as

under:- Prayer in Writ Petition:

"It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that this writ petition may kindly be allowed and by an appropriate writ, order or direction:-

1. The impugned order dated 27.07.2024 (Anx-5) may kindly be quashed and set aside.

2. The respondents may kindly be directed to permit the petitioner to join the services with all consequential benefits.

3. Cost of litigation and damages may also be allowed in favour of the petitioner.

4. Any other appropriate writ or order or direction which is favourable to the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be granted to the petitioner.

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Prayer in Stay Petition:

It is therefore, humbly and respectfully prayed that during the pendency of the writ petition this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to allow this stay application.

During the pendency of the writ petition, the effect and operation of the order dated 27.07.2024 (Anx-03) may be stayed and petitioner be permitted to join the services.

Any other appropriate order, which this Hon'ble Court deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case, may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner."

16. A perusal of the above will reveal that the prayer made in the

writ petitions was for quashing of the impugned order dated

24.07.2024 and permitting the petitioners to join the services and

the same prayer has been made in the stay applications also. The

learned Single Judge has thus essentially by way of the order

impugned, granted the final prayer as made by the petitioners in

their writ petitions itself. Further para no.21 to 23 of the impugned

order shows that directions regarding notional benefits and

continuity of service were also granted at the interim stage itself.

For convenience, the operative portion of the impugned order

dated 02.04.2025 is reproduced as under:-

"21. Meanwhile, effect and operation of the impugned orders dated 24.07.2024 qua each of the petitioners shall remain stayed.

22. The respondents shall be obligated to allow the petitioners to joint latest by 15.04.2025.

23. The period lapsed between 24.07.2024 and 15.04.2025 shall be notionally counted in their services; the petitioners shall be entitled to their pay w.e.f. 15.04.2025. There shall be not break in service."

17. Needless to emphasize that the law in this regard is no

longer res integra that a final relief cannot be granted by a Court

at an interim stage. The Hon'ble Apex Court, while considering a

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case of termination only, in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh &

Ors. v. Sandeep Kumar Balmiki & Ors., (2009) 17 SCC 555,

has held as under:-

"5. In our view, the interim order granted by the High Court staying the order of termination could not be passed at this stage in view of the fact that if such relief is granted at this stage, the writ petition shall stand automatically allowed without permitting the parties to place their respective cases at the time of final hearing of the writ petition. In this case also, the appellants have not yet filed counter-affidavit to the writ petition of the respondents.

6. That being the position and in view of the fact that the final relief could not be granted at the interim stage, we set aside the impugned order and vacate the interim order passed by the High Court."

17.1 Again, while considering the case of termination, the Hon'ble

Apex Court, in the case of State of Haryana v. Suman Dutta,

(2000) 10 SCC 311, has held as under:-

"We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court erred in law in staying the order of termination as an interim measure in the pending writ petition. By such interim order if an employee is allowed to continue in service and then ultimately the writ petition is dismissed, then it would tantamount to usurpation of public office without any right to the same."

17.2 The Division Bench of this Court, in the case of State of

Rajasthan v. Mahaveer Prasad Yadav & Ors. in D.B. Civil

Special Appeal (Writ) No.895/2015 vide judgment dated

19.07.2016, has set aside an interim order of the learned Single

Judge which had stayed the punishment order and held that it

amounted to grant of final relief at the interim stage.

18. Taking note of the above-mentioned judgments, as also,

considering the seriousness of the allegations against the

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petitioners, namely leakage of examination papers based upon

which they were related to the post in question, and also,