[Cites 10, Cited by 0]
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Ganpat Sharma vs State Of Rajasthan (2026:Rj-Jd:3627) on 20 January, 2026
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2026:RJ-JD:3627]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 1675/2025
Ganpat Sharma S/o Sh. Chatru Lal Sharma, Aged About 33
Years, Resident Of Village Chakbhajupura, Post Manoharpura,
Tehsil Bassi, Districtjaipur, The Then Executive Engineer, Water
Resources Division,udaipur. Email Ganpatpancholigmail.com
Mobile 8946910912
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
2. Additional Superintendent Of Police, A.c.b., Special Unit,
Udaipur.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. C.S. Kotwani
Ms. Preeti Sharma
Mr. Manoj Chaudhary
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Shri Ram Chaudhary,AGA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Order
20/01/2026
1. By way of filing the instant revision petition, the petitioner
calls in question the order dated 06.11.2025 passed by the
learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, No. 1,
Udaipur, in Special Sessions Case No. 46/2025 (State v.
Ganpatlal Sharma & Anr.), arising out of FIR No. 157/2024,
CPS ACB Jaipur, whereby charges have been framed against
the petitioner under Section 07 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in 2018) and Section
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61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, despite gross violation
of the mandatory provisions of Sections 230, 249, 250(1)
and 250(2) of the BNSS, resulting in serious miscarriage of
justice and infringement of the petitioner's fundamental
rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution of India, rendering the impugned order illegal,
arbitrary and unsustainable in law.
2. The brief facts of the present are that the petitioner is
Accused No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as "A-1") in the
Sessions Case titled State v. Ganpat Lal Sharma & Anr.,
arising out of FIR No. 157/2024 registered at Central Police
Station (CPS), Anti Corruption Bureau (ACB). Upon
completion of investigation, Charge-sheet No. 221/2025 was
filed against the petitioner for the offence punishable under
Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as
amended up to 2018) and Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita. The present Criminal Revision Petition is
directed against the order dated 06.11.2025, whereby
charges have been framed against the petitioner in blatant
violation of Sections 230, 249, 250(1), 250(2) and 252(1) of
the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) and Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The charge-sheet was
submitted on 21.08.2025 before the learned Special Judge,
Prevention of Corruption Act, No. 1, Udaipur, by Respondent
No. 2, the Additional Superintendent of Police, ACB, Special
Unit, Udaipur.
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3. Thereafter, the matter was placed before the learned Special
Judge on 17.09.2025, and on the same day, cognizance of
the alleged offence was taken, as reflected in the order sheet
dated 17.09.2025.
4. Subsequently, on 06.11.2025, the learned Special Judge
proceeded to take a decision to frame charges against the
petitioner. The order sheet dated 06.11.2025 records that
after hearing arguments on charge and perusal of the
record, a prima facie case under Section 7 of the Prevention
of Corruption Act and Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 was found to be made out, and charges were
accordingly framed, read over and explained to the accused,
who pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Directions were
further issued for summoning prosecution witnesses and for
leading prosecution evidence.
5. That the present S.B. Criminal Revision Petition is confined to
assailing the order dated 06.11.2025, whereby the decision
to frame charges and the consequent framing of charges
against the petitioner were undertaken, despite non-
compliance with the mandatory statutory safeguards
contained in Sections 230, 249, 250(1), 250(2) and 252(1)
of the BNSS, thereby resulting in grave prejudice to the
petitioner and causing violation of the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
India.
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6. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone
through the materials available on record.
OBSERVATIONS
A. Scope of Judicial Scrutiny at the Stage of Framing of
Charge
7. At the outset, it is necessary to recapitulate the well-settled
contours governing judicial scrutiny at the stage of framing
of charge. The Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Sections 250 (Discharge) and 251 (Framing of charge) of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), is neither
expected to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence
nor to weigh the probative value of the material as would be
done after a full-fledged trial. Equally, the Court is not to act
as a mere conduit for endorsing the opinion of the
investigating agency.
8. The seminal judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr., AIR
1979 SC 366, authoritatively lays down that while framing
charge, the Judge has the undoubted power to sift and weigh
the material for the limited purpose of finding out whether a
prima facie case exists. The Court is duty-bound to apply its
judicial mind to the broad probabilities of the case, the total
effect of the material placed on record, and to ascertain
whether the accusation is not frivolous. The expression
"ground for presuming" does not imply proof beyond
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reasonable doubt but nevertheless requires existence of
legally admissible material capable of supporting the
essential ingredients of the alleged offence.
9. At the same time, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kanti
Bhadra Shah & Anr. v. State of West Bengal, (2000) 1
SCC 722, clarified that framing of charge does not require a
detailed or elaborate order akin to a judgment of acquittal or
discharge, the order must nonetheless reflect conscious
application of mind. The Court is not obliged to write lengthy
reasons while framing charges; however, it must
demonstrate that it has examined whether the basic
ingredients of the offence are disclosed from the material on
record. Thus, the law strikes a delicate balance: brevity is
permissible, mechanical endorsement is not.
B. Mandatory Nature of Procedural Safeguards under BNSS
10.The BNSS consciously preserves and strengthens procedural
safeguards at the pre-trial stage, recognising that deprivation
of liberty commences not merely upon conviction but from
the moment the criminal process is set in motion. Sections
230 (Supply to accused of copy of police report and other
documents), 249 (Opening case for prosecution), 250
(Discharge) and 251 (Framing of charge) of the BNSS are not
empty formalities; they are statutory manifestations of the
constitutional guarantee of a fair procedure under Articles 14
and 21 of the Constitution of India.
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11.The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that where
a statute prescribes a particular procedure, it must be
followed in that manner or not at all. Procedural compliance is
not a matter of convenience but of jurisdiction.
C. Non-Compliance with Section 230 BNSS - Supply of
Documents
12.Section 230 of the BNSS mandates that in cases instituted
on a police report, the Court shall, without delay, and in no
case beyond fourteen days, furnish to the accused copies of
all documents forwarded with the police report under Section
193(6) BNSS.
13.From the record, it emerges that although the order sheet
dated 17.09.2025 records that copies of the charge-sheet
"along with CD" were supplied, there is prima facie substance
in the grievance that all documents forming part of the police
report were not furnished, and that the supply was effected
through the investigating agency without judicial verification
or grant of reasonable time to the accused to ascertain
completeness.
14.More importantly, where the prosecution case substantially
rests upon electronic evidence, compliance with Section 230
BNSS assumes heightened significance. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court in P. Gopalakrishnan @ Dileep v. State of Kerala,
(2020) 9 SCC 161, has categorically held that the original
memory card constitutes a document, and the accused is
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entitled to receive its authenticated clone copy prepared in
accordance with law. Supply of an uncertified CD, not
prepared through hash-value authentication, does not fulfil
the statutory mandate.
15.The furnishing of incomplete or legally unrecognised copies
strikes at the very root of the accused's right to effectively
invoke the remedy of discharge under Section 250 BNSS.
D. Failure to Conduct Prosecutorial Opening under Section
249 BNSS
16.Section 249 BNSS obligates the Public Prosecutor to "open
the case" by describing the charge and stating by what
evidence the prosecution proposes to establish guilt. The
phrase "shall open" is peremptory and admits of no
discretion.
17.The record of proceedings dated 06.11.2025 does not reflect
that any such prosecutorial opening was undertaken. Absence
of this statutory exercise deprives the Court of an informed
basis to assess whether the materials relied upon correspond
to the essential ingredients of the offence alleged. Framing of
charge without such prosecutorial articulation reduces the
judicial exercise to a formal endorsement of the charge-
sheet, which the law expressly prohibits.
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E. Curtailment of the Right to Seek Discharge under Section
250 BNSS
18.For ready reference section 250 BNSS is reproduced herein
below-
Section 250 Discharge
(1) The accused may prefer an application for discharge within a period
of sixty days from the date of commitment of the case under section
232.
(2) If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents
submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused
and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge
the accused and record his reasons for so doing.
19.Section 250(1) BNSS confers upon the accused a valuable
right to prefer an application for discharge within sixty days
from the date of commitment. In cases under the Prevention
of Corruption Act, where the Special Judge takes cognizance
directly, the date of cognizance effectively marks the
commencement of this statutory period.
20.Learned counsel for the accused-petitioner, namely Mr. C.S.
Kotwani, Ms. Preeti Sharma and Mr. Manoj Chaudhary,
vehemently urged that the defence was in the process of
preparing an application for discharge and had unequivocally
expressed its intention to avail the statutory remedy under
Section 250 BNSS. It was submitted that despite such clear
inclination, the learned court proceeded to frame charges
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without granting reasonable and adequate time to the
accused to exercise the liberty expressly conferred by law.
21. Although Section 250(1) BNSS provides a discretion to the
accused to prefer an application for discharge within sixty
days, the grant of such statutory period cannot be termed as
unreasonable or dilatory, as the same flows directly from the
legislative mandate. While it may be correct that in every
case the court is not denuded of power to consider the
question of discharge only upon the formal filing of an
application by the accused, yet where the accused manifests
a clear and bona fide intention to invoke the remedy of
discharge, the court is duty-bound to afford a meaningful
opportunity to do so. Denial of such opportunity, particularly
when the statute itself prescribes a specific time frame,
amounts to rendering the statutory right illusory and defeats
the very object of Section 250(2) BNSS, which obligates
judicial consideration of the sufficiency of grounds before
proceeding to frame charges.
22.In the present case, charges came to be framed on the 50th
day from the date of cognizance, thereby truncating the
statutory window available to the accused.
23.Further, Section 250(2) BNSS mandates the Court to
consider the record and hear the submissions of the accused
even where no formal discharge application is filed, and to
record reasons for declining discharge. The impugned order
does not reflect such consideration or reasoning.
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F. Mechanical Framing of Charge and Absence of Meaningful
Judicial Application of Mind
24.The impugned order dated 06.11.2025, when examined on
the anvil of the statutory framework and the settled principles
governing framing of charge, discloses a manifest deficiency
in judicial reasoning and application of mind. The order sheet
merely records, in a highly cursory and omnibus manner, that
arguments on charge were heard, the record was perused,
and a prima facie case under Section 7 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in 2018) and Section
61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita was found to be made
out. Beyond this ritualistic recital, the order is conspicuously
silent as to what material, what circumstances, or what
factual substratum weighed with the learned Trial Court in
forming such an opinion.
25.It is no doubt correct that at the stage of framing of charge,
the Court is not expected to write a detailed or elaborate
order as would be warranted at the stage of discharge or final
adjudication. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kanti Bhadra
Shah & Anr. v. State of West Bengal (2000) 1 SCC 722
has clarified that framing of charge does not require a
reasoned order akin to a judgment. However, the said
principle cannot be misconstrued to legitimise a mechanical
or non-speaking exercise, devoid of even minimal articulation
of judicial satisfaction. Brevity is permissible; opacity is not.
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26.The distinction between a brief order and a mechanical order
is well recognised in criminal jurisprudence. Even while
framing charges, the Court must indicate, albeit succinctly,
that it has adverted to the material on record and that such
material, if taken at face value, discloses the existence of
the essential ingredients of the offence alleged for
which charges has to be framed. A mere reproduction of
statutory sections or a bare assertion that an offence is
"prima facie made out" does not fulfil this requirement.
27.This requirement assumes greater significance in
prosecutions under the Prevention of Corruption Act post the
2018 amendment. The legislative transformation of Section 7
has introduced the element of "improper or dishonest
performance of public duty" as a sine qua non. Therefore,
even at the threshold stage, the Court is expected to advert,
howsoever briefly to the existence of material indicating
demand or acceptance of undue advantage in connection with
such improper or dishonest performance. In the absence of
even a skeletal reference to such material, the order betrays
a presumption rather than a judicial satisfaction.
28.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Prafulla
Kumar Samal & Anr., AIR 1979 SC 366, has categorically
held that the Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution. The Court must consider the
broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the
evidence and documents produced, and any basic infirmities
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apparent on the face of the record. The impugned order,
however, reflects no such exercise and instead appears to
have proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the filing
of a charge-sheet ipso facto warrants framing of charge.
29.Further, the expression "arguments on charge heard"
recorded in the order sheet, without even a fleeting reference
to the nature of such arguments or the reasons for their
rejection, renders the exercise under Sections 250 and 251 of
the BNSS illusory. Such recording, unaccompanied by any
demonstrable consideration, amounts to an empty formality,
which has been consistently deprecated by constitutional
courts. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kranti Associates
Pvt. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan (2010) 9 SCC 496 has
held that "rubber-stamp reasons" or pretence of reasoning
cannot be equated with a valid judicial decision-making
process.
30.This Court, in H.G. Grover v. State of Rajasthan (S.B.
Criminal Revision Petition No. 1356/2022), has
reiterated that although meticulous appreciation of evidence
is not required at the stage of framing of charge, the Trial
Court must nonetheless satisfy itself that the material on
record discloses the essential ingredients of the offence and
must reflect such satisfaction in the order. The absence of
such reflection renders the order vulnerable to judicial
correction.
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31.Thus, the impugned order dated 06.11.2025, viewed
holistically, suffers from procedural superficiality and lack of
discernible judicial reasoning. It does not demonstrate that
the learned Trial Court applied its independent judicial mind
to the statutory ingredients of the offences alleged, nor does
it indicate how the material on record satisfies the threshold
of "ground for presuming" as contemplated under Section
251 BNSS. Such an order, though brief, crosses the
impermissible line into mechanical adjudication and therefore
cannot be sustained in law.
32.At this juncture, it is of crucial significance to underscore
that Section 250 BNSS expressly enables the accused to avail
a statutory period of sixty days to prefer an application for
discharge. The provision is not merely directory but confers a
substantive procedural right upon the accused to invoke
judicial scrutiny of the sufficiency of grounds before being
compelled to face a full-fledged trial. Once the defence,
through its counsel, categorically conveys its intention to
exercise such right, the Court is obligated to facilitate and
receive such application, rather than foreclose the statutory
remedy by prematurely proceeding to frame charges.
33.This Court is conscious of the fact that the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita is a relatively new procedural code, and
situations may arise where the accused expressly seeks to
avail the entire statutory window of sixty days for moving an
application for discharge. Such procedural contingencies are
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inherent in the legislative scheme and may, in future, warrant
authoritative pronouncement by constitutional courts.
34.However, since the precise contours of such situations do not
presently fall for exhaustive adjudication, this Court refrains
from making any broader or final comment on the issue.
Nonetheless, so long as the statutory provision stands on the
statute book, adherence thereto is not optional but
mandatory. It is incumbent upon the Court, at the very least,
to examine whether the mandate of Section 250 BNSS has
been complied with in letter and spirit. The failure to do so,
particularly in the face of an expressed intent by the accused
to invoke the said provision, vitiates the procedural fairness
of the proceedings and strikes at the root of the statutory
safeguard envisaged by the legislature.
G. Nature of Present Observations and Consequential
Directions
35.It is clarified, with utmost circumspection, that the foregoing
discussion is purely academic and procedural in nature. This
Court has consciously refrained from expressing any opinion
on whether the material on record ultimately warrants
framing of charge against the petitioner or not. The merits of
the prosecution case are left completely open to be left upon
the learned trial court to adjudge whether charges are liable
to be framed or not.
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36.In view of the cumulative procedural infirmities noticed
hereinabove, the impugned order dated 06.11.2025 cannot
be sustained. The matter deserves to be remanded to the
learned Special Judge for fresh consideration.
37.Accordingly, the instant revision petition is allowed in part
and the impugned order dated 06.11.2025 is set aside. The
matter is remitted with directions that:
• the learned Trial Court shall afford adequate opportunity to
both parties;
• the petitioner shall be granted ten days' further time, if so
advised, to move an application for discharge;
• the learned Special Judge shall thereafter pass an appropriate
order strictly in accordance with law, keeping in view the
statutory scheme of the BNSS and the settled legal position.
38.The learned Trial Court shall remain entirely free and
uninfluenced by any observation made herein and shall
decide the matter independently on the basis of the material
available on record and the submissions advanced before it.
(FARJAND ALI),J
199-Mamta/-
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