Urn: Cma / 5532U / 2007Union Of India vs Vs Saini
2026 Latest Caselaw 7085 Raj

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Urn: Cma / 5532U / 2007Union Of India vs Vs Saini on 30 April, 2026

[2026:RJ-JD:18899]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
            S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 2109/2007

Union Of India, through Executive Engineer, Border Fencing
Central Public Works Department, Jaisalmer.
                                                                   ----Appellant
                                    Versus
Shri V. S. Saini
V.S. Saini Engineer Garment Contractor, Village Korba,
P.O. Sarna, Pathankot (Punjab).
                                                                 ----Respondent
                              Connected With
            S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 2110/2007
Union Of India, through Executive Engineer, Border Fencing
Central Public Works Department, Jaisalmer.
                                                                   ----Appellant
                                    Versus
Shri V. S. Saini
V.S. Saini Engineer Garment Contractor, Village Korba,
P.O. Sarna, Pathankot (Punjab).
                                                                 ----Respondent


For Appellant(s)          :     Mr. V.K. Aggarwal
For Respondent(s)         :     Mr. Saransh Vij
                                Mr. Manish Sangela
                                Mr. Gaurav Kumar Singh


              HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHAH

Judgment

Reportable:-

1. Date of conclusion of arguments 18/04/2026

2. Date on which judgment was reserved 18/04/2026

3. Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced: Full Judgment

4. Date of pronouncement 30.04.2026

1. The present Civil Miscellaneous Appeals have been filed

under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 against the orders

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dated 09.09.2005 passed by the learned District Judge, Sri

Ganganagar, in Miscellaneous Civil Case Nos. 75/2001 and

76/2001 titled (Union of India v. Shri V.S. Saini), relating to

different claims of the same claimant and pertaining to almost

identical periods and the same nature of work. By the said orders,

the application filed by the appellant under Section 30 of the

Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1940"

for the sake of brevity) for setting aside the awards came to be

dismissed and the awards were made rule of the Court. Since the

issues involved in both the appeals pertain to the same period and

arise out of contracts of similar nature, though relating to adjacent

places, concerning the same nature of work and covering the

same duration of time, the present appeals are being decided

together.

2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that pursuant to the

Notice Inviting Tenders issued by the appellant for construction of

security fencing along the Indo-Pak Border in Rajasthan, from

Pillar No. 313 to 316 and from Pillar No. 316 to 318, two separate

but identical tenders were issued for the year 1991-92. The

claimant-respondent participated in the tender process and, for

finalization of the tenders, negotiations were held, wherein certain

items, which were initially stipulated to be provided by the

appellant, were agreed to be provided by the claimant.

Subsequently, the work was commenced. As per the tender

conditions for the work relating to Pillar No. 313 to 316, the work

was to commence from 19.10.1991 and was to be completed by

01.01.1992, and as per the tender conditions for the construction

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from Pillar No. 316 to 318, the period of the contract was to

commence from 03.10.1991 and to end on 16.12.1991.

3. It was the case of the claimant-respondent that certain

additional works, including construction of additional struts on

both sides of the fencing and provision of M.S. Flats, were

undertaken by the claimant at the instance of the appellant. The

claimant thereafter approached the appellant for appointment of

an Arbitrator. With the consent of the parties, a sole Arbitrator,

Shri S.S. Juneja, Arbitrator in the Ministry of Urban Development,

New Delhi, was appointed. The claimant-respondent thereafter

submitted eleven claims for adjudication before the learned

Arbitrator. The appellant-Union of India filed its reply objecting to

the said claims, whereafter a rejoinder was filed by the claimant-

respondent, and a counter to the rejoinder was filed by the

appellant-Union of India. The learned Arbitrator thereafter, by way

of awards dated 22.02.1996, decided the claims partly in favour of

the claimant-respondent, inasmuch as Claim Nos. 1 and 2 (in both

cases), relating to additional amounts for construction of struts

and supply of M.S. Flats, were allowed in favour of the claimant-

respondent. The learned Arbitrator also awarded interest at the

rate of 14% per annum from 21.06.1995, i.e., the date of

reference, till the date of payment of the decretal amount in

favour of the claimant-respondent.

4. Being aggrieved by the said awards, the appellant filed two

separate objections/applications before the learned District Judge,

Sri Ganganagar, under Section 30 of the Act of 1940 for setting

aside the awards on the ground that the learned Arbitrator had

misconducted himself as well as the proceedings. Along with the

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said objections/appeals, an application under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, 1963 was also filed, inter alia, contending that after

receipt of notice of the awards, the matter was forwarded for

obtaining necessary approvals; however, during the relevant

period, elections had taken place and a new Government had

come into power, as a result whereof certain administrative

decisions were delayed.

5. The learned District Judge, vide orders dated 09.09.2005,

dismissed the applications filed by the appellant under Section 5

of the Limitation Act, 1963, and also rejected the objections filed

under Section 30 of the Act of 1940, while considering the matter

on merits as well. Being aggrieved by the orders so passed by the

learned District Judge, Sri Ganganagar, the present appeals have

been filed under Section 39 of the Act of 1940.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the

expression used in the agreement provided that at every tenth

post, end post and corner post, strutting was to be carried out

with M.S. Angle Iron Struts on "either" side of different sizes,

and therefore, upon taking the dictionary meaning of the word

"either", it is clear that the same denotes both sides and not

merely a single side. Learned counsel submitted that the

drawings, which formed part of the agreement (page No. 41 of the

record), also specify provision of M.S. Angle Iron Struts on both

sides. Learned counsel also contended that the learned Arbitrator

misconducted himself by not considering the dictionary meaning

of the word "either" and by treating the expression "either" to

mean only one side and not both sides. Learned counsel further

submitted that, so far as Claim No. 2 is concerned, the claimant

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failed to establish that the M.S. Flats were to be supplied by the

department, and thus, awarding the cost of M.S. Flats, which were

allegedly provided by the claimant, amounts to misconduct on the

part of the learned Arbitrator. Therefore, the impugned award

deserves to be quashed and set aside.

6.1 Learned counsel further submitted that the learned District

Judge failed to exercise jurisdiction vested under Section 30 of the

Act of 1940 and proceeded to decide the matter on surmises and

conjectures without properly considering the contents of the

agreement and the material available on record. Learned counsel

further submitted that the orders dated 09.09.2005 passed by the

learned District Judge deserves to be quashed and set aside, and

consequently, the awards impugned in the present appeals also

deserve to be set aside. Learned counsel further submitted that

the learned District Judge failed to consider that the appellant had

shown sufficient cause for delay in filing the objections/appeals,

inasmuch as elections had taken place during the relevant period

and the requisite Government sanction was obtained belatedly, on

account of which delay occurred in filing the objections/appeals.

Learned counsel further submitted that non-entertainment of the

objections on the ground of delay was ex facie illegal and,

therefore, the impugned orders deserve to be quashed and set

aside.

7. Per contra, learned counsel for the claimant-respondent,

while supporting the awards as well as the orders passed by the

learned District Judge, submitted that, so far as the aspect of

delay is concerned, needless to emphasize that objections for

setting aside an award passed by the learned Arbitrator are

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required to be filed within a period of 30 days, failing which the

award is liable to be made rule of the Court. Learned counsel

submitted that admittedly no sufficient reasons have been

assigned for condonation of delay in the application filed under

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by the appellant. Learned

counsel further submitted that merely stating that time was

consumed in obtaining administrative sanctions cannot be said to

be a reasonable ground for condoning the delay, more particularly

in arbitration matters, and especially when there was a substantial

delay of 117 days in filing the objections.

7.1 Learned counsel further submitted that the learned District

Judge has rightly dismissed the application filed under Section 5 of

the Limitation Act, 1963 and has rightly refused to condone the

delay in filing the objections under Section 30 of the Act of 1940.

7.2 On merits, learned counsel submitted that a bare perusal of

the terms of the contract would reveal that the language used

therein provided for strutting on "either" side of every tenth pillar.

Learned counsel further submitted that the expression "either"

means one side and not both sides. Learned counsel further

submitted that there were drawings of both kinds, inasmuch as

the drawing at page No. 128 of the record depicts provision of

M.S. Angle Iron Strut on a single side only.

7.3 Learned counsel further submitted that, as per the terms of

the contract, the provision relating to M.S. Angle Iron Struts on

either side was to be construed to mean that strutting was to be

carried out on a single side at every tenth post and not on both

sides. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned

Arbitrator has rightly considered the same and that even the

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learned District Judge has duly considered the definition and

dictionary meaning of the word "either", and thereafter passed the

impugned orders. As regards Claim No. 2, learned counsel for the

claimant-respondent submitted that as per the terms of the

contract, it was clear that the M.S. Flats as well as M.S. Spikes

were to be supplied by the Department free of cost. Learned

counsel further submitted that, upon negotiations being held, it

was agreed that the M.S. Spikes would be provided by the

claimant-respondent, whereas there was no agreement so far as

provision of M.S. Flats were concerned.

7.4 Learned counsel further submitted that it was the obligation

of the Department to supply the M.S. Flats. Learned counsel

further referred to document R-15 dated 12.09.1991 executed

post negotiations, placed on record by the appellant themselves,

wherein the claimant had agreed only to provide multi-

dimensional M.S. Spikes, which, as per the contract, were

otherwise to be supplied by the Union of India. Learned counsel

further submitted that there is no reference whatsoever with

regard to supply of M.S. Flats by the claimant in the letter/offer

dated 12.09.1991, and therefore, the learned Arbitrator as well as

the learned District Judge have committed no error in deciding the

claim in favour of the claimant-respondent and in dismissing the

objections filed by the appellant. Learned counsel thus prayed for

dismissal of the appeals filed by the appellant.

8. Having considered the arguments advanced by both sides,

the first and foremost question for consideration before this Court

is as to what meaning is to be assigned to the word "either" as

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used in the agreement. For ready reference, Clauses 1, 2 and 3 of

the agreement are reproduced hereunder:-

"1. Providing and fixing security fencing of G.I. barbed wire consisting of M.S. Angle iron posts 100X100X8 mm 3440 mm length above ground level (2440 mm vertical and 1000 mm slanting at 30° to horizental duly fabricated and welded at bend as per drawing) and 50 mm below ground level placed at 3000 mm center to center and embedded in cement concrete blocks 600 mm dian 1150 mm deep. Every tenth post, end post and corner posts to be strutted with MS Angle iron strut on either side of size 100X100X6 mm 3950 nem in length (200 mm vertical at top and 3750 mm slanting down) fabricated and welded as per drawing duly bolted to vertical posts, with two 12mm dia. 50mm long bolts and nuts, struts, embedded in cement concrete block 1000X600X600mm placed at 1150mm below ground level including providing and fixing galvanized iron barbed wire of size 2.5X2.00mm (weight to be not less than 108gms. per meter length) conforming to IS code 2781978 in 23 horizental rows (16 rows in vertical portion and 7 rows in slanting portion) to be fixed and stretched with M.S Hooks/tightening bolts (as per drawing) properly woven with two diagonals of same G.L barbed wire to be fixed to angle iron posts in holes with 2.5mm dia and 50mm long G.I. staples/clips and providing vertical strands of barbed wire properly interwoven with horizental rows of barbed wire at spacing of 150mm upto a height of seven rows of fencing above ground level, adequately tied at three places in staggered manner with GL wire of not less than 16 gauge, and fixing of prefabricated M.S. Flats containing multidirectional thin and sharp M.S. Spikes in goose neck portion with three nos. 10mm dia M.S. bolts and nuts in each flat (M.S. Flats containing M.S. Spikes shall be supplied by the department free of cost) including applying a coat of ready mixed zinc chromate yellow primer and two or more coats with synthetic enamel paint of approved brand and manufacture to give an even shade on all steel work except portion embedded in cement concrete. The foundation concrete blocks for vertical posts and struts shall be of cement. concrete 1:3:6 (1 cement 3 Sand (of

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finess modulus not less tan 1.2) 6 stone aggregated. 20mm nominal size) including excavation in all kinds of soil and the const of centering and shuttering, back filling of earth in foundation, disposal of surplus earth surface dressing of ground etc. complete.

A. Deduct for providing 5 to 6 wraps in barbed wire near straining bolts instead of 8 wraps.

B. deduct for providing 16 gauge G.I. binding wire having 5 tuns (Average) instead of 16 gauge G.1. binding wire having 6 terms.

C. Deduct for not hoisting angle iron post in true plumb.

2. Providing and fixing security fencing of G.1. barbed wire consisting of M.S. Angle iron posts 65X65X6 mm 725 mm length above ground level and 500 mm below ground level including providing 75 mm long 12 mm dia M.S. round bar pointed spile at the top of angle iron post by welding, placed at 3000 mm center to center duly embedded in cement concrete block 300 mm dia, 650 mm deep. Every tenth post, and post and corner posts to be strutted with M.S. Angle iron strut on either side of size 65X65X6 mm 1400 mm in length (200 mm vertical at top and 1200 mm slanting down) fabricated and welded as per drawing duly bolted to vertical posts, with two 12mm dia 50mm long bolts and nuts, struts. in embedded cement concrete block 600X500X500mm placed at 650mm below ground level including providing and fixing galvanized iron barbed wire of size 2.5X2.00mm (weight to be not less than 108gms. per meter length) conforming to IS code 278-1978 in 5 horizontal rows to be fixed and stretched with M.S. Hooks/tightening bolts (as per drawing) G.I. barbed wire to be fixed to angle iron posts in holes with 2.5mm dia and 50mm long G.1. staples/clips including applying a coat of ready mixed zinc chromate yellow primer and two or more coats with synthetic enamel paint of approved brand and manufacture to give an even shade on all steel work except portion embedded in cement concrete. The foundation concrete blocks for vertical posts and struts shall be of cement concrete 1:3:6 (1) cement: 3 Sand (of finess modulus not less tan 1.2) 6 stone aggregated 20mm nominal size) including excavation in all kinds of soil and the const of centering and shuttering, back filling of earth in

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foundation, disposal of surplus earth surface dressing of ground etc. complete.

A. Deduct for providing 5 to 6 wraps in barbed wire near straining bolts instead of 8 wraps.

B. deduct for providing 16 gange G.L binding wire having 5 tuns (Average) instead of 16 gauge G.1. binding wire having 6 terms.

C. Deduct for not hoisting angle iron post in true plumb.

3. Providing and fixing security fencing of G.I. barbed wire consisting of M.S. Angle iron posts 75X75X6 mm 3290 mm length above ground level and 1000 mm below ground (as per drawing) placed at 3000mm center to center duly embedded in cement concrete block 600 mm dia, 1150 mm deep. Every tenth post, and post and corner posts to be strutted with M.S. Angle iron strut on either side of size 75X75X6 mm 3950 mm in length (200 mm vertical at top and 1200 mm slanting down) fabricated and welded as per drawing duly bolted to vertical posts, with two 12mm dia. 50mm long bolts and nuts, struts, embedded in cement concrete block 1000X600X600mm placed at 1150mm below ground level including providing and fixing galvanized iron barbed wire of size 2.5X2.00mm (weight to be not less than 108gms. per meter length) conforming to IS code 278-1978 in 22 horizontal rows to be fixed and stretched with M.S. Hooks/tightening bolts (as per drawing) and properly woven with tow diagonals of same G.I. barbed wire to be fixed to angle iron posts in holes with 2.5mm dia and 50mm long G.I. staples/clips providing and fixing of prefabricated prefabricated M.S. Flats containing multi directional thin and sharp M.S. Spikes in goose neck portion with three nos. 10mm dia M.S. bolts and nuts in each flat including applying a coat of ready mixed zinc chromate yellow primer and two or more coats with synthetic enamel paint of approved brand and manufacture to give an even shade on all steel work except portion embedded in cement concrete. The foundation concrete blocks for vertical posts and struts shall be of cement concrete 1:3:6 (1 cement 3 Sand (of finess modulus not less tan 1.2) 6 stone aggregated 20mm nominal size) including excavation in all kinds of soil and the const of centering and shuttering, back filling of earth in foundation, disposal of surplus earth surface dressing of ground etc. complete.

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A. Deduct for providing 5 to 6 wraps in barbed wire near straining bolts instead of 8 wraps.

B. deduct for providing 16 gauge G.I. binding wire having 5 tuns (Average) instead of 16 gauge G.I. binding wire having 6 terms.

C. Deduct for not hoisting angle iron post in true plumb."

9. A perusal of the aforesaid clauses would reveal that the

expression used therein provides that every tenth post, end post

and corner post is to be strutted with M.S. Angle Iron Struts on

"either" side of size ------. The same expression has been used in

all the three clauses, and only the dimensions of the sizes differ in

each of the said clauses.

10. If we go back to the dictionary meaning of the word

"either", Black's Law Dictionary defines the words "either" as

under:-

"Each of two; the one and the other; one or the other of two alternatives; one of two."

11. So far as the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary is concerned,

the same defines the word "either" to mean "one or other of the

two; any one of two; each of two; each of more than two." It

would thus be evident that the word "either" has been used in

different contexts, meaning either one of the two or both of the

two, depending upon the usage in a given sentence. An identical

issue with regard to the use of word "either" and its significance

came up for consideration before the Bombay High Court in the

case of "Sadruddin Suleman Jhaveri v. J.H. Patwardhan,

1964, SCC, OnLine Bombay 42; wherein the Bombay High

Court, while dealing with the use of the word "either" used in

Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, held as under:-

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"He says that the key word in this section in the word "either" preceding the words "of the preceding Sub- sections" that is to say, it means "either of the Sub-section (1) or (2) and so reading it, it is impossible to apply Sub-

section (3) unless we read into the word "arable" in Sub- section (1) the meaning that it includes cultivated lands also. It is urged that otherwise the subsequent words of Sub-section (3) "offer to the persons interested compensation for the standing crops and trees (if any) on such land ......." would be rendered nugatory. The argument is that between Sub-section (1) and (2) there are contemplated three categories of lands, waste land, arable land and any land and then Sub-section (3) says that in every case under either of the preceding Sub-Sections the Collector shall at the time of taking possession offer to the persons interested compensation for the standing crops and trees if any, Obviously, then, if arable land does not include cultivated land, then the words "crops and trees" could not apply, certainly not the word "crop" and, therefore, Sub- section (3) indicates that implicit in the meaning of the word "arable" is included cultivated land.

We are unable to accept this contention, because in the first place the word "either in the opening clause of Sub-section (3) does not necessarily carry the meaning "both" as the Advocate General contends. The word "either" is used to mean "both" or "any one of two". In this case it is clear that is qualifies the words "preceding Sub-section". The expression is "in every case under either of the preceding Sub-sections" So used it is clear that it is used as an adjective and according to the Oxford Dictionary its meaning is "each of the two". In Middle English its sense is indicated as "one or other of the two". It may also be used in the plural when it may imply both, but the Oxford Dictionary indicates that that sense is very rarely used. These senses are explained by a number of illustrations and one of the illustrations given is from one Chesterton's letters as follows: "When the sun shines on either side of us (as it does mornings and evenings) the shadows are very long". Another example given is "The artificial thunder, in the hands of either nation, must have turned the fortune of the day". The word "either" in the expression "either of the preceding sub-sections" thus means "each of the two

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preceding Sub-sections". So used it cannot possible imply "both the sub-sections". What is more, the words are preceded by the words "In every case" which again emphasizes that the sub-section deals with each individual case separately arising under each of the two sub-sections. We do not think that in the context in which it is used the word "either" implies "both" the preceding sub-sections, but what it means is "In every case under either Sub-section (1) of Sub-section (2)". or in other words "each of the two sub-sections". Moreover, we shall presently show that nothing turns upon the meaning of the word "either" and that the key words of the sub-section are the words, "if any" in the brackets and if one the carefully considers why those words were at all put in, in the section the construction sought to be put upon the word "either" by the learned Advocate General must fail."

12. The Court, in the aforesaid judgment, essentially dealt with

the dictionary meaning of the word "either" and held that it is

used in different contexts, i.e., "one or the other of the two" or

"each of the two." The Court also considered various illustrations

and observed that the meaning of the word has to be construed in

the context in which it is used. It was further held that the word

"either" does not necessarily include both.

13. Juxtaposing the definition of the word "either", as provided in

the dictionaries, as well as the judgment referred to hereinabove,

with the expression used in the contract, it cannot be conclusively

held that the word "either" necessarily means both. Rather, the

terms of the contract appear to be ambiguous and capable of

being interpreted in more than one manner, i.e., providing of M.S.

Angle Iron Struts on one side or on both sides. If the appellant

intended that strutting should be carried out on both sides, then

the appropriate terminology to be used ought to have been "both

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sides" and not "either side", as the latter expression is capable of

different interpretations.

14. So far as the analogy sought to be drawn from the drawings

is concerned, a perusal of the drawing forming part of page No. 41

of the record merely indicates the nature of the structure to be

created and does not specifically depict that the angle iron struts

were to be provided on both sides. On the contrary, the drawing at

page No. 128 of the record depicts the angle iron strut on a single

side only. Thus, the terms of the contract were not sufficiently

clear to specify that the angle iron struts were required to be

constructed on both sides of the posts in question. When the

terms of the contract are capable of more than one interpretation

and the learned Arbitrator has adopted one of the possible and

plausible interpretations, the same, by itself, cannot be a ground

for interference with the award in question under Section 30 of the

Act of 1940.

15. Secondly, so far as the issue relating to Claim No. 2 is

concerned, a bare perusal of the description of Item Nos. 1 to 3 of

the agreement, as quoted hereinabove, would reveal that M.S.

Flats containing M.S. Spikes were to be supplied by the

Department free of cost. Thereafter, negotiations were held and,

as per document R-15 dated 12.09.1991 placed on record by the

claimant-respondent themselves, the claimant agreed to reduce

the rates and further agreed to provide M.S. Spikes on his own,

which were initially required to be supplied by the Department.

However, there was not even a whisper with regard to any

agreement for providing M.S. Flats by the claimant. This, coupled

with Annexures E to H placed on record by the claimant-

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respondent, would show that from the very inception, the

claimant-respondent had been requesting payment of the cost of

M.S. Flats, which were additionally provided by him without the

same being supplied by the appellant.

16. The appellant has not been able to place anything on record

to rebut the averments made by the claimant-respondent; rather,

the documents placed on record by the appellant themselves

clarify the position that the claimant-respondent had agreed only

to provide M.S. Spikes and not M.S. Flats. The learned Arbitrator

has rightly considered this aspect of the matter while awarding the

cost of M.S. Spikes to the claimant-respondent while deciding

Claim No. 2.

17. This Court does not find any illegality or misconduct on the

part of the learned Arbitrator while deciding the issues in hand. So

far as the aspect relating to interest is concerned, though no

arguments were advanced in this regard by learned counsel for

the appellant, however, Section 29 of the Act, 1940 itself provides

as under:-

"Section 29:- Where and in so far as an award is for the payment of money the Court may in decree order interest, from the date of the decree at such rate as the court deems reasonable, to be paid on the principal sum as adjudged by the award and confirmed by the decree."

17.1 Thus, there was ample power available with the learned

Arbitrator for awarding interest.

18. So far as the scope of interference in an application under

Section 30 of the Act, 1940 is concerned, it would be relevant to

mention here that the Supreme Court of India has consistently

held that the scope of interference under Section 30 of the Act of

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1940 is limited, and the grounds for setting aside an award are

circumscribed. The provisions of Section 30 of the Act, 1940

provide as under:-

"30. Grounds for setting aside award. - An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely:

(a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings;

(b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Section 35;

(c) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid."

19. A perusal of the same would reveal that, so far as the case in

hand is concerned, the challenge to the award is primarily on the

ground that the learned Arbitrator had misconducted himself as

well as the proceedings. There is no allegation of any violation of

the principles of natural justice or of bias on the part of the

learned Arbitrator. The only ground urged is with regard to alleged

non-consideration of documents, more particularly the

interpretation of the word "either" as used in the agreement. At

best, the appellant has attempted to make out a case of

perversity. However, as observed hereinabove, a perusal of the

record reveals that the learned Arbitrator has considered all the

relevant documents threadbare and thereafter arrived at the

conclusion that the word "either" did not mean both sides and

that, so far as provision of M.S. Flats is concerned, the same was

the responsibility of the appellant alone. The findings recorded by

the learned Arbitrator are duly supported by the documents on

record, and it is not even the case of the appellant that the award

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is a non-speaking award. Thus, even ground of perversity is not

made out.

20. This Court, thus, finds that there is no misconduct on the

part of the learned Arbitrator or in the conduct of the proceedings,

and the learned District Judge also has rightly refused to set aside

the award while exercising power under Section 30 of the Act of

1940. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of "Bhagawati

Oxygen Limited v. Hindustan Copper Limited, 2005 6 SCC

462; had an occasion to deal with the scope of interference under

Section 30 of the Act of 1940, and held as under:-

"25. This Court has considered the provisions of Section 30 of the Act in several cases and has held that the court while exercising the power under Section 30, cannot re- appreciate the evidence or examine correctness of the conclusions arrived at by the Arbitrator. The jurisdiction is not appellate in nature and an award passed by an Arbitrator cannot be set aside on the ground that it was erroneous. It is not open to the court to interfere with the award merely because in the opinion of the court, other view is equally possible. It is only when the court is satisfied that the Arbitrator had misconducted himself or the proceedings or the award had been improperly procured or is `otherwise' invalid that the court may set aside such award."

21. In the said judgment, the Court has also dealt with the issue

relating to award of interest and held as under:-

"36. The last question relates to payment of interest. The Arbitrator awarded interest to BOL at the universal rate of eighteen per cent for all the three stages, pre-reference period, pendente lite and post award period. It is not disputed that in the arbitration agreement there is no provision for payment of interest. The learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench were right in observing that the Arbitrator, in the facts and circumstances, could have

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awarded interest. The Arbitrator had granted interest at the rate of eighteen per cent on the ground of loan so advanced by HCL to BOL at that rate."

22. It is thus clear that, so far as the aspect of interest is

concerned, the learned Arbitrator is entitled to award interest for

the pre-reference period, pendente lite, as well as for the post-

award period. So far as the scope of interference is concerned, it

has been clearly held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that merely

because another view is equally possible, the view taken by the

learned Arbitrator cannot be a ground for interference with the

award. It has further been held that interference with an arbitral

award is warranted only in cases where the learned Arbitrator has

acted arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously, or beyond the terms of

the agreement.

23. This Court further cautions that the jurisdiction under Section

30 of the Act of 1940 is not to be exercised lightly, and that when

a question of interpretation arises, the decision of the learned

Arbitrator cannot be set aside merely because the Court itself may

have arrived at a different conclusion. Taking guidance from the

principles laid down hereinabove, this Court is of the considered

view that the learned Arbitrator did not commit any misconduct,

either personally or in the conduct of the proceedings, and that

there were justifiable reasons for allowing Claim Nos. 1 and 2 as

well as for awarding interest, which findings are duly supported by

the documents available on record and pertain to construction and

interpretation of the terms of the contract. The learned District

Judge has also not committed any error while dismissing the

application for setting aside the award.

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24. This Court, while hearing appeals against orders passed

under Section 30 of the Act of 1940, is again vested with a limited

scope of interference and cannot go beyond the contours of the

grounds of interference as provided under Section 30 of the Act of

1940. Learned counsel for the appellant was not able to point out

any ground demonstrating misconduct on the part of the learned

Arbitrator or any illegality or perversity in passing the impugned

awards.

25. As far as the question of limitation is concerned, needless to

emphasize that admittedly the limitation prescribed for filing

objections under Section 30 of the Act of 1940 is 30 days from the

date of receipt of notice of the award. In the present case, there is

an admitted delay of 117 days in filing the objections, inasmuch

as the award was passed on 02.02.1996 and a copy thereof was

received by the appellant on 26.03.1996. However, the objections/

appeals came to be filed on 20.07.1996, and thus there was a

gross delay of 117 days in filing the same. The explanation

furnished by the appellant to the effect that administrative

sanctions were delayed on account of change of Government

cannot be treated as a sufficient cause for condoning the delay.

Furthermore, no specific details as to when the sanction was

sought, what steps were undertaken in the process, and at which

stage the matter remained pending, have been set out in the

application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Needless to emphasize that in arbitration matters, delay is

required to be explained with greater rigor, and merely because

the appellant is the Union of India, the same does not enjoy any

special latitude over and above that available to any other litigant.

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[2026:RJ-JD:18899] (20 of 20) [CMA-2109/2007]

There were no justifiable reasons specified in the application under

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Thus, the learned District

Judge rightly dismissed the application under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, 1963 as well. This Court does not find any error in

the orders passed by the learned District Judge dismissing the

application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

26. Accordingly, the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal

Nos.2109/2007 & 2110/2007, being bereft of merit, are hereby

dismissed. The impugned awards dated 22.02.1996 passed by the

learned Arbitrator in both claim cases, as well as the orders dated

09.09.2005 passed by the learned District Judge, Sri Ganganagar,

are hereby upheld.

27. No order as to costs.

28. All pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

29. The records of the cases be sent back forthwith.

(SANDEEP SHAH),J 22-23-devrajP/-

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