Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti vs Authority Under Shops And C.E. Act And ... on 8 October, 2025
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
[2025:RJ-JD:42206-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. SPECIAL APPEAL (WRIT) No. 730/2008
IN
S.B. C.W. PETITION NO. 829/1995
Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Sri Ganga Nagar, through its Secretary,
Sri Ganga Nagar
----Appellant
Versus
1. Authority Under the Shops and Commercial Establishment Act,
Sri Ganganagar
2. Ram Kumar s/o Nimbaji Lal by caste Pal, R/o Near Tata
Marsadi, Sri Ganganagar.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. L.K. Purohit
For Respondent(s) : Mr. C.S. Kotwani assisted by
Mr. Avdhesh Parashar
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIPIN GUPTA
Judgment
Reserved on :: 18/09/2025
Pronouned on :: 08/10/2025
Per Mr. Bipin Gupta, J.
1. The present special appeal (writ) has been filed against the
judgment dated 05.02.2007 passed by the learned Single Judge
whereby the writ petition of the respondent was dismissed and the
order of the Authority prescribed under the Rajasthan Shops and
Commercial Establishment Act, 1958, Sriganganagar was upheld.
2. Shorn of the facts are that respondent No.2 made a petition
before the Authority prescribed under the Rajasthan Shops and
Commercial Establishment Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as
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'the Act of 1958') contending therein that he was appointed as
Chowkidar by the Mandi Samiti at Marketing Yard on 17.11.1982.
Respondent No.2 continued his services till 01.08.1983 and
thereafter his services were discontinued without any rhyme or
reason and since, he had worked for more than six months, his
services could not have been dispensed with without following the
provisions of Section 28 A of the Act of 1958.
3. The petition of respondent No.2 initially was allowed on
27.08.1984. The same was challenged by the present appellant
before this Court and vide order dated 09.12.1991, this Court
disposed of the writ petition holding that the entire activities of
the local authorities do not fall under the exemption as provided
under Section 3 of the Act of 1958. The operative part of the order
dated 09.12.1991 is reproduced as under:-
"From the perusal of the above clause it would appear
that the word 'Offices' of the local authorities has been
exempted. I am nor in agreement which with the
submission of Mr. Singhvi that the entire activities of
the local authorities would fall within the exemption.
The word 'Offices' prefixed qualifies the extent of
exemption and, therefore, the petitioner being a local
authority would be entitled in respect of the offices as
provided under Section 3(1)(a). The would be 'Offices'
has been used in the definition of Commercial
establishments as provided under clause 2(3) and as
well as in the definition of shop as provided under
clause (2)17 therefore, in respect of the shops
commercial establishments which are nature of the
offices, the exemption be applied.
Whether the employee of the office of a place which is
outside the place of office, has not gone into the
prescribed authority into by the shop and Commercial.
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In the light of the view taken by the decision dated
2.7.89 is quashed and the matter is sent back to the
authority for deciding the issue de novo in the light of
the observations made above. The petitioner will
appear without any further notice from the said
authority on 12.2.92 and in case he is able to satisfy
that the employee was to the office, then the
exemption as provided under Section 3(1)(a) will be
applicable else the authority will proceed in
accordance with the observations made above.
The writ petition is disposed of accordingly"
4. After remand, the Authority categorically recorded a finding
that respondent No.2 was working as a Chowkidar in the
Marketing Yard which is not the office place and therefore, the
exemption will not be applicable and vide order dated 01.01.1995
ordered that the termination of the services of respondent No.2
was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1958 and
he was entitled to be reinstated with complete back-wages.
5. The present appellant preferred a writ petition which is
impugned in the present special appeal (writ). The said writ
petition was rejected vide order dated 05.02.2007 against which
the present special appeal has been preferred.
6. Counsel for the appellant argued that on the Market
Committee, the Act of 1958 does not apply and further, it was
stated that since the Market Committee has been held to be the
local authority and as per Section 3, the local authorities have
been exempted from the applicability of the Act of 1958 and
therefore, argued that the order passed by the Authority as well
as the learned Single Judge may be quashed and set aside.
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7. Per contra counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that in the
first round of litigation itself, the learned Single Judge in the
present case, vide order dated 09.12.1991 had categorically held
that working in the marketing committee is not confined to the
office but it also extends to Market Yard and therefore, considering
the said fact and specifically Section 3(1)(a) of the Act of 1958,
the matter was remanded back so as to decide whether
respondent No.2 was working at the time of termination in the
office or in any other activity i.e. Market Yard.
8. It was also argued by the counsel for the respondent No.2
that after considering the evidence, the authority found that
respondent No.2 was working as Chowkidar in the Market Yard
and not in the office. Therefore, the award was correctly passed
and rightly upheld by the learned Single Judge. Counsel therefore
prayed that the present special appeal (writ) be rejected.
9. In rejoinder, counsel for the appellant submitted that all the
employees working in the Marketing Committee are governed by
the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets (Market Committee
Employees) Service Rules, 1975 and therefore, even if they are
working in the Market Yard, they are being governed by the rules,
and it cannot be held that they are not covered under Section 3(1)
of the Act of 1958. Thus, if the office is located at some place and
the working of the employees of Marketing Committee is at a
different place, then also, entire place would be considered as
office and thus, exemption under Section 3(1) of the Act of 1958
would be applicable. In support of his submissions, counsel for the
appellant has relied upon the judgment passed by this Court in
Agriculture Market Committee Vs. Prescribed Authority ::
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1994 (1) WLC 97 and prayed that the present special appeal
may be allowed.
10. Heard counsel for the parties.
11. This Court finds that in the remand order dated 09.12.1991,
the argument of the appellant was already considered and after
due consideration, the order was passed which was not challenged
by the present appellant and the said order had attained finality.
In view of that order which has attained finality, the only question
which was to be decided by the Prescribed Authority was whether
the respondent No.2 was working in the office or at Market Yard.
Based on the evidence available on record, the Prescribed
Authority found that Respondent No. 2 was working as a
Chowkidar in the Market Yard and not in the office. Therefore, in
accordance with the order dated 09.12.1991, Respondent No. 2
was granted the benefit of reinstatement and back wages.
12. This Court further finds that the judgment rendered in
Agriculture Market Committee (supra) merely carves out an
exception with respect to the offices of local authorities. However,
in the very same judgment, the Court has clearly held that Market
Committees are covered under the Act of 1958. Furthermore, it
has been observed that Market Committees also consist of
commercial establishments. The Division Bench only considered
the fact that if a person is working in the office of a local authority,
then the exemptions as available under Section 3 of the Act of
1958 would be applicable. In that case, the employee himself had
stated that he was working in the office, and therefore, in those
factual circumstances, the Market Committee was absolved of
liability under Section 3 of the Act of 1958. Whereas in the present
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case, there is a fact finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority
under the Act of 1958 that the respondent No.2 was employed as
a 'Chowkidar' in the Mandi Yard which is not the office place and
therefore, the judgment relied upon by the appellant does not
help him.
13. Another argument of the appellant is that all the employees
of the Market Committee whether in the office or any other
activity are to be covered by the Rules of 1975. This Court finds
that Rule 2 of the Rules of 1975 clearly excludes the employees of
the Market Committee who are being appointed on casual, work-
charged, contractual and other basis.
Rule 2 of the Rules of 1975 reads as under:-
"2. Extent of application.- Unless otherwise
expressly provided, these rules shall apply to, and be
binding on, all employees of the Agricultural Produce
Market Committee in Rajasthan, other than the
following:-
(a) Persons on deputation from the State
Government who will be governed by the terms and
conditions of deputation;
(b) Employees, appointed on contract, work-charged
and casual employees;
(c) Any class of employees, or any individual
employed in connection with the affairs of the said
market committee, who may be specifically exempted
from the application of these rules."
This Rule itself goes to show that there are not only the
regular employees of the Market Committee but there are other
forms of employees also to which these rules have not been made
applicable. Since respondent No. 2 has been found to be employed
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as a Chowkidar in the Mandi Yard, which is under the control of
the Market Committee, the finding of the Prescribed Authority
regarding the applicability of the Act of 1958 to the appellant, and
that the termination of respondent No. 2 was in violation of
Section 28-A of the said Act, is upheld. However, considering the
significant lapse of time and the period of service rendered by
respondent No. 2, this Court is of the opinion that reinstatement
at this stage would not be appropriate. At this juncture this Court
takes note of the precedent law of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
Deputy Executive Engineer Vs. Kuberbhai Kanjibhai (2019)
4 SCC 307 wherein it has been held as under:-
"8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on
perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the
appeal in part and modify the impugned order to the extent
indicated infra.
9. In our opinion, the case at hand is covered by the two
decisions of this Court rendered in the case of Bharat Sanchar
Nigam Limited vs. Bhurumal (2014) 7 SCC 177 and District
Development Officer and Anr. vs. Satish Kantilal Amerelia
(2018) 12 SCC 298.
10. It is apposite to reproduce what this Court has held in the
case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (supra):
"It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the
ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back
wages, when the termination is found to be illegal, is not
applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position
where services of a regular or permanent workman are
terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of
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victimisation or unfair labour practice, however, when it comes
to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where
the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect,
namely, in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes
Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such
cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and
instead the workman should be given monetary compensation
which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this
direction is obvious.
The reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such
cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is
found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment
compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under
Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after
reinstatement, it is always open to the management to
terminate the services of that employee by paying him the
retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was
working on daily-wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he
has no right to seek regularisation [see State of Karnataka v.
Umadevi (3) (2006) 4 SCC 1]. Thus when he cannot claim
regularisation and he has no right to continue even as a daily-
wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in
reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary
compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is
terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive
monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment
compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the
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relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not
serve any purpose.
We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be
cases where termination of a daily-wage worker is found to be
illegal on the ground that it was resorted to as unfair labour
practice or in violation of the principle of 'last come first go',
viz., while retrenching such a worker, daily-wage juniors to him
were retained. There may also be a situation that persons
junior to him were regularised under some policy but the
workman concerned was terminated. In such circumstances,
the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement
unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the
course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In
such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in
exceptional cases, for reasons stated in writing, such relief can
be denied."
11. Here is also a case where the respondent was held to have
worked as daily-wage or muster-roll employee hardly for a few
years in R & B of the State; secondly, he had no right to claim
regularisation; thirdly, he had no right to continue as daily-
wage worker; and lastly, the dispute was raised by the
respondent (workman) before the Labour Court almost after 15
years of his alleged termination.
12. It is for these reasons, we are of the view that the case of
the respondent would squarely fall in the category of cases
discussed by this Court in paragraph 34 of the judgment
rendered in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (supra).
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13. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the
considered view that it would be just, proper and reasonable to
award lump-sum monetary compensation to the respondent in
full and final satisfaction of his claim of reinstatement and other
consequential benefits by taking recourse to the powers under
Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the law
laid down by this Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
(supra).
14. Having regard to the totality of the facts taken note of
supra, we consider it just and reasonable to award a sum of
₹1,00,000 (Rupees One Lakh) to the respondent in lieu of his
right to claim reinstatement and back wages, in full and final
satisfaction of this dispute.
15. Let the payment of ₹1,00,000 be made by the appellant
(State) to the respondent within three months from the date of
receipt of this judgment.
16. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds
and is accordingly allowed in part. The impugned order of the
High Court is set aside. The Award dated 09.05.2007 of the
Labour Court in LCS No. 120 of 1994 is accordingly modified to
the extent indicated above."
15. In view of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the aforesaid decision, this Court is of the considered
view that the present case stands on an identical footing. As the
respondent No.2 had only worked for a period from 17.11.1982 to
01.08.1983 which is a very short period of time, therefore this
Court finds appropriate that instead of upholding reinstatement,
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the respondent No.2 may be compensated appropriately by grant
of monetary compensation.
16. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present special
appeal (writ) is partly allowed. Furthermore, Considering the
tenure of service and noting that the appellant's conduct in
terminating the services of Respondent No. 2 was in clear
violation of the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act of
1958, this Court awards a sum of ₹ 1,00,000 (1 lakh) as full
and final compensation to Respondent No. 2 in lieu of
reinstatement. The said amount shall be paid within a period of
three months from the date of this order, failing which it shall
carry interest at the rate of 9 % per annum from the date of
this order until the date of actual payment.
(BIPIN GUPTA),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J
93-1-praveen/-
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