Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 453 Raj
Judgement Date : 7 May, 2025
[2025:RJ-JD:22050-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 485/1999
Farooq S/o Nazir Mohd., resident of Chikarda, Police Station
Dungla, District Chittorgarh.
----Appellant
Versus
State of Rajasthan.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Rajiv Bishnoi.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rajesh Bhati, PP.
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL BENIWAL
Order
07/05/2025
1. This criminal appeal under Section 374 Cr.P.C. has been
preferred by the accused-appellant laid a challenge to the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 10.08.1999
passed by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST Cases, Pratapgarh in
Special Sessions Case No.57/98 (State of Rajasthan vs. Farooq),
whereby the accused-appellant has been convicted and sentenced
as below:
Offence under Sentence(s) Fine(s)
Section(s)
376 IPC 10 Years' R.I. Rs.500/-, in default of which,
was ordered to undergo
further 3 months' R.I.
3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act Life Imprisonment Rs.500/-, in default of which,
was ordered to undergo
further 3 years' R.I.
2. The salient facts of the case, as discerned by this Hon'ble
Court, reveal that one Ratni, belonging to the Khatik caste, lodged
[2025:RJ-JD:22050-DB] (2 of 12) [CRLA-485/1999]
an oral report at Police Station Bhadesar. She stated that after
visiting Avri Mata Temple from her village and having Darshan,
she was returning in Sanwariyaji's Bus. She alleged that a man
standing near her in the Bus made inquiries and introduced
himself as Farooq. He accompanied her until Bhadsora Chauraha
where he offered her sugar-cane juice, which she declined.
Despite her refusal, he allegedly forced her to disembark and
drink the sugar-cane juice. During that time, the Bus, in which,
she had been travelling departed. Farooq then offered her to drop
on his motorcycle. They proceeded from Chauraha to Sanwariyaji
Bus stand, where Farooq retrieved his motorcycle and took her to
Chittorgarh. She alleged that she was threatened, which
prevented her from disclosing the incident to anyone. They
watched a Cinema in Chittorgarh until 9 o'clock. Thereafter, they
returned to Asawara Mata, where they went to sleep in Farooq's
Ghumti. She further alleged that at about 2 o'clock in the night,
Farooq removed her clothes and, threatening her with dire
consequences, forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. When she
shouted, some individuals standing outside the Ghumti
approached, but departed upon seeing Farooq. Subsequently,
Farooq closed the window of the Ghumti and offered her Rs. 500/-
for her silence, then instructed her to return home. She thereafter,
located the address of the Police Station and reported the matter.
2.1. On the basis of the aforesaid report, an FIR bearing FIR
No.111/1998 was lodged before the concerned Police Station
against the accused-appellant for the offences under Section 376
[2025:RJ-JD:22050-DB] (3 of 12) [CRLA-485/1999]
IPC and Section 3 of SC/ST Act and the investigation commenced
accordingly. After investigation, a challan was filed against the
accused-appellant and the matter was committed to the Court of
Special Judge, SC/ST Cases, Pratapgarh.
2.2. The learned Trial Court framed the charges against the
accused-appellant under the aforementioned provisions of IPC;
the said charges were read over to the accused-appellant, which
he denied and claimed to stand due trial, whereafter, the trial
commenced accordingly.
2.3. During the course of trial, the prosecution produced as many
as 15 witnesses (PW-1 to PW-15) and got exhibited documents
(Exhibit P-1 to P-15) whereafter, the accused-appellant was
examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which he pleaded
innocence and false implication in the criminal case in question.
2.4. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties
as well as considering the material evidence placed on record, the
learned Trial Court, convicted and sentenced the accused-
appellants, as above, vide the impugned judgment of conviction
and order of sentence dated 10.08.1999, against which the
present appeal has been preferred by the accused-appellant.
3. Mr. Rajiv Bishnoi, learned counsel appearing for the accused-
appellant, submits that the prosecution's case lacks testimony of
eyewitness, complete chain of circumstantial evidence, Forensic
Science Laboratory (FSL) reports, medical evidence of injury or
any kind of doctor's evidence, which could attribute the rape to
[2025:RJ-JD:22050-DB] (4 of 12) [CRLA-485/1999]
the present accused-appellant, therefore, the sole material
evidence relied upon by the prosecution is the statement of the
prosecutrix, rendered in her capacity as PW-2.
3.1. Learned counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the
deposition of the prosecutrix wherein she averred that she went
alone to offer Darshan at Avri Mata temple and was returning back
at about 5:00 PM. At Bhadsora Chauraha, a boy, introducing
himself as Farooq, the present accused-appellant, persuaded her
to alight from the Bus. The prosecutrix further deposed that the
accused-appellant had trailed the Bus on his motorcycle from Avri
Mata temple and offered her to drop at Chittorgarh, which she
accepted, accompanying him on his motorcycle. She further stated
that the accused-appellant took her to a cinema in Chittorgarh for
a night show from 9:00 PM to midnight, during which he allegedly
gave threats. Subsequently, the accused-appellant took her to his
Ghumti near the Avri Mata Temple where they both retired for the
night. The prosecutrix alleged that, while she was in the Ghumti,
the accused-appellant disrobed her and committed rape. She
further deposed that she lay calmly, thereafter and later she
reported the matter to the concerned Police Station.
3.2. Learned counsel thereafter, has taken this Court to the
cross-examination of the prosecutrix wherein she admitted to
traveling alone to offer Darshan at Avri Mata, which was 3-4 hours
of distance from her village. She also disclosed that after
marriage, she had been embroiled in disputes with her husband
and was residing with her mother, with the matrimonial discord
[2025:RJ-JD:22050-DB] (5 of 12) [CRLA-485/1999]
ongoing. The prosecutrix conceded that she had voluntarily and
willingly accompanied the accused-appellant to the cinema, which
was a crowded place, and thereafter, travelled with him on his
motorcycle to the Avri Mata Temple, which was a distance of about
one hour from Chittorgarh. She further deposed that the Ghumti
of the accused-appellant was located in an area with open shops,
and that he provided her with clothes to wear. The prosecutrix also
admitted that following the alleged incident of rape, she remain at
the Ghumti consensually for some time. The prosecutrix further
noted that despite the presence of police in the vicinity, she
reported the incident only upon being prompted to do so.
3.3. Learned counsel has also taken this Court to the testimony
of PW-1, Dr. Dilip Kumar Sharma, who deposed that no injuries
were observed on the body of the prosecutrix, that she was
habituated to sexual intercourse, and that there were no visible
signs of rape, as confirmed in his cross-examination.
3.4. Learned counsel further submits that neither the FSL report
nor any kind of circumstantial evidence supports the contention of
forcible sexual intercourse. With respect to the charge under
Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
learned counsel contends that the prosecutrix has consistently
deposed that she saw the accused-appellant for the first time,
when he followed the Bus on his motorcycle and then went with
him on his motorcycle, and therefore, there is no question of the
appellant being aware of the prosecutrix's caste particulars.
[2025:RJ-JD:22050-DB] (6 of 12) [CRLA-485/1999]
4. Conversely, learned Public Prosecutor, while opposing the
aforesaid submissions advanced on behalf of the accused-
appellant, submits that there is a consistency in the report of the
prosecutrix.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the
record of the case.
6. This Court observes that as far as the charge under Section
3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is concerned, it
is writ large on the facts that the accused-appellant was unaware
of the prosecutrix's caste particulars, and thus, the conviction of
the accused-appellant under the aforementioned provision, in the
absence of any knowledge of her caste, is unsustainable in the
eyes of law.
6.1. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court duly
recorded the statement of the prosecutrix and was conscious of
the fact that the prosecutrix voluntarily travelled from Avri Mata to
Chittorgarh, a journey of about one hour by motorcycle, in the
company of the accused-appellant. She further consented to
watching a movie with him, frequented public places without
protest, and voluntarily accompanied him to his Ghumti, where
she remained in his company for some time without raising any
alarm or objection. Moreover, the medical report of PW-1, Dr. Dilip
Kumar Sharma, does not corroborate the occurrence of rape,
further weakening the prosecution's case.
[2025:RJ-JD:22050-DB] (7 of 12) [CRLA-485/1999]
6.2. This Court also observes that the conviction of the accused-
appellant does not induce confidence regarding establishing of the
case beyond reasonable doubt for convicting the accused-
appellant. Though, the testimony of the prosecutrix alone can be
sufficient to convict a person if it is credible or cogent, but at the
same time, when the prosecutrix herself narrating the manner in
which she has voluntarily gone with him on his motorcycle and
travelled at public place such as watching a movie at a crowded
cinema willingly and also went to his Ghumti and then continued
to stay with him for some time does not give sufficient strength to
her deposition so as to establish the case to the realm of proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of PW-3 Dilip Kumar,
PW-4 Madan Puri and PW-5 Vinod, are of no consequence because
they turned hostile. Apart from that, PW-6 Narayan Singh and PW-
7 Ishwar Lal, who were the witnesses to the site plan, also turned
hostile.
6.3. This Court also takes note of the fact that PW-11 Shankar Lal
and PW-12 Sher Mohammed, in their depositions, confirmed the
sealed delivery of materials to the FSL Unit, but at the same time,
the FSL report has not been received. Additionally, PW-14 Ramdas
@ Ratandas, a witness to the seizure of the motorcycle, also
turned hostile. The sexual compatibility report of the accused-
appellant as provided by PW-10 Dr. Ramswaroop Meena, fails to
establish any connection between the accused-appellant and the
alleged crime. The statement rendered by PW-1 Dr. Dilip Kumar
Sharma, while confirming the age of the prosecutrix, notes the
[2025:RJ-JD:22050-DB] (8 of 12) [CRLA-485/1999]
absence of visible signs of rape, injury or any indication of a
recently torn hymen and there was no such report, which could
point out a rape to be indicated by the statement of the doctor.
The other witnesses, who support the circumstances, also do not
induce any confidence. Since, the matter came up before the
learned Trial Court only for conviction on the sole testimony of
PW-2 and in the given circumstances and the factual matrix, this
Court concludes that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove
the case beyond reasonable doubt.
6.4. This Court is conscious of the judicial pronouncement of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pankaj Singh v. State of
Haryana (Criminal Appeal No.1753/2023) decided on
21.03.2024, whereby the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated that the
condition precedent for invoking the presumption under Section
114A of the Indian Evidence Act in cases involving rape is the
proof of sexual intercourse. In the instant case, the said condition
has not been fulfilled in light of the evidence on the record. The
decision affirms the fundamental principle of criminal law that the
accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, with the
prosecution bearing the burden of establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
6.5. Thus, this Court observes that solely on the basis of the
testimony of the prosecutrix against the accused-appellants, the
burden and liability of the crime in question cannot be fastened
upon the accused. Furthermore, the absence of other material
[2025:RJ-JD:22050-DB] (9 of 12) [CRLA-485/1999]
evidence which could remotely be taken against the accused-
appellant, further strengthens the case of the accused-appellant.
6.6. This Court further observes that when the judgment of
conviction is challenged before the Appellate Court, a proper
appreciation of the evidence recorded by the learned Trial Court
has to be made. The power of the Appellate Court is provided
under Section 386(b) of Cr.P.C., which reads as under:-
"386. Powers of the Appellate Court.--
(b) in an appeal from a conviction--
(i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial, or
(ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or
(iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same."
6.7. This Court also observes that as provided under Section
386(b)(i) Cr.P.C., the Appellate Court has the power to reverse the
findings of the conviction, so as to acquit the accused. At this
juncture, it is considered appropriate to reproduce the relevant
portion of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
case of Kamlesh Prabhudas Tanna v. State of Gujarat,
(2013) 15 SCC 263, as hereunder:-
"9. At this juncture, we are obliged to state that though it may be difficult to state that the judgment suffers from sans reasons, yet it is not at all difficult to say that the reasons ascribed are really apology for reasons. If we allow ourselves to say so, one may ascribe certain reasons which seem to be reasons but the litmus test is to give seemly and condign reasons either to sustain or overturn the judgment. The
[2025:RJ-JD:22050-DB] (10 of 12) [CRLA-485/1999]
filament of reasoning must logically flow from requisite analysis, but, unfortunately, the said exercise has not been carried out. In this context, we may refer with profit to the decision in Padam Singh v. State of U.P [(2000) 1 SCC 621:
2000 SCC (Cri) 285], wherein a two-Judge Bench, while dealing with the duty of the appellate court, has expressed thus: (SCC p. 625, para 2)
"2. ... It is the duty of an appellate court to look into the evidence adduced in the case and arrive at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not and even if it can be relied upon, then whether the prosecution can be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt on the said evidence. The credibility of a witness has to be adjudged by the appellate court in drawing inference from proved and admitted facts. It must be remembered that the appellate court, like the trial court, has to be satisfied affirmatively that the prosecution case is substantially true and the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt as the presumption of innocence with which the accused starts, continues right through until he is held guilty by the final Court of Appeal and that presumption is neither strengthened by an acquittal nor weakened by a conviction in the trial court."
(emphasis supplied)
10. In Rama v. State of Rajasthan[(2002) 4 SCC 571 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 829], the Court has stated about the duty of the appellate court in the following terms: (SCC p. 572, para 4)
"4. ... It is well settled that in a criminal appeal, a duty is enjoined upon the appellate court to reappraise the evidence itself and it cannot proceed to dispose of the appeal upon appraisal of evidence by the trial court alone especially when the appeal has been already admitted and placed for final hearing. Upholding such a procedure would amount to negation of valuable right of appeal of an accused, which cannot be permitted under law."
11. In Iqbal Abdul Samiya Malek v. State of Gujarat [(2012) 11 SCC 312: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 636], relying on the pronouncements in Padam Singh [(2000) 1 SCC 621 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 285] and Bani Singh v. State of U.P. [(1996) 4 SCC 720: 1996 SCC (Cri) 848], this Court has reiterated the principle pertaining to the duty of the appellate court.
12. Recently, a three-Judge Bench in Majjal v. State of Haryana [(2013) 6 SCC 798] has ruled thus: (SCC p. 800, para 7)
[2025:RJ-JD:22050-DB] (11 of 12) [CRLA-485/1999]
"7. It was necessary for the High Court to consider whether the trial court's assessment of the evidence and its opinion that the appellant must be convicted deserve to be confirmed. This exercise is necessary because the personal liberty of an accused is curtailed because of the conviction.
The High Court must state its reasons why it is accepting the evidence on record. The High Court's concurrence with the trial court's view would be acceptable only if it is supported by reasons. In such appeals it is a court of first appeal. Reasons cannot be cryptic. By this, we do not mean that the High Court is expected to write an unduly long treatise. The judgment may be short but must reflect proper application of mind to vital evidence and important submissions which go to the root of the matter."
6.8. In view of the aforementioned precedential backdrop, this
Court observes that in the present case, the sexual compatibility
report has not established any connection between the accused-
appellant and the alleged crime. Moreover, the recovery witness to
the seizure of the motorcycle has also turned hostile. Therefore, in
the presence of the such lacunae, the prosecution failed to prove
its case against the accused-appellant beyond all reasonable
doubts, which in the present case, are insufficient in themselves to
complete the chain of circumstantial evidence, and thus, it would
be appropriate to reverse the findings of conviction against the
accused- appellant, as recorded by the learned Trial Court in the
impugned judgment.
6.9. This Court also observes that looking into the overall factual
matrix and the circumstances of the case as well as the evidence
and the precedent law, as placed before us, it is a fit case to
exercise the power conferred under Section 386(2), which pertains
to the reversal of a finding from conviction to acquittal.
[2025:RJ-JD:22050-DB] (12 of 12) [CRLA-485/1999]
7. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed and the
impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
10.08.1999 passed by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST Cases,
Pratapgarh in Special Sessions Case No.57/98 is quashed and set
aside. The accused-appellant is acquitted of the charges against
him. Accused-appellant Farooq is already on bail in pursuance of
the order dated 14.01.2000 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this
Hon'ble Court in the instant appeal; he need not surrender in
connection with the present case; his bail bonds stand discharged.
7.1. However, keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A
Cr.P.C./481 B.N.S.S., the accused-appellant is hereby directed to
furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/- and a surety
bond each in the like amount before the learned Trial court which
shall be effective for a period of six months to the effect that in
the event of filing of a Special Leave Petition against the present
judgment on receipt of notice thereof, the accused-appellant shall
appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as and when called
upon to do so.
7.2. All pending applications stand disposed of. The record of the
learned Trial Court be returned forthwith.
(SUNIL BENIWAL),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J
35-Zeeshan
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