Madan Lal And Ors vs State
2025 Latest Caselaw 10098 Raj

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Madan Lal And Ors vs State on 22 May, 2025

Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati

Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati

[2025:RJ-JD:22506-DB]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                  D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 124/1994

Madan Lal And Ors.
                                                                      ----Appellant
                                       Versus
State
                                                                    ----Respondent


For Appellant(s)               :   Mr. Divik Mathur
                                   Mr. Sunil Dhaka for
                                   Mr. S.R. Godara
For Respondent(s)              :   Mr. Rajesh Bhati, AGA


     HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL BENIWAL Judgment

(per Hon'ble Beniwal,J.)

Reserved on : 09/05/2025 Pronounced on : 22/05/2025

1. Assailed herein is a judgment and order dated 02.03.1994

passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, No.1,

Sriganganagar in Sessions Case No.73/1992 by which the

appellant Nos.1 and 2 were convicted for the offences under

Section 304-B IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment

and appellant Nos.3 and 4 were convicted for the offence under

Section 498-A IPC and sentenced to undergo three years' rigorous

together with fine of Rs.500/- each, in default whereof, to further

undergo two months' rigorous imprisonment.

2. The prosecution's case, as it unfolded during the trial, is that

the complainant, Rajkumar, submitted a written complaint on

11.08.1992, alleging, inter alia, that his sister had married

accused-appellant No.1, Madanlal, approximately 2 to 2.5 years

[2025:RJ-JD:22506-DB] (2 of 12) [CRLA-124/1994]

prior. Soon after the marriage, she began to be harassed and

tortured by her husband and in-laws (the accused-appellants) for

bringing insufficient dowry. They also started demanding

additional items, such as a refrigerator, a cooler, and at times,

money. Although his parents tried to help the deceased, they were

unable to meet the growing demands. About 15 to 20 days before

the incident, his mother was informed about his sister's (since

deceased) illness, upon which she brought her to their parental

home. After some time, the accused-appellants assured the family

that they would take proper care of her, and she was sent back to

her matrimonial home. However, on the fateful day, his sister was

allegedly poisoned and killed.

3. Upon receiving the complaint, the police registered a case for

offences under Sections 302 and 304-B/34 of the IPC, and an

investigation was initiated. After a thorough investigation, the

police filed a charge sheet against the accused-appellants for the

aforementioned offences. Following arguments on merit, charges

were formally framed against them for the said offences, which

they denied, claiming trial.

4. During trial, the prosecution examined as many as 9

witnesses and documents were exhibited. The accused-appellants

were also examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and the appellant-

accused Madanlal examined himself as DW-1 and one Ramcharan

was also examined as DW-2.

5. During the trial, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor

admitted that there was no evidence on record to show that

poison had been administered to the deceased forcibly, and

therefore, no offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC was made

[2025:RJ-JD:22506-DB] (3 of 12) [CRLA-124/1994]

out. Consequently, the accused-appellants were discharged from

the offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC, however, appellant

Nos.1 and 2 (since deceased) were tried for the offence under

Section 304-B of the IPC and appellant Nos.3 and 4 were tried for

the offence under Section 498-A of IPC.

6. After appreciating the evidence available on record, the

learned trial court convicted and sentenced the appellants-accused

as aforesaid vide judgment and order dated 02.03.1994. Hence,

this appeal.

7. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the

prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case beyond

reasonable doubt. There is no iota of evidence to show that there

was consistent demand of dowry. No prosecution witness has

stated about the demand of dowry or even demand prior to the

incident.

It is further submitted that in order to constitute an offence

under Section 304-B of IPC, the prosecution had to prove that the

deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before the

death. In the case at hand, nothing has been brought on record to

show that there was any cruelty or harassment just before the

incident, which instigated the deceased to take such drastic step.

The deceased Neelam was at her paternal home 20 days prior to

the incident and she was brought back to her matrimonial home

amicably and in that course of time, there is no demand of dowry.

Furthermore, the mother of deceased Vidhyawati (PW-2), in

her statement, has specifically deposed that whatever articles

were given in the marriage was on her own wishes. Not only this,

[2025:RJ-JD:22506-DB] (4 of 12) [CRLA-124/1994]

when deceased Neelam gave birth to a male child, many gifts

were also given during the ceremomny on her own wishes.

The learned counsel for the appellants thus submitted that

the learned trial Court, while appreciating the evidence, has

committed grave error and has given erroneous finding of guilt

against the appellants and convicted them vide impugned

judgment and order, which is liable to be quashed and set aside.

8. Per contra, learned AGA supported the impugned judgment

and order passed by the learned trial Court and has submitted

that the learned trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence

on record and has rightly convicted the appellants-accused.

9. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and the

learned Public Prosecutor and perused the record.

10. During the pendency of the present appeal, the appellant

No.2-accused Smt. Sahab Devi expired and hence, the appeal

stands abated qua her.

11. This Court will first examine the correctness of the findings

recorded by the learned trial court with regard to the conviction of

the appellant Nos. 3 and 4 for the offence under Section 498-A of

IPC. For this purpose, let us re-examine the depositions in this

regard made by the relevant witnesses.

12. Rajkumar (PW-1), who is also the first informant, deposed

that his sister Neelam was married to appellant No. 1

approximately 2 to 2.5 years ago. After the marriage, the

relationship between his sister and appellant No. 1 remained

cordial for the first two months. However, thereafter, there was a

consistent demand for dowry, specifically, a refrigerator, cooler,

and a cash amount.

[2025:RJ-JD:22506-DB] (5 of 12) [CRLA-124/1994]

13. A perusal of the statements given by this witness in the First

Information Report, his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.

before the police, and his deposition before the Court reveals that

the demand was made by appellant Nos. 1 and 2. Notably, none of

the aforementioned statements contain any specific allegation of

dowry demand against appellant Nos. 3 and 4.

14. Similarly, it is observed that Vidhyawati (PW-2), the mother

of the deceased Neelam, as well as Harish Chandra (PW-3) and

Banwarilal (PW-4), do not state anywhere that there was a

consistent demand for dowry at the instance of appellant Nos. 3

and 4. Banwarilal (PW-4) deposed that the appellant Nos.3 and 4

even did not attend the marriage of appellant No.1, which shows

that the relations between the brothers were not cordial and thus,

they were living separately. A conjoint reading of the statements

of these witnesses indicates that the allegations against appellant

Nos. 3 and 4 are vague and omnibus in nature. It appears that

appellant Nos. 3 and 4 have been implicated solely because they

are the brother-in-law and sister-in-law of the deceased Neelam.

15. In fact, the allegations against appellant Nos. 3 and 4 appear

doubtful in light of the specific statement made by Rajkumar (PW-

1), wherein he stated that his brother Mohanlal had been residing

separately in the adjoining portion of the house since 10 months

after his marriage.

16. In view of the above, the involvement of appellant Nos. 3

and 4 in making dowry demands or causing any cruelty or

harassment is not established. Therefore, although the learned

Trial Court acquitted appellant Nos. 3 and 4 of the offence under

Section 304-B IPC, it nonetheless convicted them under Section

[2025:RJ-JD:22506-DB] (6 of 12) [CRLA-124/1994]

498-A IPC and sentenced them to undergo three years' rigorous

imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 500/- each. In default of

payment of the fine, they were directed to undergo an additional

two months' rigorous imprisonment.

17. The offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is established

only if the husband or a relative of the husband subjects a woman

to cruelty. An act amounts to cruelty if it involves any willful

conduct of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit

suicide, or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb, or

health, or if it involves harassment of the woman with a view to

coercing her or any person related to her to meet an unlawful

demand for property or valuable security.

18. In view of the above provision, it is clear that, in order to

establish an offence under Section 498-A of the IPC, the accused

must be shown to have subjected the woman to cruelty or

harassment. In the present case, the prosecution's case hinges on

the statements of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, and PW-4. We have

carefully perused the statements of all the aforesaid witnesses.

However, none of them have deposed that any cruelty or

harassment was inflicted by appellant Nos. 3 and 4, on account of

which the deceased Neelam was compelled to consume

insecticide, leading to her death.

19. Though there are some vague and remote assertions

regarding their involvement in the demand for dowry along with

appellant Nos. 1 and 2, there is no specific statement by any of

the witnesses pointing to a concrete instance of cruelty or

harassment. Moreover, there is no evidence of any act committed

by appellant Nos. 3 and 4 that could be seen as instigating or

[2025:RJ-JD:22506-DB] (7 of 12) [CRLA-124/1994]

abetting the deceased Neelam to take such an extreme step

resulting in her death.

20. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion

that appellant Nos.3 and 4 have wrongly been convicted for the

offence under Section 498-A of IPC.

21. So far as appellant No. 1 is concerned, it is noted that the

learned Trial Court found him to be involved in making consistent

dowry demands and held him guilty of acts of cruelty and

harassment, which instigated the deceased Neelam to consume

insecticide, ultimately resulting in her death.

22. Before discussing the allegation as levelled against the

appellant No.1, it would be apposite to reproduce Sections 304-B

of IPC, which reads as under:-

"304B. Dowry death. -- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."

23. A perusal of Section 304-B of IPC, it emerges that in order to

make out a case under Section 304-B of IPC, following are the

essential ingredients:-

"(a) The death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury, or must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances;

[2025:RJ-JD:22506-DB] (8 of 12) [CRLA-124/1994]

(b) The death must have been caused within seven years of her marriage;

(c) Soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of her husband; and

(d) Cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry."

24. If the aforesaid four ingredients are established, the death

can be called a dowry death, and the husband and/or husband's

relative, as the case may be, shall be deemed tohave caused the

dowry death. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961

provides that dowry means any property or valuable security

given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by one

party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage or by the

parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to

the other party to the marriage or to any other person. The dowry

must be given or agreed to be given at or before or any time after

the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties.

The term valuable security used in Section 2 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act, 1961 has the same meaning as in Section 30 of

IPC.

25. In this case, there is no dispute that the death of deceased

Neelam occurred within seven years of the marriage. Section 113-

B of the Evidence Act reads thus:-

"113B. Presumption as to dowry death. -- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.

[2025:RJ-JD:22506-DB] (9 of 12) [CRLA-124/1994]

Explanation. For the purposes of this section, dowry death shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."

The presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act

will apply when it is established that soon before her death, the

woman has been subjected by the accused to cruelty or

harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.

Therefore, even for attracting Section 113-B, the prosecution must

establish that the deceased was subjected by the appellant to

cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand of

dowry soon before her death. Unless these facts are proved, the

presumptions under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act cannot be

invoked.

26. In order to ascertain whether there was cruelty or

harassment coupled with a demand for dowry soon before the

death of the deceased Neelam, the statements of PW-1, PW-2,

PW-3, and PW-4 have been examined, along with the statements

given under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. before the police, as well as

the First Information Report submitted by PW-1 are to be

examined. PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 deposed that there was a

panchayat meeting to convince accused on the issue of dowry and

the same was attended by one Shri Kalra. However, prosecution

failed to produce Shri Kalra as a witness. The testimonies of PW-1,

PW-2 and PW-4 would have been treated as trustworthy if Shri

Kalra would have deposed about attending the said meeting as

PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 are all interested witnesses being close

relatives of deceased Neelam.

27. No doubt, all the prosecution witnesses have stated that

after the marriage, there was a demand for a refrigerator and

[2025:RJ-JD:22506-DB] (10 of 12) [CRLA-124/1994]

other articles by appellant No. 1 as well as by appellant No. 2

(since deceased). It is evident from the statements that the

demand was made on different occasions. However, certain facts

are particularly relevant for ascertaining whether there was cruelty

or harassment in connection with the dowry demand, especially

soon before the unfortunate incident that occurred on 10.08.1992,

and these must be taken into consideration.

28. Vidhyawati (PW-2), the mother of the deceased Neelam, in

her cross-examination, specifically deposed that at the time of

marriage, there was no dowry demand made by appellant Nos. 1

to 4, and that whatever dowry was given to Neelam was provided

of their own volition. She categorically deposed that " tks lkeku geus

"kknh ij fn;k og ethZ ls fn;k Fkk oj i{k us ugh ekaxk ". Moreover, none of the prosecution witnesses deposed that there was any specific

demand for dowry prior to or at the time of the marriage.

29. Furthermore, it is evident from the statements of PW-1 and

PW-2 that after Neelam gave birth to a male child, some articles

were gifted voluntarily. In none of the statements it is mentioned

that, during the celebration of the birth of the first child or when

the child was sent along with the mother to her matrimonial

home, there was any demand for a refrigerator at the behest of

appellant No.1. The statements of these witnesses are vague, as

no specific date or instance has been identified when the alleged

demand for a refrigerator was made by appellant No. 1.

30. In the FIR and the subsequent statement of PW-1 before the

Court, it is stated that 20 days prior to 10.08.1992--the date on

which the deceased Neelam passed away--a telephonic call was

received from appellant No. 1, informing that Neelam was not

[2025:RJ-JD:22506-DB] (11 of 12) [CRLA-124/1994]

keeping well. Upon receiving the call, PW-2, who is the mother of

the deceased Neelam, went to Neelam's matrimonial home and

was informed that she was experiencing continuous bleeding.

Thereafter, PW-2 took Neelam to Sriganganagar, where she was

admitted to a hospital, treated, and discharged after two days.

Following her discharge, Neelam was taken to her parental home.

31. Subsequently, appellant No. 1, along with his sister and

brother-in-law, visited Neelam's parental home and requested that

she be sent back to her matrimonial home. While narrating this

incident, PW-2 alleged that when she had gone to Neelam's

matrimonial home, appellant Nos. 1 and 2 (since deceased)

behaved very rudely and remarked that they would not provide

any medical treatment to Neelam, and even if she died, it would

not matter, as there were many other girls to marry. However, this

statement, by itself, cannot be construed as an act of cruelty or

harassment as required under Section 304-B of the IPC. At this

juncture as well, PW-2 did not state that such harassment or rude

behaviour was on account of the non-fulfilment of any dowry

demand.

32. It is further noted that the subsequent act of sending Neelam

back to her matrimonial home clearly indicates that the

relationship had become cordial, and accordingly, she returned to

her matrimonial home with her husband. Though this incident has

been narrated by all the witnesses from PW-1 to PW-4, none of

them have stated that there was any fresh demand for dowry

during this intervening period. Therefore, the prosecution's case

becomes highly doubtful, as the circumstances do not indicate the

presence of an immediate dowry demand, nor do they establish

[2025:RJ-JD:22506-DB] (12 of 12) [CRLA-124/1994]

any act of cruelty or harassment by appellant Nos. 1 and 2 on

account of unmet dowry demands that could have instigated

Neelam to take the drastic step of consuming insecticide and

ending her life.

33. In light of the above, the prosecution has failed to establish

its case beyond reasonable doubt.

34. In view of the discussion made above, the finding given by

the learned trial Court do not appear to be justified and the

conviction of appellant No.1 for the offence under Section 304-B of

IPC do not appear to be sustainable.

35. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment

and order dated 02.03.1994 is quashed and set aside and the

appellant Nos.1, 3 and 4 are acquitted of all the charges levelled

against them. They are on bail. Their bail bonds stand discharged.

36. The appellants shall furnish a bond of Rs.50,000/- each

along with two sureties of Rs.25,000/- under Section 481 of BNSS

(Section 437-A of Cr.P.C.) to the satisfaction of the learned trial

Court to ensure their appearance if an appeal is filed before a

higher court against the acquittal.

(SUNIL BENIWAL),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J

56-skm/-

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