Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Laxman vs State on 12 August, 2025

Author: Dinesh Mehta

Bench: Dinesh Mehta

[2025:RJ-JD:34187-DB]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
             D.B. Criminal Jail Appeal No. 331/1995

Laxman S/o Nana Meena, R/o Asariwada, P.S. Pahada, District
Udaipur.
                                                                      ----Petitioner
                                       Versus
State of Rajasthan, through P.P.
                                                                    ----Respondent


For Petitioner(s)            :     Ms. Heli Pathak, Amicus Curiae
For Respondent(s)            :     Mr. Ramesh Devasi, Public Prosecutor



             HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MEHTA

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BALJINDER SINGH SANDHU

Judgment

Reserved on : 30.07.2025

Pronounced on : 12.08.2025

(Per Hon'ble Mehta, J.):

1. The instant jail appeal is directed against the judgment

dated 30.06.1995 passed by the learned Additional District and

Sessions Judge No.1, Udaipur (hereinafter referred to as 'the trial

court') in Sessions Case No. 16/1994, whereby the accused

appellant - Laxman has been convicted of the charge under

section 302 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced as under:-

      Offence                     Sentence                           Fine
Section 302 of IPC          Life Imprisonment                To pay a fine of
                                                             Rs.200/-; in default
                                                             thereof to further
                                                             undergo one month
                                                             R.I.





 [2025:RJ-JD:34187-DB]                  (2 of 13)                    [CRLJA-331/1995]

2. The facts leading to appellant's conviction emanated from

the FIR, which came to be lodged by one Bakshi Ram on

19.03.1992 at about 12:30 a.m inter-alia stating that on

18.03.1992 at about 7:00 - 7:15 p.m. he was sitting in the house

of his father-in-law (Kachara), his father-in-law had some

altercation with his brother Nana Meena (father of the appellant

Laxman) in relation to an ox. It was stated in the said FIR that

Kura, who was present on the site tried to diffuse the situation

and pushed Nana towards his house, but after some time, while

the complainant was sitting with his father-in-law (Kachara) in

verandah (padsal), the accused approached their house and called

his father-in-law (Kachara) and raised grievance about what

Kachara had said to his father and stabbed a knife in left side of

his chest and resultantly, the deceased died instantly and the

accused Laxman ran away from the scene.

3. On the basis of such written information given by the

complainant, First Information Report bearing No. 63/1992 was

registered in the police station Pahada, District Udaipur for the

offences under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and section

4/25 of the Arms Act.

4. The investigating officer prepared the site map (Exhibit-P/1),

Panchanama of the corpse (Exhibit-P/2), seized the clothes of the

deceased and collected blood stained soil and control soil and got

the post-mortem conducted. On 22.03.1992, the appellant was

arrested and at his instance, a knife was recovered from his

house.

5. The knife, blood stained soil and vest (banyan) of the

deceased were sent for forensic examination, which reported that

[2025:RJ-JD:34187-DB] (3 of 13) [CRLJA-331/1995]

the blood group on the blood stained clothes of the deceased,

blood stained soil and the knife contained identical blood group

i.e. Group 'A'. The investigating officer, thus concluded that the

appellant was the accused and accordingly filed a charge-sheet.

6. Later on, the case was committed to the Sessions Court and

on denial of the charges, it was tried and decided by the trial court

vide impugned judgment dated 30.06.1995.

7. On behalf of the prosecution Hukka (P.W.1); Kura (P.W.2);

Manilal (P.W.3); Ashok Kumar (P.W.4); Nani (P.W.5); Bakshi Ram

(P.W.6); Amrit Lal (P.W.7); Rupa (P.W.8); Man Singh (P.W.9);

Santosh Giri (P.W.10); Padam Singh (P.W.11); Halu (P.W.12); Dr.

Rameshchandra Ahari (P.W.13) and Dhularam (P.W.14) were

examined.

8. Site Map (Exhibit-P/1); Panchnama (Exhibit-P/2); FIR

(Exhibit-P/3); Arrest Memo (Exhibit-P/4); Letter by SHO sent

while taking sample of the soil (Exhibit-P/5-I); Supurdginama of

dead body (Exhibit-P/5-II); Recovery memo of Knife (Exhibit-P/5-

III); Receipt of samples (4 packets) sent to FSL (Exhibit-P/6-I);

Recovery memo of control soil and blood stained soil (Exhibit-P/6-

II); Post-Mortem Report (Exhibit-P/6-III); Recovery memo of vest

from the dead body (Exhibit-P/7); Information under section 27 of

the Indian Evidence Act by accused Laxman (Exhibit-P/8) and

Statement of Nani (P.W.5) under section 161 of Criminal Procedure

Code (Exhibit-D/1) were exhibited.

9. When the appellant was called upon to explain the evidence

and circumstances against him as required under section 313 of

Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as 'the Cr.P.C.'),

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he refuted not only the statements but also each of the evidence

led against him.

10. Apart from above explanatory statements, the statement of

Nani (P.W.5), wife of the deceased was produced in defence as

Exhibit-D/1.

11. The trial court sift through the oral and ocular evidence.

Considering the testimony of two eyewitnesses namely Nani

(P.W.5) and Bakshi Ram (P.W.6) who had seen the accused

plunging knife in the chest of the deceased, and in view of the

recovery of blood stained knife (Exhibit-P/5) at the instance of the

appellant (in furtherance of his disclosure statement given under

section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act) and in light of the Post-

Mortem Report (Exhibit-P/6) dated 10.04.1992, the trial court

concluded/held the appellant guilty of the offence.

12. Having found such facts, the trial court reached to a

conclusion that the appellant had murdered the deceased and

sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment. He was, however,

acquitted of the charge under section 4/25 of the Arms Act.

13. Ms. Heli Pathak, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the

accused-appellant argued that the appellant was falsely implicated

and wrongly convicted. She argued that the evidence on record

was not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the

appellant - accused had murdered the deceased.

14. Inviting Court's attention towards Para No. 43 of the

judgment impugned, learned Amicus Curiae argued that the trial

court has failed to appreciate that the doctor Rameshchandra

Ahari (P.W.13), who had conducted the post-mortem and gave the

report (Exhibit-P/6) has failed to indicate that the injury suffered

[2025:RJ-JD:34187-DB] (5 of 13) [CRLJA-331/1995]

by the deceased was sufficient to cause death. Pointing towards

the cross-examination of said doctor (P.W.13), learned Amicus

Curiae argued that since the doctor conducting post-mortem had

clearly stated that if the deceased was taken to hospital in time,

he could have been saved, it was the delay in treatment, which

resulted in the death of the deceased and not the force of the

infliction or gravity of injury.

15. Learned counsel further argued that both the eyewitnesses

Nani (P.W.5) and Bakshi Ram (P.W.6) were interested

eyewitnesses and hence, the evidence led by the prosecution is

neither trustworthy nor is it sufficient to prove the charges levelled

against the appellant.

16. Ms. Pathak lastly argued that even if the oral evidence was

accepted as it was, what had surfaced is that the appellant had

given a knife blow on the left side of the chest of the deceased.

While minutely reading the statement given by the wife of the

deceased (Nani) given under section 161 of Cr.P.C., she argued

that the fact that the knife blow was given on the left side of the

body (near armpit) it is apparent that the accused did not have

any intention to murder the deceased and he simply wanted to

scare or teach the deceased a lesson.

17. She argued that analysis of the evidence suggests that the

case in hands falls under section 304 Part - II of IPC and prayed

that the appellant be alternatively convicted under section 304

Part-II of IPC and be sentenced equal to the incarceration he had

already suffered, while highlighting that after the conviction vide

judgment dated 30.06.1995, the appellant's application for

suspension of sentence was allowed on 19.03.2001.

[2025:RJ-JD:34187-DB] (6 of 13) [CRLJA-331/1995]

18. Mr. Ramesh Devasi, learned Public Prosecutor on the other

hand submitted that the trial court has committed no error in

appreciating the evidence or committed error of law so as to

warrant any interference. He argued that the appellant had all the

intentions to murder the deceased and the oral evidence so also

the documentary evidence including the Post-Mortem report are

enough for upholding the conviction of the deceased. He

submitted that the doctor (P.W.13), who conducted the post-

mortem had clearly concluded that death of the deceased was

caused on account of shock due to severe haemorrhage caused by

the wound on the left lung. He argued that since the knife blow

was given on the vital part of the body namely lungs, no

sympathetic consideration can be had towards the appellant for he

has committed a heinous offence of murdering his uncle.

19. In rejoinder, learned Amicus Curiae submitted that the

appellant hails from a tribal background and is an illiterate. She

submitted that coming from such a background, even if he is

believed to have given a knife blow, it was because of the

momentary excitement in the heat of the moment and given that

the prosecution has failed to bring home any motive or intention,

the appellant's conviction deserves to be altered to that under

section 304 Part-I or Part-II of IPC, as more than 30 years has

since passed and the appellant has already suffered incarceration

of about nine years and has been leading a life out of jail for last

24 years.

20. In support of her arguments, learned Amicus Curiae relied

upon the following judgments:-

[2025:RJ-JD:34187-DB] (7 of 13) [CRLJA-331/1995]

(i) Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in 1958 AIR 465.

(ii) State of Karnataka vs. Siddappa Basanagouda Patil & Anr., reported in 1990 SCC (Cri) 698.

(iii) Ramchandra Ohdar vs. State of Bihar, reported in (1999) 9 SCC 97.

(iv) Kandaswamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2008) 11 SCC 97.

(v) Anbazhagan vs. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police, reported in AIR 2023 SC 3660.

(vi) Jagtar Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in (1983) 2 SCC 342.

21. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

record.

22. On going through the order passed by the learned trial court

and wading through the oral and documentary evidence, this

Court finds that the prosecution's case is based on two

eyewitnesses - the wife of the deceased Nani (P.W.5) and his son-

in-law Bakshi Ram (P.W.6), who had seen the accused stabbing

the deceased. The case is as clear as crystal and duly

corroborated by medical evidence.

23. The injury sustained by the deceased as per the Post-Mortem

Report (Exhibit-P/6) reads as under:-

"Wound : Penetrating wound - 8.0 cm x 2.0 cm, obliquely placed on left anterio-lateral surface of Chest wall, 7.0 cm below and lateral to left nipple and 10.0 cm below left Axillary pit in between 5 th and 6th Ribs. Margin of wound is clean cut and ante-mortem in nature.

On dissecting - Chest wall is completely penetrated and penetrating wound 5.0 cm x 2.0 cm x 3.5 cm present on anterio-lateral surface of left Lung on

[2025:RJ-JD:34187-DB] (8 of 13) [CRLJA-331/1995]

lower lobe. Margin of wound is clean cut. Large amount of clotted blood is present in thoracic cavity. Cause of Death is shock due to sever haemorrhage through wound on left Lung. Probable time of death is about within 24 hours."

24. Admittedly, the knife blow was given on the vital part of the

body namely Left Lung and both the eyewitnesses (P.W.5 and

(P.W.6) have remained completely consistent during their

statement before the police under section 161 Cr.P.C. and during

deposition in the court. The defence has not been able to point out

any inconsistency in their statements.

25. True it is, that Nani (P.W.5) wife of the deceased in the

statement given to the police under section 161 Cr.P.C. had

purportedly stated that the accused - appellant had taken out the

knife and thrusted it under the left arm of the deceased, but in her

deposition in the court, she had clearly stated that the accused

picked out the knife from his pocket and stabbed in such a way

that it pierced the left side of the chest of the deceased.

26. It is an established position of law that the statement given

under section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot be given credence over the court

statement. That apart, there is no inconsistency much less

improvement in the stand of Nani (P.W.5), wife of the deceased, if

her statement before the police during investigation and her

deposition before the court are read in juxta position. We cannot

lose sight of the fact that her statement under section 161 of

Cr.P.C. was recorded on 19.03.1992, the day immediately

following the death of her husband. Hence, minor variation as

underscored by Ms. Pathak is quite natural and such trivial

difference hardly makes any difference in ultimate analysis.

[2025:RJ-JD:34187-DB] (9 of 13) [CRLJA-331/1995]

27. Furthermore, the fact that the deceased died instantly on

account of shock due to haemorrhage and that his ribs and then

lungs got pierced is indicative of the enormous force that was

used by the appellant.

28. The argument of learned Amicus Curiae that the prosecution

has failed to prove the intention of the accused does not hold any

water. It is clear from the record that some altercation had taken

place between the deceased and the appellant's father (Nana

Meena) on the issue of some Ox, then the appellant's father was

literally dragged home to calm down the situation. But it was

thereafter, the annoyed appellant Laxman came with preparation

(with knife in his pocket). The appellant's coming to the place of

occurrence that too with a knife in his pocket is reflective of

premeditated mind and proves his ill intention.

29. It may look strange that why for such a petty reason the

appellant would take extreme action of murdering his own uncle,

but considering the background of the parties involved and the

area they hail from, it is no big deal that a person can take life of

a man in lieu of a cattle. Nevertheless, an extreme aggression on

an insignificant issue, which is out of proportion can neither wipe

out nor whittle down the felony as heinous as a murder.

30. The prosecution has not only produced the oral evidence in

the form of two eyewitnesses, they have also corroborated the

same with the recovery of knife consequent to disclosure

statement, which the appellant had given under section 27 of the

Indian Evidence Act. Such recovery is further followed by the FSL

report, which shows that the blood group found on the knife tallied

[2025:RJ-JD:34187-DB] (10 of 13) [CRLJA-331/1995]

with the blood group found from the clothes and blood stained

soil, but the same has, however, not been exhibited in the court.

31. The testimony of the eyewitnesses namely Nani (P.W.5) and

Bakshi Ram (P.W.6) cannot be discarded on account of they being

interested witnesses. According to this Court, testimony of the

interested eyewitnesses can be doubted or discarded, if the

defence has shown major contradiction in their statement or has

been able to raise doubt about their very presence on the place of

occurrence. In the instant case, both the situations are non-

existent. That apart, pursuant to disclosure statement given under

section 27 of the Evidence Act, a knife being weapon of offence

has been recovered from the house of the appellant and two

independent witnesses Santosh Giri (P.W.10) and Padam Singh

(P.W.11) have duly supported the recovery.

32. The prosecution has thus, built a solid and foolproof

structure and the defence has not been able to even pierce the

strong walls, let alone demolish it.

33. So far as the alternative plea taken by the learned Amicus

Curiae that the appellant's conviction be altered to section 304

Part II of IPC is concerned, this Court is of the view that the facts

of the case in hands and the evidence led therein does not allow

this Court to take any other view, notwithstanding the fact that

the incident took place about 33 years back.

34. In order to bring the case under section 304 of IPC, the

accused has to first drift his case away from the precincts of

section 300 of IPC. In other words, he has to establish that his

case falls in the Exception of section 300 of IPC.

[2025:RJ-JD:34187-DB] (11 of 13) [CRLJA-331/1995]

35. All the ingredients of clause thirdly of section 300 of IPC is

present in the case - the act was done with the intention of

causing bodily injury to the deceased and that this act was

sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

36. The case can be converted to section 304 Part I or Part II of

IPC only if an accused can demonstrate that his act of culpable

homicide did not amount to murder.

37. There is subtle, yet discernible distinction between a case

falling under section 302 of IPC and section 304 of IPC. According

to this Court, when ingredient of section 300 of IPC exists and the

case does not fall in Exception I of section 300 of IPC viz. such act

was done on account of sudden provocation and such provocation

was given by the deceased or death was on account of the

mistake or accident, the accused can be convicted only for offence

under section 302 of IPC.

38. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Pulicherla

Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy vs. State of A.P., reported in

(2006) 11 SCC 444, has thrown light as to which case would fall

under section 302 and which case would fall under section 304

Part I and Part II of IPC. A gainful reference of Para No.29 of the

judgment aforesaid may be made hereunder:-

"29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters plucking of a fruit, straying of a cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in

[2025:RJ-JD:34187-DB] (12 of 13) [CRLJA-331/1995]

deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no pre-

meditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under section 302, are not converted into offences punishable under section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances : (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any pre- meditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention."

[2025:RJ-JD:34187-DB] (13 of 13) [CRLJA-331/1995]

39. The appellant was the aggressor - no scuffle or physical

fight had taken place between the deceased and the appellant or

even his father and the deceased was sitting idle when the

appellant came and plunged the knife. This Court hardly finds any

iota of evidence or material which shows that the deceased had

given any reason for provocation to the appellant - accused.

40. The judgments cited by the learned Amicus Curiae are not

applicable in the facts of the present case. They all involve

different set of facts, on the basis whereof in some of the cases

the conviction of the accused therein has been altered to section

304 Part I or Part II of IPC, but, in the instant case, the facts are