Rajasthan High Court

Purushottam Jeswani S/O Lt. Shri ... vs State Of Rajasthan on 16 October, 2024

Author: Narendra Singh Dhaddha

Bench: Narendra Singh Dhaddha

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        HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
                    BENCH AT JAIPUR

        S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 3937/2020

Purushottam Jeswani S/o Lt. Shri Chhattaram Jeshwani, Aged
About 60 Years, R/o E-77, Hanuman Path, Shyam Nagar, New
Sanganer Road, Jaipur, Raj.
                                                                   ----Petitioner
                                    Versus
State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
                                                                 ----Respondent


For Petitioner(s)          :    Mr. Swadeep Singh Hora with Mr. T. C.
                                Sharma
For Respondent(s)          :    Mr. Sudesh Kumar Saini, Addl. G. C.
                                with Mr. Kshitiz Tiwari



     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NARENDRA SINGH DHADDHA

                                 Judgment

DATE OF JUDGMENT                                                  16/10/2024

      By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed to quash

and set aside the criminal proceedings in criminal case No.

96/2016 (47/2014) titled as State Vs. Purushottam Jeswani

pending before Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act) Cases

No. 2, Jaipur, as also the charge sheet No. 309/2014 and FIR No.

277/2014 registered at Police Station Anti Corruption Bureau,

Jaipur and the cognizance order dated 08.10.2014 passed by

Special Judge (PC Act Cases) No. 1, Jaipur and all consequential

proceeding thereto qua the petitioner.

      Brief facts of the case are as under:-

      On 11.08.2014, an FIR No. 277/2014 was registered by Anti

Corruption Bureau (for short 'the ACB') in which complainant-

Additional Superintendent of Police -Bajrang Singh Shekhawat



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mentioned that against the petitioner, who was working on the

post of Executive Engineer in Zone-II Jaipur Nagar Nigam, an

information was received to the fact that he takes files of the

tenders of civil works from Accounts Department and gets them

approved from the Chief Executive Officer. Officials of ACB

intercepted the petitioner in the morning of 10.08.2014 at

Collectorate Circle, Bani Park, Jaipur where 46 files pertaining to

tender work and Rs.15,00,000/- were recovered. At that time,

petitioner did not give any satisfactory answer. During the course

of his interrogation, petitioner stated that Rs.15,00,000/- was the

amount of commission of 46 files received from contractors and

the said amount was to be given to one Shri Lal Chand Aswal-

Chief Executive Officer of Nagar Nigam. The ACB registered FIR

No. 277/2014 against the petitioner and co-accused Lal Chand

Aswal for the offence under Sections 8, 13(1)(d)(e) and 13(2) of

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

      Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the entire

proceedings initiated against the petitioner are gross abuse of

process of the court. He also submits that a bare reading of the

prosecution documents do not disclose commission of any offence

by the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner further

submits that the prosecution has relied upon the petitioner's

statement recorded at the time of interrogation. Learned counsel

for the petitioner submits that these statements are inadmissible

in the evidence. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits

that none of the contractors of 46 files were either named as

witnesses or as an accused by the ACB and none had stated that

they had given Rs.15,00,000/- to the petitioner for illegal

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gratification. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits

that there is no material by way of direct or indirect evidence or

even the telephonic transcripts of the petitioner with Shri Lal

Chand Aswal or anyone else (including any of the contractor). So,

illegal demand and acceptance of any gratification is not proved by

the Investigating Agencies. Learned counsel for the petitioner

further submits that ACB also lodged a separate FIR No. 412/2014

on the basis of the present FIR No. 277/2014 under Section 13(1)

(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988 against the petitioner in which negative final report was

submitted by the ACB, because no excess properties out of the

petitioner's income was found by the Investigating Officer.

Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that ACB had

submitted the supplementary charge sheet against the petitioner

in which ACB clearly stated that a committee was constituted

under the Superintending Engineer of PWD Shri A.K. Sanghi and

Rajiv Sanghi They had investigated the matter regarding so-called

46 files and other files but they had not found any illegality except

minor irregularities in the procedure. In report, they clearly

mentioned that no loss was caused to Nagar Nigam. Learned

counsel for the petitioner submits that Investigating Agency had

not impleaded any other person who was responsible for the

alleged irregularities, as a co-accused.

Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the

petitioner's explanation regarding recovery of Rs.15,00,000/- is

that the said amount pertains to his son Deepesh Jeswani, who is

doing the business of property. He had sold flat at ground floor to

Mr. Harish Gaurav and received an amount of Rs.15,51,000/- in

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advance. Deepesh Jeswani was going to marry on 06.11.2014, so

the petitioner wanted to buy jewellery and bridal clothes. So, he

had money with him, which was recovered by the ACB.

Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that Harish

Gourav had filed a civil suit against Deepesh Jeswani, in which

compromise was effectuated between them and a decree for

refund of Rs. 18,61,125/- with interest of @ 12% per annum was

drawn.

Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that in

criminal misc. petition bearing No. 383/2018 titled as "Lal Chand

Aswal Vs. State of Rajasthan" the Coordinate Bench of this Court

vide order dated 07.02.2020 had quashed the criminal

proceedings against the co-accused Lal Chand Aswal and observed

as under:-

12. It is also noticed from the investigation conducted and the charge sheet filed along with supplementary charge sheet that only allegation against the petitioner is of having attempted to have committed offence of criminal misconduct by corrupt and illegal means for himself in terms of Section 13(1)(d) of the Act of1988. No other person has been made as an accused except concerned Executive Officer and the petitioner. None of the contractors who have allegedly given the commission were made either as accused or witnesses nor have been named under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. There is no complaint from any contractor with regard to demand of amount against the petitioner

18. Upon reading the order of cognizance, this court finds that learned Special Judge, ACB has not discussed at all the allegation levelled in the charge sheet nor he has examined whether cognizance requires to be taken as against the petitioner from the facts which have been brought on record by the prosecution in its charge sheet.

Initiating criminal proceeding against any individual is a very serious matter and the court must be extremely vigilant to initiate proceedings as rights of an individual are seriously curtailed and his position in the society is severely harmed. However, learned Special Judge, ACB has only stated that copy of the charge sheet was made available to the counsel for the accused. Heard arguments on cognizance. From the perusal of complete documents

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filed, there is no sufficient scope for taking cognizance against the accused petitioner

20.On examining the supplementary report of the committee which examined the 46 files, no allegation has been levelled against the petitioner. However, there are procedural errors found like absence of sales tax clearance certificate etc. The other officials of the Corporation have been held responsible as per report namely, Assistant Engineer, Junior Engineer, Financial Advisor and the Executive Engineer. The petitioner being the Chief Executive Officer has been alleged to have not carried out his supervisory responsibility. This court however finds that none of the files was approved at the level of the petitioner and therefore, there is no supervisory negligence on the part of the petitioner. The supervisory negligence, if any, would not amount to criminal misconduct in terms of Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and therefore, also cognizance could not have been taken on the basis of supplementary report. It is settled law as noted above that suspicion cannot take place of a criminal act.

21.The action involving the petitioner in the case is solely based on a statement made before the police officials which has been made as evidence to frame the charge sheet against the petitioner. Thus this court is satisfied that neither there is any demand of illegal gratification available on record nor there is any material available on record to reflect direct or indirect evidence or any telephonic transcript to show that there was any demand by the petitioner. 46 files which have been recovered also do not reflect any role of the petitioner in the capacity as Chief Executive Officer to favour them in any illegal manner. There is no person claiming to have given any amount to the concerned Executive Engineer for delivering to the petitioner and therefore, it cannot be said that there is even an attempt within the meaning of Section15 of the Act of 1988. Thus, this court is satisfied that there is no sufficient legal evidence for proceeding only from the documents which have been filed by the prosecution along with charge sheet

23. One other aspect is with regard to allegation of Section 120-B IPC. Section 120B IPC can only be understood where there is a conspiracy from the attending circumstances. In the present case, from the entire charge sheet, there is no connection found to be made out between the petitioner and Mr. Purshottam Jeswani except that car was waylaid near the official residence of petitioner. It is not found whether petitioner was present in the house at the time when Mr. Purshottam Jeswani was arrested. Itis also not alleged that there was any telephonic communication between the petitioner and the concerned Mr. Purshottam Jeswani. It is also not found whether the petitioner in any way was instrumental for

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posting the concerned person Mr. Purshottam Jeswani thus presumption of conspiracy cannot be made out. Thus, even presumption under Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 would not be made out as against the petitioner.

25. At the stage of cognizance, the court must look into the documents which have been filed by the prosecution to see whether a case is made out for taking cognizance of the offences alleged as it is settled law that cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the person.

26.Taking into consideration and as discussed above, this courtis satisfied that the essential ingredients for taking cognizance of offences under Sections 8 and 13(1)(d)(e) read with Section 15 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120B IPC are found to be completely absent on the basis of the charge sheet filed by the prosecution against the petitioner. Thus, this court finds that allowing the criminal proceedings to continue would be nothing but a sort of abuse of the process of the court and ends of justice therefore would demand that proceedings ought not to be allowed to continue.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that prosecution

had not challenged the order dated 07.02.2020 and the said order

had attained the finality. So, the petition filed by the petitioner be

allowed and the criminal proceedings in criminal case No. 96/2016

(47/2014) titled as State Vs. Purushottam Jeswani pending before

Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act) Cases No. 2, Jaipur,

as also the charge sheet No. 309/2014 and FIR No. 277/2014

registered at Police Station Anti Corruption Bureau, Jaipur and the

order of cognizance dated 08.10.2014 passed by Special Judge

(PC Act Cases) No. 1, Jaipur and all proceedings consequent

thereto qua the petitioner may be quashed and set aside.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed the reliance

upon the following judgments-:

(I) B. Jayaraj Vs. State of A.P. (2014) 13 SCC 55, wherein it

was held that-:

"7. In so far as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the

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offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma Vs. and C.M. Girish Babu Vs. C.B.I.

8. .......The above also will be conclusive in so far as the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established.

9. In so far as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act...."

(II) M.R. Purshottam V/s State of Karnataka criminal

appeal No. 1578/2011, wherein it was held that-:

"6. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under 13(1)(d) of the Act and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant are liable to be set aside."

(III) Satvir Singh Vs. State of Delhi (2014) 13 SCC 143,

wherein it was held that-:

"40. It is rightly contended by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellant that the presumption of the guilt is not proved in the case on hand as the prosecution has failed to prove the ingredients of the provision of Section 7 of the Act, viz. demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the appellant to constitute an offence alleged to have committed by him...."

(IV) A. Subair Vs. State of Kerala (2009) 6 SCC 587,

wherein it was held that-:

"14. Insofar as Section 13(1)(d) of the Act is concerned, its essential ingredients are:

(i) that he should have been a public servant;

(ii) that he should have used corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abused his position as such public servant and

(iii) that he should have obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for himself or for any other person.

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15. In C.K. Damodaran Nair Vs. Govt. of India this Court had an occasion to consider the word "obtained" used in Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (now Section 13(1)(d) of Act, 1988), and it was held:

"12. The position will, however, be different so far as an offence under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Act is concerned. For such an offence prosecution has to prove that the accused "obtained" the valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as a public servant and that too without the aid of the statutory presumption under Section 4(1) of the Act as it is available only in respect of offences under Section 5(1)(a) and (b) and not under Section 5(1)(c), (d) or of the Act. "Obtain" means to secure or gain (something) as the result of request or effort (Shorter Oxford Dictionary). In case of obtainment the initiative vests in the person who receives and in that context a demand or request from him will be a primary requisite for an offence under Section 5(1)(d) of the Act unlike an offence under Section 161 IPC, which, as noticed above, can be, established by proof of either "acceptance"

or "obtainment"."

The legal position is no more res integra that primary requisite of an offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act is proof of a demand or request of a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage from the public servant. In other words, in the absence of proof of demand or request from the public servant for a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, the offence under Section 13(1)(d) cannot be held to be established.

(V) State Inspector of Police, Vishakhapatnam Vs. Surya

Snakaram Karri Criminal Appeal No. 1335 of 2004, wherein

it was held that-:

13. Provisions of the 1988 Act, no doubt, like the 1947 Act seek to protect public servant from a vexatious prosecution.

Section 17 provides for investigation by a person authorized in this behalf. The said provision contains a non-obstante clause. It makes investigation only by police officer of the ranks specified therein to be imperative in character. The second proviso appended to Section 17 of the Act provides that an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub-Section (1) of Section 13 shall not be investigated without the order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police. Authorization by a Superintendent of Police in favour of an officer so as to enable him to carry out investigation in terms of Section 17 of the Act is a statutory one. The power to grant such sanction has been conferred upon the authorities not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. The proviso uses a negative expression. It also uses the expression "shall". Ex-facie it is mandatory in character.

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When the authority of a person to carry out investigation is questioned on the ground that he did not fulfil the statutory requirements laid down therefor in terms of the second provisio, the burden, undoubtedly, was on the prosecution to prove the same.

(VI) State of Haryana and Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors.

1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein it was held that-:

117. It means that a police officer not below the rank of Inspector of Police authorized by the State Government in terms of the first proviso can take up the investigation of an offence referred to in clause (e) of Section 5(1) only on a separate and independent order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police. To say in other words, a strict compliance of the second proviso is an additional legal requirement to that of the first proviso for conferring a valid authority on a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police to investigate an offence falling under clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the Act. This is clearly spelt out from the expression "further provided"

occurring in the second proviso.

118. A conjoint reading of the main provision, Section 5- A(1) and the two provisos thereto, shows that the investigation by the designated police officer is the rule and the investigation by an officer of a lower rank is an exception.

(VII) Babu Rao Chinchansasur Vs. State of Lokayuktha

Plice, Bagalore Urban District, Bangalore and Another

(2013 SCC OnLine Kar 10386) (Para 16, 17, 18, 19),

wherein it was held that-:

16. The first proviso to Section 17 of the P.C. Act empowers any police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police, if authorized by the State Government in that behalf by a general or a special order to investigate any such offence without the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class. However, the 2nd proviso to Section 17 directs that the offence referred to under Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the P.C. Act shall not be investigated without the order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police. Thus, from the 2nd proviso, it is clear that an investigation into the offence referred to in Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the P.C. Act even by any police officer enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) or any Police Officer authorized in that behalf by the State Government as per the first proviso, can be undertaken only by an

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order of the police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. Thus, the 2nd proviso is in the nature of additional safe guard for the public servant who are accused of the offence punishable under Section 13(1)

(e) of the P.C. Act against an investigation by a police officer without the knowledge and consent of superior police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. A Superior Police Officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police or any officer higher in rank is required to pass an order before an investigation, if any, for such offence is commenced. It is needless to point-out that, before directing such investigation, the Superintendent of Police or an officer superior to him is required to apply his mind to the information and come to an opinion that the investigation on such allegations is necessary.

17. In the case of State of Haryana and Ors. Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [AIR 1992 SC 604], the Apex Court while considering the provisions of Section 5-A of P.C. Act, 1947 which corresponds to Section 17 of P.C. Act 1988, has held that the said proviso is mandatory. In the said decision, Their Lordships have observed thus in Paragraphs- 122 to 124:-

"122. According to Section 5-A, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no police officer below the rank specified in clauses (a) to (d) of Section 5-A(1), shall investigate any offences punishable under Sections 161, 165 or 165-A of the Indian Penal Code or under Section 5 of the Act without the order of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class as the case may be or make arrest therefor without a warrant. There are two provisos to that section. As per the first proviso, if a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police is authorised by the State Government, either by general or special order, he may investigate any such offence without the order of a Magistrate or make arrest therefor without a warrant. According to the second proviso, an offence referred to in clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 5 shall not be investigated without the order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police".

123. It means that a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police authorised by the State Government in terms of the first proviso can take up the investigation of an offence referred to in clause (e) of Section 5(1) only on a separate and independent order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police. To say in other words, as strict compliance of the second proviso is an additional legal requirement to that of the first proviso for conferring a valid authority on a police

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officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police to investigate an offence falling under clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the Act. This is clearly spelt out from the expression "further provided" occurring in the second proviso".

124. A conjoint reading of the main provision, Section 5-A(1) and the two provisos thereto, shows that the investigation by the designated police officers is the rule and the investigation by an officer of a lower rank is an exception".

18) In State of Madhya Pradesh-Vs-Ramsingh (2000) 5 SCC 88, the Apex Court considering the purport of second proviso to Section 17 of P.C.Act, 1988 has held thus in Paragraph-12:

"Second proviso provides that where an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 is sought to be investigated, such an investigation shall not be conducted without the order of a police officer not below the rank of superintendent of police ".

19) The Apex Court in the case of State Inspector of Police, Vishakapatnam Vs. Surya Sankaram Karri [(2006) 7 SCC 172] had an occasion to consider the provisions of Section 17 the P.C. Act and it is observed thus in Paragraph-13:-

"13. Provisions of the 1988 Act, no doubt, like the 1947 Act seek to protect public servant from a vexatious prosecution. Section 17 provides for investigation by a person authorized in this behalf. The said provision contains a non- obstante clause. It makes investigation only by police officers of the ranks specified therein to be imperative in character. The second proviso appended to Section 17 of the Act provides that an offence referred to in clause

(e) of sub-Section (1) of Section 13, shall not be investigated without the order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police. Authorization by a Superintendent of Police in favour of an officer so as to enable him to carry out investigation in terms of Section 17 of the Act is a statutory one.

The power to grant such sanction has been conferred upon the authorities not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. The proviso uses a negative expression. It also uses the expression "shall". Ex-facie it is mandatory in character.

(VIII) Mukteshwar Prasad Singh vs. State of Jharkhand

and Anr. (2006 SCC OnLine Jhar 771), wherein it was held

that-:

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15. Provided further that an offence referred to in Clause

(e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall not be investigated without the order of a police officer not below the rank of a superintendent of Police.

16. The provisions of Section 17 are mandatory and sanctioned by an officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police, in respect of an offence under Clause (e) of Sub-section (i) of Section 13, is a prerequisite to conduct the investigation.

(IX) Rajiv Thapar vs. Madan Lal Kapoor (2013 (3) SCC

330), wherein it was held that-:

"30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-

30.1 Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. 30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?

30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?

30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused."

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Learned Additional Government Counsel has opposed the

arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and

submitted that the petitioner had challenged the order dated

08.10.2014 taking cognizance against him. The said order of

cognizance is revisable. So, petitioner be directed to file the

revision petition against the said order. Learned Additional

Government Counsel has also submitted that at the time of

interception, 46 files and Rs. 15,00,000/- were recovered from the

petitioner. Petitioner stated that Rs. 15,00,000/- is the amount of

commission of 46 files received from contractors and said amount

was to be given to Shri Lal Chand Aswal. So, prima facie offence

under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is made out against

the petitioner. So, the present petition filed by the petitioner being

devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed.

I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned

counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Government

Counsel.

It is an admitted fact that proceedings against the co-

accused Lal Chand Aswal has been quashed by Coordinate Bench

of this Court vide order dated 07.02.2020 in S.B. Criminal Misc.

Petition No. 383/2018 "Lal Chand Aswal Vs. State of Rajasthan"

and it is also an admitted position that prosecution had not

challenged the said order and the said order attained finality. In

this case prosecution merely relied upon the statement of the

petitioner recorded at the time of interrogation and it is settled

proposition of law that said statement or admission recorded at

the time of interrogation had not evidentary value. Investigating

Authorities had not established the demand and acceptance of any

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gratification in this case because none of the contractors of the 46

files were named either as a witness or as an accused in this case.

Case was also registered against the petitioner regarding having

disproportionate properties out of his income but in said case

negative final report was submitted by the ACB Authorities.

Department also initiated the enquiry against the petitioner

regarding so-called 46 files and other files under the supervision

of Superintending Engineer of PWD Shri A.K. Sanghi and Rajiv

Sanghi but they had not found any illegality except minor

irregularities in the procedure. They also stated in the enquiry

report that no loss was caused to Nagar Nigam. Investigating

Authorities had not impleaded any other person as a co-accused

who had allegedly done the illegality in this matter, as co-accused.

Regarding recovery of Rs. 15,00,000/- from the petitioner,

petitioner had given the explanation that said amount belongs to

his son Deepesh Jeswani who is doing the business of property

and he had sold one flat to Mr. Harish Gourav and received an

amount of Rs. 15,51,000/- in advance. Petitioner also stated that

Deepesh Jeswani was going to marry on 06.11.2014, so,

petitioner wanted to buy jewellery and bridal clothes. So, he had

money with him that was recovered by the ACB Authorities. Harish

Gourav had filed a civil suit against the Deepesh Jeswani in which

compromise was effectuated between them and a decree for

refund of Rs. 18,61,125/- with interest of @ 12% per annum was

drawn. So, in my considered opinion, Investigating Authorities

failed to collect the cogent evidence regarding offence under

Section 8, 13(1)(d), 3(1)(e) and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1988. So, this court finds that allowing the criminal

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proceedings to continue would be nothing but a sort of abuse of

the process of the court and ends of justice therefore would

demand that proceedings ought not to be allowed to continue.

Accordingly, this criminal misc. petition filed by the petitioner

is allowed. The criminal proceedings in criminal case No.

96/2016(47/2014) titled as State Vs. Purushottam Jeswani

pending before Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act) Cases

No. 2, Jaipur, charge sheet No. 309/2014, FIR No. 277/2014

registered at Police Station Anti Corruption Bureau, Jaipur, the

order of cognizance dated 08.10.2014 passed by Special Judge

(PC Act Cases) No. 1, Jaipur and all proceedings consequent

thereto qua the petitioner are hereby quashed and set aside.