Dharmendra vs State Of Rajasthan ...
2023 Latest Caselaw 8119 Raj

[2023:RJ-JD:33866]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 11501/2023

Dharmendra S/o Shri Kune Singh Panwar, Aged About 57 Years, R/o Villa 32, Nandanvan Greens, Kheme Ka Kua Pal Road, Ps Shastri Nagar Jodhpur. Rajasthan - 342008 (Petitioner In Judicial Custory Since 17/11/2022 At Jodhpur Central Jail

----Petitioner Versus State Of Rajasthan, Through PP

----Respondent

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Parvez Khan Moyal For Respondent(s) : Mr. Mahipal Bishnoi, PP

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI

Order

07/10/2023

1. Despite service, no one has appeared on behalf of the victim.

2. The jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked by way of fil

ing an application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. at the instance

of accused-petitioner. The requisite details of the matter are

tabulated herein below:

S.No.                               Particulars of the Case
     1.     FIR Number                                       210/2022
     2.     Concerned Police Station                         Udaimandir
     3.     District                                         Jodhpur City East
     4.     Offences alleged in the FIR                      Under Sections 420,        406
                                                             and 120-B of IPC
     5.     Offences added, if any                           -
     6.     Date of passing of impugned order                04.09.2023

3. It is contended on behalf of the accused-petitioner that no

case for the alleged offences is made out against him and his

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incarceration is not warranted. The matter is of civil nature

which has arisen due to non-fulfillment of commercial

obligations and does not attract criminal liabilities. It is

further contended that none of the ingredients of the offences

contained under Sections 420, 406 and 120B of IPC are made

out against the petitioner from the allegations levelled in the

FIR. There are no factors at play in the case at hand that may

work against grant of bail to the accused-petitioner and he

has been made an accused based on conjectures and

surmises.

4. Contrary to the submissions of learned counsel for the

petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor opposes the bail

application and submits that the present case is not fit for

enlargement of accused on bail.

5. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Public

Prosecutor and perused the material available on record.

6. It is noticed that all the offences alleged against the

petitioner as contained in the charge-sheet are triable by a

Court of Magistrate. It is run of the mill for High Courts as

well as Hon'ble the Apex Court to grant bail in cases

concerning offences that are triable by Magistrate. It is

deemed imperative by this Court to enunciate and elaborate

upon the theory and reasoning owing to which it is justifiable

to grant bail under Section 439 of CrPC in matters involving

commission of offences triable by Magistrate.

7. The jurisprudence begins right from Section 437 of the Code

which is the sole provision in the entirety of criminal statutory

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literature that provides for grant of bail as Section 439 of

CrPC merely preserves and recognizes the special powers of

the Session Courts and High Courts to grant bail which leads

to the logical inference that the discretion vested in the

Magistrates is exclusive. Moreover, there is nothing prescribed

in Section 439 that talks about bail jurisprudence/ granting or

refusing of a bail plea on any specific ground; it is just

recognition of power of the upper Courts.

8. Section 437 CrPC talks about the circumstances when bail

can be granted in cases where non-bailable offences are

alleged to have been committed. It states that when any

person who is accused of or suspected of commission of a

non-bailable offence is arrested or detained; is brought

before the Court of a Magistrate; or appears before the Court

of a Magistrate, such person may be released on bail except

in two conditions; the first condition being that if reasonable

grounds appear for believing that such person has been guilty

of committing an offence which is punishable by death or life

imprisonment, he shall not be released on bail and the

second condition being that if the offence alleged to have

been committed by such person is a cognizable offence and if

he had been convicted of an offence punishable with death,

imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or

more on a previous count or if he had been convicted for

commission of a cognizable offence punishable with a term of

imprisonment amounting to three years or more but not less

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than seven years on two or more occasions, such person shall

not be released on bail.

9. These two conditions are further qualified by the first proviso

of the provision of Section 437 which prescribes that persons

falling into the orbit of the afore-mentioned two conditions

may be released on bail if such persons are under the age of

sixteen years, women, sick or infirm. Another qualification to

the second condition is that any person falling under that

ambit may be released on bail by a Court of Magistrate if it is

just and proper to do so owing to any special reason. Coming

to the second clause of Section 437 of CrPC, it is manifested

that the Magistrate may release an accused if there are no

reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has

committed a non-bailable offence but there are grounds

sufficient enough to conduct further inquiry into his guilt.

10. There is yet another discretion vested in the Magistrates

through sub-clause (6) of Section 437 of CrPC which

empowers them to release any person whose trial has not

been concluded within sixty days from the first day fixed for

evidence in cases triable by Magistrate provided that such

person was in custody for the whole of this period spanning

over sixty days.

11. Lastly, sub-clause (7) of Section 437 entitles the Magisterial

Courts to release a person who is in custody and is accused

of non-bailable offence on bail during the period that his trial

is concluded but the judgment has not been delivered and the

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Court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds to

believe that the accused is not guilty of any such offence.

12. A combined reading of Section 437(6) and Section 428 of the

Code indicates that the legislative intent regarding release of

a person pending trial while framing Section 428 of CrPC

might have probably been in the minds of the law-framers

simply for adjustment of the period that an accused goes

through in police/judicial custody.

12. Section 437 is reproduced below for easy reference:

437. When bail may be taken in case of non- bailable offence.--(1) When any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court other than the High Court or Court of session, he may be released on bail, but--

(i) such person shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life;

(ii) such person shall not be so released if such offence is a cognizable offence and he had been previously convicted of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or more, or he had been previously convicted on two or more occasions of a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for three years or more but not less than seven years:

Provided that the Court may direct that a person referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii) be released on bail if such person is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm:

Provided further that the Court may also direct that a person referred to in clause (ii) be released on bail if it is satisfied that it is just and proper so to do for any other special reason: Provided also that the mere fact that an accused person may be required for being identified by witnesses during investigation shall not be sufficient ground for refusing to grant bail if he is otherwise entitled to be released on bail and gives an

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undertaking that he shall comply with such directions as may be given by the Court:

Provided also that no person shall, if the offence alleged to have been committed by him is punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for seven years or more, be released on bail by the Court under this sub-section without giving an opportunity of hearing to the Public Prosecutor.

(2) If it appears to such officer or Court at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial, as the case may be, that there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence, but that there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, the accused shall, subject to the provisions of section 446A and pending such inquiry, be released on bail, or, at the discretion of such officer or Court, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided.

(3) When a person accused or suspected of the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more or of an offence under Chapter VI, Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or abatement of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit, any such offence, is released on bail under sub-section (1) the Court shall impose the conditions,--

(a) that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter,

(b) that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused, or suspected, of the commission of which he is suspected, and

(c) that such person shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer or tamper with the evidence,

and may also impose, in the interests of justice, such other conditions as it considers necessary.

(4) An officer or a Court releasing any person on bail under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), shall record

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in writing his or its reasons or special reasons for so doing.

(5) Any Court which has released a person on bail under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), may, if it considers it necessary so to do, direct that such person be arrested and commit him to custody.

(6) If, in any case triable by a Magistrate, the trial of a person accused of any non-bailable offence is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case, such person shall, if he is in custody during the whole of the said period, be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs.

(7) If, at any time, after the conclusion of the trial of a person accused of a non-bailable offence and before judgment is delivered, the Court is of opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of any such offence, it shall release the accused, if he is in custody, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance to hear judgment delivered.

13. In the garb of these qualifications and riders contained under

Section 437, the Magistrates have been equipped with well-

defined authorizations to grant bail. If the discretion to grant

bail has been so clearly vested in Magisterial Court with

specific restraints/curtailments on such power as well as

specific exceptions to such restraints/curtailments, then it is

writ large that the legislature intended to vest the discretion

to grant bail to a person accused of or suspected of

commission of a non-bailable offence in the Court of

Magistrate. Such widely contoured and meticulously

formulated discretion vested in Courts of Magistrate cannot

be usurped by any Court just by virtue of being higher in the

hierarchy of courts of the nation.

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14. Section 29 of CrPC pertains to sentences which a Magistrate

can pass and it provides that a Chief Judicial Magistrate may

pass any sentence which is authorised by law and entails a

term of imprisonment not exceeding a period of seven years;

a Magistrate of First Class may pass a sentence which entails

a term of imprisonment not exceeding a period of three

years; a Magistrate of Second Class may pass a sentence

which entails a term of imprisonment not exceeding a period

of one year. Section 29 of CrPC is reproduced below for easy

reference:

29. Sentences which Magistrates may pass.--(1) The Court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate may pass any sentence authorised by law except a sentence of death or of imprisonment for life or of imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years.

(2) The Court of a Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or of fine not exceeding ten thousand rupees, or of both.

(3) The Court of Magistrate of the second class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or of fine not exceeding five thousand rupees, or of both.

(4) The Court of a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate shall have the powers of the Court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate and that of a Metropolitan Magistrate, the powers of the Court of a Magistrate of the first class.

15. The above-cited provision clearly lays down what sentences

can be passed by a Magisterial Court and the intent of the

legislature is expressed in definite and unambiguous terms.

It is imperative to understand that the insertion of none of

the provisions is ever without a purpose; in other words, it is

never an aimless insertion. Furthermore, these sentences can

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be passed by the Magistrates only after reaching a conclusion

of guilt in the trial and hearing the accused on the point of

sentence. In fact, it is the exclusive prerogative and judicial

discretion of the convicting Court to pass an order of

sentence after hearing the accused on the point of sentence.

The commonality in a slew of judgments passed by Hon'ble

the Supreme Court in this regard is that the hearing on the

point of sentence needs to be "meaningful, real and

effective"1. A deeper look into the stipulations of the Code

brings this Court to the provisions encompassed in Sections

235 and 255 of CrPC which talk about Judgment of acquittal

or conviction in a trial before a Court of Session and in a trial

of summons-cases by Magistrates respectively. Section 235 of

CrPC reads as follows:

235. Judgment of acquittal or conviction. - (1) After hearing arguments and points of law (if any), the Judge shall give a judgment in the case. (2) If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of section 360, hear the accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to law.

16. Sub-clause (2) of Section 235 clearly states that once the

accused has been convicted, he shall be heard on the

question of sentence and thereafter, sentence shall be

passed. The interpretation of Section 235 clearly brings out

that the requirement of hearing the accused after passing the

judgment of conviction and before passing the order of

1 In Re: Framing Guidelines regarding Potential Mitigating Circumstances to be Con-

sidered while imposing Death Sentences, Suo Moto Writ Petition (Crl.) 01 of 2022, decided on 19.09.2022.

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sentence is explicit in the statute and cannot be waived off.

Hearing the accused has to be an effective hearing as the

process of sentencing cannot be considered to be a stage

which is subservient to the stage of deciding the guilt of the

accused.

17. At this stage of determining the term of sentence or fine or

both, the rights of the complainant or victim party to partake

in the trial seize and the hearing of sentence requires only

the presence and participation of the accused. The hearing as

well as the passing of the order of sentence is per se between

the convicting court and the accused. Similarly, under Section

255 of CrPC, it is provided that if the magistrate is not

choosing to proceed as per Sections 325 or 360 of CrPC, he

shall pass sentence concerning the accused according to law

if he finds him/her/them guilty. Section 255 of CrPC is

reproduced below:

255. Acquittal or conviction. -- (1) If the Magistrate, upon taking the evidence referred to in section 254 and such further evidence, if any, as he may, of his own motion, cause to be produced, finds the accused not guilty, he shall record an order of acquittal.

(2) Where the Magistrate does not proceed in accordance with the provisions of section 325 or section 360, he shall, if he finds the accused guilty, pass sentence upon him according to law. (3) A Magistrate may, under section 252 or section 255, convict the accused of any offence triable under this Chapter, which from the facts admitted or proved he appears to have committed, whatever may be the nature of the complaint or summons, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the accused would not be prejudiced thereby.

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18. It can be inferred from the above discussion that as

envisaged under Sections 233 and 255 of CrPC, the Court has

to hear the accused only on the point of sentence and the

complainant has no locus standi to argue on the point of

sentence.

19. It is pertinent to mention here that both in the matters of

passing of sentence amounting to three years as well as

seven years, the provision of Section 360 of Cr.P.C. which

empowers the Court to release the accused on probation of

good conduct or after admonition applies mutatis mutandis.

Besides the provision of Section 360 of CrPC, the application

of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

is also warranted in a case of like nature. There are four

types of sentencing; namely, retributive, deterrent,

preventive and reformative. Reformative sentencing/

reformative justice lies at the base of criminal jurisprudence

of our nation which is also the foundation of the edifice of the

provisions encompassing the concept of Probation as

discussed above. Sub-clause (1) of Section 360 stipulates

that when any person who is more than 21 years old is

convicted of an offence punishable with fine only or with

imprisonment for a term of sentence amounting to seven

years or less, then the convicting court, it it so appears to it,

can release the offender on probation of good conduct with

the imposition of condition of entering into a bond (with or

without sureties) instead of imposing any term of

imprisonment upon him after due consideration of age,

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character or antecedents of the offender as well as of the

circumstances in which the offence was committed.

Furthermore, Section 361, which talks about special reasons

that have to be recorded in case a person could have been

given benefit under Section 360 or under the provisions of

Probation of Offenders Act or a youthful offender is being

dealt with but the same has not been done, was intentionally

separated from Section 360 which further specifies the

expansive extent of the powers of the Courts of Magistrate.

20. Additionally, the proviso to sub-clause (5) of Section 360

states that the High Court or Court of Session shall not inflict

a greater punishment than what might have been inflicted by

the convicting court, thus, the intent of the legislature is very

clear and expressed explicitly in the provisions of the Code

that the Magistrate has the exclusive discretion and power to

pass a sentence in the circumstances specified in the Code

and such discretion of sentencing spans over a wide gamut

starting from no term at all/probation of good

conduct/admonition to a term of imprisonment spanning over

7 years.

21. There is not even a single provision in the Code of Criminal

Procedure which recognizes the power or grants the power to

any Court to allow a part of sentence to be passed to be

suffered pre-conviction and the rest of the sentence to be

passed to be suffered post-conviction. The sentence cannot

be divided and passed in such a manner that some part of it

is suffered before passing of judgment of conviction and the

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rest is suffered after passing of judgment of conviction. In

fact, sentence shall begin from the date of passing of order of

sentence when the signature of the judicial officer is

appended on the same. It is necessary to state here that

Section 428 of CrPC, which provides that the period of

detention undergone by the accused is to be set-off against

the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him/her/them, is

only for the purpose of preventing the time spent by the

accused in custody from going into vain and does not, by any

stretch of imagination, forms part of the sentence actually

passed after reaching the conclusion of guilt.

22. While passing a sentence, just the facts specific to the case

are not considered rather the facts surrounding the offender

are also considered. Presumption of guilt and presumption of

innocence are two different phenomenon and presumption of

guilt never drives the convicting court as per the criminal

jurisprudence prevalent in our nation; right from the initiation

of a criminal proceeding until the guilt is proved, the accused

shall be presumed to be innocent. While entertaining a bail

plea of an accused, it is evident that his/her/their case is

pending and the trial is ongoing, thus, presumption of

innocence is there to support him. There are certain

provisions pertaining to presumption in the Indian Evidence

Act, 1872 such as Sections 111A, 113A, 113B, 114, 114A

etc. and in some special statutes also, there are provisions

regarding presumption that can be drawn but nowhere in the

Evidence Act or any other penal statutes, the doctrine of

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presumption of guilt has been advocated. All the presumption

clauses referred above come into the picture when the

prosecution has succeeded in discharging the burden laid

upon it regarding establishment of the basic features of the

case, thus, the initial burden always lies on the prosecution

and only after discharge of the initial burden, the theory of

reverse burden comes into play. Simply put, the theory of

reverse burden or the reverse onus theory means that once

the fundamental facts/features/truth of a case has/have been

established which is substantial enough to move the burden

from the prosecution to the defence, then the burden of proof

shifts and lies on the defence/accused to disprove the

allegations leveled against him/her/them or to prove

his/her/their innocence. Having said this, suffice it is to say

that while considering a bail plea under Section 439 of CrPC

which relates to a bail pending trial, there is always a

presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. While

taking into account consideration of presumption of

innocence, Court cannot lose sight of the other parameters

that are to be considered while entertaining a bail plea which

have been laid down and reiterated innumerable times by

Hon'ble the Supreme Court in plethora of cases like nature

and gravity of offences and availability of material in support

thereof; whether there are prima facie or reasonable grounds

to believe that the accused has committed the offence;

severity of punishment in case of finding of guilt of the

accused; possibility of abscondance of accused if released in

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bail; possibility of hampering of or tampering with the

evidence if released on bail; character, conduct and social

status of the accused; antecedents of the accused; if the

accused is an influential person who may be able to impact

the smooth process of trial if released on bail; possibility of

the prosecution witnesses being influenced; likelihood of

repetition of offence or peril of infraction of justice if bail is

granted.

23. There are multiple factors to be taken into account before

passing an order of sentence like nature of the offence, the

extenuating/mitigating and aggravating circumstances,

previous criminal antecedents, age of the person who

committed the offence, educational background of the

accused, information pertaining to employment of the

accused, mental & emotional state of the offender, life of the

offender at home & family, "society and social adjustment,

the prospects for the rehabilitation of the offender, the

possibility of return of the offender to a normal life in the

community, the possibility of treatment or training of the

offender, the possibility that the sentence may serve as a

deterrent to crime by the offender or by others and the

current community need, if any, for such a deterrent in

respect to the particular type of offence."2

24. At this juncture, it would be worthwhile to mention that

almost in all penal statutes where an offence is triable by

Magistrate, convicting court has been given an absolute

2 Santa Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 190.

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discretion. For instance, for commission of offence of cheating

and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, Section 420 of

IPC prescribes that such a person "shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description for a term which may

extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine"; for

commission of offence under Section 386 of CrPC, such a

person "shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to ten years, and

shall also be liable to fine"; for commission of offence of

extortion, Section 384 prescribes that such a person "shall be

punished with imprisonment of either description for a term

which may extend to three years, or with fine or with both".

The discretionary bracket given to a convicting court makes it

abundantly clear that post conviction and hearing on the

point of sentence, the court of law may pass minimum

sentence which may be for a shortest term of 'till rising of the

court' or by imposition of fine only and this is an absolute

discretion vested in the convicting court. Before reaching on

this stage, even the trial judge cannot speculate that what

kind of punishment would be inflicted upon the accused

whom he is trying and this is due to two reasons, namely that

the guilt of the accused had not been proved till that moment

in time and that maybe for administrative exigency or for any

other reason, he may not preside to hear the accused on the

point of sentence and he may not even remain the convicting

judge. Of course, the order of sentence can be challenged in

appeal or revision along with conviction but this stage has not

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come on the day when the bail application of the accused

pending trial is heard meaning thereby when even the order

of sentence has not been passed or has not been challenged,

whether any order affecting the sentence can be passed or

not and whether doing so during trial would be unreasonable

and premature. To my mind, keeping a person detained

during trial in a case exclusively triable by court of magistrate

would necessarily mean elongating the period of sentence

whilst even at this stage, conviction has not been made leave

aside the point of sentence. Thus, keeping an accused of the

offence of above nature for a longer period during

investigation and trial would mean enhancement of the period

of sentence before actually passing the order of sentence.

25. After pondering over the legal provisions made in the code of

Criminal Procedure, the law enunciated by Hon'ble the

Supreme Court through plethora of judicial pronouncements

and upon deliberation of bail jurisprudence, it is understood

that the only thing which a court of law is to ascertain while

entertaining a bail plea is whether the accused should be

allowed to come to the court to attend the judicial proceeding

from his home and he may be allowed to remain with his

family and within the society on the specific condition that on

the stipulated date of the hearing of the case, he will willfully

attend the court proceeding or he is such a person that even

in the pending trial, he should be detained, should not be

allowed to visit his family and should be lodged at a specified

place of detention so that on the day of hearing, he may be

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brought to the court from the jail. In other words, it is to be

decided whether he may be allowed to eat, sleep and live

with his family like a man ordinarily does or he may be

allowed to eat, sleep and live in the jail. It all boils down to

this that whether the Court wishes to allow the accused to

come to the court to attend the proceedings from his home

upon furnishing his bonds and surety of independent

person(s)s or the court thinks that he cannot be allowed to

roam free and therefore, he should be detained so that he

may be brought before the court on the day fixed for the

hearing. This Court is of the considered view that this is the

only thing which is to be thought over and to be ascertained

while entertaining a bail plea. It is a judicially noticeable fact

in the present era that due to high volume of pending cases,

culmination of trial takes considerable time and in my view,

keeping the accused behind the bars during the pendency of

the case would serve no purpose except in exceptional

circumstances.

26. The entire gamut of bail jurisprudence revolves around the

conduct of the accused. Release of a person having bad

conduct or a history of bad conduct may be a peril to the

society. It is his conduct which brings into the mind of a

judicial officer to make an idea that if the accused is released

on bail, he may commit the offence again/ repeat the offence

again and as such, the same will not be in societal interest.

Here, it is to be made clear that such kind of speculation

should not be made on vague and bald pleas and aspersions

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rather there must be some solid material to reach on the

above conclusion which means that the speculation should

not be vague but should be well-founded.

27. The Sessions Judge or this Court is not permitted by the law

to usurp the discretion vested in the Court of Magistrate to

pass an order of sentence. The discretionary

bracket/spectrum of passing an order of term of

imprisonment amounting to one day or the maximum shall

always lie with the convicting Magistrate. It is apropos to

state that until an order or judgment is actually passed and

attains finality, it does not become assailable which forces

this Court to wonder that when something has not become

eligible for challenge before the Court, how can the Court

assume/ speculate/ form an idea as to what term of sentence

or imposition of punishment will the Magistrate pass. And, if

such an assumption/speculation/idea cannot be formed, then

where from the higher courts get authority that enables them

to not grant bail to an accused facing allegations regarding

commission of offences triable by Magistrate. How do the

courts decide what sentence a Magistrate may pass, more so

when the spectrum of discretion vested in the Magistrate

ranges from fine and imprisonment till rising of the court to

imprisonment for a period of seven years. This Court is of the

considered view that long detention of an accused of the

cases triable by magistrate during trial would necessarily

result in elongation of sentence and by doing so, the upper

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courts are actually snatching away the discretion exclusively

vested in the magistrate.

28. This Court is of the considered view that in the cases which

are exclusively triable by a Court of Magistrate, the Court of

Sessions and this Court should adopt a liberal approach until

it is shown that if released on bail, the offender/accused-

petitioner will surely flee from justice and will not be readily

available for trial or would otherwise hamper the course of

trial. The main object of keeping a person behind the bars

pending trial is nothing more but to ensure a smooth,

unhindered, fair and speedy trial and that he may be present

to receive the sentence as may be passed. No such

apprehension has been shown in this legal aspect of the

matter and as such, there is no legal impediment to release

the accused on bail in view of the discussion made herein

above. Apart from this, the investigation of the case is

completed and charge sheet has been filed as mentioned in

the bail application, thus, any possibility of hindrance in

investigation is ruled out and of course, it is not known as to

how much time the trial would take in reaching at a

legitimate conclusion, thus, taking into consideration the

totality of facts and circumstances and the deliberation made

in the preceding paragraphs of this order, I deem it

appropriate to release the petitioner on bail.

29. Accordingly, the instant bail application under Section 439

Cr.P.C. is allowed and it is ordered that the accused-petitioner

as named in the cause title shall be enlarged on bail provided

[2023:RJ-JD:33866] (21 of 21) [CRLMB-11501/2023]

he furnishes a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with

two sureties of Rs.25,000/- each to the satisfaction of the

learned trial Judge for his appearance before the court

concerned on all the dates of hearing as and when called

upon to do so.

(FARJAND ALI),J 108-pramod/-

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