Rajasthan High Court
Shri Om Prakash S/O Makhan Lal vs Judge, Labour Court No. 2 ... on 3 October, 2023
Bench: Augustine George Masih, Sameer Jain
[2023:RJ-JP:26155-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 726/2023
Shri Om Prakash S/o Makhan Lal, Aged About 44 Years, R/o
Village Panchlagi, Teh. Udaipurvati, District Jhunjhunu (Raj.).
----Appellant
Versus
1. Judge, Labour Court No. 2, Jaipur.
2. Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti Udaipurvati,
District Jhunjhunu (Raj.)
----Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Raghunandan Sharma with
Mr. Nikhil Kumawat
For Respondent(s) :
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN
Order
03/10/2023
ORAL
1. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by the learned
Single Judge dated 18.07.2023 vide which writ petition preferred
by the appellant-petitioner challenging the order dated
18.10.2005, passed by the Labour Court dismissing the claim as
has been put-forth by the appellant-petitioner for termination of
his services by the respondents without complying with the
provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for
short, 'the Act') has been dismised. The reason for not accepting
the claim of the appellant was that the appellant was appointed
under the Maru Vikas Yojana which came to an end in June, 1996
and his service was therefore terminated w.e.f. 01.07.1996.
[2023:RJ-JP:26155-DB] (2 of 3) [SAW-726/2023]
2. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the
courts below have failed to appreciate that appellant had worked
with the respondents as a daily wager w.e.f. 01.04.1991 to
30.06.1996. For five years, he had worked with them and without
complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act, his
services have been terminated. Learned counsel contends that
nothing has been produced on the record which would
substantiate the stand of the respondents that Maru Vikas Yojana
has come to an end, or that the appellant had been appointed and
worked under the said scheme. Learned counsel contends that
there are various other schemes which were still continuing as is
apparent from the cross examination of the departmental witness
who had appeared. The factum that the appellant had been
working with the respondents and in each year he had completed
more than 240 days is not in dispute. He further contends that
impugned order passed by learned Single Judge as also the award
of the Labour Court cannot be sustained and deserves to be set
aside.
3. We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the appellant and with his assistance have gone
through the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single
Judge as also the award of the Labour Court apart from the
pleadings in the writ petition.
4. Perusal of the orders would clearly indicate proper
appreciation of the evidence and the pleadings by the Labour
Court as also learned Single Judge. The evidence which has come
on record and the pleadings clearly indicate that the appellant had
been appointed under the scheme known as the Maru Vikas
[2023:RJ-JP:26155-DB] (3 of 3) [SAW-726/2023]
Yojana which was in operation for a period of five years. He was,
as per the pleadings, appointed under the scheme and continued
to work for five years till the continuation of the Scheme.
Thereafter, the scheme did not operate as no extension was
granted. The factum that there were other schemes will not really
help as far as the case of the appellant is concerned. Nothing has
come on record that any other person along with appellant
working under the Maru Vikas Yojana had been continued while
terminating the services of the appellant.
5. In light of the above and keeping in view the fact that the
appointment of the appellant was under a specified scheme and
therefore for a fixed term with the scheme coming to an end, the
employment of the appellant had also come to an end. The
termination of the services in pursuance thereof, therefore cannot
be faulted being in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Further, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act
would, therefore, not be applicable.
6. In light of above, there is no merit in the present appeal and
the same stands dismissed.
(SAMEER JAIN),J (AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH),CJ
Anil Sharma/ Pooja /21
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
