Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 5826 Raj
Judgement Date : 1 March, 2021
(1 of 9) [CW-1754/2019]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1754/2019
Pooja Joshi W/o Vivek Joshi, Aged About 40 Years, 1-C-14, R.c. Vyas Colony, Bhilwara (Raj.).
----Petitioner Versus
1. Union Of India, Through The Secretary, Ministry Of Petroleum And Natural Gas, Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi - 110001.
2. Indian Oil Corporation Limited Ali Yavar Jung Mard, Bandra East, Mumbai 400051 Through Its Chairman And Managing Director.
3. General Manager, Incharge (Lpg), Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Rajasthan State Office, Indian, Oil Bhawan, Ashok Chowk, Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur.
4. Chief Area Manager, Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Indane Are Office, Spl 1297, Sitapura Industrial Area, Goner Road, Jaipur.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Suresh Shrimali, through Cisco
Webex App
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Nishant Bora
JUSTICE DINESH MEHTA
Order
01/03/2021
1. The matter comes for consideration of application under
Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India. Having regard to the
controversy involved, learned counsel for the rival parties
submitted that the petition itself be heard and decided on its merit
as the arguments for application seeking vacation of stay and writ
petition are common.
(2 of 9) [CW-1754/2019]
2. By way of the present writ petition, petitioner has challenged
communication dated 23.01.2019 whereby petitioner's application
for appointment of LPG distributor at Mandal, Bhilwara under open
category, advertised on 23.08.2017, has been rejected.
3. The facts relevant for the present case are that pursuant to
the advertisement dated 23.08.2017, petitioner submitted an
application form for award of dealership in her name on
25.09.2017.
4. In relation to the ownership of land for infrastructure facility,
under para 2 of the brochure, the petitioner offered land
admeasuring 58m x 48m situated in Aaraji No.57/1 at village
Dhuwala, Tehsil Mandal, District Bhilwara.
5. In the application form aforesaid, petitioner categorically
relied upon the lease deed dated 08.02.2013, executed by Mr.
Tara Shankar Joshi, in favour of petitioner's husband, Mr. Vivek
Joshi. It is pertinent that a copy thereof was enclosed in Appendix-
2 of the application form.
6. The respondents issued a notice dated 02.05.2018 to the
petitioner inter alia stating that the land for showroom offered by
the petitioner is not acceptable. A concern was also expressed for
the land offered for establishment of godown, as according to
them, though registered lease-deed was for 15 years, but the
same was not in accordance with the dealership
guidelines/brochure.
7. Petitioner submitted her response to the above notice dated
02.05.2018 and tried to satisfy the respondents that though the
lease deed dated 08.02.2013 was originally for a period of 15
years, however, the same has been got extended by way of an
(3 of 9) [CW-1754/2019]
agreement dated 25.09.2017, which was duly notarized and the
lease has been extended for a further period upto 07.02.2033.
8. In the reply so submitted, the petitioner stated that the land
offered for showroom belongs to the petitioner's family and the
same should be considered as land owned by her in the family
unit. While contending that land offered for Godown fulfills the
requirement of brochure, petitioner offered two alternative lands;
one for godown situated at Bhim Road, Near Gopal Dwara,
Mandal-311403, District Bhilwara in aaraji No.2659 and second
land was situated at Ghambirpura, Data Kala, Mandal-311403,
District Bhilwara, in aaraji No.105 & 106.
9. The respondents considered petitioner's reply and vide
impugned order dated 23.01.2019, rejected her candidature inter
alia indicating that though the lease-deed dated 08.02.2013 had
validity for 15 years, but the same was not valid for a period of 15
years from the date of advertisement (23.08.2017).
10. Mr. Shrimali, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
argued that rejection of petitioner's candidature by way of
impugned order dated 23.01.2019 is illegal and deserves to be
quashed. He argued that the terms of the advertisement simply
requires that a candidate should offer a leasehold land having 15
years' validity.
11. He informed that the application form contains following
condition with respect to land :-
"Provide following details for the plot(s) of land for construction of LPG godown or constructed LPG godown owned or registered lease for minimum 15 years in the name of applicant/member of Family Unit commencing on any date from the date of advertisement upto last date of submission of application as specified either in the advertisement or
(4 of 9) [CW-1754/2019]
in the Corrigendum (if any) and meeting the norms specified."
12. Learned counsel argued that as per clause 4 of the
application form, the petitioner's application form could not have
been rejected inasmuch as on the date of submitting application
form i.e., 25.09.2017, the petitioner had got the lease-deed
extended upto 07.02.2033 and said supplementary lease
agreement was also got registered on 15.01.2018.
13. Learned counsel argued that in light of provision of Section
47 of the Registration Act, the registration will relate back to the
date of execution of lease agreement dated 25.09.2017 and thus,
it cannot be said that the petitioner was not having a land in her
favour on the date of application. He emphasized that on
25.09.2017, the lease-deed was valid upto 07.02.2033, thus
rejection of petitioner's candidature was illegal.
14. Mr. Shrimali also argued that in response to the notice dated
02.05.2018 issued by the respondent-Corporation, though the
petitioner had offered two alternative lands, but the respondents
have rejected petitioner's candidature by stating that the applicant
has not submitted any alternative land.
15. Inviting Court's attention towards the reply dated
11.08.2018, Mr. Shrimali highlighted that petitioner had offered
alternative lands and the respondents were under an obligation to
consider the same.
16. Mr. Bora, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-
Corporation submitted that petitioner's candidature has rightly
been rejected.
17. He highlighted that the lease deed which the petitioner had
relied upon and placed on record, along with her application form,
(5 of 9) [CW-1754/2019]
was a registered lease deed, executed on 08.02.2013, having its
validity for 15 years, whereas the terms of the
brochure/advertisement requires that lease deed should be
executed on any date between date of advertisement till the last
date of submitting application form, having its validity for 15
years.
18. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, the
Corporation requires a leasehold land having its validity of 15
years and thus, petitioner's argument that on the date of
application, petitioner had a lease agreement for 15, years cannot
be accepted.
19. He argued that the fact that petitioner had enclosed a duly
notarized agreement purportedly extending the lease period till
07.02.2033, cannot be accepted inasmuch as the agreement
dated 25.09.2017 was got registered on 15.01.2018.
20. In relation to furnishing of alternative land, Mr. Bora invited
Court's attention towards the reply filed by the respondents and
argued that even the said alternative land offered by the
petitioner does not meet the norms.
21. In rejoinder, Mr. Shrimali relied upon the judgment of
Hon'ble the Supreme Court reported in (1995) AIR(SC) 73
(Thakur Kishan Singh Vs. Arving Kumar) particularly para No.3 of
the judgment aforesaid which reads as :-
"Section 47 of the Registration Act provides that a registered document shall operate from the time it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof have been required or made and not from the time of its registration. It is well established that a document so long it is not registered is not valid yet once it is registered it takes effect from the date of its execution."
(6 of 9) [CW-1754/2019] 22. Heard.
23. The respondents have rejected petitioner's candidature vide
impugned order dated 23.01.2019. Precise reason for rejection
was as under :-
"This notarized agreement/lease deed was registered only on 15.01.2018 i.e. after the last date of submission of application i.e. 25.09.2017. Therefore subject lease deed would be valid for only 10 years, 5 months, 15 days as on the date of subject advertisement i.e. 23.08.2017. Hence these lease extension agreements cannot be considered. Further you have not submitted any documents for alternate godown land confirming to the applicable Unified Guidelines for Selection of LPG Distributors."
24. In considered opinion of this Court, the facts are not in
dispute that on the date of submitting application form i.e.
25.09.2017, the petitioner had in her husband's favour land
having lease hold rights for 15 years, but the lease hold rights
were from 08.02.2013 to 07.02.2028.
25. True it is that along with the application form, the petitioner
had placed an agreement dated 25.09.2017, vide which lease hold
rights were extended upto 07.02.2033, however, the same was
not a registered document. It was got registered on 15.01.2018.
26. This being the position, on the date of submitting application
form i.e. 25.09.2017, the period of lease-deed, which the
petitioner's husband was having, was indisputably less than 15
years.
27. Following the proviso appended after definition clause in para
1 (W) unequivocally shows that an applicant having a registered
lease-deed commencing on any date, prior to the date of
advertisement will also be considered, provided the lease-deed is
(7 of 9) [CW-1754/2019]
valid for a minimum period of 15 years from the date of
advertisement.
28. On the date of furnishing application form, the petitioner did
not have a valid lease-deed for a period of 15 years.
29. The fact that the petitioner had enclosed a supplementary
lease document dated 25.09.2017, will not convey lease-hold right
in favour of her husband, as the lease-deed was not registered.
30. Section 47 of the Registration Act does not lend any
statutory support to the petitioner inasmuch as the said provision
is applicable in a contingency, when the document was not
required to be registered, when the same was made and was got
registered afterwards.
31. Section 47 requires that registered document shall operate
from the date of its execution, provided its registration was not
required when executed, if the document is registered, after a
subsequent date.
32. In the instant case, such is not the situation. As per the
norms set by the respondent-Corporation, a candidate applying for
awarding of LPG Distributorship, was required to have a registered
lease-deed in his/her favour.
33. The judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of
Thakur Kishan Singh (supra) is not of any help to the petitioner, as
the same deals with a situation when the document got registered
later on and on the date of execution, the document dated
05.12.1945 was not required to be registered.
34. In considered opinion of this Court, the respondents have
committed no illegality or error in rejecting petitioner's
candidature.
(8 of 9) [CW-1754/2019]
35. So far as the land situated in Khasra (Aaraji) No.57 of village
Dhuwala, Mandal is concerned, this Court finds that the petitioner
had offered alternative land by way of her response to the notice
dated 02.05.2018.
36. While passing the impugned order dated 23.01.2019, the
respondents have stated that the petitioner has failed to submit
any document for any alternative godown land, but in the reply to
the writ petition, the respondents have indicated that her
alternative land was not found suitable.
37. There is a clear contradiction in the order dated 23.01.2019
if the reply filed by the respondents is carefully read.
38. If respondents were of the view that the alternative land
offered by the petitioner was not suitable, such stand ought to be
reflected in the impugned order dated 23.01.2019.
39. As an upshot of discussion aforesaid, the writ petition is
partly allowed. It is held that petitioner's candidature has rightly
been rejected qua the land situated in Aaraji No.57/1 in village
Dhuwala, Mandal.
40. The matter is remanded back. The order dated 23.01.2019
is quashed to the extent it stipulates that the petitioner had not
submitted documents for alternative godown land.
41. The respondents shall issue a notice providing an opportunity
of personal hearing to the petitioner within a period of seven days
from today. They shall consider the alternative land if offered by
the petitioner and pass a fresh order qua her alternative land, in
accordance with law, preferably within a period of four weeks from
today. The order shall be intimated to the petitioner.
42. Petitioner's right to take her remedies against any such order
(if passed against her), shall remain reserved.
(9 of 9) [CW-1754/2019]
43. All interlocutory applications including the application under
Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India stand disposed of.
(DINESH MEHTA),J 86-Amar/-
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