Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Vimla Devi vs State Of Rajasthan on 2 August, 2021

Bench: Dinesh Mehta

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 312/2021

Krishna Devi W/o Shri Surendra Singh, Aged About 52 Years, Resident Of Vill- Kandhran, Teh- Rajgarh, Distt- Churu, At Present Working As ANM, CHC - Rajgarh, Teh- Rajgarh, District - Churu.

----Petitioner Versus

1. State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary, Department Of Medical And Health, Secretariat, Jaipur.

2. Director, Medical And Health Services, Tilak Marg, Jaipur.

3. Chief Medical And Health Officer, District Churu.

4. Block Chief Medical And Health Officer, Rajgarh, District Churu.

5. Principal Secretary, Department Of Rural Development And Panchayati Raj, Jaipur, Rajasthan.

----Respondents

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. YP Khileree, Mr. Vikas Bijarniya, Mr. Rohit Kaswan, Mr. KR Saharan, Mr. Manish Patel, Mr. Manoj Bohra, Mr. MP Pareek, Mr. Anil Vyas, Mr. VS Bhati, Mr. Rishabh Tayal, Mr. Manjeet Singh, Mr. Shailesh Agarwal, Mr. DS Motsara, Mr. Inderjeet Yadav, Mr. Deepak Nehra, Mr. SK Verma, Mr. ML Deora, Mr. PD Vaishnava For Respondent(s) : Mr. KS Rajpurohit, Addl. Advocate General with Mr. Rajat Arora

JUSTICE DINESH MEHTA

Judgment Reserved on : 27.07.2021 Pronounced on : 02.08.2021 Reportable

1. Pursuant to 73rd Amendment in the Constitution of India,

twenty nine subjects mentioned in the Eleventh Schedule were

brought under Panchayati Raj Institutions to empower the

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Panchayat Raj in the State. The Rural Development and

Panchayati Raj Department passed an order dated 02.10.2010

whereby activities including the funds and staff of some

departments were transferred from their respective/parent

departments to Panchayati Raj Department. In the spirit of 73 rd

Amendment in the Constitution, the State of Rajasthan

promulgated the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj (Transferred Activities)

Rules, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules of 2011"), which

specifically lays down the rules and regulations for transfer of the

employees of the State Government.

2. Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011 provides that a transfer of an

employee shall be made under the transfer policy and directions

issued from time to time. Rule 12 further provides that in case

the guidelines and directions are not followed, Panchayati Raj

Department can initiate action against the Panchayati Raj

Institutions/ Office bearers.

3. By way of the order dated 02.10.2010, issued by the

Principal Secretary Medical & Health Department, all Sub-Centres,

Primary Health Centres (PHC) and Community Health Centres

(CHC) situated in various rural areas, including their staff were

transferred to the Panachati Raj Institutions.

4. Pursuant to above decision of the State, services of the

employees (including the petitioners) were ordered to be governed

by the Rules of 2011. Consequently, though their parent

department continues to be Medical & Health Department, but

their other incidence of service, including transfer are governed by

the Rules of 2011.

5. The petitioners (enumerated in the Schedule appended with

the present order, which be treated an integral part of this order)

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have challenged transfer orders issued by the Director (Non-

gazetted), Medical & Health Services, Rajasthan Jaipur, being

contrary to Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that impugned

transfers made by the Medical & Health Department are in breach

of Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011 and issue involved is squarely

covered by the judgment dated 15.01.2020 rendered by this Court

in case of Kiran Kumari Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (SB

Civil Writ Petition No.14964/2019).

7. Mr. K.S. Rajpurohit, learned Addl. Advocate General assisted

by Mr. Rajat Arora could not controvert the legal position that the

issue involved in the present writ petition has been decided by this

Court in the case of Kiran Kumari (supra). He, however

submitted that a very important and substantial argument relating

to directory nature of the Rules of 2011 was not advanced, when

the case of Kiran Kumari (supra) was heard and decided by this

Court. He urged that as the issue of rule being directory goes to

the root of the matter, the same be considered and decided in

favour of the State and petitions be dismissed.

8. Navigating the Court through Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011, he

contended that though expression "shall" has been used in the

opening words of the Rule but the same is directory in nature.

Hence, it is not necessary for the State Government/Medical &

Health Department to seek/take consent of the Panchayati Raj

Department, before effecting transfers from one District to

another and even intra or inter-Panchayat Samiti transfers.

9. In support of his contention that inspite of use of word

"shall", Rule 8 is directory, learned Addl. Advocate General relied

upon following judgments :-

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(i) (2008) 12 SCC 372 (Bachahan Devi & Anr. Vs. Nagar

Nigam, Gorakhpur & Anr.) Para - 17

(ii) (2009) 6 SCC 735 (Ram Deen Mayurya (Dr.) Vs. State of

Uttar Pradesh & Ors.) Para - 43, 49, 52

(iii) AIR 1964 Raj. 223 (Sardar Mal Vs. Smt. Gayatri Devi)

Para-23.

10. It was also argued that in light of Rule 3 of the Rules of

2011, since the service conditions as also the cadre control of

transferred employees remains with the parent department - the

Medical & Health Department of the State is competent to pass

orders of transfers in relation to a transferred employee within one

Panchayat Samiti; from one Panchayat Samiti to another

Panchayat Samiti and from one District to another District.

11. Taking support of Rule 13 of the Rules of 2011, an argument

was advanced that the decision of the Panchayati Raj Department

is final, and if any doubt arises relating to application,

interpretation and scope of these Rules, the decision/order of the

Panchayati Raj Department would prevail. He submitted that the

order dated 16.06.2018 issued by the State Government permits

the Medical & Health Department to transfer one employee from

one District to another without consent of the Panchayati Raj

Department, and the same is having supremacy and even without

consent, the Medical & Health Department of the State can

transfer an employee.

12. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted in unison that

this issue has come up before this Court on a number of occasions

and every time State's action has been held illegal, and in-spite of

the settled legal position, the Medical & Health Department of the

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State is illegally transferring the employees, whose services have

been entrusted to Panchayati Raj Department. They argued that

the Medical & Health Department does not have power to transfer

the employees, who are working under the aegis of Panchayati Raj

Department, as has been held by this Court in the following

judgments :

(i) (Samleta Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) :

"3. Concededly no such consent was taken. I note that vide order dated 20.09.2017 it was directed that joining of duties by the petitioner pursuant to impugned transfer order dated 15.09.2017 at the place where she has been transferred shall be subject to the decision of the writ petition.

4. The respondents have not been able to show to the Court as to why consent of the Panchayati Raj Department is not warranted."

(ii) (State of Raj. & Ors. Vs. Samleta) :

"Sub-rule (ii) of Rule 8 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj (Transfer Activities) Rules, 2011 clearly postulates that when a person is transferred from one District to another, there is a prerequisite condition of obtaining prior consent of Panchayati Raj Department. In the present case, the respondent is an employee of the Panchayati Raj Institution and she has been transferred from one district to another. Admittedly, no consent as per Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011 was obtained from the Panchayati Raj Department and therefore, her transfer is bad and in violation of the provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011. Even in the cases of transfer of surplus employees, consent has to be obtained from the Panchayati Raj Department.

In view of the above observations, we are not inclined to interfere in the order passed by the learned Single Judge.

The appeal is, therefore, dismissed."

(6 of 18) [CW-312/2021]

(iii) (Smt. Bimla Devi Vs. State of Raj. & Ors.) :

"Sh. S.K. Gupta Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents submits that in each & every matter consent as required under Rule 8 of the Rules, 2011 is not necessary and submits that a circular dated 16.06.2018 was issued in this regard by the Panchayati Raj Department.

After hearing counsel for the parties, the contention advanced by the counsel for the petitioners holds substance for the reasons; firstly according to Rule 8 of the Rules, 2011 the consent is necessary to be obtained as required from the Panchayati Raj. Department; secondly a bare perusal of the order/circular dated 16.6.2018 clearly shows that it holds that for transfer of an employee the consent of the Panchayati Raj Department is not necessary which is violative of Rule 8 of the Rules, 2011.

In that view of the matter, the writ petitions filed by the petitioners deserve acceptance and the transfer orders impugned herein deserve to be set aside.

Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed and the respective transfer orders impugned in the present petitions are set aside. However, the respondent-State is at liberty to pass order of transfer afresh, if exigency of service so require, only after strict compliance of Rule 8 of the Rules, 2011. Copy of the order be separately placed in each file."

(iv) (Harish Chandra Katara Vs. State of Raj. & Ors.) :

"Learned counsel appearing for the respondent department placed reliance on the order dated 16.06.2018 (Annex.9 in SBCWP No.7212/2019), purportedly directing under Rule 8 and ordering that the required consent of the Panchayati Raj Department would not be required and therefore, the plea raised by the petitioners in this regard has no substance.

Learned counsel for the petitioners in SBCWP No.7212/2019 submits that the circular dated 16.06.2018

(7 of 18) [CW-312/2021]

relied on by the respondents being contrary to the express provisions of Rule 8, the transfer orders without requisite consent under Rule 8 has been set aside in Smt. Bimla Devi v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. ; SB Civil Writ Petition No.16963/2018, decided on 12.11.2018 at Jaipur Bench.

.........

In view of the express provision of Rule 8 as well as the judgment in the case of Bimla Devi (supra), wherein the circular sought to be relied on by the respondents has been taken into consideration, the action of the respondents in effecting transfers of the petitioners in SBCWP Nos.4214/2019 and 7212/2019 cannot be sustained. The order dated 08.03.2019 (Annex.2 in SBCWP No.4214/2019) and order dated 08.03.2019 (Annex.8 in SBCWP No.7212/2019), qua the petitioners are quashed and set aside."

13. While conceding that Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011 has not

been held to be mandatory in express terms by the Single

Benches, learned counsel argued that the Division Bench in case

of State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Samleta (DB Special Appeal

(W) No.736/2018), decided on 11.10.2018 has held Rule 8 of the

Rules of 2011 to be mandatory.

14. Reading the relevant part of the Division Bench judgment in

case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Samleta (highlighted portion of

para 12(ii) above), it was argued that the Division Bench has

clearly held that consent has to be obtained from Panchayati Raj

Department by the Medical Health Department, while transferring

an employee from one District to another. According to the

learned counsel for petitioners, such adjudication is unequivocally

mandatory.

15. Heard.

(8 of 18) [CW-312/2021]

16. The enunciation made by this Court in case of Kiran Kumari

(supra), Samleta (supra) and Bimla Devi (supra) clearly

suggests that this Court has found/held the transfers made by

Medical & Health Department to be violative of Rule 8 of the Rules

of 2011. But as the argument that Rule 8 is directory was not

advanced by the State, there was no occasion for this Court to

record a finding to this effect. But merely because such finding is

absent, it cannot be said that this issue is still alive or undecided.

17. The Division Bench in its judgment in the case of Samleta

(supra) has held that Rule 8 is mandatory. The argument

advanced by Mr. Rajpurohit that Rule 8 is directory in nature is

only a new facet of the consistent stand of the State, which has

never found favour from this Court. The fact that the transfers

made by the Medical & Health Department sans consent of the

Panchayati Raj Department has been held contrary to Rule 8 of

the Rules, implies that various Benches of this Court have found

the Rule 8 to be mandatory.

18. In the opinion of this Court, the decision to transfer various

departments in the Panchayati Raj Department, including Primary

Health Services etc. and to assign services of the petitioners and

other similarly situated employees was taken in a bid to augment

Panchayati Raj Institutions and to ensure their autonomy and

empowerment in spirit of 73rd Amendment to the Constitution and

Article 243 of the Constitution that mandates endowment of

powers and strengthening of the Panchayati Raj Institutions at the

root level.

19. A perusal of Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011 reveals that a

transferred employee can be transferred from one Gram

Panchayat to another Gram Panchayat by the Administration and

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Establishment Committee of a Panchayat Samiti; from one

Panchayat Samiti to another Panchayat Samiti within the District

by District Establishment Committee of the Zila Parishad

concerned; while inter-district transfers can be made by the

parent department, however, with the consent of the Panchayati

Raj Department.

20. A combined reading of the contingencies enumerated in Rule

8 reveals that in first two situations viz. transfers within the

districts, the transfers can be made by the authorities under the

Panchayati Raj Department. A simple look at Rule 8 makes it

crystal clear that as per the scheme of the Rules, the Panchayati

Raj Department is having upper hand if not supremacy. Panchayati

Raj Department is the competent department to effect or facilitate

transfers within District; whereas its consent is quintessential if

the Medical & Health Department proposes to effect inter-district

transfer.

21. Argument of Mr. Rajpurohit that expression "shall" used in

Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011 should be read or taken as "may",

even if accepted for the sake of argument, would hardly serve his

cause. Because requirement of consent of Panchayati Raj

Department is provided in Clause (iii) of Rule 8 without giving any

leeway. If the expression "shall" is substituted by the expression

"may", Rule 8 would appear like this :-

"Transfer of such transferred employees may be made under the transfer policy and directions issued by the State Government from time to time, by:-".

22. The change as attempted to by learned Addl. Advocate

General would have hardly made any difference. Because then,

the discretion would be to transfer the employees or not to

(10 of 18) [CW-312/2021]

transfer. But once a decision to transfer an employee is taken,

then, the conditions contained in Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Rule 8

are required to be complied with, in the manner and by the

authority prescribed. This being the position, even if the

expression "shall" of Rule 8 is read as "may", it would hardly dilute

the requirement of consent of Panchayati Raj Department.

23. True it is, that no consequence has been provided in case of

non-observance of mandate of Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011 but if

the argument of the State is accepted, then, the public authorities

will conveniently flout the mandate of laws framed by the

legislature. The Courts cannot afford to countenance such

endeavours, as the consequence would be disasterous and would

pose threat to the very rule of law.

24. The judgments cited by learned AAG lay down general

principles in relation to expression "shall / may" - when despite

use of the expression "shall" a provision is to be treated as

directory. So far as judgment in case of Bachahan Devi

(supra) is concerned, the case in question involved interpretation

of Order 41 Rule 25 of the CPC in which both the expression

"may" and "shall" have been used. Interpreting the provisions,

the Supreme Court carefully examined the use of expression

"shall" and "may" in the said provision. However, a perusal of

para No.11 of the judgment reveals that the expression "shall"

given in the latter part of the provision has been held mandatory

inasmuch as the Supreme Court observed : "once the appellate

Court directs the lower court to do so, it is incumbent upon the

trial Court to take additional evidence required."

(11 of 18) [CW-312/2021]

25. Paras - 43, 49 and 52 of the judgment in case of Ram Deen

Maurya (supra) cited by learned Addl. Advocate General also

deals with the general principles. Para 44 of the judgment notices

provisions of Rule 4(6) of the Rules concerned, which has four

parts. The question before the Supreme Court was whether

applications for transfer, which were not submitted through the

management along with the consent of both the management,

which has been processed by the competent authority was valid or

not. In such circumstances, inspite of use of expression "shall" in

clause (ii), the Supreme Court held the expression "shall" to be

directory. Reasons for doing so have been given in para 52 of the

judgment, which reads thus :-

"52. While considering the non-compliance with the procedural requirement, it has to be kept in view that such a requirement is designed to facilitate justice and furthers its ends and, therefore, if the consequence of non-compliance is not provided, the requirement may be held to be directory."

26. Above quoted part of the judgment clearly shows that the

Supreme Court has held the provision to be directory, as the same

was designed to facilitate justice or it contained procedure of

dealing with applications for transfers. And since consequence of

non-compliance was not provided in the rule, such requirement

was held to be directory. It is in that context the Supreme Court

has ruled that if consequence of a requirement is not provided,

then, the provision should be held directory.

27. Similar is the situation in the case of Sardar Mal (supra). In

the aforesaid case, the Full Bench of this Court was dealing with

the provisions of Section 81(3) of the Representation of People

Act, 1950 and while dealing with the same, the Full Bench has

(12 of 18) [CW-312/2021]

held that provision of requirement of furnishing attested copy is

mandatory.

28. The judgments cited by learned Addl. Advocate General

relate to such provisions or conditions where the burden of

observance of law is cast on citizenry. In those circumstances,

the Supreme Court has held that regardless of the use of

expression "shall", the provision under consideration was required

to be treated as directory. But in the instant case, the duty has

been cast upon the public authority to do a particular act in a

particular manner. When a duty is cast upon a public authority, it

is not necessary for the statute to provide consequence. In the

opinion of this Court, merely because the consequence of the

breach has not been provided in the Rules, Rule 8 cannot be

treated to be directory. All public authorities are bound to follow

the mandate of law may be substantive or procedural and they are

required to act in tandem with the laws as framed by the law

makers.

29. The Supreme Court has time and again held that if a statute

requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner, the

same has to be done in the manner prescribed. Reference of the

following judgments of the Supreme Court would be apt at this

juncture : -

(i) Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavir Prasad & Ors. AIR 1999

SC 3558, relevant para of the judgment is as under:

"12. ... ... ... It is a well-settled salutary principle that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. See with advantage : Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, Ind App 372 : AIR

(13 of 18) [CW-312/2021]

1936 PC 253(2); Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Anr. v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, 1954 SCR 1098 : AIR 1954 SC 322; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singara Singh AIR 1964 SC 358 : (1964) SCWR 57 ... ... ..."

(ii) Dipak Babaria Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. : AIR 2014 SC

1792, relevant para is as under:

"53. It is well settled that where the statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. This proposition of law laid down in Taylor v. Taylor (1875) 1 ChD426, 431 was first adopted by the Judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor reported in AIR 1936 PC 253 and then followed by a bench of three Judges of this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1954 SC 322. This proposition was further explained in paragraph 8 of State of U.P. v. Singara Singh by a bench of three Judges reported in AIR 1964 SC 358 in the following words:

"8. The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor is well recognised and is founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted ... ... ..."

This proposition has been later on reiterated in Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad reported in 1999 (8) SCC 266 : (AIR 1999 SC 3558), Dhananjaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka reported in 2001 (4) SCC 9 : (AIR 2001 SC 1512) and Gujarat

(14 of 18) [CW-312/2021]

Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Essar Power Limited reported in 2008 (4) SCC 755 : (AIR 2008 SC 1921)."

30. In the opinion of this Court, above principle canvassed by Mr.

Rajpurohit is applicable only in the cases when the provisions

under consideration deal with performance of public duties under

an enactment. Almost all the judgments in which the use of word

"shall" has been held as directory are, those, in which the statute

provided for time limit of doing a particular thing. In case the

time limit was not met by the public authority and consequence

has not been given in the enactment, the provision has been held

directory. (Re: Nasiruddin Vs. Sita Ram Agarwal (2003) 2

SCC 577).

31. A gainful reference of the judgment of the Apex Court in the

case of Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmed Ishaque (AIR

1955 (SC) 233) can be made. Para Nos.35 to 37 are reproduced

hereinfra :

"35. On the question whether Rule 47(1)(c) is mandatory, the argument of Mr. Pathak is that notwithstanding that the rule provides that the Returning Officer shall reject the ballot papers, its real meaning is that he has the power to reject them, and that on that construction, his discretion in the matter of accepting them is not liable to be questioned. He relies on certain well-recognised rules of construction such as that a statute should be construed as directory if it relates to the performance of public duties, or if the conditions prescribed therein have to be performed by persons other than those on whom the right is conferred. In particular, he relied on the following statement of law in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, pages 381 and 382 :

"To hold that an Act which required an officer to prepare and deliver to another officer a list of voters on or before a certain day, under a penalty, made a list not delivered till a later day invalid, would in effect, put it in the power of the person charged with the duty of preparing it to disfranchise

(15 of 18) [CW-312/2021]

the electors, a conclusion too unreasonable for acceptance".

36. He contended that to reject the votes of the electors for the failure of the polling officer to deliver the correct ballot papers under Rule 23 would be to disfranchise them, and that a construction which involved such a consequence should not be adopted.

37. It is well-established that an enactment in form mandatory might in substance be directory, and that the use of the word "shall" does not conclude the matter. The question was examined at length in Julius v. Bishop of Oxford [1880] 5 A.C. 214, and various rules were laid down for determining when a statute might be construed as mandatory and when as directory. They are well- known, and there is no need to repeat them. But they are all of them only aids for ascertaining the true intention of the legislature which is the determining factor, and that must ultimately depend on the context. What we have to see is whether in Rule 47 the word "shall" could be construed as meaning "may". Rule 47(1) deals with three other categories of ballot papers, and enacts that they shall be rejected. Rule 47(1)(a) relates to a ballot paper which "bears any mark or writing by which the elector can be identified". The secrecy of voting being of the essence of an election by ballot, this provision must be held to be mandatory, and the breach of it must entail rejection of the votes. That was held in Woodward v. Sarsons [1875] L.R. 10 C.P. 733 on a construction of section 2 of the Ballot Act, 1872. That section had also a provision corresponding to Rule 47(1)(b), and it was held in that case that a breach of that section would render the vote void. That must also be the position with reference to a vote which is hit by Rule 47(1)(b). Turning to Rule 47(1)

(d), it provides that a ballot paper shall be rejected if it is spurious, or if it is so damaged or mutilated that its identity as a genuine ballot paper cannot be established. The word "shall" cannot in this sub-rule be construed as meaning "may", because there can be no question of the Returning Officer being authorised to accept a spurious or unidentifiable vote. If the word "shall" is thus to be construed in a mandatory sense in Rule 47(1)(a), (b) and

(d), it would be proper to construe it in the same sense in Rule 47(1) (c) also. There is another reason which clinches the matter against the first respondent. The practical bearing of the distinction between a provision which is mandatory and one which is directory is that

(16 of 18) [CW-312/2021]

while the former must be strictly observed, in the case of the latter it is sufficient that it is substantially complied with. How is this rule to be worked when the Rule provides that a ballot paper shall be rejected ? There can be no degrees of compliance so far as rejection is concerned, and that is conclusive to show that the provision is mandatory."

32. As against this, in the present case, Rule 8 is not a provision

dealing with the procedural requirement or formality of processing

an application etc. As a matter of fact, it is a power given to the

State officials to effect transfers - it cannot be equated with a

provision, which is meant to facilitate justice and furthers its ends.

33. As as upshot of the discussion foregoing, this Court does not

find any merit and substance in the additional argument so

zealously advanced by Mr. K.S. Rajpurohit. He has not been able

to persuade me to take a view other than what has been taken in

Kiran Kumari's case (supra).

34. Following the judgment rendered in case of Kiran Kumari

(supra), all these writ petitions are allowed; impugned transfer

orders being passed in violation of Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011 are

hereby quashed and set aside qua the petitioners.

35. All the interlocutory application(s) also stands disposed of.

(DINESH MEHTA),J 36-91, 35, 98, 221-223

& 280-ArunV/-


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2.    SB Civil Writ Petition No.11723/2020 3.    SB Civil Writ Petition No.197/2021 4.    SB Civil Writ Petition No.206/2021 5.    SB Civil Writ Petition No.267/2021 6.    SB Civil Writ Petition No.271/2021 7.    SB Civil Writ Petition No.294/2021 8.    SB Civil Writ Petition No.298/2021 9.    SB Civil Writ Petition No.335/2021 10.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.344/2021 11.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.357/2021 12.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.371/2021 13.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.374/2021 14.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.376/2021 15.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.377/2021 16.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.402/2021 17.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.404/2021 18.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.423/2021 19.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.431/2021 20.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.471/2021 21.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.476/2021 22.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.513/2021 23.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.524/2021 24.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.576/2021 25.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.585/2021 26.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.591/2021 27.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.592/2021 28.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.597/2021 29.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.599/2021 30.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.600/2021 31.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.618/2021 32.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.627/2021 33.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.676/2021 34.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.684/2021 35.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.685/2021 36.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.691/2021 37.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.702/2021 38.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.703/2021 39.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.714/2021 40.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.715/2021 41.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.716/2021 42.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.724/2021 43.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.725/2021 44.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.739/2021 45.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.744/2021 46.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.884/2021 47.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.915/2021 48.   SB Civil Writ Petition No.919/2021

49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

(17 of 18) [CW-312/2021] SCHEDULE Petitioner(s) Respondents Jaswant Singh State of Rajasthan Dr. Anushansha Saharan State of Rajasthan Ranjeet Karatiya State of Rajasthan Manju Devi State of Rajasthan Gurdeep Singh State of Rajasthan Om Prakash Potliya State of Rajasthan Manju Solanki State of Rajasthan Amar Kaur State of Rajasthan Saroj State of Rajasthan Smt. Bali Choudhary State of Rajasthan Geeta Devi State of Rajasthan Krishna State of Rajasthan Manju Lata State of Rajasthan Vimla Devi State of Rajasthan Prakash Kaur State of Rajasthan Babita State of Rajasthan Sunita State of Rajasthan Sudesh Kumar Garg State of Rajasthan Pawan Kumar State of Rajasthan Bhunesh Kumar Kalla State of Rajasthan Mool Shanker State of Rajasthan Rajesh Bai State of Rajasthan Afsana Banu State of Rajasthan Reena Meena State of Rajasthan Suman State of Rajasthan Sunil Kumar State of Rajasthan Radha Meena State of Rajasthan Sushila Devi State of Rajasthan Pushpa Chopra State of Rajasthan Sudershana State of Rajasthan Leela Meena State of Rajasthan Bharpai Devi State of Rajasthan Kusumlata State of Rajasthan Vidya State of Rajasthan Munesh Kumari State of Rajasthan Thana Ram State of Rajasthan Sulochana State of Rajasthan Pradeep Kirodiwal State of Rajasthan Kaushalya State of Rajasthan Rose Janet State of Rajasthan Sunita Kumari State of Rajasthan Suman Kumari State of Rajasthan Suman Verma State of Rajasthan Ambika Kumari State of Rajasthan Sangeeta Aseri State of Rajasthan Manju State of Rajasthan Hanumana Ram Dhaka State of Rajasthan Jitender Mangoliya State of Rajasthan (18 of 18) [CW-312/2021] SB Civil Writ Petition No.1124/2021 Kiran Depan State of Rajasthan SB Civil Writ Petition No.1167/2021 Anchal State of Rajasthan SB Civil Writ Petition No.1572/2021 Smt. Asha State of Rajasthan SB Civil Writ Petition No.1786/2021 Smt. Rama Devi State of Rajasthan SB Civil Writ Petition No.1794/2021 Mamta State of Rajasthan SB Civil Writ Petition No.2454/2021 Devi State of Rajasthan SB Civil Writ Petition No.2771/2021 Madan Lal Dahwal State of Rajasthan SB Civil Writ Petition No.308/2021 Rajbala State of Rajasthan 57. SB Civil Writ Petition No.5991/2021 Himmat Singh Garasiya State of Rajasthan

58. SB Civil Writ Petition No.832/2021 Pawan Kumar Arya State of Rajasthan

59. SB Civil Writ Petition No.1035/2021 Rekha State of Rajasthan

60. SB Civil Writ Petition No.1054/2021 Sobharam State of Rajasthan

61. SB Civil Writ Petition No.8090/2021 Ashok Kumar Legha State of Rajasthan