Anshul Garg vs State Of Haryana
2026 Latest Caselaw 2045 P&H

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Anshul Garg vs State Of Haryana on 6 March, 2026

CRM-M--51942-2025                                                            1

        IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
                       CHANDIGARH

101-8                                             CRM-M-51942-2025


Anshul Garg
                                                            ....Petitioner
                                          V/s
State of Haryana
                                                            ....Respondent

Date of decision: 06.03.2026
Date of Uploading : 09.03.2026
                    0

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present:    Mr. Vinod Ghai,, Senior Advocate with
            Mr. Sajal Bansal, Advocate and
            Mr. Arnav Ghai, Advocate and
            Mr. R.S. Bagga,, Advocate for the petitioner.
            Mr. Gurmeet Singh, AAG Haryana.
                                         *****
SUMEET GOEL,
       GOEL J. (Oral)

1. Present second petition has been filed under Section 483 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short 'BNSS') for grant of

regular bail to the petitioner in case bearing FIR No. No.387 dated 10.11.2023, 10.11.2023

registered for the offences punishable under Section Sections 120-B, B, 201, 304

(deleted later on vide order framing charge dated 4.3.2025), Sections 307,

302 of IPC (added later on vide order framing charg chargee dated 4.3.2025),

Section 328 of IPC and Section 72-A 72 A of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (as

amended by the Haryana Amendment Bill, 2020) at Police Station Chhapar,

District Yamunanagar, Haryana.

Haryana

1 of 21

The petitioner has earlier applied for grant of regular bail

before this Court which was dismissed on merits vide order dated on

30.08.2024 30.08.2024.

Thereafter, the present petition i.e. the second petition for grant

of regular bail, has been preferred by the petitioner on 10.09.2025.

2. The gravamen of the FIR reflec reflects that on 09.11.2023, 09.11.2023

information was received at Police Station Chhapar, District Yamunanagar

regarding the death of one Jagmal,, who allegedly died after consuming

intoxicating/spurious country-made country made liquor upon receipt of the said

information The police reached Civil Hospital, Yamunanagar, where the information.

deceased had been brought. On the following day, i.e., 10.11.2023,, the

statement of Mohit, son of the deceased deceased,, was recorded by the police, police

wherein he alleged that his father, who worked as a labourer, had consumed

country-made made liquor allegedly purchased from certain individuals, namely

Raj Kumar @ Babli, Naresh Kumar @ Khuba, Rajesh Kumar and Radhey.

Radhey

It was alleged that the said liquor was ppoisonous oisonous in nature and resulted in

the death of the deceased. On the basis of the said statement, FIR in

question was registered and investigation was set into motion motion. During the

course of investigation, several accused persons were arrested and their

disclosure losure statements were recorded, pursuant to which the investigating

agency claimed to have unearthed a larger network allegedly involved in the

manufacture, supply and distribution of illicit and spurious liquor.

liquor

Subsequently, upon further investigation aand nd in view of the material

collected by the investigating agency, Section 302 IPC was added while

Section 304 IPC was deleted at the stage of framing of charge. During the

2 of 21

course of further investigation, three more persons namely Anil Kumar,

Paramjeet and an Sushil were also stated to have died after allegedly

consuming the spurious liquor.

3. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the

petitioner has been falsely implicated into the FIR in question and his name

does not find mention in the original FIR FIR. Learned senior counsel has

further iterated that the petitioner has been roped in at a subsequent stage of

investigation on the basis of disclosure statement statement(s) of co-accused,, which

per se are inadmissible in evidence and are not supported ed by any

independent or corroborative material on record. It has been further

submitted that neither any recovery whatsoever has been effected from the

petitioner nor is there any documentary linking him with the alleged

manufacture, supply or distribution of illicit spurious liquor. According to

learned senior counsel, the entire prosecution case against the petitioner

rests solely upon custodial disclosure statements which by themselves

cannot constitute legally admissible evidence in view of the settled position

of law. It has been further asserted that the petitioner has clean antecedents

and is running a licensed Ayurvedic manufacturing unit unit.. It has been further

contended that t during the COVID-19 19 pandemic the petitioner was duly

authorized to procure ENA for manufacturing sanitizers and therefore, the

attempt of the prosecution to link the petitioner with the alleged illicit liquor

network is wholly misconceived and unfounde unfounded. Learned senior counsel has

emphasized that certain co-accused, accused, who are alleged to have played layed a more

prominent role, have already been granted the concession of bail by this

Court and, therefore, on the principle of parity the petitioner is also entitled entitle

3 of 21

to the same relief. According to learned senior counsel, the petitioner has

been in custody since 13.03.2024 and the investigation qua him stands

concluded. Furthermore, the challan as well as supplementary challan have

already been presented before the competent Court of jurisdiction. Learned

senior counsel has emphasized that out of 105 prosecution witnesses cited

not even a single witness has been examined so far and the trial is likely to

take a considerable period of time to conclude. IIt has, thus, been submitted

that the continued incarceration of the petitioner particularly in the absence

of any substantive or direct evidence linking him to the alleged offence

would serve no useful purpose. The petitioner shall undertake to abide by all

conditions that may be imposed by this Court, including not tampering with

the prosecution evidence or influencing witnesses and not leaving the

country without prior permission of the Court. On the strength of aforesaid

submissions, the grant of petition in hand is entreated for.

4. Per contra, learned earned State counsel has vehemently opposed the

grant of bail to the petitioner by arguing that the allegations are grave and

serious in nature as the case pertains to the manufacture and supply of

illicit/spurious liquor which allegedly resulted in the death of certain

persons. Learned State counsel has iterated that during the course of

investigation the investigating agency has unearthed a larger and well investigation,

organized conspiracy involving multiple individuals engaged in the

manufacture and distribution of poisonous liquor has been unearthed.

According to learned State counsel, the name of the petitioner surfaced

during the course of investigation through disclosure statements of co-

co

accused persons, persons, wherein it was specifical specifically ly alleged that the petitioner has ha

4 of 21

supplied Extra Neutral Alcohol (ENA) which has been subsequently used

for the preparation of illicit spurious liquor. It has been further submitted

that the role attributed to the petitioner is not merely peripheral, rather, er, it

constitutes a crucial link in the chain of supply which facilitated the

manufacture of the spurious liquor responsible for the death of the victims.

victim

Furthermore, the charges have already been framed by the learned trial

Court for offences under Sections Sections 302, 328 and 120 120-B B IPC along with

Section 72-A 72 of the Punjab Excise Act,, and and, therefore, a prima facie case

stands made out against the petitioner.

petitioner Learned State counsel has pointed

out that the earlier petition of the petitioner for grant of regular bail has

already been dismissed and there is no substantial change in circumstances.

circumstances

Considering the gravity of the offence and the specific role attributed to the

petitioner, learned State counsel has prayed for the dismissal of the iinstant nstant

petition.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have

perused the available record.

6. It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by

this Court in Rafiq Khan vs. State of Haryana and another: 2024:

PHHC:054064 relevant whereof reads as under:

PHHC:054064; under:-

9. The paramount issue, in any plea for grant of regular bail, is the liberty of an individual. Indubitably, within our society and jurisprudence, liberty is a cherished foundational principle and has fundamental ascendency cy over all other attributes of social order. Even within the framework of Constitution, this principle is made conspicuous, inter alia, in Article 21 of our Constitution that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according to procedure procedur established by law. The Cr.P.C., 1973 is one such procedural law which permits curtailment of liberty of anti anti-social and anti-national national 5 of 21

elements. Yet, liberty of an individual, the accused, must not transgress the rights of another individual, the victim, in terms of right to dignified everyday life without any imminent fear or threat. Additionally, the rights of the collective of individuals viz. the State/Society at large, also cannot be neglected. Therefore, while countenancing the facts for considering g the bail, the rights of the triad of accused, victim and the State (Society at large) ought to be entailed. Ergo, while considering a bail plea, the Court ought to take into account this core concept(s).

9.1 An analytical perusal of Cr.P.C. explicates that this statute does not contain any provision relatable to maintainability or otherwise of second/successive bail petitions, including one(s) seeking regular bail. Once there is no statutory prohibition provided for in law, a Court is not logically empowered wered to import into it such prohibitions, especially in case of codified and legislated law. It is trite law that Courts ought not to read a provision in codified law which has not been specifically provided for by the legislature especially when such reading ding results into deprivation of rights. The bar contained in Section 362 of Cr.P.C. can, by no stretch of legal imagination, be said to be barring the filing of second/successive regular bail petition.

9.2 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Babu Singh case (supra) has held that rejection of a bail petition does not, by itself, forbid a Court from considering another one, later in point of time.

Similar is the ratio decidendi of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar (supra). Ergo, rgo, it can be safely inferred that the decision of a Court qua regular bail petition is essentially an interlocutory order and hence the postulation of res judicata does not apply to its realm.

9.3 The issue that next craves attention is as to what are the factors/parameters for consideration of second/successive regular bail petition(s).

9.4. The concordant legal position is that the essential pre-

pre requisite for consideration of second/successive regular petition is the material/substantial change in circumstances and factors of alike nature. Indubitably, the further period of incarceration suf suffered fered by the petitioner-accused accused after rejection/withdrawal of first/earlier plea for bail, pace of trial, the witnesses turning hostile or not supporting prosecution case and changed medical condition(s) of accused would 6 of 21

be pertinent factor(s). It goes wit without hout saying that these factors are only illustrative in nature and cannot by any means be said to be exhaustive.

9.5 No rigid or universal criterion can possibly be delineated to conclusively govern the exercise of judicial discretion, in determining, ass to what would constitute as the above stated substantial change in circumstances. Factual flexibility, one additional or different fact, may cause a sea of difference. There is no gainsaying that each case has its own distinct and unique facts and, hence, hence exercise of such judicial power is best left to the judicial discretion of a Court, in accordance with the settled norms of our jurisprudence.

10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following principles emerge:

I Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof.

II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as withdra withdrawn/dismissed wn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-prosecution prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.

III For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently required to show substantial al change in circumstances and showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not suffice. The metaphoric expression of seeking second/successive bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of petition(s) without substantial, eff effective ective and consequential change in circumstances.

IV No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as every case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such an attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing with such second/successive regular bail petition(s).

V In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently required to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being

7 of 21

second/successive petition(s). In other words, the cause for a C Court ourt having successfully countenanced/entertained such second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly decipherable from the said order passed."

7. The present petition is a second petition for grant of regular

bail by the petitioner. A second second regular bail petition is indeed maintainable

under law; however, it requires demonstration of a substantial change in

circumstances since the earlier petition. It is a settled proposition of law

that such a change must be significant and not merely sup superficial erficial or

technical to warrant reconsideration. This standard ensures that the remedy

of successive bail petitions is not misused through repeated filings but is

available when new and material factors arise that alter the initial

assessment of the case. The first second bail filed by the petitioner was

dismissed on merits on 30.08.2024.. The instant petition i.e. second petition

for grant of regular bail has been filed thereafter on 10.09.2025.

8. The grant of bail falls within the discretionary domai domainn of the

court; however, such discretion must be exercised in a judicious and

principled manner, ensuring it aligns with established legal precedents and

the interests of justice. While considering a bail application, the Court ourt must

evaluate factors such as as the existence of prima facie evidence implicating

the accused, the nature and gravity of the alleged offence and the severity of

the likely sentence upon conviction. The Court ourt must also assess the

likelihood of the accused absconding or evading the due pprocess rocess of law, the

probability of the offence being repeated and any reasonable apprehension

of the accused tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses.

Additionally, the character, antecedents, financial means, societal standing,

8 of 21

and overall conduct of the accused play a crucial role. Furthermore, the

Court ourt must weigh the potential danger of bail undermining the

administration of justice or thwarting its due course. A profitable reference

in this regard is made to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Su Supreme preme Court

titled as State through C.B.I. vs. Amaramani Tripathi Tripathi,, 2005 AIR Supreme

Court 3490, relevant whereof reads as under:

"14. It is well settled that the matters to be considered in an application for bail are (i)whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of accused absconding or fleeing if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted bygrant of bail (see Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi, 2001(2) RCR (Criminal) 377 (SC) :2001(4) SCC 280 and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1978 Supreme Court 179).

). While a vague allegation that accused may tamper with the evidence or witnesses may not be a groun ground d to refuse bail, if the accused is of such character that his mere presence at large would intimidate the witnesses or if there is material to show that he will use his liberty to subvert justice or tamper with the evidence, then bail will be refused. We may also refer to the following principles relating to grant or refusal of bail stated in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, 2004(2) RCR (Criminal) 254 (SC) :2004(7) SCC 528 :"The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non non-application of mind. It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are:

9 of 21

a. The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supportin supporting evidence.

b. Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension ofthreat to the complainant. c. Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. (see Ram GovindUpadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, 2002(2) RCR (Criminal) 250 (SC) C) : 2002(3) SCC 598 andPuran v. Ram Bilas, 2001(2) RCR (Criminal) 801 (SC) : 2001(6) SCC 338.

338."

This Court also in specific terms held that :

"the the condition laid down under section 437(1)(i) is sine qua non for granting bail even under section 439 of th thee Code. In the impugned order it is noticed that the High Court has given the period of incarceration already undergone by the accused and the unlikelihood of trial concluding in the near future as grounds sufficient to enlarge the accused on bail, in spitee of the fact that the accused stands charged of offences punishable with life imprisonment or even death penalty. In such cases, in our opinion, the mere fact that the accused has undergone certain period of incarceration (three years in this case) by itself would not entitle the accused to being enlarged on bail, nor the fact that the trial is not likely to be concluded in the near future either by itself or coupled with the period of incarceration would be sufficient for enlarging the appellant on baill when the gravity of the offence alleged is severe and there are allegations of tampering with the witnesses by the accused during the period he was on bail."

In Panchanan Mishra v. Digambar Mishra, 2005(1) Apex Criminal 319 : 2005(1) RCR(Criminal) 712 (SC) : 2005(3) SCC 143, this Court observed :

"The The object underlying the cancellation of bail is to protect the fair trial and secure justice being done to the society by preventing the accused who is set at liberty by the bail order from tampering with the evidence in the heinous crime..... It hardly requires to be stated that once a person is released on bail in serious criminal cases where the punishment is quite stringent and deterrent, the accused in order to get away from the clutches of the same iindulge ndulge in various activities like tampering with the prosecution witnesses, threatening the family members of the deceased victim and also create problems of law and order situation.

situation."

10 of 21

9. Indubitably, the he allegations against the petitioner are grave in

nature. The material which has come on record, at this stage, prima facie

suggests that the petitioner has specially been attributed an active role in the

alleged incident. The gravamen of the allegations in the FIR discloses that

the deceased Jagmal has allegedly consumed illicit and poisonous liquor, liquor

which resulted in his death. On the basis of the statement of the

complainant, the FIR was registered against certain persons who were

allegedly involved in the sale of such liqu liquor.

or. During the course of

investigation, several accused persons were arrested and their disclosure

statements were recorded, which led the investigating agency to unravel an

alleged network engaged in the manufacture and distribution of spurious

liquor. As As per the case of the prosecution, the name of the present petitioner

has surfaced during the course of further investigation through disclosure

statements of certain co-accused, co accused, who allegedly stated that Extra Neutral

Alcohol (ENA) used in the preparation of illicit liquor has been procured

from the petitioner. On the basis of the said statements and the alleged role

attributed to him in the supply chain, the petitioner has been subsequently

arrested on production warrants on 13.03.2024 and was arrayed as an

accused in the supplementary challan. It is not in dispute that the petitioner

has not been named in the original FIR and his implication is based upon the

material collected during the course of investigation. It is also a matter of

record that the investigation investigation has culminated in the filing of the challan as

well as a supplementary challan and charges have been framed by the Court

below against the petitioner and certain other co-accused accused for offences under

Sections 302, 328 and 120-B 120 B IPC along with Se Section 72-A A of the Punjab

11 of 21

Excise Act. The record further reflects that the prosecution has cited a large

number of witnesses and the trial is presently at the stage of recording

evidence.

10. The he allegations in the present case pertain to an incident

involving lving the manufacture and circulation of illicit liquor leading to loss of

human man lives which is a matter of serious concern. The prosecution case, at

this stage, prima facie indicates the existence of a conspiracy involving

multiple persons engaged in the supply and use of alcohol for the

preparation of spurious liquor.

liquor The contention of learned counsel that the

name of the petitioner does not find mention in the initial FIR and he has

been subsequently nominated does not, not by itself itself, create a ground for grant ant of

regular bail, as it is well settled that an accused can be arrayed during the

course of investigation if sufficient material surfaces against him. Moreover,

such uch submissions would require deeper appreciation of evidence evidence,, which

cannot appropriately be undertaken at the stage of consideration of a bail

petition. It is apt to mention herein that the petitioner has a long criminal

history involving a large number of cases registered against him.. Though in

some of the cases he has been released on bail but the nature of the cases

cannot be ignored while considering the plea for grant of regular bail bail. The

criminal riminal antecedents of an accused are a relevant factor while considering

the prayer for bail, particularly where there is a reasonable apprehension

that at the accused, if released, may indulge in similar activities or may

attempt to influence witnesses. Furthermore, the alleged role of the

petitioner, as projected by the prosecution, pertains to the supply of the petitioner,

primary raw material allegedly used in th thee manufacture of the illicit liquor

12 of 21

which forms a significant link in the chain of events leading to the

commission of the alleged offence. At this stage, it cannot be said that the

role attributed to the petitioner is an insignificant one. The prosecution case

specifically alleges that the involvement of the petitioner surfaced during

investigation on the basis of material collected subsequently.

11. Furthermore, the he plea of parity raised on behalf of the

petitioner is misconceived as the parity rity is not tto o be applied in a mechanical

manner. In the considered opinion of this Court, the role attributed to each

accused, their antecedents and other attending circumstances are required to

be considered while deciding the plea for grant of bail bail.. The petitioner has h

also sought bail on the ground of prolonged custody and snail pace of the

trial. Though it is true that the petitioner has been in custody for a

considerable period but the seriousness of the allegations and his criminal

antecedents weigh heavily againstt him. The material which has been placed

on record does not show that the delay in trial is solely attributable to the

prosecution. In such circumstances, long custody custody, by itself, cannot be

treated as a ground for grant of bail. At this stage, no accentuating ating

circumstances have been made out which may prima facie constitute a

compelling ground for the grant of regular bail to the petitioner, especially

in light of the gravity of the allegations and the evidence on record. It is also

to be borne in mind that offences of this nature strike at the very root of

public order and societal conscience. Granting bail in such cases would not

only undermine the gravity of the offence but may also embolden the

accused.

13 of 21

12. Considering the gravity of the offence, the he stage of the trial and

the overall facts and circumstances emerging from the record, this Court

finds no merit in the present petition. Accordingly, this Court is of the

considered opinion that the petitioner does not deserve the concession of

regular bail ail in the factual milieu of the case in hand.

13. There is yet another aspect nay vital aspect of the matter which

craves the attention of this Court.

13.1 There is no gainsaying that the powers of the High Court under

Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 are powers which are unbridled, unfettered and

plenary in nature aimed at securing the ends of justice. The inherent powers

of a High Court are powers which are incidental replete powers, which if

did not so exist, the Court would be obliged to sit still and helplessly see the

process of law and Courts being abused for the purposes of injustice. In

other words; such power(s) is intrinsic to a High Court, it is its very life-

life

blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such power(s), a

High Court would have form but lack the substance. These powers of

a High Court hence deserve to be construed with the widest possible

amplitude. These inherent powers are in consonance with the nature of a

High Court which ought to be, and has in fact been, invested with power(s)

to maintain its authority to prevent the process of law/Courts being

obstructed or abused. It is a trite posit of jurisprudence that though laws

attempt to deal with all cases that may arise, the infinite variety of

circumstances which which shape events and the imperfections of language make

it impossible to lay down provisions capable of governing every case, which

in fact arises. A High Court which exists for the furtherance of justice in an

14 of 21

indefatigable manner, should therefore, have unfettered power(s) to deal

with situations which, though not expressly provided for by the law, need to

be dealt with, to prevent injustice or the abuse of the process of law and

Courts. The juridical basis of these plenary power(s) is the authority; in fact

the seminal duty and responsibility of a High Court; to uphold, to protect

and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice, in accordance

with law, in a regular, orderly and effective manner. In other words;

Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 reflects reflects peerless powers, which a High Court

may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so, in

particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent

vexation or oppression, to do justice nay substantial justice between ween the

parties and to secure the ends of justice.

13.2. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer herein to a

judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay

Dubey vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and another, 2023 AIR Supre Supreme me

Court 3263, 3263 relevant whereof reads thus:

"10. Having given the matter our anxious and thoughtful consideration, though the appellant may have a point that, stricto sensu, in a petition under Section 439 of the Code, the concerned Court ought not to travel vel beyond considering the specific issue viz. whether to grant bail or reject bail to an accused in custody, it cannot be lost sight of that the Court concerned herein was not a 'Court of Session' but the High Court for the State of Madhya Pradesh, establ established under Article 214 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the "Constitution").

11. This singular fact, for reasons elaborated hereinafter, leads us to decline interfering with the Impugned Judgment, but for different reasons. We have no hesitation in stating that had the Impugned Judgment been rendered by a Court of Session, the factors that would have weighed with us would be starkly different.

15 of 21

12. A little digression is necessita necessitated.

ted. The High Court is a Constitutional Court, possessing a wide repertoire of powers. The High Court has original, appellate and suo motu powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are meant for taking care of situations where the High gh Court feels that some direction(s)/order(s) are required in the interest of justice. Recently, in B S Hari Commandant v Union of India,, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 413, the present coram had the occasion to hold as under:

"50. Article 226 of the Constitution is a succour to remedy injustice, and any limit on exercise of such power, is only self-

self imposed. Gainful refer- ence can be made to, amongst others, A V Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani Wadhwani, (1962) 1962) 1 SCR 573 and U P State Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. Kamal Swaroop Tandon,, (2008) 2 SCC 41. The High Courts, under the Constitutional scheme, are endowed with the ability to issue prerogative writs to safeguard rights of citizens. For ex ex- actly this reason, this Court has never laid down any strait strait-jacket jacket principles that can be said to have "cribbed "cribbed,, cabined and confined" [to borrow the term employed by the Hon. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) in E P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu Nadu,, (1974) 4 SCC 3 : AIR 1974 SC 555] the extraordinary powers vested unde underr Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution. Adjudged on the anvil of Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan (supra), this was a fit case for the High Court to have examined the matter threadbare, more so, when it did not involve navigating a factual minefield.")

13. Returning rning to the present case, though usually the proper course of action of the High Court ought to have been to confine itself to the acceptance/rejection of the prayer for bail made by the accused under Section 439 of the Code; however the High Court, being satisfied that there were, in its opinion, grave lapses on the part of the police/investigative machinery, which may have fatal consequences on the justice delivery system, could not have simply shut its eyes."

13.3 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgme judgment titled as The

Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Mir Usman @ Ara @ Mir Usman Ali,

2025 INSC 1155 has held as under:

16 of 21

"35. The practice of conducting trials on a day to day basis more particularly in important or sensitive cases as was the tradition about thirty years ago has been given a complete go go-by.

by. We sincerely believe that it is high time that the courts revert to that practice. For the purpose of reverting to the old practice, it is necessary to understand the current social, political and administrative scenario including the way the Police are functioning. All the High Courts need to constitute a Committee to discuss cuss this issue very seriously for the benefit of their respective district judiciaries."

13.4 The chronic protraction of criminal proceedings serves as a

systemic blight that transcends the individual interest of the accused,

inflicting a highly deleterious deleterious impact upon the collective conscience of the

society. While legal discourse frequently centers on the hardship of the

incarcerated, it is a grave juridical error to overlook the active suffering and

anguish visited upon the victim. For the aggrieved; aan n interminable trial is

not merely a procedural delay but a form of secondary victimization leading

to a state of perpetual emotional purgatory where the wounds of offense are

kept raw by the lack of finality. A Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court Cou in Rattiram and Others Vs. State of M.P. through

Inspector of Police; 2012 AIR Supreme Court 1485 while appreciating the

observation in Mangal Singh and Another Vs. Kishan Singh and Others;

2009 AIR Supreme Court 1535; observed as under:

"47. While delineating ineating on the facets of speedy trial, it cannot be regarded as an exclusive right of the accused. The right of a victim has been given recognition in Mangal Singh and Anr. v. Kishan Singh and ors., AIR 2009 Supreme Court 1535 wherein it has been observed thus :-

:

"Any inordinate delay in conclusion of a criminal trial undoubtedly has highly deleterious effect on the society generally and particularly on the two sides of the case. But it will be a grave mistake to assume that delay in trial does not cause acute suffering and anguish to the victim of the offence. In many cases the victim may suffer even more 17 of 21

than the accused. There is, therefore no reason to give all the benefits on account of the delay in trial to the accused and to completely deny all justice ice to the victim of the offence."

The fundamental principle of an ever ever-evolving evolving liberty

jurisprudence dictates that prolonged incarceration, absent any realistic

prospect of a near-term near term conclusion of trial, renders continued pre pre-conviction conviction

detention constitutionally constitutionally impermissible. Under the umbrella of Article 21

of the Constitution, the right to a speedy trial is recognized as an

indispensable facet of the guarantee of life and personal liberty. The pre-

pre

trial incarceration must not, by mere flux of time time,, be permitted to assume

the character of punishment, as the state cannot be allowed to achieve

through procedural delay what it has not yet achieved through a verdict of

guilt. However, this Constitutional promise is not an absolute or unregulated

license,, rather it ensures that deprivations of liberty are neither arbitrary,

unconscionable nor unfair.

13.5 Where relief is being sought, solely upon the ground of

procedural delay, the Court must adopt a golden mean approach, where the

rights of the accused/incarcerated accused/ person are protected without reducing the

criminal justice system to a state of toothlessness. Ergo, the Constitutional

inquiry into delay must be a contextual assessment of whether the continued

detention remains constitutionally permissible under the specific penumbra

of the case. Unless the delay is so inordinate that it shocks the judicial

conscience, it cannot be treated as a solitary determinant for enlargement. A

plea of delay cannot be examined in a legal vacuum or an abstraction;

instead it must be weighed against the gravamen of allegations; specific role

attributed to the applicant; trajectory ooff the trial; risks involved in

18 of 21

enlargement of the applicant on bail, etc. A profitable reference in this

regard can be made to the dicta passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Gulfisha Fatima vs. State (Govt. of Delhi), SLP (Crl.) No.13988 No.13988-2025, 2025,

relevant whereof w reads thus:

"26. As the hearing progressed, however, it became evident that the plea of delay could not be examined in abstraction. In the course of submissions and rejoinder, reference was necessarily made to the nature of the allegations, the statutory atutory framework invoked, and the role attributed to individual appellants. This was not a departure from the original submission, but a reflection of the legal reality that the constitutional question of delay does not arise in a vacuum. xxx xxx.

30. Article 21 occupies a central place in the constitutional scheme. The right to life and personal liberty, and the insistence that any deprivation must conform to procedure established by law, are foundational guarantees. The right to a speedy trial has been recognised as an important facet of this guarantee. It follows that pre-trial trial incarceration cannot, by the mere passage of time, be permitted to assume the character of punishment.

31. At the same time, Article 21 has never been understood as operati operating ng in isolation from law. The constitutional promise is not that liberty will be unregulated, but that deprivations of liberty will not be arbitrary, unconscionable, or unfair. The expression "procedure established by law reflects that balance. xxx xxx.

xxx."

A justice delivery system rests on a simple promise; fairness

delivered in reasonable time. Any procedural protraction does not merely

delay the verdict; it actively erodes the edifice of public confidence in the

judiciary. When a trial is allowed to languish, languish, it transcends the aphorism

that 'justice delayed is justice denied' and enters the more perilous territory

of 'justice doubted'.

doubted'. In the constitutional scheme of Article 21, the Right to

a Speedy trial is not a unilateral concession to the accused, but a collective

entitlement shared by the victim & the State, ensuring that S Scales cales of justice

do not rust through inaction.

19 of 21

13.6 Ergo, in cases where, notwithstanding the lapse of time, the

Court in its judicious wisdom finds that other factors preclud precludee grant of bail,

a proactive approach to prevent travesty of justice must be adopted. In such

cases, the refusal to grant on bail must be coupled with a peremptory

mandate of expeditious conclusion of trial (or in appropriate cases a time-

time

bound conclusion of trial). A profitable reference in this regard can be made

to the dicta passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tarun Kumar Vs.

Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement; SLP (Crl.) No. 9431 of

2023, relevant whereof reads thus:

"23. xxxx xxxx xxxx When the detention of the accused is continued by the Court, the courts are also expected to conclude the trials within a reasonable time, further ensuring the right of speedy trial guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution."

13.7. Ergo; in the factual milieu of the case in hand which tends to

reflect that trial is procrastinating and witness(s) are not being examined for

one cause or the other; it is a fit case which warrants direction(s) from this

Court for expeditious/time-bound expeditious/time trial.

14. In view of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:

(i) The petition in hand is devoid of merits and is hereby

dismissed.

(ii) The Court below is directed to make an earnest endeavour to

expedite the trial and conclude the same as expeditiously as possible, possible

preferably within a period of one year, in accordance with law. If need be,

the learned trial Court is at liberty to adopt the procedure of day day-to-day day trial

20 of 21

as enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Mir Usman @ Ara

@ Mir Usman Ali case (supra).

(iii) Any observations made and/or submissions noted hereinabove

shall not have any effect on merits of the case and the investigating agency

as also the trial Court shall proceed further, in accordance with law, without

being g influenced with this order.

(iv) Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

                                                   (SUMEET GOEL)
                                                      JUDGE

March 06, 2026
Ajay


             Whether speaking/reasoned:               Yes/No
             Whether reportable:                      Yes/No




                              21 of 21