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Punjab-Haryana High Court

Subhash vs State Of Haryana on 6 March, 2026

CRM-M--19196-2025                                                             1

        IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
                       CHANDIGARH

101-4                                                CRM-M-19196-2025


Subhash
                                                             ....Petitioner
                                            V/s
State of Haryana
                                                             ....Respondent
Date of decision: 06.03.2026
Date of Uploading : 09.03.2026
                    0

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present:      Mr. Sandeep Singh Jattan, Advocate for the petitioner.
              Mr. Gurmeet Singh, AAG Haryana.
                                           *****
SUMEET GOEL,
       GOEL J. (Oral)

1. Present second petition has been filed under Section 483 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short 'BNSS') for grant of

regular bail to the petitioner in case bearing FIR No. No.387 387 dated 10.11.2023, 10.11.2023

registered for the offences punishable under Section Sectionss 328, 304 of IPC and

Section 72-A 72 A of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (as amended by the Haryana

Amendment Bill, 2020) (Section 304 of IPC has been deleted and Sections

120-B, B, 302, 201, 307 of IPC have been added later on) at Police Station

Chhapar, District Yamunanagar, Haryana.

The petitioner has earlier applied for grant of regular bail

before this Court which was dismissed on merits vide order dated on

30.08.2024 30.08.2024.

Thereafter, the present petition i.e. the second petition for grant

of regular bail, has been preferred by the petitioner on 03.04.2025.

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2. The gravamen of the FIR reflects that on 09.11.2023, 09.11.2023

information was received at Police Station Chhapar, District Yamunanagar

regarding the death of one Jagmal,, who allegedly died after consuming

intoxicating/spurious country-made country made liquor upon receipt of the said

information The police reached Civil Hospital, Yamunanagar, where the information.

deceased had been brought. On the following day, i.e., 10.11.2023,, the

statement of Mohit, son of the deceased deceased,, was recorded by the police, police

wherein he alleged that his father, who worked as a labou labourer, rer, had consumed

country-made made liquor allegedly purchased from certain individuals, namely

Raj Kumar @ Babli, Naresh Kumar @ Khuba, Rajesh Kumar and Radhey.

Radhey

It was alleged that the said liquor was poisonous in nature and resulted in

the death of the deceased.

deceas On the basis of the said statement, FIR in

question was registered and investigation was set into motion. During the

course of investigation, several accused persons were arrested and their

disclosure statements were recorded, pursuant to which the inv investigating estigating

agency claimed to have unearthed a larger network allegedly involved in the

manufacture, supply and distribution of illicit and spurious liquor.

liquor

Subsequently, upon further investigation and in view of the material

collected by the investigating agency, Section 302 IPC was added while

Section 304 IPC was deleted at the stage of framing of charge. During the

course of further investigation, three more persons namely Anil Kumar,

Paramjeet and Sushil were also stated to have died after allegedly

consuming suming the spurious liquor.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the

petitioner has not been named in the FIR and has been falsely implicated

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into the FIR in question during the course of investigation. Learned counsel

has further iterated that the petitioner has been nominated on the basis of the

statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of one Ajay Kumar (i.e.

brother of deceased Paramjeet Singh), Singh , who ha has alleged that his brother used

to purchase liquor liquor from certain persons in the village. Learned counsel has

further submitted that the allegations levelled against the petitioner are that

he has purchased liquor from other co-accused co accused persons and allegedly sold

the same on retail basis in the village. It I has been further submitted that the

petitioner has ha no role in the manufacturing or adulteration of the alleged

liquor and was not involved in any illegal activity relating to the preparation

of spurious liquor. It has further submitted that even as per the prosecution

case, the petitioner is merely alleged to be a seller or retailer of liquor and

not a manufacturer or supplier of the allegedly spurious liquor. Learned

counsel has emphasized that there has been no evidence to establish any

conspiracy between between the petitioner and other co co-accused persons. According

to learned counsel, the entire prosecution case against the petitioner rests

solely upon custodial disclosure statement statement(s) which by themselves cannot

constitute legally admissible evidence in view of the settled position of law.

Learned counsel has emphasized that certain co-accused, who are alleged to

have played layed a more prominent role, have already been granted the

concession of bail by this Court and, therefore, on the principle of parity the

petitioner tioner is also entitled to the same relief. According to learned counsel,

the petitioner has been in custody since 11.11.2024 and the investigation

qua him stands concluded. Furthermore, tthe challan as well as

supplementary challan have already been prese presented before the competent

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Court of jurisdiction. Learned counsel has emphasized that out of 105

prosecution witnesses cited not even a single witness has been examined so

far and the trial is likely to take a considerable period of time to conclude. It I

has,, thus, been submitted that the continued incarceration of the petitioner

particularly in the absence of any substantive or direct evidence linking him

to the alleged offence would serve no useful purpose. The petitioner shall

undertake to abide by all conditions that may be imposed by this Court,

including not tampering with the prosecution evidence or influencing

witnesses and not leaving the country without prior permission of the Court.

On the strength of aforesaid submissions, the grant of petition in hand is

entreated for.

4. Per contra, learned earned State counsel has vehemently opposed the

grant of bail to the petitioner by arguing that the allegations are grave and

serious in nature as the case pertains to the manufacture and supply of

illicit/spurio liquor which allegedly resulted in the death of certain illicit/spurious

persons. Learned State counsel has iterated that during the course of

investigation the investigating agency has unearthed a larger and well investigation,

organized conspiracy involving multiple individuals engaged aged in the

manufacture and distribution of poisonous liquor has been unearthed.

According to learned State counsel, the petitioner has himself allegedly

suffered a disclosure statement wherein he has admitted that he has ha

purchased boxes of country-made country liquor iquor from co co-accused accused persons and

thereafter sold the same to various persons in his village. It has been further

contended that the role attributed to the petitioner is that of retail sale of the

liquor which ultimately reached the consumers and allegedly resulted in the

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deaths of several persons. Furthermore, the charges have already been

framed by the learned trial Court for offences under Sections 302, 328 and

120-B B IPC along with Section 72-A 72 A of the Punjab Excise Act Act,, and, and

therefore,, a prima facie case stands made out against the petitioner petitioner. Learned

State counsel has pointed out that the earlier petition of the petitioner for

grant of regular bail has already been dismissed and there is no substantial

change in circumstances.

circumstances. Considering the gravity of the offence and the

specific role attributed to the petitioner, learned State counsel has prayed for

the dismissal of the instant petition.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have

perused the available record.

6. It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by

this Court in Rafiq Khan vs. State of Haryana and another: 2024:

PHHC:054064; relevant whereof reads as under:

PHHC:054064; under:-

9. The paramount issue, in any plea for grant of regular bail, is the liberty of an n individual. Indubitably, within our society and jurisprudence, liberty is a cherished foundational principle and has fundamental ascendency over all other attributes of social order. Even within the framework of Constitution, this principle is made conspicuous, icuous, inter alia, in Article 21 of our Constitution that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The Cr.P.C., 1973 is one such procedural law which permits curtailment of liberty of anti anti-social and anti-national national elements. Yet, liberty of an individual, the accused, must not transgress the rights of another individual, the victim, in terms of right to dignified everyday life without any imminent fear or threat. Additionally, the rights of the collective ollective of individuals viz. the State/Society at large, also cannot be neglected. Therefore, while countenancing the facts for considering the bail, the rights of the triad of accused, victim and the State (Society at large) ought to be entailed. Ergo, w while hile considering a bail plea, the Court ought to take into account this core concept(s).

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9.1 An analytical perusal of Cr.P.C. explicates that this statute does not contain any provision relatable to maintainability or otherwise of second/successive bail petitions, including one(s) seeking regular bail. Once there is no statutory prohibition provided for in law, a Court is not logically empowered to import into it such prohibitions, especially in case of codified and legislated law. It is trite law that Courts urts ought not to read a provision in codified law which has not been specifically provided for by the legislature especially when such reading results into deprivation of rights. The bar contained in Section 362 of Cr.P.C. can, by no stretch of legal imag imagination, ination, be said to be barring the filing of second/successive regular bail petition.

9.2 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Babu Singh case (supra) has held that rejection of a bail petition does not, by itself, forbid a Court from considering another one, later in point of time.

Similar is the ratio decidendi of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar (supra). Ergo, it can be safely inferred that the decision of a Court qua regular bail petition is essentially an interlocutory order and hence the postulation of res judicata does not apply to its realm.

9.3 The issue that next craves attention is as to what are the factors/parameters for consideration of second/successive regular bail petition(s).

9.4. The concordant legal po position sition is that the essential pre-

pre requisite for consideration of second/successive regular petition is the material/substantial change in circumstances and factors of alike nature. Indubitably, the further period of incarceration suffered by the petitioner-accused accused after rejection/withdrawal of first/earlier plea for bail, pace of trial, the witnesses turning hostile or not supporting prosecution case and changed medical condition(s) of accused would be pertinent factor(s). It goes without saying that these factors are only illustrative in nature and cannot by any means be said to be exhaustive.

9.5 No rigid or universal criterion can possibly be delineated to conclusively govern the exercise of judicial discretion, in determining, as to what would constit constitute ute as the above stated substantial change in circumstances. Factual flexibility, one additional or different fact, may cause a sea of difference. There is no gainsaying that each case has its own distinct and unique facts and, hence,

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exercise of such judicial cial power is best left to the judicial discretion of a Court, in accordance with the settled norms of our jurisprudence.

10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following principles emerge:

I Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is m maintainable aintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof.

II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-prosecution prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.

III For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently required to show substantial change in circumstan circumstances ces and showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not suffice. The metaphoric expression of seeking second/successive bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of petition(s) without substantial, effective and consequentiall change in circumstances.

IV No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as every case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such an attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour.

ur. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing with such second/successive regular bail petition(s).

V In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently required to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being second/successive petition(s). In other words, the cause for a Court having successfully countenanced/entertained such second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily aand nd clearly decipherable from the said order passed."

7. The present petition is a second petition for grant of regular

bail by the petitioner. A second regular bail petition is indeed maintainable

under law; however, it requires demonstration of a substan substantial tial change in

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circumstances since the earlier petition. It is a settled proposition of law

that such a change must be significant and not merely superficial or

technical to warrant reconsideration. This standard ensures that the remedy

of successive bail petitions is not misused through repeated filings but is

available when new and material factors arise that alter the initial

assessment of the case. The first regular bail filed by the petitioner was

dismissed on merits on 30.08.2024.. The instant petition i.e. second petition

for grant of regular bail has been filed thereafter on 03.04.2025.

8. The grant of bail falls within the discretionary domain of the

court; however, such discretion must be exercised in a judicious and

principled pled manner, ensuring it aligns with established legal precedents and

the interests of justice. While considering a bail application, the Court ourt must

evaluate factors such as the existence of prima facie evidence implicating

the accused, the nature and gravity gravity of the alleged offence and the severity of

the likely sentence upon conviction. The Court ourt must also assess the

likelihood of the accused absconding or evading the due process of law, the

probability of the offence being repeated and any reasonable appr apprehension ehension

of the accused tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses.

Additionally, the character, antecedents, financial means, societal standing,

and overall conduct of the accused play a crucial role. Furthermore, the

Court ourt must weigh the potential danger of grant of bail undermining the

administration of justice or thwarting its due course. A profitable reference

in this regard is made to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court

titled as State through C.B.I. vs. Amaramani Tripathi Tripathi, 2005 AIR Supreme

Court 3490, relevant whereof reads as under:

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"14. It is well settled that the matters to be considered in an application for bail are (i)whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of accused absconding or fleeing if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted bygrant of bail (see Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi, 2001(2) RCR (Criminal) 377 (SC) :2001(4) SCC 280 and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1978 Supreme Court 179).

). While a vague allegation that accused may tamper with the evidence or witnesses may not be a ground to refuse bail, if the accused is of such character that his mere presence at large would intimidate the witnesses or if there is material to show that he will use his liberty to subvert justice or tamper with the evidence, then bail will be refused. We may also refer to the following principles relating to grant or refusal of bail stated in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, 2004(2) RCR (Criminal) 254 (SC) :2004(7) SCC 528 :"The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manne mannerr and not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non non-application application of mind. It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider among other ther circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are:

a. The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence. b. Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension ofthreat to the complainant. c. Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. (see Ram GovindUpadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, 2002(2) RCR (Criminal) 250 (SC) : 2002(3) SCC 598 andPuran v. Ram Bilas, 2001(2) RCR (Criminal) 801 (SC) : 2001(6) SCC 338.

338."

This Court also in specific terms held that :

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"the the condition laid down under section 437(1)(i) is sine qua non for granting bail even under section 439 of the Code. In th thee impugned order it is noticed that the High Court has given the period of incarceration already undergone by the accused and the unlikelihood of trial concluding in the near future as grounds sufficient to enlarge the accused on bail, in spite of the fact that the accused stands charged of offences punishable with life imprisonment or even death penalty. In such cases, in our opinion, the mere fact that the accused has undergone certain period of incarceration (three years in this case) by itself would not entitle the accused to being enlarged on bail, nor the fact that the trial is not likely to be concluded in the near future either by itself or coupled with the period of incarceration would be sufficient for enlarging the appellant on bail when the gravity of the offence alleged is severe and there are allegations of tampering with the witnesses by the accused during the period he was on bail."

In Panchanan Mishra v. Digambar Mishra, 2005(1) Apex Criminal 319 : 2005(1) RCR(Criminal) 712 (SC) : 200 2005(3) SCC 143, this Court observed :

"The The object underlying the cancellation of bail is to protect the fair trial and secure justice being done to the society by preventing the accused who is set at liberty by the bail order from tampering with the evidence ce in the heinous crime..... It hardly requires to be stated that once a person is released on bail in serious criminal cases where the punishment is quite stringent and deterrent, the accused in order to get away from the clutches of the same indulge in various arious activities like tampering with the prosecution witnesses, threatening the family members of the deceased victim and also create problems of law and order situation.

situation."

9. Indubitably, the he allegations against the petitioner are grave in

nature. The material which has come on record, at this stage, prima facie

suggests that the petitioner has specially been attributed an active role in the

alleged incident. The gravamen of the allegations in the FIR discloses that

the deceased Jagmal has allegedly consumed nsumed illicit and poisonous liquor, liquor

which resulted in his death. On the basis of the statement of the

complainant, the FIR was registered against certain persons who were

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allegedly involved in the sale of such liquor. During the course of

investigation, several several accused persons were arrested and their disclosure

statements were recorded, which led the investigating agency to unravel an

alleged network engaged in the manufacture and distribution of spurious

liquor. As per the case of the prosecution, the petitioner has allegedly

purchased liquor from the co-accused co accused and thereafter sold the same to the

persons in his village. The he material placed on record indicates that during

the course of investigation the petitioner has been attributed a specific role rol

in the sale of the liquor which was allegedly supplied by other co co-accused accused

persons. On the basis of the alleged role attributed to the petitioner in the

supply chain, the petitioner has been arrested on 11.11.2024 and was

arrayed as an accused in the supplementary supplementary challan. It is not in dispute that

the petitioner has not been named in the FIR initially and his implication is

based upon the material collected during the course of investigation. It is

also a matter of record that the investigation has cul culminated minated in the filing of

the challan as well as a supplementary challan and charges have been

framed by the Court below against the petitioner and certain other co-

accused for offences under Sections 302, 328 and 120 120-B B IPC along with

Section 72-A 72 of the Punjab Excise Act. The record further reflects that the

prosecution has cited a large number of witnesses and the trial is currently at

the stage of recording evidence.

10. The he allegations in the present case pertain to an incident

involving the manufacturee and circulation of illicit liquor leading to loss of

human man lives which is a matter of serious concern. The prosecution case, at

this stage, prima facie indicates the existence of a conspiracy involving

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multiple persons engaged in the supply and use of alcohol cohol for the

preparation of spurious liquor.

liquor The contention of learned counsel that the

name of the petitioner does not find mention in the initial FIR and he has

been subsequently nominated does not, not by itself itself,, create a ground for grant of

regular bail, as it is well settled that an accused can be arrayed during the

course of investigation if sufficient material surfaces against him. Moreover,

such uch submissions would require deeper appreciation of evidence evidence,, which

cannot appropriately be undertaken at the sstage tage of consideration of a bail

petition. It is apt to mention herein that the petitioner has a long criminal

history involving a large number of cases registered against him.. Though in

some of the cases he has been released on bail but the nature of the cases

cannot be ignored while considering the plea for grant of regular bail bail. The

criminal riminal antecedents of an accused are a relevant factor while considering

the prayer for bail, particularly where there is a reasonable apprehension

that the accused, accused, if released, may indulge in similar activities or may

attempt to influence witnesses. Furthermore, the alleged role of the

petitioner, as projected by the prosecution, pertains to the supply of the petitioner,

primary raw material allegedly used in the manufac manufacture ture of the illicit liquor

which forms a significant link in the chain of events leading to the

commission of the alleged offence. At this stage, it cannot be said that the

role attributed to the petitioner is an insignificant one.. The prosecution case

specifically cifically alleges that the involvement of the petitioner surfaced during

investigation on the basis of material collected subsequently.

11. Furthermore, the he plea of parity raised on behalf of the

petitioner is misconceived as the parity rity is not to be appl applied ied in a mechanical

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manner. In the considered opinion of this Court, the role attributed to each

accused, their antecedents and other attending circumstances are required to

be considered while deciding the plea for grant of bail bail.. The petitioner has

also sought ought bail on the ground of prolonged custody and snail pace of the

trial. Though it is true that the petitioner has been in custody for a

considerable period but the seriousness of the allegations and his criminal

antecedents weigh heavily against him. Th The material which has been placed

on record does not show that the delay in trial is solely attributable to the

prosecution. In such circumstances, long custody custody, by itself, cannot be

treated as a ground for grant of bail. At this stage, no accentuating

circumstances umstances have been made which may prima facie constitute a

compelling ground for the grant of regular bail to the petitioner, especially

in light of the gravity of the allegations and the evidence on record. It is also

to be borne in mind that offences of this nature strike at the very root of

public order and societal conscience. Granting bail in such cases would not

only undermine the gravity of the offence but may also embolden the

accused.

12. Considering the gravity of the offence, the stage of the trial and

the overall facts and circumstances emerging from the record, this Court

finds no merit in the present petition. Accordingly, this Court is of the

considered opinion that the petitioner does not deserve the concession of

regular bail in the factual factu milieu of the case in hand.

13. There is yet another aspect nay vital aspect of the matter which

craves the attention of this Court.

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13.1 There is no gainsaying that the powers of the High Court under

Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 are powers which are unbridled, unfettered and

plenary in nature aimed at securing the ends of justice. The inherent powers

of a High Court are powers which are incid incidental ental replete powers, which if

did not so exist, the Court would be obliged to sit still and helplessly see the

process of law and Courts being abused for the purposes of injustice. In

other words; such power(s) is intrinsic to a High Court, it is its very life-

life

blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such power(s), a

High Court would have form but lack the substance. These powers of

a High Court hence deserve to be construed with the widest possible

amplitude. These inherent powers powers are in consonance with the nature of a

High Court which ought to be, and has in fact been, invested with power(s)

to maintain its authority to prevent the process of law/Courts being

obstructed or abused. It is a trite posit of jurisprudence that though laws

attempt to deal with all cases that may arise, the infinite variety of

circumstances which shape events and the imperfections of language make

it impossible to lay down provisions capable of governing every case, which

in fact arises. A High Court which which exists for the furtherance of justice in an

indefatigable manner, should therefore, have unfettered power(s) to deal

with situations which, though not expressly provided for by the law, need to

be dealt with, to prevent injustice or the abuse of the pr process ocess of law and

Courts. The juridical basis of these plenary power(s) is the authority; in fact

the seminal duty and responsibility of a High Court; to uphold, to protect

and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice, in accordance

with law, aw, in a regular, orderly and effective manner. In other words;

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Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 reflects peerless powers, which a High Court

may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so, in

particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent

vexation or oppression, to do justice nay substantial justice between the

parties and to secure the ends of justice.

13.2 At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer herein to a

judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme C Court in the case of Sanjay

Dubey vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and another, 2023 AIR Supreme

Court 3263, 3263 relevant whereof reads thus:

"10. Having given the matter our anxious and thoughtful consideration, though the appellant may have a point that, stricto sensu, in a petition under Section 439 of the Code, the concerned Court ought not to travel beyond considering the specific issue viz. whether to grant bail or reject bail to an accused in custody, it cannot be lost sight of that the Court concerned d herein was not a 'Court of Session' but the High Court for the State of Madhya Pradesh, established under Article 214 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the "Constitution").

11. This his singular fact, for reasons elaborated hereinafter, leads us to decline interfering with the Impugned Judgment, but for different reasons. We have no hesitation in stating that had the Impugned Judgment been rendered by a Court of Session, the factors tthat hat would have weighed with us would be starkly different.

12. A little digression is necessitated. The High Court is a Constitutional Court, possessing a wide repertoire of powers. The High Court has original, appellate and suo motu powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are meant for taking care of situations where the High Court feels that some direction(s)/order(s) are required in the interest of justice. Recently, in B S Hari ri Commandant v Union of India,, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 413, the present coram had the occasion to hold as under:

"50. Article 226 of the Constitution is a succour to remedy injustice, and any limit on exerci exercise se of such power, is only self-

self imposed. Gainful refer- ence can be made to, amongst others, A V

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Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani Wadhwani, (1962) 1962) 1 SCR 573 and U P State Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. Kamal Swaroop Tandon,, (2008) 2 SCC 41. The High Courts, under the Constitutional scheme, are endowed with the ability to issue prerogative writs to safeguard rights of citizens. For ex ex- actly this reason, this Court urt has never laid down any strait strait-jacket jacket principles that can be said to have "cribbed, cabined and confined" [to borrow the term employed by the Hon. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) in E P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu,, (1974) 4 SCC 3 : AIR 1974 SC 555] the extraordinary powers vested under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution. Adjudged on the anvil of Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan (supra), this was a fit case for the High Court to have examined the matter tthreadbare, hreadbare, more so, when it did not involve navigating a factual minefield.")

13. Returning to the present case, though usually the proper course of action of the High Court ought to have been to confine itself to the acceptance/rejection of the prayer for bail made by the accused under Section 439 of the Code; however the High Court, being satisfied that there were, in its opinion, grave lapses on the part of the police/investigative machinery, which may have fatal consequences on the justice delivery system, em, could not have simply shut its eyes."

13.3 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as The

Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Mir Usman @ Ara @ Mir Usman Ali,

2025 INSC 1155 has held as under:

"35. The practice of conducting trials on a day tto o day basis more particularly in important or sensitive cases as was the tradition about thirty years ago has been given a complete go go-by.

by. We sincerely believe that it is high time that the courts revert to that practice. For the purpose of reverting to thee old practice, it is necessary to understand the current social, political and administrative scenario including the way the Police are functioning. All the High Courts need to constitute a Committee to discuss this issue very seriously for the benefit of their respective district judiciaries."

13.4 The chronic protraction of criminal proceedings serves as a

systemic blight that transcends the individual interest of the accused,

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inflicting a highly deleterious impact upon the collective conscience of the

society. While legal discourse frequently centers on the hardship of the

incarcerated, it is a grave juridical error to overlook the active suffering and

anguish visited upon the victim. For the aggrieved; an interminable trial is

not merely a procedural delay delay but a form of secondary victimization leading

to a state of perpetual emotional purgatory where the wounds of offense are

kept raw by the lack of finality. A Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Rattiram and Others Vs. State of M.P. through

Inspector of Police; 2012 AIR Supreme Court 1485 while appreciating the

observation in Mangal Singh and Another Vs. Kishan Singh and Others;

2009 AIR Supreme Court 1535; observed as under:

"47. While delineating on thee facets of speedy trial, it cannot be regarded as an exclusive right of the accused. The right of a victim has been given recognition in Mangal Singh and Anr. v. Kishan Singh and ors., AIR 2009 Supreme Court 1535 wherein it has been observed thus :-

:

"Any inordinate delay in conclusion of a criminal trial undoubtedly has highly deleterious effect on the society generally and particularly on the two sides of the case. But it will be a grave mistake to assume that delay in trial does not cause acute sufferin suffering g and anguish to the victim of the offence. In many cases the victim may suffer even more than the accused. There is, therefore no reason to give all the benefits on account of the delay in trial to the accused and to completely deny all justice to the victim tim of the offence."

The fundamental principle of an ever-evolving evolving liberty

jurisprudence dictates that prolonged incarceration, absent any realistic

prospect of a near-term near term conclusion of trial, renders continued pre pre-conviction conviction

detention constitutionally impermissible. Under the umbrella of Article 21

of the Constitution, the right to a speedy trial is recognized as an

indispensable facet of the guarantee of life and personal liberty. The pre-

pre

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trial incarceration must not, by mere flux of time, be permitted to assume

the character of punishment, as the state cannot be allowed to achieve

through procedural delay what it has not yet achieved through a verdict of

guilt. However, this Constitutional promise is not an absolute or unregulated

license, rather it ensures ensures that deprivations of liberty are neither arbitrary,

unconscionable nor unfair.

13.5 Where relief is being sought, solely upon the ground of

procedural delay, the court must adopt a golden mean approach, where the

rights of the accused/incarcerated person erson are protected without reducing the

criminal justice system to a state of toothlessness. Ergo, the Constitutional

inquiry into delay must be a contextual assessment of whether the continued

detention remains constitutionally permissible under the spec specific ific penumbra

of the case. Unless the delay is so inordinate that it shocks the judicial

conscience, it cannot be treated as a solitary determinant for enlargement. A

plea of delay cannot be examined in a legal vacuum or an abstraction;

instead it must be weighed against the gravamen of allegations; specific role

attributed to the applicant; trajectory of the trial; risks involved in

enlargement of the applicant on bail, etc. A profitable reference in this

regard can be made to the dicta passed by the Hon'b Hon'ble le Supreme Court in

Gulfisha Fatima vs. State (Govt. of Delhi), SLP (Crl.) No.13988 No.13988-2025, 2025,

relevant whereof reads thus:

"26. As the hearing progressed, however, it became evident that the plea of delay could not be examined in abstraction. In the course ooff submissions and rejoinder, reference was necessarily made to the nature of the allegations, the statutory framework invoked, and the role attributed to individual appellants. This was not a departure from the original submission, but a reflection of the legal reality that the constitutional question of delay does not arise in a vacuum.xxx xxx.

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30. Article 21 occupies a central place in the constitutional scheme. The right to life and personal liberty, and the insistence that any deprivation must conform nform to procedure established by law, are foundational guarantees. The right to a speedy trial has been recognised as an important facet of this guarantee. It follows that pre-trial trial incarceration cannot, by the mere passage of time, be permitted to assume the character of punishment.

31. At the same time, Article 21 has never been understood as operating in isolation from law. The constitutional promise is not that liberty will be unregulated, but that deprivations of liberty will not be arbitrary, unconsc unconscionable, ionable, or unfair. The expression "procedure established by law" reflects that balance.

xxx xxx."

A justice delivery system rests on a simple promise; fairness

delivered in reasonable time. Any procedural protraction does not merely

delay the verdict; it actively erodes the edifice of public confidence in the

judiciary. When a trial is allowed to langu languish, ish, it transcends the aphorism

that 'justice delayed is justice denied' and enters the more perilous territory

of 'justice doubted'.

doubted'. In the constitutional scheme of Article 21, the Right to

a Speedy trial is not a unilateral concession to the accused, but a collective

entitlement shared by the victim & the State, ensuring that S Scales cales of justice

do not rust through inaction.

13.6 Ergo, in cases where, notwithstanding the lapse of time, the

Court in its judicious wisdom finds that other factors preclude gr grant ant of bail,

a proactive approach to prevent travesty of justice must be adopted. In such

cases, the refusal to grant on bail must be coupled with a peremptory

mandate of expeditious conclusion of trial (or in appropriate cases a time-

time

bound conclusion of trial).

trial). A profitable reference in this regard can be made

to the dicta passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tarun Kumar Vs.

Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement; SLP (Crl.) No. 9431 of

2023, relevant whereof reads thus:

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"23. xxxx xxxx xxxx When the detention of the accused is continued by the Court, the courts are also expected to conclude the trials within a reasonable time, further ensuring the right of speedy trial guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution."

13.7 Ergo; in the factual milieu of the case in hand which tends to reflect that trial is procrastinating and witness(s) are not being examined for one cause or the other; it is a fit case which warrants direction(s) from this Court for expeditious/time-bound expeditious/time trial.

14. In view w of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:

(i) The petition in hand is devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed.

(ii) The Court below is directed to make an earnest endeavour to expedite the trial and conclude the same as expeditiously as ppossible ossible, preferably within a period of one year, in accordance with law. If need be, the learned trial Court is at liberty to adopt the procedure of day day-to-day day trial as enunciated by the Hon'ble trial Court in case of Mir Usman @ Ara @ Mir Usman Ali case (supra).

(iii) Any observations made and/or submissions noted hereinabove shall not have any effect on merits of the case and the investigating agency as also the trial Court shall proceed further, in accordance with law, without being influenced with this th order.