Gurnam Singh @ Gama vs State Of Haryana And Others
2026 Latest Caselaw 759 P&H

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Gurnam Singh @ Gama vs State Of Haryana And Others on 31 January, 2026

CRWP-12919-2025 (O&M)                                             -1-




      IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND
                  HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

301
                                                  CRWP-12919-2025 (O&M)
                                                 Date of decision : 30.01.2026

Gurnam Singh @ Gama                                             ...Petitioner

                                        Versus

State of Haryana and others                                   ...Respondents


CORAM:- HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE MANISHA BATRA

Present:-   Mr. Kushager Goyal, Advocate
            for the petitioner.

            Mr. Neeraj Poswal, AAG, Haryana.

                                    ********

MANISHA BATRA, J. (Oral)

1. The instant petition has been filed by the petitioner under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of a writ in the

nature of Certiorari for quashing the order dated 14.07.2025 (Annexure P-8),

passed by respondent No. 1-Secretary to Govt. of Haryana, Home

Department, whereby the petitioner was ordered to be detained, and also for

quashing of order dated 15.09.2025 (Annexure P-9), whereby the detention

of the petitioner was confirmed for six months by the said respondent.

2. Brief facts relevant for the purpose of disposal of this petition

are that the petitioner was involved in five cases, registered against him. All

of these cases had been registered against him under the provisions of the

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short 'NDPS

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Act') involving non-commercial quantities of the contrabands. He had been

granted concession of regular bail in all of those cases. Respondent

No. 4-Superintendent of Police, Dabwali wrote a letter on 21.03.2025 to

respondent No. 3-Director General of Police, Haryana State Narcotics

Control Bureau requesting him to detain the petitioner on the ground that he

was still involved in selling of narcotic substances. The said letter was

forwarded to respondent No. 2-Director General of Police, Haryana for

obtaining order under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and

Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (for short 'PITNDPS Act'). Thereafter,

respondent No. 1, while acting upon the proposal sent by respondent No. 2,

had ordered for detention of order, vide impugned order dated 14.07.2025.

The petitioner was accordingly detained on 05.08.2025. Then, vide

impugned order dated15.09.2025, respondent No. 2 had confirmed detention

order of the petitioner and the petitioner was ordered to be kept in detention

for a period of six months. Aggrieved from the same, the petitioner has filed

the present petition.

3. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the

impugned detention order dated 14.07.2025 and the confirmation order dated

15.09.2025 are arbitrary, illegal and violative of the fundamental right to

personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India as

the petitioner was already on regular bail in all the five cases registered

against him under the NDPS Act, each involving non-commercial quantity.

There existed no compelling necessity warranting recourse to the

extraordinary power of preventive detention against the petitioner. While

passing the detaining orders, the respondent-authority had mechanically

relied upon the pendency of criminal cases without recording any cogent

satisfaction as to why the conditions of bail imposed by the competent

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Courts were insufficient to prevent the alleged activities. It is further argued

that the failure to consider the efficacy of bail conditions vitiates the

subjective satisfaction and renders the detention order unsustainable. The

alleged involvement of the petitioner in cases relating to non-commercial

quantities under the NDPS Act, by itself, does not constitute a threat to

public order so as to justify preventive detention under the PITNDPS Act,

particularly when no fresh material or proximate incident has been brought

on record to demonstrate any imminent danger or continuing prejudicial

activity. The impugned action, therefore, amounts to using preventive

detention as a substitute for ordinary criminal law, which is impermissible in

law and results in unreasonable and disproportionate curtailment of the

personal liberty of the petitioner. The petitioner is in detention since

05.08.2025. His continued detention is a clear abuse of statutory power,

which suffers from non-application of mind and violates the constitutional

mandate of fairness, reasonableness and due process under Article 21,

warranting interference by this Hon'ble Court. Hence, it is urged that the

petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned orders are liable to be

quashed, thereby setting the petitioner at liberty forthwith.

4. Reply as well as status report has been filed by the respondent-

State. In terms thereof, learned State counsel has argued that there is no

illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders as the same have been passed

strictly in accordance with the provisions of the PITNDPS Act after due

application of mind and on the basis of credible material placed before the

competent authority showing the continuous involvement of the petitioner in

illicit trafficking of narcotic substances. Mere grant of bail in the pending

NDPS cases does not wipe out the antecedents of the petitioner nor does it

curtail the power of the State to invoke preventive detention to prevent

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future prejudicial activities. The repeated involvement of the petitioner in

five NDPS cases, even though involving non-commercial quantity, clearly

establishes a habitual pattern of narcotic trafficking posing a serious threat to

public health and social order. The safeguards prescribed under the

PITNDPS Act were duly complied with and the detention was subsequently

confirmed after statutory review. With these broad submissions, it is stressed

that the petition is liable to be dismissed.

5. This Court has heard the rival submissions.

6. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the

preventive detention order dated 14.07.2025 and the confirmation order

dated 15.09.2025 passed under the PITNDPS Act, whereby the petitioner,

who was already on bail in five NDPS cases involving non-commercial

quantities, has been detained for a period of six months. The core issue

which arises for consideration is whether such detention, in the facts and

circumstances of the case, satisfies the constitutional and statutory

requirements governing preventive detention or not? This question finds

answer in several judicial pronouncements. Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Golam Hussain v. Commissioner of Police (1974) 4 SCC 530 held that the

past conduct alone cannot justify preventive detention of a person, unless

there exists a live and proximate link between the alleged past activity and

the apprehension of future prejudicial conduct. It was categorically observed

that detention cannot be sustained merely because the detenu had indulged in

illegal activity in the distant past, as such an approach would amount to

misuse of preventive powers and virtual nullification of the judicial process.

Reliance can also be placed upon Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar,

(1984) 3 SCC 14, wherein Hon'ble Supreme had observed as under :

32. ...It is well settled that the law of preventive detention

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is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant law. The law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court."

7. Reference can also be made to Sama Aruna v. State of

Telangana, (2018) 12 SCC 150, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court

reiterated that although past conduct may be taken into consideration but

only such past activities which are proximate in time and have a direct

bearing on the likelihood of immediate future illegal conduct can be relied

upon. It was cautioned that stale incidents or remote antecedents cannot

form a valid foundation for preventive detention. In Sushanta Kumar Banik

v. State of Tripura, AIR 2022 SC 4715, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that

when a detenu has been granted bail in NDPS cases and such bail orders

have not been challenged by the State, the same constitutes a relevant and

material circumstance which ought to have been considered by the detaining

authority. It was observed that grant of bail under the stringent regime of the

NDPS Act indicates judicial satisfaction regarding the prima facie case and

likelihood of reoffending and non-consideration of such bail orders vitiates

the subjective satisfaction forming the foundation of preventive detention.

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8. Similar view has been taken by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Joyi

Kitty Joseph v. Union of India & Others, 2025 AIR SC 1702, wherein it

was held that preventive detention is an extraordinary measure and cannot be

resorted to mechanically or as a substitute for ordinary criminal law. It was

emphasized that where a detenu is already on bail in the criminal cases, then

before forming the basis of detention, the detaining authority is under a

constitutional obligation to consider the bail orders and the conditions

imposed therein and to record specific reasons as to why such conditions are

insufficient to prevent further prejudicial activities. It was further held that

failure to consider this vital aspect amounts to non-application of mind and

renders the "subjective satisfaction" of the detaining authority legally

unsustainable.

9. Reliance can also be placed upon Hemlata Kantilal Shah v.

State of Maharashtra (1981) 4 SCC 647, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme

Court held that though mere delay in passing a detention order is not ipso

facto fatal but such delay must be satisfactorily explained by the detaining

authority, failing which the order becomes vulnerable. The said principle

was reiterated and applied in Pradeep Nilkanth Paturkar v. S. Ramamurthi

(1993 Supp (2) SCC 61), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court quashed the

detention order on account of unexplained delay and observed that absence

of a reasonable explanation snaps the live and proximate link between the

alleged prejudicial activities and the necessity of detention. In Savita

Shankar Lokhande v. M.N. Singh, 2001 (2) MhLJ 410, the Division Bench

of Bombay High Court emphasized that unexplained inaction and

administrative laxity cast serious doubt on the genuineness of the subjective

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satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority and indicate that the

detention has assumed a punitive, rather than preventive, character. It was

categorically held that where the authorities fail to act with promptitude, the

"live link" between the alleged activities and the detention order stands

severed, rendering such detention unsustainable in law.

10. Further, reliance can be placed upon a recent pronouncement of

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Roshini Devi v. The State of Telangana and

others, 2026 INSC 41 wherein while relying upon the ratio of law laid down

in Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana and Others, (2023) 9 SCC 587, it

was observed as under:

"10. Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1986 enables the Government, if it is satisfied that a drug offender ought to be prevented from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order to make an order of preventive detention. The expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order"

has been defined by Section 2(a) of the Act 1986. As per the Explanation to the said provision, if any of the activities of the person concerned causes or is calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or a section thereof or in case of a grave widespread danger to life or public health is likely to be caused, such power can be exercised. The order of detention does not indicate in what manner the maintenance of public order was either adversely affected or was likely to be adversely affected so as to detain the detenu. Mere reproduction of the expressions mentioned in Section 2(a) of the Act of 1986 in the order of detention would not be sufficient. The detention order ought to indicate the recording of subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority in that regard. It is well settled that there is a fine distinction

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between "law and order" and "public order". Mere registration of three offences by itself would not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order unless there is material to show that the narcotic drug dealt with by the detenu was in fact dangerous to public health under the Act of 1986. This material is found to be missing in the order of detention."

11. On applying the aforesaid settled principles to the facts of the

present case, this Court finds that the impugned detention order is not

founded upon any credible, proximate or compelling material demonstrating

imminent likelihood of the petitioner's involvement in illicit trafficking. A

careful reading of the grounds of detention, which are annexed as Annexure

A with the impugned order, shows that the entire case of the respondents is

based only on the petitioner's past involvement in criminal cases and on

general and vague apprehensions about his future conduct, without pointing

out any specific, recent or concrete incident which could justify the extreme

step of preventive detention. Merely describing the petitioner as a "habitual

offender" or stating that he is "likely to resume trafficking" is not sufficient

in law unless supported by credible and proximate material showing an

immediate threat. It is also significant that the petitioner is on bail in all the

cases. However, the detaining authority has nowhere examined or recorded

any finding as to how the conditions imposed by the criminal Courts were

inadequate or ineffective to prevent the alleged activities. As held by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court, consideration of bail orders and bail conditions is a

mandatory requirement and failure to do so reflects non-application of mind

and vitiates the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.

12. Further, the last case against the petitioner was registered on

20.01.2025, whereas the detention order was passed only on 05.08.2025,

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after a gap of more than six months, without any satisfactory explanation.

Such unexplained delay clearly breaks the live and proximate link between

the alleged past activities and the need for immediate preventive action.

When these factors are seen together, it becomes evident that the impugned

detention is based more on past history and assumptions rather than on any

real and urgent necessity. The detention, therefore, assumes a punitive

character instead of a preventive one and results in an unreasonable and

unjustified curtailment of the petitioner's fundamental right to personal

liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. In view of the

discussion as made above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the

impugned orders are not sustainable. Accordingly, the present petition is

allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. The petitioner is ordered to be

released from detention forthwith.

30.01.2026                                              (MANISHA BATRA)
Waseem Ansari                                               JUDGE


                Whether speaking/reasoned                     Yes
                Whether reportable                            Yes




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