[Cites 30, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Gurdev Singh vs State Of Punjab on 9 April, 2026
Author: Anoop Chitkara
Bench: Anoop Chitkara
CRA-D-1343-2025
-1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRA-D-1343-2025
JUDGEMENT JUDGEMENT OPERATIVE PART UPLOADED ON
RESERVED ON PRONOUNCED PRONOUNCED OR
ON FULL
17.03.2026 09.04.2026 FULL PRONOUNCED 09.04.2026
Gurdev Singh ...Appellant
Versus
State of Punjab ...Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUKHVINDER KAUR
Present: Mr. Mitul Singh Rana, Advocate
for the appellant.
Ms. Pooja Nayar Sharma, D.A.G., Punjab.
****
ANOOP CHITKARA, J.
FIR No. Dated Police Station Section
35 06.06.2022 Bakshiwala, District 25(7), (8) of Arms Act, 411, 489,
Patiala 212, 216 IPC and 13, 16, 20 of
UAPA
Bail Application number before the Sessions CIS No. 3620 of 04.09.2025
Court
Date of Decision 10.09.2025
1. Aggrieved by the dismissal of regular bail by the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala
vide order dated 10.09.2025, the appellant had come up before this Court by filing the
present appeal under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008.
2. Per custody certificate, the appellant has the following criminal antecedent:
Sr. RC No. Date Offenses Police Station
No.
1. 21/2019 01.10.2019 489A, 489B, 489C, 120B IPC, NIA
3,4,5 of Explosive Act and 25 of
Arms Act
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3. The appellant's counsel submits that the appellant would have no objection
whatsoever to any stringent conditions that this Court may impose, including that if the
appellant repeats the offense or commits any non-bailable offense which provides for a
sentence of imprisonment for more than seven years, the State may file an application to
revoke this bail before the concerned Court having jurisdiction over this FIR, which shall
have the authority to cancel this bail, and to which the appellant shall have no objection.
Counsel for the appellant further submits that he shall not use his right of speech expression
beyond what is permitted under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
4. The facts of the case are being taken from the short reply dated January 19, 2026
filed by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Patiala. On June 6, 2022, when the police party
was present for the purpose of patrolling and detecting crime, they received secret
information that Binder Singh alias Harman Singh alias Polo, Gagandeep Singh alias Teja
and Kamaldeep Singh alias Kamal Lahoran were involved in several cases pertaining to
heinous offenses and were declared proclaimed persons in multiple offenses. The informer
also gave information that at that time they were having lethal weapons including pistols,
revolvers and ammunition. Based on this information, the police registered the FIR.
5. After that, on June 7, 2022, the police also received further information about their
current location, based on which the police conducted a raid and recovered ammunition, 1
pistol, and four live cartridges from Sukhjinder Singh alias Polo and then a revolver from
Gagandeep Singh alias Teja. The investigation further led to the involvement of Kamaldeep
Singh alias Kamal Lahoran who was arrested on September 25, 2022. From his search, the
police recovered a .32 bore pistols and two live cartridges. The investigation further
revealed that the pistol and cartridges had been given to the appellant by Pritpal Singh alias
Gary Batra in February 2022 and he was working as their conduit through WhatsApp
messages.
6. The appellant's counsel seeks bail on the grounds that the appellant was arrested
based on disclosure statement of co-accused and there is no other evidence against him
except the alleged recovery of two mobile phones. Counsel for the appellant further submits
that it is not a case of UAPA Act and that appellant's custody is in violation of Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. Additionally, the appellant also seeks bail on parity.
7. State counsel opposes the bail and submits that the appellant is neither entitled for
bail on merits nor on parity nor on custody.
8. An analysis of the above said arguments would lead to the following outcome. It
shall be appropriate to refer to the role of the appellant from paragraph no. 22 of the short
reply, which reads as follows:
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"22. The Role of the appellant in the above captioned FIR: That during
the course of investigation, the role of appellant Gurdev Singh alias Preeti
surfaced on the basis of disclosure statements suffered by co-accused.
particularly Kamaldeep Singh alias Kamal Loharan, wherein it was
categorically disclosed that the appellant was the key coordinator and
facilitator of the supply of illegal arms and ammunition and was acting at
the behest of handlers operating from abroad. The appellant was found to
be giving specific directions through WhatsApp to the co-accused for
collecting foreign-made pistols and live cartridges from predetermined
locations, including near the Pathankot Toll Plaza, and was maintaining
continuous communication for the movement, concealment and further
distribution of such weapons for unlawful and terrorist activities. After his
arrest on 04.10.2022 on production warrants, the appellant, during
interrogation, disclosed that he had clandestinely concealed mobile
phones by creating a cavity in the bathroom of Barrack No. 6, Block-C.
Faridkot Jail, from where he was actively communicating with his
associates; pursuant to his disclosure statement, two mobile phones were
recovered, which were being used for coordinating the illegal supply chain
of arms and ammunition. In view of his central role as a coordinator, his
active association with other accused persons, his conscious involvement
in facilitating communication, procurement and circulation of foreign-
made weapons, and his participation in the larger conspiracy having
terrorist ramifications, offences under Sections 13, 16 and 20 of the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 were rightly invoked against
the appellant, clearly establishing his active and knowing participation in
the unlawful and terrorist activities forming the subject matter of the
present case."
9. Although a specific role is attributed to the appellant, but the recovery from him
were only two mobile phones and he has been in custody for a sufficient period. As per the
custody certificate dated March 16, 2026, the appellant's custody in the present case is 02
years, 04 months and 25 days, as such, the applicant is entitled to bail on the grounds of
custody. Additionally, the similarly placed co-accused namely Bhavdeep Singh was granted
bail by this Court and Pritpal Singh Batra alias Giffy Batra was granted bail by a Co-
ordinate Division Bench of this Court.
10. Given the above, the applicant is entitled to bail on merits, on custody, and on
parity.
11. In Yedala Subba Rao and Anr. v. UOI, 2023-INSC-382, Apr 17, 2023, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court holds,
[21]. We have examined material relied upon against the appellants in
paragraph 5 of the additional affidavit of the respondent as well as the
chargesheet. Taking the material against the appellants as it is and
without considering the defence of the appellants, we are unable to form
an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusations against the appellants of commission of offence under the
UAPA are prime facie true. Hence, the embargo on the grant of bail
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under proviso to subsection (5) of Section 43D will not apply in this case.
We, however, make it clear that the findings recorded in this Judgment
are only prima facie observations recorded for the limited purposes of
examining the case in the light of the proviso to subsection (5) of Section
43D of the UAPA. The trial shall be conducted uninfluenced by these
observations.
12. In Vernon v. State of Maharashtra [2023] 10 S.C.R. 867; 2023 INSC 655, July 28,
2023, the Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,
[43]. In the case of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) [National
Investigation Agency -vs- Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC
1]reference was made to the judgment of Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal
-vs- State of Tamil Nadu [(2005) 2 SCC 13) in which, citing two earlier
decisions of this court in the cases of State -vs- Jagjit Singh (AIR 1962
SC 253) and Gurcharan Singh -vs- State of (UT of Delhi) [(1978) 1 SCC
118), the factors for granting bail under normal circumstances were
discussed. It was held that the nature and seriousness of the offences, the
character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being
secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tempered
with; the larger interest of the public or the State would be relevant
factors for granting or rejecting bail. Juxtaposing the appellants' case
founded on Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India with the
aforesaid allegations and considering the fact that almost five years have
lapsed since they were taken into custody, we are satisfied that the
appellants have made out a case for granting bail. Allegations against
them no doubt are serious, but for that reason alone bail cannot be denied
to them. While dealing with the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the
1967 Act, we have referred to the materials available against them at this
stage. These materials cannot justify continued detention of the
appellants, pending final outcome of the case under the others provisions
of the 1860 Code and the 1967 Act.
13. In Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab & Another, SLP (Criminal) No.10047 of
2023, 2024-INSC-92, February 07, 2024, the Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,
[18]. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary penal
offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted
phrase - 'bail is the rule, jail is the exception' - unless circumstances
justify otherwise - does not find any place while dealing with bail
applications under UAP Act. The 'exercise' of the general power to grant
bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope. The form of the
words used in proviso to Section 43D (5)- 'shall not be released' in
contrast with the form of the words as found in Section 437(1) CrPC -
'may be released' - suggests the intention of the Legislature to make bail,
the exception and jail, the rule.
[19]. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task on hand. In
dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the courts are merely
examining if there is justification to reject bail. The 'justifications' must
be searched from the case diary and the final report submitted before the
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Special Court. The legislature has prescribed a low, 'prima facie'
standard, as a measure of the degree of satisfaction, to be recorded by
Court when scrutinising the justifications [materials on record]. This
standard can be contrasted with the standard of 'strong suspicion', which
is used by Courts while hearing applications for 'discharge'. In fact, the
Supreme Court in Zahoor Ali Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] has noticed this
difference, where it said:
"In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the
Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is
lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for
considering a discharge application or framing of charges in
relation to offences under the 1967 Act."
[20]. In this background, the test for rejection of bail is quite plain. Bail
must be rejected as a 'rule', if after hearing the public prosecutor and
after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a
conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusations are prima facie true. It is only if the test for rejection of bail
is not satisfied - that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail
application in accordance with the 'tripod test' (flight risk, influencing
witnesses, tampering with evidence). This position is made clear by Sub-
section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on
granting of bail specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the
restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for
the time being in force on grant of bail.
[21]. On a textual reading of Section 43 D(5) UAP Act, the inquiry that a
bail court must undertake while deciding bail applications under the UAP
Act can be summarised in the form of a twin-prong test :
1) Whether the test for rejection of the bail is satisfied?
1.1 Examine if, prima facie, the alleged 'accusations' make out an
offence under Chapter IV or VI of the UAP Act
1.2 Such examination should be limited to case diary and final
report submitted under Section 173 CrPC;
2) Whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail in light of
the general principles relating to grant of bail under Section 439
CrPC ('tripod test')? On a consideration of various factors such as
nature of offence, length of punishment (if convicted), age,
character, status of accused etc., the Courts must ask itself :
2.1 Whether the accused is a flight risk?
2.2. Whether there is apprehension of the accused tampering with
the evidence?
2.3 Whether there is apprehension of accused influencing
witnesses?
22. The question of entering the 'second test' of the inquiry will not
arise if the 'first test' is satisfied. And merely because the first test
is satisfied, that does not mean however that the accused is
automatically entitled to bail. The accused will have to show that
he successfully passes the 'tripod test'.
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[33]. Hence, we are of the considered view that the material on record
prima facie indicates the complicity of the accused as a part of the
conspiracy since he was knowingly facilitating the commission of a
preparatory act towards the commission of terrorist act under section 18
of the UAP Act.
[34]. For the aforementioned reasons the bail application of the Appellant
is rejected and consequently the appeal fails...
14. In Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of U.P., [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1054; 2024 INSC 534, July
18, 2024, the Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,
[5]. First Information Report (FIR) was lodged against the appellant by
the informant Inspector Tej Bahadur Singh under Sections 121A, 489B
and 489C of IPC. It came to be registered as Crime No. 01 of 2015.
Informant stated that fake Indian currency notes of the denomination of
Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 500, totalling a sum of Rs. 26,03,500.00, were
recovered from the possession of the appellant on 22.02.2015 at about
09:10 PM from the Indo-Nepal border. He was apprehended by a
constable of the ATS team and brought to the ATS Headquarter. In the
course of investigation, the appellant disclosed his name as Sheikh Javed
Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari, resident of Narayani Parsa,
Belwa, Nepal. In addition to the fake Indian currency notes, one
Nepalese driving licence of the appellant and one Nepalese citizenship
certificate also of the appellant were recovered besides two mobile
phones. According to the police, appellant had confessed that he was
engaged in the illegal trade of supplying counterfeit Indian currency
notes in Nepal. The appellant was arrested on 23.02.2015.
[32]. This Court has, time and again, emphasized that right to life and
personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is
overarching and sacrosanct. A constitutional court cannot be restrained
from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory
provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused-
undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been
infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the
way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever
stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of
constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part.
In the given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline
to grant bail. But it would be very wrong to say that under a particular
statute, bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of
our constitutional jurisprudence. In any view of the matter, K.A. Najeeb
(supra) being rendered by a three Judge Bench is binding on a Bench of
two Judges like us.
[33]. Thus, having regard to the discussions made above, we are of the
considered view that continued incarceration of the appellant cannot be
justified. We are, therefore, inclined to grant bail to the appellant.
15. In Harpreet Singh Talwar v. State of Gujarat, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 291; 2025 INSC 662,
May 13, 2025, the Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,
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[25]. Having given our anxious consideration to the submissions
advanced by both sides and upon careful perusal of the material on
record, we are of the view that the Appellant has not been able to make
out a case for grant of regular bail at this stage.
[26]. We say so for the reason that despite no direct recovery of
contraband effected from the Appellant, the Prosecution's case is that he
played a coordinating and enabling role in facilitating the import of
narcotics concealed as talc through M/s Magent India--which he
allegedly controlled through a proxy. The consignment, although not
seized with heroin, shares structural and logistical similarities with those
where heroin was ultimately found.
[27]. The charge against the Appellant must also be evaluated in light of
the broader matrix of facts, including
(i) his alleged meetings in Dubai with a principal foreign accused;
(ii) the transfer of documents through intermediaries for the
clearance of a flagged consignment;
(iii) efforts to retrospectively fabricate invoices and assign
responsibility to others;
(iv) the use of multiple firms allegedly connected to him to
obfuscate the true nature of the transactions; and
(v) his telephonic calls to certain co-conspirators.
These aspects, supported by the statements of protected witnesses and
circumstantial linkages, currently meet the threshold of prima facie
satisfaction regarding the Appellant's complicity.
[28]. This Court is cognizant of the fact that no heroin or narcotic
substances were directly recovered from the consignment linked to the
Appellant. However, the investigative narrative does not rest solely on
physical recovery but proceeds on the basis of conspiracy and
facilitation. In such cases, the absence of direct seizure is not dispositive,
particularly where there exists a pattern of covert coordination, fictitious
entities, and barter-based compensation--features which, according to
the prosecution, mark the smuggling architecture employed in the present
matter.
[29]. The Appellant faces serious charges, which allegedly carry grave
societal ramifications, including the facilitation of cross-border drug
trafficking--an offence with well-documented links to organised crime
and public health degradation. The seizure in the connected consignment
is part of what the Prosecution claims to be the largest heroin bust in
Indian history, valued at over INR 21,000 crores. The scale and
sophistication of the operation, involving foreign syndicates, shell firms,
medical visas, and false documentation, elevates this case far beyond
routine NDPS violations.
[30]. This Court also cannot ignore the fact that multiple key witnesses
still remain to be examined, and the trial while underway, will take time
in completion. Out of 24 most vulnerable or material witnesses, two have
died, and two others are untraceable. One of the deceased witnesses, a
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retired Customs Officer, was found dead on the very day he was
scheduled to record his statement under Section 164 CrPC. The risk of
witness tampering or elimination--whether directly attributable to the
Appellant or not--is a real and present concern that militates against the
grant of bail at this stage.
[31]. Moreover, the Appellant's criminal antecedents, though not
involving prior accusations under the NDPS Act, include multiple DRI
and customs proceedings involving smuggling of cigarettes,
undervaluation of imports, and alleged complicity in corruption offences.
These antecedents are relevant only for the limited purpose of evaluating
the Appellant's propensity to interfere with the process of justice if
enlarged on bail.
[32]. NIA has also highlighted that several accused remain absconding,
including the primary foreign conspirators. In that context, the
Appellant's foreign travel, overseas connections, and financial capacity
cannot be overlooked in evaluating the possibility of flight risk. These
are not speculative concerns but flow directly from the Appellant's prior
conduct and profile.
[33]. We are conscious of the settled principle that pre-trial incarceration
should not translate into punitive detention. The Appellant has been in
custody since 24.08.2022, and while we do not find that this duration
alone warrants bail under the present circumstances, the Appellant shall
remain at liberty to renew his prayer for bail after a period of six months,
or upon substantial advancement in the trial, whichever is earlier. Such a
course would allow the Prosecution to complete the examination of its
core witnesses while preserving the accused's right to seek release at a
later and more appropriate stage.
[34]. Before parting with this matter, we deem it necessary to clarify that,
at this stage, it would be premature and speculative to extend the
allegations against the Appellant to the domain of terror financing. While
the prosecution has invoked provisions of the UAPA and has broadly
linked the smuggling enterprise to trans-national syndicates with
suspected affiliations, there is no compelling reason to currently link the
Appellant and proscribed terrorist organisations, either within or outside
the country. The evidentiary foundation to sustain such a grave allegation
must be clear and compelling--something that, can be seen only after a
substantial portion of evidence is led by both the parties.
[35]. In light of the foregoing discussion, and without expressing any
opinion on the merits of the case, we dismiss the instant appeal with the
following directions:
i. We are not inclined to enlarge the Appellant on regular bail at
this stage. He shall be at liberty to renew his plea for regular bail
after a period of 6 months, or at a stage where the ongoing trial has
progressed substantially;
ii. The NIA is directed to submit to the Special Court an additional
list of witnesses who, in its assessment, are sensitive or material,
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inasmuch as their testimony may have a direct bearing on the role
of the Appellant or other co-accused in the ongoing trial and
connected investigation;
iii. The Special Court is directed to list the matter twice in a month
and record the statements of Prosecution witnesses on a continuous
and uninterrupted basis; and
iv. If the Presiding Officer of the Special Court has not been posted
thus far, we request the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the High Court of
Gujarat to do the needful within a week.
16. In the light of the Judicial Precedents of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India,
considering the nature of allegations against the appellant and keeping in mind the stage of
trial, and the pre-trial custody, we are of the considered opinion that further pre-trial
incarceration would cause grave injustice to the appellant.
17. Further, the appellant, through his counsel, undertakes not to indulge in any Anti-
India activity and also that he would not cross the limits of his speech and expression
beyond what is permitted under Article 19 of the Constitution of India and considering the
entire facts and the pre-trial custody, which on the face of it, is excessive for the purpose of
pre-trial custody and the undertaking given by the appellant through counsel, we are of the
considered opinion that his further custody is not required.
18. Without commenting on the case's merits, in the facts and circumstances unique and
peculiar to this case, and for the reasons mentioned above, the appellant makes a case for
bail.
19. Given the above, provided the appellant is not required in any other case, the
appellant shall be released on bail in the FIR captioned above, subject to furnishing bonds
of Rs. 1 lac to the satisfaction of the concerned trial Court and due to unavailability before
any nearest Chief Judicial Magistrate or Duty Magistrate/ Ilaqa Magistrate.
20. In Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) Jan 05, 2026, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court holds,
[434]. The appellants granted bail shall be released subject to the
following conditions, which are imposed not as matters of form, but as
substantive safeguards in the interest of national security, public order,
and the integrity of the trial process.
i. xxxx
ii. xxxx
iii. The appellants shall surrender their passports, if any, before the Trial
Court. Where no passport exists, an affidavit to that effect shall be filed.
We direct the respondent to intimate all the immigration authorities in the
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country not to permit their exit from the country in any manner
whatsoever, without express permission from the Trial Court.
iv. The appellants shall furnish their current residential addresses, contact
numbers, and e-mail addresses to the Investigating Officer as well as to
the Trial Court. The appellants shall not change their place of residence
or contact particulars without giving at least seven days' prior written
intimation to the Investigating Officer and the Trial Court.
v. xxxx
vi. The abovenamed appellants shall not directly or indirectly contact,
influence, intimidate or attempt to contact any witness or any person
connected with the proceedings, nor shall they associate with or
participate in the activities of any group or organization linked to the
subject matter of the present FIR/ final report.
vii. The appellants shall not make or publish or disseminate any
information, statement, article or post whether in print, electronic or
social media concerning the present case or its
participants till conclusion of the trial.
viii. The appellants shall not participate in any programme or address or
attend any gathering, rally or meeting, whether physically or virtually till
conclusion of the trial.
ix. The appellants shall not circulate any post either in electronic form or
physical form or circulate any hand bills, posters, banners, etc in any
form whatsoever.
x. The appellants shall fully cooperate with the trial and shall appear on
every date of hearing unless exempted for reasons to be recorded by the
Trial Court to its satisfaction and they shall
not exhibit any conduct that has the effect of delaying the proceedings.
xi. The appellants shall maintain peace and good behaviour throughout
and in the event of any offence committed during the pendency of the
trial, the prosecution would be at liberty to seek for revocation of the bail
granted by filing such application before the Trial Court and in the event
of such application being filed the Trial Court shall consider it on its own
merits.
[435]. In case of breach of any of the afore-stated conditions imposed or
in the event of appellants having misused the liberty granted, it shall be
open to the Trial Court to cancel the bail which would be necessarily
after affording opportunity of hearing to the appellants.
21. The Appellants shall abide by all the above conditions as were ordered by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Gulfisha Fatima supra, before the police station
concerned in the present case.
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22. In addition to the above conditions, the Appellant shall also abide by the following
additional conditions, wherever these do not overlap with the conditions mentioned in
Gulfisha Fatima supra. It is clarified that the conditions mentioned in Gulfisha Fatima
supra are to be preferred over the following conditions imposed by this Court.
23. The appellant shall abide by all statutory bond conditions and appear before the
concerned Court(s) on all dates. The appellant shall not tamper with the evidence,
influence, browbeat, pressurize, induce, threaten, or promise, directly or indirectly, any
witnesses, Police officials, or any other person acquainted with the facts and circumstances
of the case or dissuade them from disclosing such facts to the Police or the Court.
24. The appellant shall not seek any unnecessary adjournment, and if he does so, the
State shall have the right to apply for cancellation of bail.
25. The appellant shall mention his current address, phone number, e-mail, if any, and
present address, native address, and in case of change, he shall inform the SHO of the
police station concerned through a registered letter by mentioning the case number.
Additionally, he shall also inform the concerned Court before whom the bonds were
furnished.
26. Given the background of allegations against the appellant, it becomes paramount to
protect the members of society as well as the integrity of the country, and incapacitating the
accused would be one of the primary options until the filing of the closure report,
discharge, or acquittal. Consequently, it would be appropriate to restrict the possession of
firearms. This restriction is being imposed based on the preponderance of evidence of
probability and not of evidence of certainty, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt; and as such, it
is not to be construed as an intermediate sanction. Given the nature of the allegations and
the other circumstances peculiar to this case, the appellant shall surrender all weapons,
firearms, and ammunition, if any, along with the arms license, to the concerned authority
within fifteen days of release from prison and inform the Investigator of compliance.
However, subject to the Indian Arms Act, 1959, the appellant shall be entitled to renew and
take it back in case of acquittal in this case, provided that this is otherwise permissible
under the concerned rules. Restricting firearms would instill confidence in society; it would
also restrain the accused from influencing the witnesses and repeating the offense.
27. The conditions mentioned above imposed by this court are to endeavor to reform
and ensure that the accused does not repeat the offense. In Mohammed Zubair v. State of
NCT of Delhi, 2022:INSC:735 [Para 28], Writ Petition (Criminal) No 279 of 2022, Para 29,
decided on July 20, 2022, A Three-Judge bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court holds that "The
bail conditions imposed by the Court must not only have a nexus to the purpose that they
seek to serve but must also be proportional to the purpose of imposing them. The courts,
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while imposing bail conditions must balance the liberty of the accused and the necessity of
a fair trial. While doing so, conditions that would result in the deprivation of rights and
liberties must be eschewed."
28. In Md. Tajiur Rahaman v. The State of West Bengal, decided on 08-Nov-2024, SLP
(Crl) 12225-2024, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds in Para 7, "It goes without saying that if
the petitioner is found involved in such like offence in future, the concession of bail granted
to him today will liable to be withdrawn and the petitioner is bound to face the necessary
consequences."
29. This bail is conditional, with the foundational condition being that if the appellant
repeats the offense or commits any non-bailable offense which provides for a sentence of
imprisonment for more than three years, the State shall file an application to revoke this
bail before the trial Court having jurisdiction over this FIR, which shall have the authority
to cancel this bail, and as per their discretion, they may cancel this bail.
30. Any observation made hereinabove is tentative and is not an expression of opinion
on the case's merits, and it shall have no bearing on the trial or on the case of the co-
accused, and the trial Court shall not advert to these comments.
31. It is clarified that this bail order shall not be considered as a blanket bail order in
any other matter and is only limited to granting bail in the FIR mentioned above.
32. In Amit Rana v. State of Haryana, CRM-18469-2025 [in CRA-D-123-2020, decided
on 05.08.2025], a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in paragraph 13,
holds that "To ensure that every person in judicial custody who has been granted bail or
whose sentence has been suspended gets back their liberty without any delay, it is
appropriate that whenever the bail order or the orders of suspension of sentence are not
immediately sent by the Registry, computer systems, or Public Prosecutor, then in such a
situation, to facilitate the immediate restoration of the liberty granted by any Court, the
downloaded copies of all such orders, subject to verification, must be accepted by the Court
before whom the bail bonds are furnished."
33. Given the above, the impugned order is set aside and appeal is allowed in terms
mentioned above. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(ANOOP CHITKARA)
JUDGE
(SUKHVINDER KAUR)
JUDGE
09.04.2026
Jyoti Sharma
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes
Whether reportable: No.
authenticity of this order/judgment
High Court, Sector 1, Chandigarh
