[Cites 29, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Shiv Kumar vs State Of Punjab And Another on 2 April, 2026
Author: Rajesh Bhardwaj
Bench: Rajesh Bhardwaj
CRM-M No.7423 of 2024 -1-
127
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M No.7423 of 2024
Reserved on: 11.02.2026
Pronounced on: 02.04.2026
Uploaded on: 02.04.2026
Shiv Kumar Sarpanch
..... Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and another
..... Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BHARDWAJ
***
Present: Mr. Gurinder Singh Dhot, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Ms. Ramta Chowdhary, DAG, Punjab.
None for respondent No.2.
***
RAJESH BHARDWAJ, J.
1. Present petition has been filed praying for the quashing of
FIR No.105, dated 01.07.2022, under Sections 21(1) & 4(1) of Mines &
Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 (Section 379 IPC added
later on), registered at Police Station Lalru, District SAS Nagar including
the police report (challan) filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C. along with all
consequent proceedings arising therefrom. Further prayer has been made
for staying the further proceedings before the learned trial Court during
the pendency of the present petition.
2. Succinctly, the facts of the case are that FIR in the present
case was got registered on the statement of complainant, namely, Satpal
Singh for stopping the illegal mining in village Bhagwasi and for taking
action against the accused. It was alleged that mining was conducted in
last few days and the same was got done by the present Sarpanch of
village Shiv Kumar in Khasra No.750, which was the common land of
village and the same was being done without any permission, which was
the violation of the Mining rules. Thus, the request was made to take
legal action against the accused. On the basis of the same, the FIR was
registered. On registration of the FIR, the investigation commenced. On
completion of the investigation, the challan was presented under Section
173 Cr.P.C. and the petitioner was prosecuted under Sections 21(1), 4(1)
of Mines & Minerals Act, 1957 and Section 379 IPC. On framing of
charges, the trial commenced. After registration of the FIR, the petitioner
was granted the concession of anticipatory bail by this Hon'ble Court
vide order dated 23.03.2023 passed in CRM-M-31155-2022. Hence, the
petitioner is before this Court praying for quashing of the above said FIR
along with the challan filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently submitted
that the petitioner has been falsely and frivolously implicated in the
present case. He has submitted that the present FIR was registered against
the petitioner at the instance of respondent No.2 and after completion of
the investigation, the challan was presented before the learned trial Court
on 26.10.2023. He has further submitted that on perusal of the FIR and
police report, no offences under Section 21(1) of Mines & Minerals
(Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 (for short 'the Act') and Section
379 IPC are made out. He has submitted that the petitioner has no
concern with the khasra No.750, in which the illegal mining had taken
place and the same is under the illegal possession of some other persons
of village Bhagwasi. He has further submitted that the petitioner is the
Sarpanch of the village and he has performed his duties honestly. He has
submitted that some persons of village are in illegal possession of the
Panchayat land and the petitioner, being the Sarpanch, had initiated the
legal action against them, which resulted in enmity and thus, in lieu of the
same, the present FIR has been registered against the petitioner with
intention to remove him from the post of Sarpanch in order to retain their
illegal possession of the Panchayat land. He has submitted that the
complainant-respondent No.2 is also in the illegal possession of the
common land in Khasra No.326(5-10), 327(4-0) and 383(1-3) and the
petitioner had initiated the process to remove the complainant's
encroachment on the abovesaid land and passed a resolution in this
regard on 11.06.2022. He has submitted that the petitioner has already
approached before the Collector (Panchayat Lands), SAS Nagar and he
got issued the possession warrants of the Gram Panchayat land against
the persons, namely, Kulwinder, Sushil Kumar, Harichand and Naresh
Kumar, who were cited as witnesses against the petitioner in the police
challan. He has submitted that after registration of the FIR, the petitioner
was suspended by the Director, Rural Development and Panchayat vide
order dated 29.05.2023 against which the petitioner has earlier filed CWP
No.26755 of 2023 before this Hon'ble Court and this Hon'ble Court had
stayed the order dated 29.05.2023 vide order dated 30.11.2023. He has
further submitted that after the suspension of the petitioner, the
Government appointed the Administrator of the village, who passed a
resolution dated 25.11.2023 regarding 17 warrants of possession received
by the village Panchayat, which shows that the Khasra No.750 is in the
possession of other persons including the witnesses of the present case.
He has submitted that the investigating agency could not collect any
evidence to connect the petitioner with the alleged crime, however the
challan has been presented before the learned trial Court with intention to
harass the petitioner at the instance of persons, who are in illegal
possession of the Panchayat land. He has submitted that the petitioner has
already granted the concession of anticipatory bail by this Hon'ble Court
vide order dated 23.03.2023 passed in CRM-M-31155-2022. To buttress
his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the
decision passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in 'State of Haryana vs.
Bhajan Lal', AIR 1992 SC 604. He has further relied upon the decisions
passed by by this Hon'ble Court in 'Sukhdev Singh vs. State of Punjab',
CRM-M-36469-2019, decided on 13.06.2024; 'Karampal and another
vs. State of Haryana', 2014(2) Crimes 607 and 'Jagjit Singh vs. State of
Punjab', CRM-M-19534-2014, decided on 10.11.2014 and has submitted
that cognizance of offence punishable under Section 21 of Mines &
Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 can be taken only on a
complaint in writing to be filed by the authorized person and that FIR
cannot be recorded in respect of an offence punishable under Section 21
of the said Act and as such, the present case is squarely covered by the
said decisions. He has further submitted that the present FIR, being
nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court, deserves to be quashed.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the State has opposed the
submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner. She has
submitted that the petitioner was found doing the mining of earth without
any licence or permit and committed an offence under Section 4(1) and is
rightly punishable under Section 21(1) of Mining & Minerals
(Development & Regulation) Act, 1957. She has further submitted that in
the facts and circumstances, no ground for quashing of the FIR is made
out and thus, the present petition deserves to be dismissed.
5. The Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the record with their able assistance.
6. On the analysis of the arguments advanced and the record
perused, it has been transpired that the present FIR has been lodged on
the statement of complainant-respondent No.2, namely, Satpal Singh for
stopping the illegal mining in village Bhagwasi. The allegations made
against the petitioner in the FIR are that the petitioner, who was the
Sarpanch of the village, was doing illegal mining in the common land of
the village without any permission. The petitioner has already been
granted the concession of anticipatory bail by this Hon'ble Court vide
order dated 23.03.2023 passed in CRM-M-31155-2022. After completion
of the investigation, the challan was presented before the learned trial
Court on 26.10.2023. As submitted before this Court by learned counsel
for the petitioner, the illegal mining was got done by some other persons
of village Bhagwasi and they are also in illegal possession of the
Panchayat land. Suspension order of the petitioner was also stayed by this
Court vide order dated 30.11.2023 passed in CWP-26755-2023.
7. For consideration, Sections 21 & 22 of Mines and Minerals
(Development & Regulation) Act is equally relevant, which is as under:
'21. Penalties.―(1) Whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-
section (1) or sub-section (1A) of section 4 shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend
to five years and with fine which may extend to five lakh
rupees per hectare of the area.
(2) Any rule made under any provision of this Act may provide
that any contravention thereof shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or
with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees, or with
both, and in the case of a continuing contravention, with
additional fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees
for every day during which such contravention continues
after conviction for the first such contravention.]
(3) Where any person trespasses into any land in
contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section
4, such trespasser may be served with an order of eviction
by the State Government or any authority authorised in this
behalf by that Government and the State Government or
such authorised authority may, if necessary, obtain the help
of the police to evict the trespasser from the land.
(4) Whenever any person raises, transports or causes to be
raised or transported, without any lawful authority, any
mineral from any land, and, for that purpose, uses any tool,
equipment, vehicle or any other thing, such mineral tool,
equipment, vehicle or any other thing shall be liable to be
seized by an officer or authority specially empowered in
this behalf.
(4A) Any mineral, tool, equipment, vehicle or any other thing
seized under sub-section (4), shall be liable to be
confiscated by an order of the court competent to take
cognizance of the offence under sub-section (1) and shall
be disposed of in accordance with the directions of such
court.
(5) Whenever any person raises, without any lawful authority,
any mineral from any land, the State Government may
recover from such person the mineral so raised, or, where
such mineral has already been disposed of, the price
thereof, and may also recover from such person, rent,
royalty or tax, as the case may be, for the period during
which the land was occupied by such person without any
lawful authority.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an offence under
sub-section (1) shall be cognizable.
22. Cognizance of offence: No Court shall take cognizance of
any offence punishable under this Act or any rules made
thereunder except upon complaint in writing made by a
person authorized in this behalf by the Central Government
or the State Government.'
8. A bare perusal of Section 22 of the Mines and Minerals Act
would show that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence
punishable under Section 21 of the Act except upon complaint in writing
made by a person authorized in this behalf by central government or State
government. Hon'ble the Supreme Court and this Court has time and
again held that if complaint as mentioned in terms of Section 22 of the
Act is not made, then the cognizance is bad and contrary to the law.
9. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in 'Kanwar Pal Singh vs. State
of Uttar Pradesh and another', 2020(1) RCR (Criminal) 545, has held
as under:
"11. We would again advert to the decision in Sanjay (supra)
which had overruled the decision of the Calcutta High
Court in Seema Sarkar v. State wherein the High Court
held the proceedings to be invalid and illegal as the
Magistrate had taken cognizance on the basis of a charge-
sheet submitted by the police under Section 21(2) of the
Mines Regulation Act and Section 379 of the IPC,
observing that the cognizance was one that cannot be split
or divided. The High Court had further observed that as
the complaint was not made in terms of Section 22 of the
Mines Regulation Act, the cognizance was bad and
contrary to law. We have already noted the decision of the
Delhi High Court which had directed that the FIR should
not be treated as registered under Section 379 of the IPC
but only under Section 21 of the Mines Regulation Act.
These decisions of the Calcutta High Court and the Delhi
High Court were reversed and set aside by this Court in
Sanjay (supra) after referring to Section 26 of the General
Clauses Act and the meaning of the expression 'same
offence', to observe that the offence under Section 21 read
with Section 4 of the Mines Regulation Act and Section
379 of the IPC are different and distinct. The aforesaid
reasoning compels us to reject the contention of the
appellant that the action as impugned in the FIR is a mere
violation of Section 4 which is an offence cognizable only
under Section 21 of the Mines Regulation Act and not
under any other law. There is no bar on the Court from
taking cognizance of the offence under Section 379 of the
IPC. We would also observe that the violation of Section 4
being a cognizable offence, the police could have always
investigated the same, there being no bar under the Mines
Regulation Act, unlike Section 13(3)(iv) of the TOHO Act.
12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we would uphold the
order of the High Court refusing to set aside the
prosecution and cognizance of the offence taken by the
learned Magistrate under Section 379 of the IPC and
Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public
Property Act. We would, however, clarify that prosecution
and cognizance under Section 21 read with Section 4 of
the Mines Regulation Act will not be valid and justified in
the absence of the authorisation. Further, our observations
in deciding and answering the legal issue before us should
not be treated as findings on the factual allegations made
in the complaint. The trial court would independently
apply its mind to the factual allegations and decide the
charge in accordance with law. In light of the aforesaid
observations, the appeal is partly allowed, as we have
upheld the prosecution and cognizance of the offence
under Section 379 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the
Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act. There
would be no order as to costs."
10. A similar view has been taken up time and again by this
Court in 'Jagjit Singh vs. State of Punjab', 2014(30) RCR (Criminal)
562, which held as under:
"9. A perusal of Section 22 of the Act brings out that an
offence punishable under Section 21 of the Act is a non-
cognizable offence. To put it otherwise cognizance of an
offence punishable under Section 21 of the Act can be
taken only on complaint in writing to be filed by the
authorised person. To clarify further, an F.I.R cannot be
recorded in respect of an offence punishable under Section
21 of the Act. In Harmela Ram Versus State of Haryana
(supra), a similar situation arose and this Court quashed
the FIR and proceedings arising therefrom by observing
that the offence being non-cognizable, FIR in the matter
could not be recorded and continuance of the proceedings
arising therefrom would be an abuse of process of law and
the Court. It has been contended on behalf of the
respondent-State that offence of Section 379, IPC, being a
cognizable offence, FIR has been rightly recorded even
though another offence which happens to be non
cognizable is involved. I regret my inability to subscribe to
the view put forth on behalf of the respondent-State. It is
not in dispute that offence of Section 379, IPC, is a simple
as offence of theft and the theft of sand or other minerals is
governed by the provisions of the Act, which is a special
statute. The matter being regulated by a special statute,
provisions of general law have to give way to the
provisions of said Act. This was so held by this Court in
M/s Mahalakshmi Spinners Ltd. Versus State of
Haryana, 2007(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 381, Raman Kapila and
another Versus State of Punjab 2012(4) R.C.R.
(Criminal )634 and Rakesh Kumar Versus State of
Haryana 2011(3) R.C.R(Criminal) 629. Nothing to the
contrary has been shown during the course of hearing.
10. That being so, the offences of Section 379, IPC, could not
be included in the First Information Report and allowing
the proceedings under that provision, would, in disputably
amount to an abuse to the process of law and the Court
and shall be vexations.
11. The consequence that follows is that the only offence that
could be said to have been committed by the petitioners
under falls Section 21 of the Act which would be a non-
cognizable offence in terms of Section 22 of the Act and, as
such, the FIR recorded in the matter deserves to be
quashed.
12. In the consequence, I accept the petition and quash the
F.I.R No.9 dated 17.02.2013 recorded under Section 379,
IPC, and Section 21 of Mines and Minerals (Regulation &
Development) Act, 1957, (Annexure P1) with all the
proceedings emanating therefrom."
11. A bare perusal of statutory provision of the 528 of B.N.S.S.
would show that the High Court may make such orders, as may be
necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse
of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of cases including
Narinder Singh and others Versus State of Punjab and another, 2014
(6) SCC 466; B.S.Joshi and others vs State of Haryana and another
(2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases 675 followed by this Court in Full
Bench case of Kulwinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and
another, 2007(3) RCR 1052 have dealt with the proposition involved in
the present case and settled the law.
13. Thereafter, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh vs State
of Punjab and another (2012) 10 Supreme Court Cases 303 further
dealt with the issue and the earlier law settled by the Supreme Court for
quashing of the FIR in State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335. Para 61 of the judgment reads as under:-
"61. The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in
quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise
of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power
given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under
Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with
no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with
the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends
of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In
what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint
or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have
settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to
the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences
of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's
family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences
are not private in nature and have serious impact on society.
Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in
relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity, etc; cannot provide for any basis
for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But
the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly
civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of
quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial,
financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions
or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or
the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or
personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire
dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash
criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction
is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would
put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme
injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal
case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with
the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether
it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue
with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal
proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite
settlement and compromise between the victim and the
wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is
appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer
to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall
be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."
14. In the considered opinion of this Court the prosecution of the
petitioners is nothing but an abuse of the process of Court. As a result,
this Court finds that the case in hand squarely falls within the ambit and
parameters settled by judicial precedents and hence, FIR No.105, dated
01.07.2022, under Sections 21(1) & 4(1) of Mines & Minerals
(Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 (Section 379 IPC added later on),
registered at Police Station Lalru, District SAS Nagar including the
police report (challan) filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C. along with all
consequent proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed qua the
petitioner.
15. Petition stands allowed.
(RAJESH BHARDWAJ)
02.04.2026 JUDGE
rittu Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
