Punjab-Haryana High Court
Dharamvir Singh vs State Of Punjab on 21 November, 2025
CRM-M No.64913 of 2025 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
222
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CRM-M No.64913 of 2025
Date of decision : 21.11.2025
Date of uploading : 21.11.2025
Dharamvir Singh .............Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab .......Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present: Mr. Raj Kumar Gupta, Advocate, for the petitioner
Mr. Baljinder Singh Sra, Addl. AG, Punjab
---
SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)
1. Present petition has been filed under Section 483 of Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for grant of regular bail to the petitioner
in case bearing FIR No.160 dated 25.8.2024, registered for the offences
punishable under Section 18-C of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 (for short 'NDPS Act') at Police Station Mandi
Gobindgarh, Fatehgarh Sahib.
2. The gravamen of the allegations against the petitioner is that he
is an accused of being involved in an FIR pertaining to NDPS Act
involving 5 Kgs. of opium allegedly recovered from the petitioner and his
co-accused on 24.8.2024 in the area of Anaj Mandi, Mandi Gobindgarh
while they were going on motor cycle bearing registeration No.PB08-DA-
0857.
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3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is
in custody since 24.8.2024. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further
submitted that the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not been
complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent
defects. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the trial is
delayed and the liability thereof cannot be fastened upon the petitioner.
Learned counsel has further iterated that the petitioner has suffered
incarceration for about 01 year, 2 months and 22 days. Thus, regular bail
is prayed for.
4. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by
arguing that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in
nature and, thus, he does not deserve the concession of the regular bail.
Learned State counsel has further submitted that the instant bail plea is
restricted by the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and thus, the same
ought to be dismissed. Learned State counsel seeks to place on record
custody certificate dated 19.11.2025 in Court, which is taken on record.
5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through
the available records of the case.
6. The petitioner was arrested on 24.8.2024, whereinafter,
investigation was carried out and the challan was presented on 8.1.2025.
Charges in the present case were framed on 30.1.2025. Total 18
prosecution witnesses have been cited, but only 10 have been examined
and 01 has been given up till date. The rival contentions raised at Bar give
rise to debatable issues shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of
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trial. This Court does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival
contentions, at this stage, lest it may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible
has been brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner
absconding from the process of justice or interfering with the prosecution
evidence.
6.1 A perusal of the zimni orders passed by the trial Court, brought
forth by the petitioner, indicates that the trial is indeed procrastinating and
folly thereof cannot be saddled upon the petitioner. As per custody
certificate dated 19.11.2025 filed by the learned State counsel, the
petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a period of 01 year, 2
months and 22 days. In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.
6.2 This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of
Punjab passed in CRM-M-64074-2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after
relying upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1
SCC 81; Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed
Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR
(Criminal) 494; Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi)
reported as 2023 INSC 311; Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated
07.02.2020 titled as "Chitta Biswas Alias Subhas vs. The State of West
Bengal"; "Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The State of West Bengal",
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated 22.08.2022 titled as
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"Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of Gujarat"; Criminal
Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal Krishna Patra
@ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus:
"7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate
anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail
any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there
is an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This
right has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio
decidendi of the above-referred to Supreme Court's judgments have
laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental
rights. The concept of speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21
as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty,
guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy
trial begins with the actual restraint imposed at the time of the arrest of
the accused and consequent incarceration which continues at all
stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and
revision so that any possible prejudice that may result due to
impermissible and avoidable delay since the time of the commission of
the offence till the criminal proceedings consummate into a finality,
could be averted. The speedy trial, early hearing and quick disposal
are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The overcrowded Court-
dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant pressure on the
prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire criminal
jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this
cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the
accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to
the criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs.
The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and
prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an
obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The
guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused
against oppressive pre-trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the
accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal
charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence will be lost
or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability
of the accused to defend himself. It goes without saying that the
consequences of pre-trial detention are grave. Accused, presumed
innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to psychological and
physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous conditions.
Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused
frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family.
There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to
accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of
contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail
petition in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep
in mind the rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985
which mandates that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after
hearing the public prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin
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conditions which are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused
is not guilty of the offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37
of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be meticulously scrutinized against the
backdrop of accused's fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to
life and personal liberty cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted
delays in the judicial process, particularly where such delay(s) is
neither attributable to the accused nor justified at the end of the
prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind
bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid
down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature in its
wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases
under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under
Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson's eye
to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this
legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does
not become complicit in violation of an individual's fundamental rights,
notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with
bail petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act, 1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the
legislative intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right
of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration,
without justifiable cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into
punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the principle of
justice and equity.
Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has
failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged
incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of
life and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty
overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the
NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In
other words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity,
on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985."
Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial
is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is
ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds
to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate.
However, in addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned
trial Court/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the
following conditions:
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral
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or documentary, during the trial.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date
before the trial.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on
bail.
(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with
the trial Court.
(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the
Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station
and shall not change his cell-phone number without
prior permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the
trial.
(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of
every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial
Court, to the effect that he has not been involved in
commission of any offence after being released on
bail. In case the petitioner is found to be involved in
any offence after his being enlarged on bail in the
present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise,
the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for
cancellation of his bail which plea, but of course, shall
be ratiocinated upon merits thereof.
8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those
which may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as
directed hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the
State/complainant shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the
petitioner.
9. Ordered accordingly.
10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the case.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
21.11.2025
Ashwani Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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