Punjab-Haryana High Court
Punjab Mandi Board vs State Of Punjab And Others on 21 November, 2025
CWP-14378-2024 -1-
CWP-15371-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
1. CWP-14378-2024 (O&M)
Punjab Mandi Board
... Petitioner
Vs.
State of Punjab and others
... Respondents
2. CWP-15371-2025 (O&M)
Jagroop Singh
... Petitioner
Vs.
Punjab Mandi Board and others
... Respondents
Reserved on: 10.11.2025
Pronounced on: 21.11.2025
Uploaded on: 21.11.2025
Whether only the operative part of the judgment is pronounced ? No
Whether full judgment is pronounced ? Yes
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR
Present: Mr. K.S. Sidhu, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Praagbir Singh Dhindsa, Advocate
for the petitioner (in CWP-14378-2024).
Mr. F.S. Dhillon, Advocate
for the petitioner (in CWP-15371-2025) and
for respondent No.3 (in CWP-14378-2024).
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Mr. Vikas Sonak, AAG, Punjab.
Mr. Vikas Chatrath, Sr. Advocate with
Ms. Priya Kaushik, Advocate,
Ms. Haridhi Aggarwal, Advocate
for the respondent-Mandi Board (in CWP-15371-2025).
Mr. Deepak Sabharwal, Advocate and
Mr. Gurnoor S. Sandhu, Advocate
for respondent No.3 (in CWP-15371-2025).
*******
HARPREET SINGH BRAR, J.
1. This common order shall dispose of the aforementioned two writ
petitions, as they arise from a similar factual matrix. The petitioner-Board in
CWP-14378-2024 seeks a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the
order dated 01.12.2023 (Annexure P-19) passed by respondent No.2
(Additional Secretary, Agriculture and Farmers Welfare Department, Punjab),
whereby the revision petition filed by respondent No.3-Jagroop Singh was
allowed directing the correction of his date of birth in the service record from
01.01.1966 to 15.01.1968 and the order dated 27.12.2023 (Annexure P-20)
passed by respondent No.2, whereby the review application filed by the
petitioner-Board against the order dated 01.12.2023 was dismissed.
2. Petitioner-Jagroop Singh, in CWP-15371-2025, seeks a writ in the
nature of certiorari for quashing of chargesheet dated 20.03.2025 (Annexure
P-1 in CWP-15371-2025) issued against him by the respondent-Board.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3. Briefly stated, the genesis of this litigation lies in the dispute
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regarding the recorded date of birth of Jagroop Singh, who is respondent No.3
in CWP-14378-2024 and petitioner in CWP-15371-2025. He was initially
appointed as Clerk on ad hoc basis for 89 days vide office order No.756 dated
08.04.1992 (Annexure P-1 in CWP-14378-2024) and joined his duties on
16.04.1992. At the time of joining, he submitted his matriculation certificate
(Annexure P-2), issued on 01.10.1984, in which his date of birth is recorded as
01.01.1966. This date was also consistently declared by him in the proforma
for police verification dated 27.05.1992 (Annexure P-3). His services were
regularized w.e.f. 02.05.1994 vide office order No.1338 dated 18.09.1994
(Annexure P-4) and he was later promoted, ultimately holding the position of
Secretary, Market Committee, Dhariwal.
4. As per the petitioner-Board, respondent No.3 vide application
dated 23.08.1996 (Annexure P-5), for the very first time, sought correction of
his date of birth in the service record from 01.01.1966 to 15.01.1968. This
application was based on a Birth Certificate dated 13.08.1996 (Annexure P-6)
issued by the Additional District Registrar, Birth and Death, Gurdaspur. The
petitioner-Board, vide its letter dated 19.09.1996 (Annexure P-7), directed
respondent No.3 to first get the correction made in his matriculation certificate
from the Punjab School Education Board. However, on 14.08.1999, he served
a legal notice (Annexure P-8), reiterating his request for correction. The Board
rejected his prayer vide letter dated 25.07.2000 (Annexure P-9).
5. The above rejection triggered a long and protracted legal battle.
Respondent No.3 filed a revision petition (termed as an appeal) under Section
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42 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (for short 'Act of
1961') before respondent No.2 being revisional authority. However, instead of
deciding the matter on merits, respondent No.1 issued a letter dated 10.04.2002
(Annexure P-11/T) to the petitioner-Board, directing it to take appropriate
action. Consequently, the petitioner-Board issued a letter dated 02.05.2002
(Annexure P-12/T) stating that the request of respondent No.3 for correction of
his date of birth had already been rejected vide communication dated
25.07.2000 (Annexure P-9) and he had been duly informed regarding the same.
6. Over the next two decades, from 2002 to 2021, respondent No.3
made a series of repeated representations, legal notices and applications
(Annexures P-13 to P-18) seeking the same relief. These included requests for
a 'No Objection Certificate' to approach the Education Board. All these
representations were consistently rejected by the Board on the ground of being
time-barred under the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume-I, Part-I (for short
'PCS Rules'), which had been adopted by the Board. On 26.10.2021, the Board
passed a fresh order (Annexure P-18/T) again rejecting his request primarily on
the ground that the application was not filed within the period of two years
from the date of coming into force of Annexure-A of Rule 2.5 of PCS Rules,
Vol. 1, Part 1. The relevant portion of the order dated 26.10.2021 (Annexure P-
18/T) is reproduced as under:
"On the subject cited above and the letter under reference, it is
written that you are working in the Board for the last 29 years and
as per Annexure-A of Rule 2.5 of The Punjab Civil Services Rules
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(Volume 1), Part-1 you were to submit your application for
correction in the date of your birth along with documentary proof
within a period of two years from the date of coming into force of
the said Rules. Therefore, the application submitted by you after
consideration is consigned to records. You are also instructed to
refrain from unnecessary correspondence with this office."
7. Challenging the order dated 26.10.2021 (Annexure P-18/T) and all
previous rejections, respondent No.3 filed a revision petition under Section 42
of Act of 1961 before respondent No.2. Respondent No.3 contended before the
revisional authority that the Punjab Civil Services (First Amendment) Rules,
Volume I, Part I, 1994 (for short '1994 Amendment') (referred to as
'Government notification' in the revisional order) came into force on
22.06.1994. Under this amendment, employees already in service on the date
of its commencement could seek correction of date of birth within two years
from the date of coming into effect the amended rules. He argued that his first
application for correction of date of birth had been submitted on 06.05.1994
(Annexure P-4 in CWP-15371-2025), which was already pending
consideration, when 1994 Amendment came into force and was, therefore, well
within the prescribed limitation period of two years. However, the petitioner-
Board's consistent stand was that it never received this application.
8. To resolve the disputed factum regarding receipt of application
(Annexure P-4 in CWP-15371-2025), the revisional authority summoned the
original dispatch register/diary from the District Mandi Officer, Gurdaspur (for
short 'DMO'). The then DMO Kuljit Singh appeared before the revisional
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authority on 30.11.2023 and made a statement (Annexure P-14 in CWP-15371-
2025) confirming that the application dated 06.05.1994 was sent to the Head
Office via registered post. Furthermore, during pendency of the revision
petition, Jagroop Singh was asked to submit the copies of original birth
certificates so as to get verified from the concerned department. Accordingly,
the revisional authority found that Additional District Registrar, Births and
Deaths, Gurdaspur had verified the genuineness of the birth certificates
showing the date of birth as 15.01.1968. (Annexures P-12 and P-13 in CWP-
15371-2025). In light of the aforesaid, the revision was allowed vide impugned
order dated 01.12.2023 (Annexure P-19 in CWP-14378-2024) and the Board
was directed to correct the date of birth to 15.01.1968. The Board's review
application filed against the order dated 01.12.2023 (Annexure P-19 in CWP-
14378-2024) was also dismissed vide order dated 27.12.2023 (Annexure P-20).
9. Aggrieved by the aforementioned orders, the petitioner-Board
filed CWP-14378-2024 before this Court. During pendency of the aforesaid
writ petition, the Board issued a chargesheet dated 20.03.2025 (Annexure P-1
in CWP-15371-2025) against respondent No.3-Jagroop Singh. The chargesheet
levels allegations of forgery and tampering with official records (specifically
1992 and 1994 records and the dispatch register) and fabricating documents
(including the application dated 06.05.1994) to secure an undue extension of
service. Challenging this chargesheet, Jagroop Singh has approached this Court
by way of filing CWP-15371-2025.
CONTENTIONS
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10. Learned counsel for the petitioner-Board, inter alia, contends that
the impugned order dated 01.12.2023 (Annexure P-19) is patently illegal and
violates the express provisions of Rule 2.5 of PCS Rules, Volume-I, Part-I. It is
further contended that the date of birth declared by an employee at the time of
entry into government service is deemed conclusive and the Rules permit an
employee to apply for a change of date of birth only within a period of two
years from the date of coming into force of 1994 Amendment, i.e., within two
years from 22.06.1994. His first application on record was made only on
23.08.1996, which was beyond the stipulated period of two years. Therefore,
all his applications were rightly rejected as time-barred. Reliance has been
placed on a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Dhani Ram
Chaudhary Vs. State of Haryana, 2005 (1) SCT 571 and judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Harnam Singh, (1993) 2 SCC
162, to contend that a request for correction of date of birth must be made by
the employee within the period of limitation prescribed in the relevant service
rules; consequently, any delay in seeking such correction bars the relief.
11. Learned counsel vehemently disputed the existence and
authenticity of the application dated 06.05.1994. It was contended that this
application is a totally false and forged document. The Board's record do not
show its receipt and it was never entered in the Receipt Register. The entry in
the Dispatch Register maintained in the office of DMO, Gurdaspur, is
manipulated and fictitious. It was argued that respondent No.3, who was
working as an Assistant and later as Senior Assistant in that very office, had
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control over the record and tampered with it. The entry was made as the last
entry on a page and the word 'Registered' was written against a different entry,
making the entire entry doubtful.
12. Further, learned counsel for the petitioner-Board challenged the
veracity of the Birth Certificates produced by respondent No.3. It was
contended that the Birth Certificate dated 13.08.1996 (Annexure P-6) records
name of mother of respondent No.3 as Malkiat Kaur. However, a subsequent
Birth Certificate issued on 22.06.2021 (Annexure P-21) records his mother's
name as Gurmeet Kaur. This fundamental contradiction in a vital particular
renders both certificates untrustworthy and no reliance can be placed on them.
Learned counsel stressed that several other official documents of respondent
No.3 consistently affirm his date of birth as 01.01.1966, which was ignored by
the revisional authority. These include his Aadhaar Card (Annexure P-22),
Passport (Annexure P-23) and official Identity Card (Annexure P-24).
13. It was argued that it is a well settled principle of law that a date of
birth cannot be changed at the fag-end of an employee's career. Respondent
No.3 was due to retire on 31.12.2023 and the impugned order (Annexure P-19)
was passed on 01.12.2023, granting him an unmerited extension of two years.
Reliance in this regard is placed on judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
State of Maharashtra Vs. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble, (2010) 14 SCC 423.
14. Learned counsel further contended that first revision petition was
dismissed as far back as in the year 2002. Therefore, second revision petition
filed decades later was not maintainable in law and the revisional authority
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committed a grave illegality in entertaining it. Moreover, the order dated
27.12.2023 (Annexure P-20), dismissing the review application filed by the
petitioner-Board, was cryptic and non-speaking, failing to deal with any of the
substantive grounds raised by the Board.
15. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.3, inter alia,
contended that the application for correction was submitted on 06.05.1994.
This application was already pending consideration before the petitioner-Board
when 1994 Amendment came into force on 22.06.1994 and was, therefore,
well within the prescribed two years' limitation period. The Board's inaction
on this application for years cannot be used to the detriment of an employee.
16. It was submitted that the revisional authority's order is based on a
meticulous verification process. The Board itself got the Birth Certificates
verified from the issuing authority, i.e., the Registrar of Births and Deaths, who
certified it as genuine. This finding of fact, based on verification by the
competent authority, cannot be challenged in writ jurisdiction. Furthermore, the
original record (dispatch register) was summoned by the revisional authority.
The then DMO, Gurdaspur, the official custodian of the record, produced it and
gave a statement confirming that the application was sent. The Board, being
the custodian of this record, cannot now disown it.
17. Learned counsel vehemently argued that the present writ petition
filed by the Board is not maintainable, as it raises seriously disputed questions
of fact regarding the authenticity of application and the Birth Certificates.
Reliance was placed on a judgment of the Division Bench of Chhattisgarh
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High Court in M/s Sai Info Services Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others,
2025 NCCGHC 24239, wherein the Court, after relying on the judgments of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, has held that where disputed questions of fact are
involved, the High Court should not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. Rather, the proper remedy in such cases is to
file a civil suit.
18. Furthermore, it was argued that the petitioner-Board has not
demonstrated any jurisdictional error, perversity, or violation of principles of
natural justice in the impugned order passed by the revisional authority. In the
absence of such grounds, this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, cannot
sit in appeal over the findings of fact duly recorded by the competent revisional
authority. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Neemuch Vs. Mahadeo Real Estate &
Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 738.
19. Moreover, learned counsel submitted that the chargesheet dated
20.03.2025 (Annexure P-1 in CWP-15371-2025) is a blatant example of
malafides and a colourable exercise of power. It has been issued with the sole
intent to harass respondent No.3 and to nullify the effect of the statutory order
dated 01.12.2023 (Annexure P-19). It was argued that the chargesheet has been
issued despite the Board being estopped from raising allegations of having
forged documents by way of issuing chargesheet, having earlier relinquished
this ground by neither raising such objection nor contesting it before the
competent authority while the revision petition was being heard on the same
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cause. All relevant objections, including allegations of forgery or tampering of
records, stood deemed to have been raised and rejected in the proceedings
before the revisional authority. Therefore, it was submitted that initiation of the
departmental proceedings on the same cause of action is without jurisdiction,
hit by the principles of res judicata and estoppel and represents a malafide
attempt to frustrate and circumvent the findings of a quasi-judicial/statutory
authority. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in State of Punjab Vs. V.K. Khanna, 2001 (1) SCT 933, to contend that where
the element of malice or malafide is apparent and the inquiry would be a mere
farce, the Court is justified in quashing the chargesheet at the threshold to
avoid harassment.
20. Learned counsel further submitted that the chargesheet was issued
under pressure and as an act of vengeance. The then DMO Kuljit Singh was
punished for his statement before the revisional authority (Annexure P-14). He
then, to save his own skin, concocted a story against respondent No.3. He had
refused to resign voluntarily as per his old date of birth, which led to this
vindictive action. It was also brought to the notice of this Court that said Kuljit
Singh was punished by the department vide order dated 05.03.2025, in which
one increment without cumulative effect was stopped. Subsequently, vide order
dated 15.05.2025, he has been reverted from the post of District Mandi Officer
to the post of Deputy District Mandi Officer. Furthermore, it was argued that
the Board, in the absence of any formal order or subsisting stay on the
operation of the impugned order of the Additional Secretary, has arbitrarily and
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without authority withheld the salary of respondent No.3 from August 2024
onwards, even while he continued to perform the duties of Secretary, Market
Committee.
21. In reply, learned counsel for Punjab Mandi Board submitted that a
mere chargesheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of
action, as it does not amount to an adverse order affecting the rights of a party,
unless it is issued by an authority lacking in inherent jurisdiction. It was
asserted that in the present case, the jurisdiction of the competent authority to
issue the chargesheet is not disputed, therefore, the invocation of extraordinary
writ jurisdiction, at this nascent stage, is premature and impermissible.
Reliance in this regard was placed on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Union of India Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28, and
Secretary, Ministry of Defence Vs. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, (2012) 11
SCC 565. Furthermore, it was argued the chargesheet dated 20.03.2025
(Annexure P-1 in CWP-15371-2025) contains allegations of an exceptionally
grave and serious nature, which must be thoroughly investigated through a full-
fledged departmental enquiry.
OBSERVATION & ANALYSIS
CWP-14378-2024
22. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record
of the cases with their able assistance.
23 Rule 2.5 of PCS Rules, Vol. 1, Part 1, as it presently stands, reads
as follows:
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"2.5. Age.-The day on which a Government employee retires or is
retired or is discharged or is allowed to resign from service as the
case may be, shall be treated as his last working day. The date of
death shall also be treated as working day:
Provided that in the case of a Government employee who is
retired prematurely or who retires voluntarily under sub-rule
(1) or sub-rule (2) of rule 3 of the Punjab Civil Services
(Premature Retirement) Rules, 1975, as the case may be, the
date of retirement shall be treated as a non working day.
Note 1.-Every person newly appointed to a service or a post
under Government should at the time of appointment, be
asked to produce birth certificate issued by the Registrar,
Birth and Deaths, and in the absence of such a certificate, he
should furnish either an attested copy of Matriculation
Certificate or an affidavit in proof of correctness of the date
of birth. The actual date or the assumed date determined
under Note 2 below should be recorded in the History of
Service, Service Book, or any other record that may be kept
in respect of the Government Employee's service under
Government and once recorded, it cannot be altered except
in the case of clerical error, without the previous orders of
Government (see also Annexure 'A' to this Chapter).
xxx xxx xxx
Note 3.-The date of birth given by an employee, in his
application form, submitted to a recruiting agency viz., the
Punjab Public Service Commission or the Punjab
Subordinate Services Selection Board or the Departmental
Selection Committee as the case may be, shall be treated as
final and no change in it shall be allowed after entry into
Government service.
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For administrative instructions in respect of
alterations in the date of birth, see Annexure 'A' to this
Chapter.
xxx xxx xxx
ANNEXURE 'A'
(Referred to in Rule 2.5 and Note 3 thereunder)
1. In regard to the date of birth, a declaration of age made
at the time of or for the purpose of entry into Government
service shall, as against the Government employee in
question, be deemed to be conclusive. The employees
already in the service of the Government of Punjab on the
date of coming into force of the Punjab Civil Services (First
Amendment) Rules, Volume-I, Part-I, 1994, may apply for
the change of date of birth within a period of two years
from the coming into force of these rules on the basis of
confirmatory documentary evidence such as Matriculation
Certificate or Municipal Birth Certificate, etc. No request
for the change of date of birth shall be entertained after the
expiry of the said period of two years. Government, however
reserves the right to make a correction in the recorded age of
a Government employee at any time against the interests of
the Government employees when it is satisfied that the age
recorded in his service book or in the History of service of a
Gazetted Government employee is incorrect and has been
incorrectly recorded with the object that the Government
employee may derive some unfair advantage therefrom.
2. When a Government employee, within the period allowed,
makes an application for the correction of his date of birth as
recorded a special enquiry should be held to ascertain his
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correct age and reference should be made to all available
sources of information such as Certified Copies of entries in
the municipal birth register, University or School age
Certificate, Janam Patris or horoscopes. It should, however,
be remembered that it is entirely discretionary on the part of
the sanctioning authority to refuse or grant such application
and no alteration should be allowed unless it has
satisfactorily been proved that the date of birth as originally
given by the applicant was a bonafide mistake and that he
has derived no unfair advantage therefrom.
3. The result of every such enquiry should, in the case of
gazetted, non-gazetted Government employees be briefly
stated in their service cards, service books and if a correction
is sanctioned, the fact should be reported to the Accountant-
General."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. The revisional authority, upon examining the original record and
statement of the then DMO, Gurdaspur (Annexure P-14 in CWP-15371-2025),
categorically held that an application dated 06.05.1994 for correction of date of
birth had, in fact, been submitted by respondent No.3 and forwarded to the
Secretary, Punjab Mandi Board by registered post. This application was
already pending consideration when 1994 Amendment came into force and
was, therefore, well within the prescribed two years' limitation period. The
authenticity of respondent No.3's birth certificate was also duly verified by the
Additional District Registrar, Births and Deaths, Gurdaspur. In light of these
findings, the revision was allowed and the petitioner-Board was directed to
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modify the date of birth of respondent No.3 to 15.01.1968, as recorded in the
certificate issued by the Registrar, Births and Deaths, Gurdaspur.
25. This Court is of the considered view that it is well settled that the
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are to be exercised only
where the findings recorded by an authority are arbitrary, suffer from
procedural illegality, or disclose manifest prejudice. This Court cannot re-
appreciate the matter on merits and substitute the conclusion drawn by the
concerned authority with its own. Tritely, a High Court cannot sit in appeal
with respect to the decision arrived. As such, this Court must confine itself to
ensuring that the findings rendered are justified by the material available on
record and the proceedings were conducted in compliance with the prescribed
procedure as well as the principles of natural justice.
26. A two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in South
Indian Bank Ltd. Vs. Naveen Mathew Philip, (2023) 17 SCC 311, speaking
through Justice M.M. Sundresh, has observed as follows:
"13. A writ of certiorari is to be issued over a decision when the
court finds that the process does not conform to the law or
statute. In other words, courts are not expected to substitute
themselves with the decision-making authority while finding
fault with the process along with the reasons assigned. Such a
writ is not expected to be issued to remedy all violations. When a
tribunal is constituted, it is expected to go into the issues of fact
and law, including a statutory violation. A question as to whether
such a violation would be over a mandatory prescription as
against a discretionary one is primarily within the domain of the
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Tribunal. So also, the issue governing waiver, acquiescence, and
estoppel. We wish to place reliance on the decision of this Court in
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque [Hari Vishnu Kamath
v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, (1954) 2 SCC 881 : (1955) 1 SCR 1104] :
(SCC pp. 898-900, paras 24-27):
"24. Then the question is whether there are proper grounds
for the issue of certiorari in the present case. There was
considerable argument before us as to the character and
scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which
it could be issued. The question has been considered by this
Court in Parry & Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Employees' Assn.
[Parry & Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Employees' Assn., (1952) 1
SCC 449] , G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. [G.
Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., (1952) 1 SCC
334] , Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian of Evacuee Property
[Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian of Evacuee Property,
(1952) 1 SCC 798] and quite recently in T.C. Basappa v. T.
Nagappa [T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, (1954) 1 SCC 905] .
On these authorities, the following propositions may be taken
as established:
24.1. Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of
jurisdiction, as when an inferior court or Tribunal acts
without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise
it.
24.2. Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or
Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted
jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an
opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the
principles of natural justice.
24.3. The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in
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exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction.
One consequence of this is that the Court will not review
findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal,
even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a
Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has
jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when
the legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal
against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose
and policy, if a superior court were to rehear the case on
the evidence, and substitute its own findings in certiorari.
These propositions are well-settled and are not in
dispute...
xxx xxx xxx
...The position was thus summed up by Morris, L.J. : (R.
case [R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex p
Shaw, (1952) 1 KB 338 (CA)] , KB p. 357)
'It is plain that certiorari will not issue as the cloak of an
appeal in disguise. It does not lie in order to bring up an
order or decision for rehearing of the issue raised in the
proceedings. It exists to correct error of law where
revealed on the face of an order or decision, or
irregularity, or absence of, or excess of, jurisdiction where
shown.'
27. In G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. [G. Veerappa
Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., (1952) 1 SCC 334] , it was
observed by this Court that under Article 226 the writ should be
issued : (SCC p. 341, para 26)
'26. ... in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or
bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in
excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural
justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them,
or there is an error apparent on the face of the record....'
In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa [T.C. Basappa v. T.
Nagappa, (1954) 1 SCC 905] the law was thus stated : (SCC p.
915, para 11)
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'11. ... An error in the decision or determination itself
may also be amenable to a writ of "certiorari" but it must
be a manifest error apparent on the face of the
proceedings e.g. when it is based on clear ignorance or
disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a
patent error which can be corrected by "certiorari" but
not a mere wrong decision.'"
(Emphasis supplied)
27. The revisional authority in the present case has passed a well-
reasoned order and the findings recorded therein are neither arbitrary nor
tainted by any procedural or jurisdictional irregularity, nor they disclose any
manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings. This Court is satisfied
that the conclusions reached are duly supported by the material on record and
the proceedings were conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure
as well as the principles of natural justice. Consequently, none of the grounds
warranting interference with the impugned order, as noted above, are made out.
28. Furthermore, this Court finds merit in the argument of learned
counsel for respondent No.3 that the question of authenticity and genuineness
of the Birth certificate and the application dated 06.05.1994 is a disputed
question of fact. It is settled law that where disputed questions of facts are
involved, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not the
proper remedy. A two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.P.S.
Rathore Vs. State of Haryana, (2005) 10 SCC 1, speaking through Justice
Y.K. Sabharwal, has held as follows:
"16. In Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v.
Sukamani Das [(1999) 7 SCC 298] the question which arose for
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consideration was, can the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution award compensation for death caused due to
electrocution on account of negligence, when the liability was
emphatically denied on the ground that the death had not occurred
as a result of negligence, but because of an act of God or of acts
of some other persons. The Court held that it is the settled legal
position that where disputed questions of facts are involved, a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper
remedy. Therefore, questions as to whether death occurred due
to negligence or due to act of God or of some third person could
not be decided properly on the basis of affidavits only, but should
be decided by the civil court after appreciating the evidence
adduced by the parties. In T.N. Electricity Board v. Sumathi
[(2000) 4 SCC 543] it was held that when a disputed question of
fact arises and there is clear denial of any tortious liability,
remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution may not be proper.
The Court carved out exception to this general rule by observing
that, it should not be understood that in every case of tortious
liability, recourse must be had to a suit. When there is negligence
on the face of it and infringement of Article 21 is there, it cannot
be said that there will be any bar to proceed under Article 226 of
the Constitution."
(Emphasis supplied)
29. Similarly, a two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
speaking through Justice Indira Banerjee in Shubhas Jain Vs. Rajeshwari
Shivam, 2021 SCC Online SC 562, has held as under:
"26. It is well settled that the High Court exercising its
extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, does not adjudicate hotly disputed questions
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of facts. It is not for the High Court to make a comparative
assessment of conflicting technical reports and decide which one
is acceptable."
30. Moreover, another two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Union of India Vs. Puna Hinda, (2021) 10 SCC 690, speaking
through Justice Hemant Gupta has observed as follows:
"24. Therefore, the dispute could not be raised by way of a writ
petition on the disputed questions of fact. Though, the
jurisdiction of the High Court is wide but in respect of pure
contractual matters in the field of private law, having no
statutory flavour, are better adjudicated upon by the forum
agreed to by the parties. The dispute as to whether the amount is
payable or not and/or how much amount is payable are disputed
questions of facts. There is no admission on the part of the
appellants to infer that the amount stands crystallised. Therefore,
in the absence of any acceptance of joint survey report by the
competent authority, no right would accrue to the writ petitioner
only because measurements cannot be undertaken after passage of
time. Maybe, the resurvey cannot take place but the measurement
books of the work executed from time to time would form a
reasonable basis for assessing the amount due and payable to the
writ petitioner, but such process could be undertaken only by the
agreed forum i.e. arbitration and not by the writ court as it does
not have the expertise in respect of measurements or construction
of roads."
(Emphasis supplied)
31. Notably, the first revision filed under Section 42 of Act of 1961
before respondent No.2 was not decided on merits. Rather, a letter dated
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10.04.2002 (Annexure P-11/T) was issued to the petitioner-Board, directing it
to take appropriate action. Relevant portion of the aforesaid letter dated
10.04.2002 is reproduced as under:
"To
Punjab Government
Department of Agriculture
(Mandi Branch)
The Secretary,
Punjab Mandi Board,
Chandigarh.
Memo No: 5/38/02.M1/2109
Chandigarh dated: 10.04.2002
Subject:- Regarding correction of date of birth in the service
record of Jagroop Singh, Clerk.
While sending a copy of the notification received on the
above subject, it is written that while taking appropriate action on
the request, the applicant is informed that a copy of the same
should be sent to the Government."
32. Thereafter, the petitioner-Board issued a letter dated 02.05.2002
(Annexure P-12/T) stating that request of respondent No.3 for correction of his
date of birth was 'consigned to the office' vide communication dated
25.07.2000 (Annexure P-9) and he had been duly informed regarding the same.
The material portion of the letter dated 02.05.2002 reads as follows:
"Superintendent Grade-1,
Punjab Government,
Department of Agriculture,
(Mandi Branch),
Chandigarh.
Subject: Regarding correction of date of birth in the service record
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of Jagroop Singh Clerk Gurdaspur.
Reference:- Your memo No.5/38/02-M-1/2109, Dated: 10.04.2002.
In respect to the letter received on the subject cited above it is
written that Sh. Jagroop Singh, Clerk had earlier given a request
to this office regarding the correction of date of birth, which after
consideration was consigned to the office, vide letter no.Estt-
9/32954 dated 25.07.2000 and has already been informed, vide
letter no.Estt.-9/54468 dated 10.10.2001."
33. It is therefore evident that instead of deciding the first revision on
merits, the matter was merely remitted to the petitioner-Board for
reconsideration, without passing of any detailed order. It was only upon the
filing of the second revision that respondent No.2 undertook a comprehensive
examination of the case and rendered a detailed, well-reasoned order dated
01.12.2023 (Annexure P-19) deciding the matter on merits.
34. Moreover, the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in
Dhani Ram Chaudhary's case (supra) and the decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Harnam Singh's case (supra) and Gorakhnath Sitaram
Kamble's case (supra) are distinguishable on facts. In those cases, the
applications for correction of date of birth were filed after expiry of the
prescribed limitation period. In contrast, in the present case, the revisional
authority, upon examining the material on record, found that the application
submitted by respondent No.3 for change of date of birth was already pending
consideration when 1994 Amendment came into force and was, therefore, well
within the limitation period. In Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble's case (supra),
the employee working as an Assistant Teacher had applied for correction in
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date of birth after 26 years of service. The two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Dalveer Bhandari held as follows:
"19. These decisions lead to a different dimension of the case
that correction at the fag end would be at the cost of large
number of employees, therefore, any correction at the fag end
must be discouraged by the Court. The relevant portion of the
judgment in Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department &
Ors. v. R.Kribakaran (surpa) reads as under :
"An application for correction of the date of birth by a
public servant cannot be entertained at the fag end of his
service. It need not be pointed out that any such direction
for correction of the date of birth of the public servant
concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as others
waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions
are affected in this process. Some are likely to suffer
irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction
of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in
office, in some cases for years, within which time many
officers who are below him in seniority waiting for their
promotion, may lose the promotion forever. According to us,
this is an important aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by
the court or the tribunal while examining the grievance of a
public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth. As
such, unless a clear case on the basis of materials which
can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the
respondent, the court or the tribunal should not issue a
direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim
only plausible and before any such direction is issued, the
court must be fully satisfied that there has been real
injustice to the person concerned and his claim for
correction of date of birth has been made in accordance
with the procedure prescribed, and within time fixed by any
rule or order. The onus is on the applicant to prove about
the wrong recording of his date of birth in his service-
book."
20. In view of the consistent legal position, the impugned
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judgment cannot be sustained and even on a plain reading of the
Notification and the instructions set out in the preceding
paragraphs leads to the conclusion that no application for
alteration of date of birth after five years should have been
entertained."
(Emphasis supplied)
35. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgment held
that an application for correction of date of birth by a public servant cannot be
entertained at the fag end of service. However, the extracted passage from the
two-Judge Bench decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Secretary and
Commissioner, Home Department Vs. R. Kirubakaran, 1993(4) SCT 803,
also makes it clear that a change of date of birth may be permitted, where a
clear case is made out on the basis of conclusive material and where the Court
is fully satisfied that real injustice has occurred and the claim has been made in
accordance with the prescribed procedure and within the time stipulated by the
applicable rules.
36. In the present case, the revisional authority's order rests on a
meticulous process of verification. Upon examining the material on record, a
fair and reasoned conclusion was reached that the application was initially
submitted on 06.05.1994 and not at the fag end of service. The claim was thus
found to have been made in accordance with the prescribed procedure and
within the time stipulated under the applicable rules. This Court does not find
any error apparent on the face of the record, therefore, in view of the decision
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Naveen Mathew Philip's case (supra), no
ground is made out for interference with the order passed by the revisional
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authority.
CWP-15371-2025
37. A two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kunisetty
Satyanarayana's case (supra), speaking through Justice Markandey Katju has
observed as follows:
"13. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be
entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is
that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A
mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any
cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order
which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been
issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite
possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice
or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the
proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is
well settled that a writ lies when some right of any party is
infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not
infringe the right of any one. It is only when a final order
imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a
party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any
grievance.
14. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such
discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by
quashing a show-cause notice or charge sheet.
15. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High
Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is
found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason
if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should
not interfere in such a matter."
(Emphasis supplied)
38. Similarly, in Prabhash Chandra Mirdha's case (supra), another
two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
"13. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect
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that chargesheet cannot generally be a subject matter of
challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the
delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued
by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary
proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the
chargesheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a
premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not
liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been
initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a
reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the
delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant
factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the
proceedings."
(Emphasis supplied)
39. Further still, it is settled law that judicial review over disciplinary
proceedings, though limited, is not altogether excluded. In cases, where the
issuance of a charge-sheet is shown to be actuated by malice, mala fides, or an
improper motive, the very foundation of the inquiry stands vitiated. Likewise,
if the authority initiating or conducting the enquiry is so heavily biased or
predisposed against the delinquent officer that the proceedings are nothing but
an empty formality, where the outcome is a foregone conclusion, such an
inquiry cannot be permitted to run its course. In situations of this nature, the
process ceases to be a fair or genuine inquiry and degenerates into a mere
farcical ritual, aimed only at subjecting the public official to harassment and
humiliation. It is precisely to prevent such abuse of process and to safeguard
the dignity and fairness owed to a public servant that the Courts have held
themselves justified in exercising their jurisdiction at the very inception,
thereby interdicting the proceedings at the charge-sheet stage itself. Reference
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in this regard may be made to a two Judge Bench decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in V.K. Khanna's case (supra). However, the Court has also emphasized
that there must be cogent evidence on record to establish that the action is
tainted by malice or bias. Mere general or vague assertions are insufficient;
there must be at least a substantial possibility of bias for an action to be
vitiated. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
V.K. Khanna's case (supra), speaking through Justice Umesh C. Banerjee, are
reproduced as under:
"5. Whereas fairness is synonymous with reasonableness - bias
stands included within the attributes and broader purview of the
word 'malice' which in common exception means and implies
'spite' or 'ill will'. One redeeming feature in the matter of
attributing bias or malice and is now well settled that mere
general statements will not be sufficient for the purposes of
indication of ill will. There must be cogent evidence available on
record to come to the conclusion as to whether in fact, there was
existing a bias or a mala fide move which results in the
miscarriage of justice (see in this context Kumaon Mandal Vikas
Nigam v. Girija Shankar Pant and others, JT 2000 Suppl.II 206).
In almost all legal enquiries, 'intention as distinguished from
motive is the all important factor' and in common parlance a
malicious act stands equated with an intentional act without just
case or excuse...
xxx xxx xxx
37. While it is true that justifiability of the charges at this stage
of initiating a disciplinary proceeding cannot possibly be delved
into by any court pending inquiry but it is equally well settled
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that in the event there is an element of malice or mala fide,
motive involved in the matter of issue of a charge-sheet, or the
concerned authority is so biased that the inquiry would be a
mere farcical show and the conclusions are well known then
and in that event, law courts are otherwise justified in
interfering at the earliest stage so as to avoid the harassment
and humiliation of a public official. It is not a question of
shielding any misdeed that the Court would be anxious, it is the
due process of law which should permeate in the society and in
the event of there being any affectation of such process of law,
that law courts ought to rise up to the occasion and the High
Court in the contextual facts, has delved into the issue on that
score. On the basis of the findings no exception can be taken and
that has been the precise reason as to why this court dealt with
the issue in so great a detail so as to examine the judicial
propriety at this stage of the proceedings."
(Emphasis supplied)
40. In the light of aforementioned judgments, this Court is of the view
that the writ petition (CWP-15371-2025) filed by Jagroop Singh challenging
the charge-sheet dated 20.03.2025 is premature at this stage. A mere charge-
sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it
does not amount to an adverse order, which affects the rights of any party
unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It
is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely
affecting the petitioner is passed, he can be said to have any grievance.
Furthermore, mere general statements will not be sufficient for the purposes of
indication of ill-will or malice. Cogent evidence is not available on record to
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come to the conclusion as to whether in fact, there is existing a bias or a
malafide move, which would result in the miscarriage of justice.
CONCLUSION
41. In view of the foregoing discussion, CWP-14378-2024 filed by
Punjab Mandi Board is dismissed. This Court finds no ground to interfere with
the impugned orders dated 01.12.2023 (Annexure P-19) and 27.12.2023
(Annexure P-20).
42. CWP-15371-2025, filed by Jagroop Singh, is disposed of in the
following terms: -
(i) No ground has been made out to warrant interference with the
chargesheet dated 20.03.2025 (Annexure P-1 in CWP-15371-
2025) at this stage. Needless to state, the respondent-Board shall
proceed further with respect to the said chargesheet strictly in
accordance with law, while affording the petitioner a fair and
reasonable opportunity of hearing and ensuring due compliance
with the principles of natural justice.
(ii) The respondent-Board was not justified in withholding the
petitioner's salary since August 2024, particularly when he
continues to discharge his duties as Secretary, Market Committee,
Dhariwal, in the absence of any formal order or communication.
Accordingly, the respondent-Board is directed to release the
arrears of salary due to the petitioner from August 2024 onwards
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forthwith.
43. The pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
44. Photocopy of this order be placed on the file of connected case.
[ HARPREET SINGH BRAR ]
21.11.2025 JUDGE
vishnu
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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