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Pardeep Kaur And Another vs State Of Punjab
2025 Latest Caselaw 5384 P&H

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 5384 P&H
Judgement Date : 20 November, 2025

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Pardeep Kaur And Another vs State Of Punjab on 20 November, 2025

      IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
                     CHANDIGARH




132



CRM-M-65098-2025

Pardeep Kaur and another                                            ......Petitioner(s)


                                          Versus


State of Punjab                                              ......Respondent(s)


Decided on : 20.11.2025

Date of uploading: 21.11.2025



CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present:    Mr. Naveen Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner.
            Mr. Adhiraj Singh, AAG, Punjab.
                                          *****
SUMEET GOEL, J. (Oral)

1. The petition in hand has been filed under Section 528 of BNSS,

2023 with the following substantive prayer:

"It is therefore, prayed that present petition may kindly be allowed and FIR no 78 dated 15.08.2024 under section 174A IPC registered at Police Station Payal, District Ludhiana (Annexure P-1) may kindly be quashed and all subsequent proceeding arising out of this FIR, keeping in view of the facts mentioned in the present petition."

2. The impugned FIR (as set out in the petition in hand) reads thus:-

"This order from the court of Sh. Ekta Sahota, SDJM Payal bearing CRM 129 2022 dated 01.12.2022 has been received at police station for registration of FIR through PHG Paramjit Singh. The contents of which are as: "State Vs Kuldeep Singh CRM-129-2022 Present: Learned APP for the State. Accused absent. Proclamation warrant of accused Kuldeep Singh and

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Pardeep Kaur already received back duly served. Serving constable HC Talwinder Singh already suffered the statement to the effect that he has affixed the proclamation on 16 10.2022, copy of the proclamation of the accused Kuldeep Singh and Pardeep Kaur is Ex Pl and report is Ex. P2. statutory period has already been elapsed. Case called several time since morning but accused has not appeared. Accused Kuldeep Singh and Pardeep Kaur are declared proclaimed absconder. No list of property os filed at this stage for initiating the proceedings under section 83 of Cr.P.C. accordingly the file be consigned to record room to be put as and when accused surrender in the court or arrested by the police or as and when list of property is filed for initiating the proceedings under section 83 of Cr.P.C. Proceedings against the accused under section 174-A be also initiated. Intimation be sent to the concerned SHO for initiating the proceedings under section 174-A of IPC against accused. SD/- (EKTA SAHOTA) Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Payal. UID. No. PB00340, Date of order 01.12.2022 Poonam, Steno Grade-II)."

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the

impugned FIR, has its genesis, in a criminal case filed against the petitioners

(herein) under Sections 323, 324, 34 IPC in proceedings whereof the

petitioner was declared as a proclaimed person & hence the impugned FIR

came to be got registered against the petitioners. Learned counsel for the

petitioners has argued that the order as also the proceedings declaring the

petitioners as proclaimed person are manifestly illegal and against the

mandatory provisions of law. It has been further iterated that the FIR

registered for the offences under Sections 323, 324, 34 IPC has already been

quashed in CRM-M-31444-2025, vide order dated 12.11.2025 (Annexure P-

2) as the rival parties had entered into a compromise/settlement and hence no

useful purpose would be served by continuation of the proceedings qua the

impugned FIR.

On the strength of above arguments, learned counsel for the

petitioner has pressed for grant of petition in hand.

4. Learned State counsel has opposed the claim of the petitioners

seeking quashing of the FIR in question. While refuting the case of the 2 of 9

petitioner, detailed arguments concerning the merits of the case were made

and it is argued that the offence alleged against the petitioners is serious and

heinous. Learned State counsel has submitted that the Police has conducted

fair and proper investigation and after completion of the same, final report

under Section 173 of Cr.P.C., 1973 was presented before the competent Court

of jurisdiction. Furthermore, it has been submitted by the learned State

counsel that the petitioners were served through non-bailable warrants but

they did not appear which compelled the Court below to declare them

proclaimed person. Instead of surrendering before the competent Court, the

petitioners have chosen to file the instant petition which clearly reflects his

conduct that they were fully aware of the proceedings and the coercive

measures undertaken by the Court below to secure their presence. Moreover,

it has been stated that the learned Court below followed the procedure as laid-

down under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 in letter and spirit and no

discrepancy whatsoever is forthcoming from the records of the case.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have

perused the paper-book.

6. The seminal question that arises for consideration in the present

petition is as to whether the impugned FIR (as also proceedings arising

therefrom) under Section 174-A of the IPC deserves to be quashed in the

factual matrix of the present case.

7. At this juncture; it would be apposite to refer herein to a

judgment of this Court passed in CRM-M-51049-2019 titled as Mohammad

Hanif Attari vs. State of Haryana, decided on 06.07.2023; relevant whereof

reads as under:

"3. In view the fact that after the principle proceedings in which the petitioner was declared Proclaimed Offender stand concluded, the question would arise is: 'whether in the given circumstances, proceedings under Section 174A of the

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IPC pursuant to FIR No.425 dated 17th of November, 2017 can be allowed to continue.

4. The question framed ibid is no more res integra and already stands answered by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CRM-M-43813-2018 titled as "Baldev

Chand Bansal v. State of Haryana and another" vide order dated 29.01.2019, which held as under:

"Prayer in this petition is for quashing of FIR No.64 dated 15.02.2017 filed under Section 174A of the Indian Penal Code registered at Police Station Sector-5, Panchkula and all other subsequent proceedings arising thereof as well as order dated 24.10.2016 passed by the trial Court vide which a direction was issued to register the aforesaid FIR."

XX XXX XXXX Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions rendered by this Court in "Vikas Sharma v. Gurpreet Singh Kohli and another (supra), 2017, (3) L.A.R.584, Microqual Techno Limited and others v. State of Haryana and another, 2015 (32) RCR (Criminal) 790 and "Rajneesh Khanna v. State of Haryana and another" 2017 (3) L.A.R. 555 wherein in an identical circumstance, this Court has held that since the main petition filed under Section 138 of the Act stands withdrawn in view of an amicable settlement between the parties, therefore, continuation of proceedings under Section 174A of IPC shall be nothing but an abuse of the process of law.

XX XXX XXXX In view of the same, I find merit in the present petition and accordingly, present petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 24.10.2016 passed by Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Panchkula as well as FIR No.64 dated 15.02.2017 registered under Section 174A of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Sector-5, Panchkula and all other subsequent proceedings arising thereof, are hereby quashed."

5. Same is the view of another Co-ordinate Bench in the "Ashok Madaan v. State of Haryana and another" reported as 2020 (4) RCR (Criminal) 87, wherein it has been held that:

"No doubt, the learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently argued that the offence under Section 174A I.P.C. is independent of the main case, therefore, merely because the main case has been dismissed for want of prosecution, the present petition cannot be allowed, however, keeping in view the fact that the present FIR was registered only on account of absence from the proceedings in the

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main case which had been subsequently regularised by the court while granting bail to the petitioner, the default stood condoned. In such circumstances, continuation of proceedings under Section 174A LP.C. shall be abuse of the process of court.

7. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. FIR No. 446 dated 21.08.2017, registered under Section 174A I.PC. at Police Station Kotwali, District Faridabad, as well as consequential proceedings shall stand quashed."

7.1. More recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled

as Daljit Singh vs. State of Haryana and Another, Criminal Appeal No.4359

of 2024 decided on 02.01.2025; has held that:

"7.3 Now, what happens if the status under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is nullified i.e., the person subjected to such proclamation, by virtue of subsequent developments is no longer required to be presented before a Court of law. Then, can the prosecution still proceed against such a person for having not appeared before a Court during the time that the process was in effect. The answer is in the affirmative. We say so for the following reasons:-

(i) The language of Section 174A, IPC says "whoever fails to appear at the specified place and the specified time as required by proclamation...". This implies that the very instance at which a person is directed to appear, and he does not do so, this Section comes into play;

(ii) What further flows from the language employed is that the instance of non-appearance becomes an infraction of the Section, and therefore, prosecution therefor would be independent of Section 82, Cr.P.C. being in effect;

(iii) So, while proceedings under Section 174A IPC cannot be initiated independent of Section 82, Cr.P.C., i.e., can only be started post the issuance of proclamation, they can continue if the said proclamation is no longer in effect.

(iv) We find that the Delhi High Court has taken this view, i.e., that Section 174A, IPC is a stand-alone offence in Mukesh Bhatia v.State (NCT of Delhi) 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1023; Divya Verma v. State 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2619; Sameena & Anr. v. State GNCT of Delhi & Anr. Crl. M.C. No.1470 of 2021, Dated 17th May, 2022 For the reasons afore-stated, we agree with the findings made in these judgments/orders. At the same time, it stands clarified that we have not commented on the merits of the cases.

(v) Granted that the offence prescribed in Section 174A IPC is indeed stand-alone, given that it arises out of an original offence in 5 of 9

connection with which proceedings under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is initiated and in the said offence the accused stands, subsequently, acquitted, it would be permissible in law for the Court seized of the trial under such offence, to take note of such a development and treat the same as a ground to draw the proceedings to a close, should such a prayer be made and the circumstances of the case so warrant.

8. In conclusion, we hold that Section 174A IPC is an independent, substantive offence, that can continue even if the proclamation under Section 82, Cr.P.C. is extinguished. It is a stand-alone offence. xxxxxxxxx"

However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court quashed the impugned

FIR (therein) under Section 174-A of the IPC since, inter alia, the original

offence in the form of criminal complaint under Section 138 of NI Act, 1881

in the said case had been settled and withdrawn by the rival parties.

8. It is for the High Court, while exercising its innate plenary

powers under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023/428 of Cr.P.C., 1973, to ratiocinate

that it should not apply the law in an austere, academic and exacting technical

manner, without considering its practical implications. The Law is not merely

a set of programmed, nailed-to-the-ground rules, to be applied without

context. It must be enforced, while bearing in mind, that its purpose is to

ensure substantive justice between the parties. The statutory provision of

Section 174-A of IPC, when perused in the light of ratio decidendi of the

judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Daljit Singh's case (supra),

unequivocally shows that an FIR under Section 174-A of the IPC does not

proprio vigore become liable to be quashed, in case the rival parties have

entered into a compromise and such criminal complaint/FIR has been

compromised and quashed/withdrawn accordingly. However, at the same

time, the factum of the criminal complaint/FIR (in furtherance of proceedings

whereof) having been compromised/settled, is indubitably, a relevant factor

to be considered while dealing with a plea for quashing of an FIR (as also

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proceedings emanating therefrom) under Section 174-A of IPC. It would

tantamount to contravening the principles of fairness, proportionality, and

justice in criminal proceedings. A literal interpretation may sometimes lead to

unjust outcomes that also contradict the law's underlined purpose. Therefore,

the High Court under its inherent jurisdiction must balance the letter of Law

with its spirit, ensuring fair and equitable results. This approach underscores

Law's role as an apparatus for fostering societal harmony and addressing the

real-world complexities, efficaciously as also effectively, rather than mere

literal/technical compliance.

9. The inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS, 2023/Section

482 Cr.P.C., 1973 is primarily aimed at preventing abuse of judicial process

and securing the ends of justice. Thus, when the dispute is essentially personal

in nature and a genuine compromise has been reached, the High Court may

intervene to quash the criminal proceedings, recognizing the continuation

thereof would be non-productive and unjust in the given circumstances. The

inherent powers of a High Court are powers which are incidental replete

powers, which if did not so exist, the Court would be obliged to sit still and

helplessly see the process of law and Courts being abused for the purposes of

injustice. In other words; such power(s) is intrinsic to a High Court, it is its

very life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such

power(s), a High Court would have form but lack the substance. These powers

of a High Court hence deserve to be construed with the widest possible

amplitude. These inherent powers are in consonance with the nature of a High

Court which ought to be, and has in fact been, invested with power(s) to

maintain its authority to prevent the process of law/Courts being obstructed or

abused. It is a trite posit of jurisprudence that though laws attempt to deal with

all cases that may arise, the infinite variety of circumstances which shape

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events and the imperfections of language make it impossible to lay down

provisions capable of governing every case, which in fact arises. A High Court

which exists for the furtherance of justice in an indefatigable manner, should

therefore, have unfettered power(s) to deal with situations which, though not

expressly provided for by the law, need to be dealt with, to prevent injustice

or the abuse of the process of law and Courts. The juridical basis of these

plenary power(s) is the authority; in fact the seminal duty and responsibility

of a High Court; to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the judicial function of

administering justice, in accordance with law, in a regular, orderly and

effective manner. In other words; Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 reflects peerless

powers, which a High Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just

and equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observance of the due process

of law, to prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice nay substantial justice

between the parties and to secure the ends of justice.

10. Keeping in view the entirety of the attending facts and

circumstances of the case in hand; especially the original offence being an

offence under Section 323, 324, 34 IPC, the original offence alleged to have

been committed in the year 2020, the subject matter of the original offence

having been settled amicably between the parties and the original FIR having

been quashed on the basis of compromise; this Court deems it appropriate that

the impugned FIR as also all proceedings emanating therefrom deserve to be

quashed.

11. It is, hence, directed as under:

(i) The FIR No. 78 dated 15.08.2024 registered for the offences

punishable under section 174A IPC, at Police Station Payal, District Ludhiana

(Annexure P-1) and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom stand

quashed.

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(ii) All pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.





                                                 (SUMEET GOEL)
                                                    JUDGE

November 20, 2025
Naveen


          Whether speaking/reasoned:                Yes
          Whether reportable:                       Yes




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