Punjab-Haryana High Court
Satnam Singh vs State Of Punjab And Another on 20 November, 2025
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CRM-M-59021-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-59021-2025
Satnam Singh
....Petitioner
versus
State of Punjab and another
....Respondents
Reserved on: November 07, 2025
Date of decision/pronouncement: November 20, 2025
Date of Uploading: November 20, 2025
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present:- Mr. Kamaldip Singh Sidhu, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Amit Kumar Goyal, Additional AG Punjab.
Ms. Kirandeep Kaur, Advocate for respondent No.2.
*****
SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)
The present petition has been preferred by the accused under
Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking quashing
of the FIR No.48 dated 09.06.2022 (hereinafter to be referred as the 'impugned
FIR'), registered under Sections 304-A & 279 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, at
Police Station Ajitwal, District Moga, as also the proceedings subsequent
thereto, including the judgment of conviction dated 04.04.2024 (Annexure P-2)
passed in case No.CHI/282/2022 titled as "State versus Satnam Singh" by the
learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Moga (hereinafter referred to as 'JMIC'),
on the basis of a compromise deed dated 07.04.2024 (copy whereof is appended
as Annexure P-4 with the present petition).
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2. The gravamen of the impugned FIR is that complainant, namely,
Harbhajan Singh, son of Gurmail Singh, stated that on 08.06.2022 at about 6:00
p.m., his son, namely, Gurjit Singh, along with Ashpreet Singh (son of Swaran
Singh, resident of village Chuhar Chak), was travelling on a motorcycle bearing
registration No.PB29-AC-6834 (Platina) from village Buttar towards
Takhanvadh. The complainant was following them on his own motorcycle
bearing registration No.PB29N-1761 (Platina). When the motorcycle of his son
and Ashpreet Singh reached near the house of Jagdeep Singh, son of Nahar
Singh, resident of village Takhanvadh, a JCB machine bearing registration
No.PB29X-4981 approached from the direction of Takhanvadh at high speed,
being driven rashly and negligently by Satnam Singh, petitioner herein, (whose
identity the complainant learnt after the incident), son of Balwinder Singh,
resident of Takhanvadh. The JCB struck the motorcycle, causing serious injuries
to Gurjit Singh and Ashpreet Singh. Gurjit Singh sustained a head injury. People
gathered at the spot, and the complainant arranged a vehicle to take his injured
son to Civil Hospital, Moga. However, Gurjit Singh succumbed to his injuries
on the way. Ashpreet Singh was admitted to Civil Hospital, village Dhudike.
Based on these set of allegations, the impugned FIR was registered.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner has
been falsely implicated into the impugned FIR. Learned counsel has further
submitted that a compromise has been entered into between the petitioner and
the FIR-complainant (father of the deceased) on 07.04.2024, relevant whereof
reads as under:
"I, Harbhajan Singh, Aadhar No.858259264437 son of Gurmail
Singh son of Sampuran Singh resident of Dhudike (First Party)
Balwinder Singh, Aadhar No._ son of Gurcharan Singh son of Inder
Singh resident of Takhanwad, District Moga. About 2 years ago, Harbhajan
Singh's son Gurjit Singh had an accident with Balwinder Singh's Hydra
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Crane, which was driven by Balwinder Singh's son Satnam Singh. Gurjit
Singh has been died. Harbhajan Singh has filed cases against Balwinder
Singh & Satnam Singh, in one of which Satnam Singh has been convicted
and against Balwinder Singh, a claim case is pending in the High Court.
Today dated 07.04.2024, both the parties have been affected compromise in
the presence of respectable persons namely Jasdip Singh @ Garry, Jagtar
Singh Dhaliwal and Chamkaur Singh Kamrade. Second party Balwinder
Singh will be pay an amount of Rs.13,00,000/- to those three respectable
persons upto dated 14.04.2024 and Harbhajan Singh will be bound to give
the statement to a lawyers in the Hon'ble Courts wherever it is required to
do so. Balwinder Singh will bear the expense of the lawyers in the case.
Compromise has written, which can useful. Dated 07.04.2024."
Learned counsel has, thus, iterated that the impugned FIR which
was registered on account of a misunderstanding has since been resolved
between the parties and in order to keep peace as also harmony, the parties do
not wish to continue the proceedings, including the impugned FIR, against each
other. Learned counsel has further urged that no useful purpose would likely be
served by allowing the criminal prosecution to continue against the petitioner.
Thus, it has been iterated that the petition in hand be allowed.
4. Learned State counsel has submitted that the charge-sheet (challan)
was rightly put up against the petitioner and he has since been convicted by the
learned JMIC vide judgment dated 04.04.2024, which is based on evidence
brought forth and thus, the petition in hand deserves to be dismissed. Learned
State counsel: has submitted that in a case pertaining to an offence under Section
304-A of the IPC, the deceased individual is the real victim and hence any
compromise or settlement reached with the family members or legal heirs of the
deceased victim, cannot operate to absolve the offender, nor should it be
construed as a mitigating factor, sufficient, to warrant the quashing of such an
FIR, on the basis of compromise. Learned State counsel has placed reliance upon
the dicta passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Daxaben Vs. State of Gujarat
& Others, (2022) AIR Supreme Court 3530, and conceded that while the said
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dicta pertains to an offence under Section 306 of the IPC, however, by way of
corollary, the underlying principle as laid down in Daxaben (supra) will be
extended and applied analogously to an offence under Section 304-A of the IPC,
also. Furthermore, relying upon the dicta, passed by a Division bench of this
Hon'ble Court passed in CRM-M-40769-2024, titled as Baldev Singh Vs. State
of Punjab and another, decided on 02.06.2016, it has been submitted by the
learned State counsel that given the gravity and fatal consequences inherent in
an offence under Section 304-A of the IPC, the same cannot be classified as one
that is merely private in nature. Concluding his submissions, the learned State
counsel has submitted that quashing an FIR pertaining to an offence under
Section 304-A of the IPC, on the basis of compromise/settlement is not in
consonance with the settled jurisprudence governing the domain of quashing
criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise/settlement.
5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2/ complainant has ratified the
compromise having been effected between the parties and submit that respondent
No.2/ complainant has no objection, in case, the impugned FIR including the
judgment of conviction dated 04.04.2024 passed by learned JMIC, are quashed.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the
record.
Prime Issue
7. The issue that arises for consideration in the present petition is as
to whether the impugned FIR registered under Sections 304-A & 279 of the IPC
and proceedings arising therefrom, including the judgment of conviction dated
04.04.2024 passed by learned JMIC, deserve to be quashed.
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The seminal legal issue that arises for consideration is as to whether
an FIR (as also proceedings emanating therefrom) under Section 304-A of
IPC/Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 can be quashed on the
basis of compromise/settlement.
8. Relevant Statutory Provisions
The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter to be referred as 'IPC')
Section 304-A of the IPC reads as under:
"304A. Causing death by negligence.--Whoever causes the death of any
person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable
homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred
as 'the Cr. P.C.')
Section 482 of Cr. P.C., reads as under:
"482. Saving of inherent power of High Court - Nothing in this
Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court
to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under
this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice."
The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter to be referred as
BNS, 2023)
Section 106 of BNS, 2023 reads as under:
"106. Causing death by negligence.--(1) Whoever causes death of
any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable
homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if
such act is done by a registered medical practitioner while performing
medical procedure, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be
liable to fine."
The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter to
be referred as BNSS, 2023)
Section of the BNSS, 2023 reads as under:
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"528. Saving of inherent powers of High Court - Nothing in this
Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High
Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order
under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice."
Relevant Case Law
9. The precedents, apropos to the matter(s) in issue, are as follows:
I. Re: Powers of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr. P.C., vis-a-vis.,
quashing of the FIR/criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise
(i) In a judgment titled as Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and
another, 2012 (10) SCC 303 a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has held as under:
"48. The question is with regard to the inherent power of the High Court in
quashing the criminal proceedings against an offender who has settled his
dispute with the victim of the crime but the crime in which he is allegedly
involved is not compoundable under Section 320 of the Code.
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xxx
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xxx
57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be
summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal
proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is
distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power
is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in
accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends
of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases
power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be
exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be
prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must
have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and
the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature
and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the
victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes
like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis
for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal
cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on
different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences
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arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such
like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry,
etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal
in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category
of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because
of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put
accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be
caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete
settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court
must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of
justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the
criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite
settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether
to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an
end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High
Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceeding."
(ii) In a judgment titled as Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2014(6)
SCC 466 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down
the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving
adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its
power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and
quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction
to continue with the criminal proceedings:
(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the
Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings
even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have
settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be
exercised sparingly and with caution.
(II)When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis
petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in
such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. While exercising
the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid
two objectives.
(III) Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which
involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have
a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been
committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are
not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim
and the offender.
(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and
pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of
commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or
family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their
entire disputes among themselves.
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(V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to
whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation
of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal
cases.
(VI) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of
heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as
crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the
High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention
of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision.
It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation
of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected
sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge
under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High
Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted
on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical
report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the
guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can
examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the
chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse
to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the
later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea
compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties.
At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement
between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may
improve their future relationship.
(VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section
482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases
where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission
of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be
liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal
proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the
investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed.
Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to
start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show
benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie
assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other
hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the
conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally
the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482
of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide
the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence
under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where
the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the
appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the
parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of
the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge
is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a
heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found
guilty of such a crime."
(iii) In a judgment titled as Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai
Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat and anr. AIR 2017
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SUPREME COURT 4843, a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has held as under:
"15 The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the
subject, may be summarised in the following propositions :
(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice.
The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves
powers which inhere in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a
First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a
settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the
same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an
offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed
by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-
compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section
482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify
the exercise of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit
and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii)
to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information
Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have
settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of
each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing
with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious
offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and
dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of
the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not
private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to
continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of
public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal
cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil
dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the
inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with
an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing
where parties have settled the dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the
possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal
proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions
(viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and
economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the
domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would
be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an
activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The
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consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic
system will weigh in the balance."
(iv) In a judgment titled as State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi
Narayan and others AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 1296, a three Judge Bench
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this
Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as
under:
i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash
the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section
320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and
predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of
commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or
family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute
amongst themselves;
ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which
involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have
a serious impact on society;
iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under
the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be
quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the
offender;
iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall
in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be
treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone,
and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section
307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the
society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the
Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute
amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision
merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the
charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court
to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the
sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if
proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this
purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury
sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the
body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High
Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after
investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during
the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under
investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and
29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra)
should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the
circumstances stated hereinabove;
v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to
quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences,
which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on
the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the
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offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the
accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was
absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the
complainant to enter into a compromise etc."
II. Re: Powers of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. to quash
FIR under Section 304-A of the IPC on the basis of compromise
In a Division Bench judgment titled as Baldev Singh versus State
of Punjab & another, decided on 02.06.2016 in CRM-M-40769-2014, this
Court held as under:
"The question formulated for consideration of a larger Bench was
whether the crime registered under Section 304-A IPC can be quashed on
the basis of compromise arrived at by the legal heir/legal representative of
the victim/deceased with the offender.
XX XX XX
Whether the crime registered under Section 304-A IPC can be
quashed on the basis of compromise arrived at by the legal heirs/legal
representatives of the victim (deceased) with the offender.
XX XX XX
In the facts and circumstances of the case it would indeed be
paradoxical and incorrect to hold that the offence under Section 304-A is
private in nature. Its serious impact on society is not subject to
understatement. When a person or persons lose their life/lives due to the
rash and negligent act of the accused, the question of mens rea or intention
in such a situation pales into insignificance. The wrong cannot be termed
to be private or personal in nature like offences arising out of matrimony,
relating to dowry etc., family disputes or criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominantly a civil flavour like commercial,
financial, mercantile, civil or partnership matters.
XX XX XX
Reference is thus answered in the negative as there can be no
quashing of an offence registered under Section 304-A and subsequent
proceedings, solely on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the
legal heirs/representatives of the victim (deceased) and the accused."
III. Re: Powers of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. to quash
FIR under Section 306 of IPC
"(i) In a judgment titled as Daxaben vs. State of Gujarat &
Ors.,2022 AIR Supreme Court 3530, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
as under:-
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"25. The only question in this appeal is whether the Criminal
Miscellaneous Applications filed by the accused under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. could have been allowed and an FIR under Section 306 of the IPC
for abetment to commit suicide, entailing punishment of imprisonment of
ten years, could have been quashed on the basis of a settlement between the
complainant and the accused named in the FIR. The answer to the aforesaid
question cannot, but be in the negative.
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37. Offence under Section 306 of the IPC of abetment to commit
suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence. Of course, the inherent
power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is wide and can
even be exercised to quash criminal proceedings relating to non-
compoundable offences, to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of
the process of Court. Where the victim and offender have compromised
disputes essentially civil and personal in nature, the High Court can
exercise its power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the criminal
proceedings. In what cases power to quash an FIR or a criminal complaint
or criminal proceedings upon compromise can be exercised, would depend
on the facts and circumstances of the case.
38. However, before exercising its power under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR, criminal complaint and/or criminal
proceedings, the High Court, as observed above, has to be circumspect and
have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous or serious
crimes, which are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society
cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise between the offender and
the complainant and/or the victim. Crimes like murder, rape, burglary,
dacoity and even abetment to commit suicide are neither private nor civil
in nature. Such crimes are against the society. In no circumstances can
prosecution be quashed on compromise, when the offence is serious and
grave and falls within the ambit of crime against society.
39. Orders quashing FIRs and/or complaints relating to grave
and serious offences only on basis of an agreement with the complainant,
would set a dangerous precedent, where complaints would be lodged for
oblique reasons, with a view to extract money from the accused.
Furthermore, financially strong offenders would go scot free, even in cases
of grave and serious offences such as murder, rape, bride- burning, etc. by
buying off informants/complainants and settling with them. This would
render otiose provisions such as Sections 306, 498- A, 304-B etc.
incorporated in the IPC as a deterrent, with a specific social purpose.
40. In Criminal Jurisprudence, the position of the complainant
is only that of the informant. Once an FIR and/or criminal complaint is
lodged and a criminal case is started by the State, it becomes a matter
between the State and the accused. The State has a duty to ensure that law
and order is maintained in society. It is for the state to prosecute offenders.
In case of grave and serious non- compoundable offences which impact
society, the informant and/or complainant only has the right of hearing, to
the extent of ensuring that justice is done by conviction and punishment of
the offender. An informant has no right in law to withdraw the complaint of
a non- compoundable offence of a grave, serious and/or heinous nature,
which impacts society.
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50. In our considered opinion, the Criminal Proceeding cannot
be nipped in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.
P.C. only because there is a settlement, in this case a monetary settlement,
between the accused and the complainant and other relatives of the
deceased to the exclusion of the hapless widow of the deceased. As held by
the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Laxmi Narayan &
Ors. (supra), Section 307 of the IPC falls in the category of heinous and
serious offences and are to be treated as crime against society and not
against the individual alone. On a parity of reasoning, offence
under section 306 of the IPC would fall in the same category. An FIR
under Section 306 of the IPC cannot even be quashed on the basis of any
financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse, parents, children,
guardians, care-givers or anyone else. It is clarified that it was not
necessary for this Court to examine the question whether the FIR in this
case discloses any offence under Section 306 of the IPC, since the High
Court, in exercise of its power under Section 482 CrPC, quashed the
proceedings on the sole ground that the disputes between the accused and
the informant had been compromised."
Analysis (re law)
10. The conventional view, premised upon the statutory framework,
was that criminal offence(s) could be settled only by way of compounding, as
per the provisions of Section 320 of the Cr. P.C., 1973 (now Section 359 of
BNSS, 2023). In ordinary parlance, "compounding" is known as "compromise"
or "settlement". This expression is ordinarily understood as condoning a felony
in exchange for repatriation received by the victim-complainant from the felon.
In other words, no compounding/compromise of a criminal offence could be
permitted by the Court, except for an offence which met with the rigours of
Section 320 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the question arose whether the High Court, by
exercising its plenary/inherent jurisdiction, under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., could
quash ongoing FIR/criminal proceedings, on the basis of compromise/settlement
having been arrived at between the rival parties, pertaining to the offences which
do not fall within the ambit of 'compoundable'.
10.1. Before proceeding further, it would be germane to delve into the
nature, scope and ambit of powers of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.
P.C., 1973.
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10.2. Inherent powers of the High Court are powers which are incidental
replete powers, which if did not so exist, the Court would be obliged to sit still
and helplessly see the process of law and Courts being abused for the purposes
of injustice. In other words, such power(s) is intrinsic to the High Court, as it is
its very life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such
power(s), the High Court would have form but lack the substance. These powers
of the High Court, hence, deserve to be construed with the widest possible
amplitude. These inherent powers are in consonance with the nature of the High
Court which ought to be, and has in fact been, invested with power(s) to maintain
its authority to prevent the process of law/Courts being obstructed or abused. It
is a trite posit of jurisprudence that though laws attempt to deal with all cases
that may arise, the infinite variety of circumstances which shape events and the
imperfections of language make it impossible to lay down provisions capable of
governing every case, which, in fact, arise. The High Court which exists for the
furtherance of justice in an indefatigable manner, should therefore, have
unfettered power(s) to deal with situations which, though not expressly provided
for by the law, need to be dealt with, to prevent injustice or the abuse of the
process of law and Courts. The maxim, namely, "quando lex aliquid alicui
concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsa, esse non potest" (when the
law gives anything to anyone, it also gives all those things without which the
thing itself cannot exist) also signifies that the inherent powers of the High Court
are all such powers which are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in
the course of administration of justice. Further, the maxim "ex debito justitiae"
stipulates that such powers are given to do real and substantial justice, for which
purpose alone, the High Court exists. Hence, the powers under Section 482 of
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Cr. P.C., are aimed at preserving the inherent powers of a High Court to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. The juridical
basis of these plenary power(s) is the authority; in fact the seminal duty and
responsibility of the High Court; to uphold, to protect and to fulfil the judicial
function of administering justice, in accordance with the law, in a regular, orderly
and effective manner. In other words; Section 482 of Cr. P.C. reflects peerless
powers, which a High Court may draw upon as necessary, whenever it is just and
equitable to do so; in particular, to ensure the observance of the due process of
law, to prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice nay substantial justice
between the parties and to secure the ends of justice.
10.3 The above principle(s), in context of provisions of Section 482 of
Cr. P.C, 1973, would apply with complete vigour, to the provisions of Section
528 of BNSS 2023 as well, since there is no alteration in the wording of these
two provisions.
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh (supra) has
enunciated that the powers of the High Court for quashing of criminal
proceedings on the basis of settlement are materially different from
compounding of offence in terms of Section 320 of Cr. P.C. (Now Section 359
of BNSS, 2023) as a Court while exercising power under Section 320 of Cr. P.C.
(Now Section 359 of BNSS, 2023) is circumscribed by the statutory provision
but the High Court may proceed to quash a criminal offence/criminal
proceedings if the ends of justice justify exercise of such power. It was thus held
that the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil flavor;
offences arising out of matrimonial dispute; offences arising out of family
dispute as also offences which are basically private or personal in nature, could
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be quashed by the High Court in case the parties have resolved their entire
dispute(s). Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Narinder Singh
(supra) has held that the possibility of conviction being remote and bleak,
whereas continuation of the criminal case putting the accused to oppression and
prejudice & the parties being put to general inconvenience, as also prejudice
could be considered as factors by the High Court, while examining a plea for
quashing of criminal proceedings on the basis of settlement/compromise. To the
same effect is the dicta of the judgment of three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Parbatbhai Aahir case (supra). Further, a three
Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment of Laxmi Narayan
case (supra) reiterated the principles laid-down in cases of Gian Singh (supra),
Narinder Singh (supra) and Parbatbhai Aahir (supra).
11.1. It is, thus, unequivocal that the plenary powers vested in a High
Court, by virtue of its very constitution, are to be exercised with circumspection
and in a manner befitting judicial propriety. The invocation of inherent
jurisdiction must serve the ends of justice, necessitating a holistic evaluation of
all the attendant circumstances. The criminal justice system is not merely a
forum for resolving interpersonal disputes; it embodies the sovereign obligation
of the State to safeguard the fundamental rights of its citizens, including the
protection of life, liberty, and property. In adjudicating petitions seeking
quashing of criminal proceedings on the basis of a purported compromise
between the parties, the court must transcend the immediate assertions of
harmony. While the absence of current grievances between parties may be a
material consideration, it cannot be the determinative criterion. The court is
duty-bound to scrutinize the gravity of the allegations, the nature of the offences,
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and their ramifications on the public order and societal welfare. This judicial
responsibility is accentuated in cases involving heinous or egregious offences,
where the broader societal interest outweighs private settlements. Compromising
such cases on the ground of mutual accord risks undermining the public
confidence in the justice delivery system and jeopardizing the larger interest of
law enforcement.
11.2. The aureate enunciation of law, by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
above judgments, essentially points out that the prime factors for consideration
of quashing of FIR/criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise/settlement
is that the dispute/offence is essentially private in nature; continuation of criminal
proceeding would be an exercise in futility as its fate-accompli is known;
pendency of such proceedings would be an undesirable burden on the
police/prosecution as also the Courts, which are already struggling hard to
manage the ever increasing and unmanageable docket and/or such quashing
would ensure the ends of justice.
12. The basic and essential edifice of a plea seeking quashing of
FIR/criminal proceedings, on the basis of compromise, is the consent of the
victim. In other words, the consent on the part of the victim for
compromise/settlement of FIR/criminal proceedings is sine-qua-non for such
petition to succeed.
12.1. For an extended period of time, criminal jurisprudence was, by and
large, acquisitive, placing the crime and criminal act at its epicenter. The jurists
have preoccupied themselves with the rights and safeguards concerning the
accused, concomitantly, the victim, i.e. the de facto and real sufferer whose very
misery put the criminal law into motion, remained a forgotten figure. Conscious
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of this critical lacunae in the criminal justice administration system, J. Krishna
Iyer, rendered the following seminal observation:
"It is a weakness of our jurisprudence that the victims of crime, and
the distress of the dependents of the prisoner, do not attract the
attention of the law. Indeed, victim reparation is still the vanishing
point of our criminal law. This is a deficiency, which must be
rectified by the legislature."
-(J. Krishna Iyer;
Vide (para 9) Rattan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1980) AIR Supreme Court
84)
Until recently, a victim was rendered almost entirely passive,
relegated to the periphery of judicial process and compelled to remain an
outsider, mute spectator, with virtually no substantive role in the prosecution of
criminal trial. With the development of 'victimology' as a distinct and vital
domain of jurisprudence, a transformative shift has occurred. Unfolding with the
coinage of the term 'victimology' by Benjamin Mendelsohn in 1947, this
evolution reflects a belated acknowledgment of a victim's inherent right to
participate and have a meaningful voice in the prosecution of a criminal trial. In
recognition of this evolving jurisprudence, seminal amendments were introduced
to the Cr.P.C., 1973, vide Cr.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 2008, resulting into
insertion of Section 2(wa) which defines a victim' and various other provisions
(such as Section 24(8) and proviso to Section 372, etc.), thereby, giving statutory
recognition to the rights evolved in favour of a victim.
Pertinently, a victim can no longer be relegated to the periphery or
rendered a forgotten entity once the machinery of criminal law has been set into
motion. The terminus of criminal justice system must transcend beyond the mere
safeguarding of rights of an accused and must encompass the preservation and
effective vindication of the rights of a victim. The law must adopt an equipoise
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approach, harmoniously balancing the competing interests of the accused and the
victim. It is a bounden duty of the courts of law to ensure that justice embraces
the injured and afflicted. Jurisprudentially, the guarantee under Article 21
embraces both the life and liberty of the accused as well as interest of the victim,
his near and dear ones as well as of the community at large and therefore cannot
be alienated from each other with levity. As an age-old adage, which has met
with approval by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reads thus:
"We cannot remain oblivious to the substantial suffering of the
victims. It stands as a fact that criminal justice reform and civil rights
movement in India has historically only paid considerable attention to the
rights of the accused and neglected to address to the same extent the
impact of crime on the victims. It is not only the victims of crime only that
require soothing balm, but also the incidental victims like the family, the
co-sufferers and to a relatively larger extent the society too. The judiciary
has a paramount duty to safeguard the rights of the victims as diligently
as those of the perpetrators."
With impunity, a further reference in this regard can be made to an
observation made by J. F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, in a Five judge Bench dicta of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which reads as under:
"....While considering the problem of penology we should not
overlook the plight of victimology and the sufferings of the people who die, suffer
or are maimed at the hands of criminals."
-(J. F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla;
Vide (para 72) Union of India Vs.V. Sriharan @ Murugan &Ors., (2016) 7 SCC 1)
13. Conceptually; FIR-complainant/informant is different from victim,
though, in a given case, they may be same person. In a case pertaining to an
offence, as a result whereof a death has occurred, it is the deceased who is the
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real victim. In such a case, the surviving family members of the deceased
including the spouse/parents/children/guardian/care-giver etc. nay the FIR-
complainant/informant cannot adorn the mantle of primary victim for purpose of
settlement/compromise. The jurisprudential foundation for quashing criminal
proceedings on the basis of a compromise, rests upon the absence of grievance
by the victim, against the accused. In offence under Section 304-A of the
IPC/Section 106 of BNS involving death due to rash and negligent act/ driving,
the primary victim is the deceased, whose demise is directly attributable to the
accused's alleged rash and negligent act/ driving. The deceased, being the
primary aggrieved party (i.e. the real victim), is no longer capable of expressing
consent or grievance, rendering any compromise with the informant or
complainant incongruous with this foundational principle. A settlement between
the accused and the complainant, who merely initiated the criminal process, fails
to satisfy the underlying rationale for such a quashing to succeed. It disregards
the irreversible harm inflicted upon the deceased and the broader societal interest
implicated in crime(s) of this gravity. Thus, permitting quashing in such
instances undermines the rule of law and trivializes the serious nature of the
offence, warranting judicial circumspection and restraint.
13.2. A pertinent issue which craves attention of this Court is the
probable erosion of judicial integrity when criminal proceedings, particularly
involving grave and serious offences (such as Section 304-A IPC/Section 106
BNS), are quashed solely on the basis of a compromise/settlement , having been
arrived at between rival parties. This practice of entering into compromise, more
often than not, involves pecuniary consideration; proferred as reparation or
compensation to the victim's family; creates deeply deleterious impact on the
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societal psyche that the criminal justice system is available for commodification.
Such a scenario suggests that penal absolution is a purchasable commodity,
thereby, implying that serious public wrongs, in which society as a whole has
stakes, can be put to naught by the accused person's financial capacity. Such an
outcome is antithetical to the Rule of Law, which demands that the severity of a
crime and penal consequences must remain insulated from the private financial
arrangements of the parties, thereby, maintaining public confidence in the
impartiality and deterrent efficacy of the justice delivery system. The law, being
a guarantor of equity and fairness, cannot afford to be subjugated to the influence
of wealth, lest it compromise its sacrosanct essence and institutional integrity.
The inherent powers of this Court, ought not be employed for privatization of
criminal liability. An old age adage reads thus:
"Why in history has everyone always focused on the guy with the
big stick, the hero, the activist, to the neglect of the poor slob who is at the
end of the stick, the victim, the passivist - or maybe, the poor slob (in
bondages) isn't all that much of a passivist victim - maybe he asked for it?"
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Daxaben (supra) has
held that an FIR/criminal proceedings qua an offence under Section 306 of the
IPC cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise/settlement since such an
offence falls in the category of heinous and serious offences and is to be treated
as crime against the Society and not against an individual(s). To the same effect
is the dicta of the Division Bench of this Court in Baldev Singh's case (supra)
wherein; dealing with a FIR under Section 304-A of the IPC; this Court has held
that there can be no quashing of an offence registered under Section 304-A of
the IPC and subsequent proceedings emanating therefrom, solely on the basis of
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a compromise arrived at between the legal heirs/representatives of the victim
(deceased) and the accused. This Court must sound a word of caution herein, viz.,
a plea for quashing an FIR under Section 304-A of the IPC/ Section 106 of the
BNS, filed solely on the basis of merits thereof is very much maintainable and
ought to be considered and ratiocinated upon merits thereof.
15. As a result of above-said rumination, it is clear nay crystal clear
that an FIR (as also proceedings emanating therefrom) under Section 304-A of
the IPC/Section 106 of the BNS cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise/
settlement arrived at between the accused on one hand and FIR-
complainant/informant/surviving family of the victim (including
spouse/parents/children/guardian/care-giver etc.) on the other hand. Even if
credence is sought to be lend to such a compromise/settlement, by way of raising
plea(s) on merits, including the plea that the offence of Section 304-A of the IPC
/Section 106 of the BNS is not made out in the facts/circumstances of a given
case, still such petition ought to be rejected.
Analysis (re facts of the present case)
16. The petition in hand has been filed for quashing of FIR No.48 dated
09.06.2022, registered under Sections 304-A & 279 of the IPC, at Police Station
Ajitwal, District Moga, as also the proceedings subsequent thereto, including the
judgment of conviction dated 04.04.2024 (Annexure P-2) passed in case
No.CHI/282/2022 titled "State versus Satnam Singh" by the learned JMIC, on
the basis of a compromise deed dated 07.04.2024 which, in essence pertains to
death of one Gurjit Singh. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that
once the entire matter has been settled, there would be no fruitful purpose served
by allowing the proceedings to continue. It has been argued that the compromise
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in question is for betterment of all the concerned and hence it would met the ends
of justice if the impugned FIR etc. are quashed. Indubitably, the impugned FIR
pertains to the death of one Gurjit Singh, who, of-course, cannot possibly be a
party to the compromise. In view of the discussion in law and facts hereinabove,
petition in hand ought not to be entertained and deserves rejection.
Decision
17. It is thus, directed as follows:
(i) The petition in hand; seeking quashing of FIR No.48 dated
09.06.2022, registered under Sections 304-A & 279 of the IPC, at
Police Station Ajitwal, District Moga, as also the proceedings
subsequent thereto, including the judgment of conviction dated
04.04.2024 (Annexure P-2) passed in case No.CHI/282/2022 titled
as "State versus Satnam Singh" by the learned JMIC, on the basis
of a compromise deed dated 07.04.2024; is dismissed;
(ii) Any observations made and/or submissions noted hereinabove
shall not have any effect on the merits of the case and the appellate
Court shall proceed further, in accordance with law, without being
influenced with the same;
(iii) No deposition as to costs;
(iv) Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
November 20, 2025
Mahavir/naveen
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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