Punjab-Haryana High Court
Hukmi vs State Of Haryana Etc on 20 January, 2025
Author: Sureshwar Thakur
Bench: Sureshwar Thakur, Vikas Suri
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:010026-DB
CWP No. 8740 of 1999 (O&M) -1-
In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
CWP No. 8740 of 1999 (O&M)
Reserved on: 8.1.2025
Date of Decision: 20.1.2025
Hukmi ......Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana and others .....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESHWAR THAKUR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS SURI
Argued by: Mr. P.C.Chaudhary, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. A.G., Haryana,
Mr. Pardeep Prakash Chahar, Sr. DAG, Haryana and
Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana.
Mr. R.N.Lohan, Advocate
for respondent No. 5.
****
SURESHWAR THAKUR, J.
1. Through the instant writ petition, the petitioner seeks the
quashing of the order dated 5.5.1999 (Annexure P-11) passed by the
Commissioner, Hisar Division, Hisar, wherebys through the impugned order
(supra) passed on the revision petition filed by respondent No. 6 against the
order dated 28.7.1998 passed by the District Collector, Jind, the matter was
remanded to the Assistant Collector concerned. The petitioner has further
sought a direction upon respondents No. 1 to 5 to remove the alleged
encroachment, as made by respondent No. 6, thus through his constructing a
house on the public passage comprised in khasra No. 198.
Brief facts of the case
2. It is averred in the instant petition, that the petitioner is the
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owner and in possession of the agricultural land measuring about 8-9
situated within the revenue estate of village Harnampura, Tehsil Narwana,
District Jind, comprised in khewat No. 10, khatauni No. 21, khasra No. 24/4
(0-4), rectangle No. 17, khasra Nos. 2(7-15), 9(8-0), 10(6-8), 11(8-0), 12(8-
0), 19(4-0), 20(8-0), rectangle No. 18, khasra No. 15 (3-4), 16(7-18), 24/2
(0-10), 25/1(1-16), rectangle No. 97 and 102 measuring (0-4) and (0-15), as
detailed in the jamabandi for the year 1995-96. During the consolidation of
holdings, 11 feet wide passage was provided to the petitioner for ingress and
egress purposes in khasra No. 198, khewat No. 158/141-142, khatauni No.
228, measuring 01 kanal 01 marla, which vests in the Gram Panchayat
concerned. The petitioner and the other inhabitants of the village, whose
lands abuts or fall on the said passage, have been using the said land for
ingress and egress purposes.
3. It is further averred that in the year 1993, respondent No. 6-
Mukandi had encroached upon a part of the land measuring about one marla
i.e. 26 feet x 5½ feet of the said public passage, as comprised in khasra No.
198, by constructing a house over it. The petitioner also requested
respondent No. 5 for getting the said encroachment removed, however, it
failed to do so. Subsequently, the petitioner filed an application under
Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (for
short 'the Act of 1961') seeking removal of encroachment made by
respondent No. 6.
4. Initially, on 2.5.1994, the application (supra) was decided by
the Assistant Collector concerned, and the same was consigned to the record
room. However, an appeal thereagainst became preferred by the petitioner
herein, thus before the Collector concerned, who through an order dated
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24.10.1994, set aside the order (supra), and, remanded the case to the
Assistant Collector concerned, rather for a fresh decision being made
thereon, but after getting the demarcations done through an experienced
revenue officer, as per the FCR instructions. In compliance of the order
(supra), the Assistant Collector concerned, appointed one Ram Dass,
Assistant Consolidation Officer (Retired), as Local Commissioner, rather for
making the demarcations of the disputed lands. The Local Commissioner
concerned, after conducting the demarcation of the petition lands, submitted
the detailed report (Annexure P-7).
5. The learned Assistant Collector concerned, on 3.2.1997, after
accepting the said demarcation report, ordered for the ejectment of
respondent No. 6 from the petition land. However, an appeal became filed
thereagainst by respondent No. 6, thus the learned Collector concerned, who
through an order made on 21.7.1997, on the appeal (supra) rather remanded
the case to the Assistant Collector concerned, with a direction to summon
the Local Commissioner concerned, and, to afford an opportunity to
respondent No. 6 to cross-examine the said Local Commissioner.
6. In compliance to the said order, the Local Commissioner was
examined, and, after hearing both the parties, the application (supra) filed by
the petitioner was allowed on 15.12.1997, by the Assistant Collector
concerned, and, an order for ejecting respondent No. 6 from the petition land
became passed.
7. Being aggrieved from the order (supra), the respondent No. 6
filed an appeal before the Collector concerned. However, the said appeal
was dismissed by the learned Collector concerned on 28.7.1998, while
upholding the eviction order dated 15.12.1997, as passed by the Assistant
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Collector concerned.
8. Being aggrieved from order (supra) passed by the learned
Collector concerned, respondent No. 6 filed a revision petition before the
learned Commissioner concerned. However, vide the impugned order dated
5.5.1999, the learned Commissioner concerned, remanded the case to the
Asisstant Collector Ist Grade, Narwana, with a direction to carry out
nishandehi under the direct supervision of the Tehsildar or of the Naib
Tehsildar, but without considering the detailed demarcation report of the
Local Commissioner concerned.
9. In reply filed by respondent No. 6, it is averred that there is
nothing on record to show that the passage covering an area of 1 kanal and 1
marla was carved out for the use of the petitioner, and, that respondent No. 6
has not encroached any area of the passage, rather has raised construction on
the adjoining area. It is further averred that the dispute in the present
litigation relates to an area of 1/2 marla of khasra No. 198, and, any
controversy regarding any area of khasra No. 152 is irrelevant. Furthermore,
it is averred in the reply that there is a grave error in the demarcation report,
as there was no fixed pucca points nearby.
Inferences of this Court
10. Since pursuance to the order rendered on 21.7.1997, upon, the
apposite statutory appeal, wherebys the learned Collector concerned,
remanded the case to the learned Assistant Collector concerned, but with a
direction to him to summon the Local Commissioner concerned, and, to
afford an opportunity to respondent No. 6, thus to examine the said Local
Commissioner, thus when the Local Commissioner becoming both
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examined-in-chief, and, also becoming cross-examined. Moreover, when a
reading of the order rendered by the learned Assistant Collector concerned,
displays that the latter after referring to the testification(s), as made by the
Local Commissioner concerned, both in his examination-in-chief and in his
cross-examination, rather ultimately concluded, that the report submitted
before him by the Local Commissioner concerned, thus was required to be
assigned credence. Resultantly, when the said assigning of credence by the
learned Assistant Collector concerned, to the report of the Local
Commissioner, thus also became affirmed by the learned Collector
concerned, through his making a decision on the relevant statutory appeal on
28.7.1998,
11. Though therebys the verdict of eviction was required to be
enforced but yet against the supra made order on 28.7.1998, the aggrieved
therefrom preferred a revision petition before the learned revisional authority
concerned, whereons the impugned order became passed.
12. The prime issue, which requires determination in the instant
writ petition, is whether the exercisings of revisional jurisdiction by the
learned Commissioner concerned, thus on the revision petition (supra), and,
whereons the impugned order became rendered, was a validly assumed
jurisdiction on the said revision petition.
13. If this Court concludes, that the entertainment of the revision
petition (supra), at the instance of the Commissioner concerned, thus was
outside the domain of Section 13-B of the Haryana Village Common Lands
(Regulation) Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act of 1961'), thereupon, this Court
would proceed to set aside the impugned order (Annexure P-11). However,
before proceeding to adjudicate the above issue, it is also necessary to
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extract the provisions, as carried in Section 7 of the Act of 1961, provisions
whereof become extracted hereinafter.
"7. Power to put Panchayat in possession of certain lands.--
[(1) An Assistant Collector of the first grade having jurisdiction in
the village may, either suo moto or on an application made to him
by a Panchayat or an inhabitant of the village or the Block
Development and Panchayat Officer or Social Education and
Panchayat Officer, or any other Officer authorised by the Block
Development and Panchayat Officer, after making such summary
enquiry as he may deem fit and in accordance with such procedure
as may be prescribed, eject any person who is in wrongful or
unauthorised possession of the land or other immovable property in
the shamilat deh of that village which vests or is deemed to have
been vested in the panchayat under this Act and put the panchayat in
possession thereof and for so doing the Assistant Collector of the
first grade may exercise the powers of a revenue court in relation to
the execution of a decree for possession of land under the Punjab
Tenancy Act, 1887:
Provided that if in any such proceedings the question of title is
raised and proved prima facie on the basis of documents that the
question of title is really involved, the Assistant Collector of the first
grade shall record a finding to that effect and first decide the
question of title in the manner laid down hereinafter.
(2) The Assistant Collector of the first grade shall by an order, in
writing, require any person to pay a penalty, in respect of the land
or other immovable property which was or has been in his wrongful
or unauthorised possession, at a rate not less than five thousand
rupees and not more than ten thousand rupees per hectare per
annum, having regard to the benefit which could be derived from the
land or other immovable property. If the penalty is not paid within
the period of thirty days from the date of the order, the same shall be
recoverable as arrears of land revenue.
(3) The procedure for deciding the question of title under proviso to
sub-section (1) shall be the same as laid down in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.
(4) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction
passed under sub-section (1), within ten days of the date of such
order, the Assistant Collector of the first grade may use such force,
including police force, as may be necessary for putting the
panchayat in possession.
(5) Any person who is found in wrongful or unauthorised possession
of the land or other immovable property in shamilat deh and is
ordered to be ejected under sub-section (1), shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years. "
14. At the outset, the jurisdictional competence of revisional
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authority to entertain a revision petition when becomes directed against the
orders of eviction passed by the Assistant Collector concerned, or by the
Appellate Authority concerned, especially when the said order of eviction
becomes stricto sensu made within the domain of sub-Section (1) of Section
7 of the Act of 1961, and, but without within the domain of the proviso
thereunders, rather no question of title becoming raised by the respondent in
the said eviction petition, thus, also extending to the situation (supra), rather
has resulted in diverse verdicts becoming made thereons.
15. In the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in
case titled as Leela Ram versus Gram Panchayat, Jailaf, reported in
1997(4) RCR (Civil) 354, this Court after making an appraisal of the
mandate, carried in Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, concluded in paragraph
3 thereof, para whereof becomes extracted hereinafter, that when no
question of title, thus within the domain of the proviso to Section 7 of the
Act of 1961, became raised by the respondent in the eviction petition,
thereupon, the exercisings of revisional jurisdiction on the relevant revision
petition, is clearly barred.
"3. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners we are of
the view that the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners
has got force. Section 13-B(2) clearly envisages that Commissioner
can entertain the revision petition suo motu or on an application
filed by the aggrieved party if the case has been decided under the
amended proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act. The
proviso of Sub-section (1) clearly lays down that if question of title
is involved in a case, it should be decided under proviso. In other
words if no question of title is involved, the proviso would not apply
and in such a situation the jurisdiction of the Commissioner to act
Under Section 13-B(2) shall stand excluded whether he was to act
suo motu or on the application of an aggrieved party. As a
necessary corollary, it can safely be held that in eviction
proceedings the order of Collector in appeal would be final whereas
the Commissioner would have the power to entertain the revision
petition, if question of title is raised and proved prima facie on the
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basis of documents and this is the mandate of the proviso. This is the
only interpretation which can be placed on combined reading of
Section 7 and Section 13-B of the Act. No other interpretation in our
view is possible. If the legislature had intended to vest powers in the
Commissioner to entertain the revision petition even in cases of
eviction of unauthorised occupants, there was no obstacle in its way
to either make a specific provision in this regard or manifest its
intention by adding another proviso.
16. The said view became reiterated in a judgment passed by this
Court in CWP No. 24188 of 2013, titled as Gram Panchayat Village
Badangi versus State of Haryana and others.
17. However a view contrary to the view adopted in the verdicts
(supra) became taken by the Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 2891
of 2014, titled as Rulia Khan versus State of Haryana and others.
Moreover, in the judgment passed by a Division Bench of this Court in case
titled as Orion Infrastructure Limited versus Commissioner, Gurgaon
Division, Gurgaon and others, reported in 2012(3) PLR 128, this Court in
para 37 thereof, para whereof becomes extracted hereinafter, has taken the
view, that the investment of suo moto revisional jurisdiction under Section
13-B of the Act of 1961, thus in the revisional Court concerned, especially
given the occurrence of the statutory coinages thereins "call for the record
of any proceedings pending before, or orders passed by, any authority
subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or
propriety of the proceedings or order", thus therebys, rather the Revisional
Court concerned, becomes validly permitted to even without the respondent
in the apposite eviction petition recoursing the mandate of the proviso
carried in Section 7 of the Act of 1961, rather exercise revisional jurisdiction
against such orders passed in any statutory appeal by the Appellate
Authority concerned.
"37. An argument has been raised by learned counsel for the
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petitioner that under sub-section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of
1961, the Commissioner can only entertain the revision either suo
motu or on an application made to him by a person aggrieved
against the order passed under the proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 7, and not against an order passed by the Assistant
Collector Ist Grade under Section 13-A of the Act of 1961.
Therefore, the order of the Commissioner setting aside the order of
the Assistant Collector Ist Grade, in exercise of suo motu power
under Section 13-B(2) of the Act of 1961 is wholly without
jurisdiction. This contention of learned counsel for the petitioner
cannot be accepted. If this contention is accepted, then the words
"call for the record of any proceedings pending before, or orders
passed by, any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of
satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the proceedings
or order" used in Section 13-B (2) will become redundant. It is
fundamental principle of interpretation that every word of the
statute is to be given meaning. The Court cannot give interpretation
to a provision by rendering certain portion or words of the provision
as meaningless or redundant. In Aswini Kumar Ghose Vs. Arabinda
Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369, it has been held that "It is not a sound
principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being
inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in
circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute".
Similar observation was made in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & Anr.
Vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394 that "It is incumbent
on the court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on
the language, which would render a part of the statute devoid of any
meaning or application". In J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills
Co. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1170, it was observed that
"the courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part
thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part
of the statute should have effect". The Legislature is deemed not to
waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which
attributes redundancy to the Legislature will not be accepted except
for compelling reasons. In the present case, we do not find any
reason to give construction to the provision of Section 13-B(2) of the
Act of 1961, by rendering some portion or words of the provision as
meaningless or redundant. Sub-section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act
of 1961 deals with two types of revisions, firstly on the application
made by a person aggrieved against an order passed under the
proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 7, and secondly, the
Commissioner has been given suo motu power to revise or modify
any order passed by any authority subordinate to him. The
Commissioner has been given wide suo motu power to pass any
order in relation to any proceedings or order passed by any
authority subordinate to him, as he may deem fit."
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18. The reason which has been portrayed in the above extracted
paragraph, rather for the Division Bench taking the above view, arose from
its concluding, that in the legislature employing the said coinages in the
above extracted provision, is therebys thus deemed not to waste its words or
to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the
Legislature, except for compelling reasons rather will not be accepted.
Therefore, to avoid the assigning of redundancy to the employment of the
statutory coinage (supra), in the provisions cast under Section 7 of the Act of
1961, thus the Division Bench of this Court concluded, that the expanse of
the said statutory coinages, spreads even to a situation, whereby the
respondent in the eviction petition, who despite not rearing, thus within the
domain of the proviso, as occurs thereins, hence any question of title,
whereby he/she resists the assertion of title, as made to the disputed lands by
the petitioner/Gram Panchayat in the eviction petition, rather becoming
empowered to avail the revisional remedies (supra). The judgment (supra)
also became concurred by a verdict rendered by the Division Bench of this
Court in case titled as Sudesh Kumar and others versus State of Haryana
and others, reported in 2019(4) PLR 204.
19. Though, the principles of judicial propriety ordain, that the
verdicts rendered by a Bench strength of this Court, thus co-equal to the
Bench strength of this Court, are required to be adhered to, unless
distinguished or unless per incuriam the statutory provisions. However,
when divergent views in respect of the issue at hand, are taken by the
Division Benches of this Court, which are thus naturally co-equal in strength
to the quorum of this Court, thereby though normally a reference to a Bench
strength larger in size to the Bench strengths, which delivered contra views
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over the subject at hand, rather is required to be made.
20. However, for the reasons to be assigned hereinafter, this Court
refrains from despite contra views becoming taken by the Division Benches
of this Court, to make a reference vis-a-vis the subject at hand, to a Bench
strength larger in size to the Bench strength(s) of the Division Benches of
this Court, each of whom, as stated (supra), but have taken divergent views
over the subject at hand.
21. This Court for the reasons to be assigned hereinafter, becomes
empowered to adopt the view taken by one of the Division Bench of this
Court, and, also becomes empowered to refrain from concurring with the
contra view taken by another Division Bench of this Court, thus on
employment of the rules relating to the interpretation of the "coinages",
which occur in Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, provisions whereof become
extracted hereinafter. Resultantly, therebys this Court concludes, that the
view adopted in Rulia Khan's case (supra), and, in Orion Infrastructure
Limited's case (supra) is but per incuriam the statutory coinage, as occur in
Section 13-B of the Act of 1961. Moreover, therebys this Court would
become inclined to uphold the view adopted by a Division Bench of this
Court in Gram Panchayat village Badangi's case (supra), and, also therebys
becomes coaxed to disconcur with the contra thereto view taken by the
Division Benches of this Court in Rulia Khan's case (supra), and, in Orion
Infrastructure Limited's case (supra). Conspicuously, for the reasons that
the view taken in Rulia Khan's case (supra), and, in Orion Infrastructure
Limited's case (supra), thus on a plain and literal construction of statutory
coinages (supra), which occur in Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, rather is
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per incuriam the underlined statutory coinages (supra).
"13-B. Appeal and revision-(1) Any person aggrieved by an order
of the Assistant Collector of the first grade may, within a period of
thirty days from the date of order passed under sub-section (1) or
sub-section (2) of section 7 prefer an appeal to the Collector in such
form and manner, as may be prescribed . and the Collector may
after hearing the appeal, confirm, vary or reverse the order as he
deems fit:
Provided that no such appeal shall lie unless the amount of penalty,
if any, imposed under sub-section (2) of section 7, is deposited with
the Collector.]
(2) The Commissioner may, suo motu [or on an application made to
him by any person aggrieved by an order passed under the proviso
to sub-section (1) of section 7 at any time] call for the record of any
proceedings pending before, or order passed by, any authority
subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the
legality or propriety of the proceedings or order and pass such
order in relation thereto as he may deem fit-:
Provided that no order adversely affecting any person shall be
passed unless he has been afforded an opportunity of being heard."
22. First, and, foremost a circumspect, and, incisive reading of the
provisions of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, especially of the mandate
borne in sub-Section (1) thereof, but clearly, and, forthrightly makes
speakings, that the right of appealability to an aggrieved from an order
passed by the Assistant Collector Ist Grade, is thus, before the Appellate
Authority concerned. Nonetheless, beneath the said sub-Section (1), a
proviso occurs wherebys, the said appeal has been declared to be well
constituted only subject to the amount of penalty, as becomes imposed under
sub-Section (2) of Section 7 of the Act of 1961, rather being deposited with
the Collector.
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23. Be that as it may, the legal conundrum at hand relates to the
expanse of revisional jurisdiction conferred, upon the Commissioner
concerned, through the mandate which occurs in sub-Section (2) of Section
13-B of the Act of 1961. Tritely on employing the rule of plain readings or
on employing the rule of making literal construction of the said sub-Section
(2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, the inference which is but naturally
marshable therefrom, is that, though the Commissioner becomes empowered
to suo motu exercise the revisional jurisdiction, but the said exercising of
revisional jurisdiction, is also so exerciseable, rather though an application
becoming made before him by any person, who becomes aggrieved from an
order passed under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Act of
1961. The initial segment, as becomes carried in sub-Section (2) of Section
13-B of the Act, is but in the first component of sub-Section (2), and, the
subsequent thereto statutory coinage(s), inasmuch as, "call for the record of
any proceedings pending before, or order passed by, any authority
subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or
propriety of the proceedings or order and pass such order in relation
thereto as he may deem fit" but naturally are the second component or the
second segment of the said statutory provision. Therefore, on employing the
interpretative tool of making literal interpretation, vis-a-vis, the opening or
of the first segment of sub-Section (1) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961,
unless the second component (supra), is earmarkedly or pointedly carved, as
an exception thereto, therebys the second component is to be read in
alignment with the first component. In other words, the rules of ejusdem
generis, thus also require, that the first and the second component of sub-
Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, require theirs being
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harmonized or being aligned with each other, for therebys both becoming
made workable, and/or therebys the able functionality of both the
components becomes fully enabled.
24. On employing the above interpretative tools, since the
revisional jurisdiction conferred through sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of
the Act of 1961, upon the Commissioner, rather in the first component of the
said sub-Section, has to be exercised by the Commissioner, thus vis-a-vis an
order passed under the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 7 of the Act of
1961. Therefore, when the second component of sub-Section (2) of Section
13-B of the Act of 1961, thus is not explicitly expressed to function as a
rider or as an exception thereto, nor functions as a proviso to the first
component. Resultantly, the statutory expressions carried thereins, inasmuch
as "call for the record of any proceedings pending before, or order passed
by, any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as
to the legality or propriety of the proceedings or order and pass such order
in relation thereto as he may deem fit" are to be aligned or are to be read
with in conjunction with the first segment, as therebys both would be
conjointly workable, and, whereupon both would not become rendered
redundant. In sequel, when there is a specific legislative intent, thus in the
first segment of sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961,
wherebys an explicitly expressed revisional jurisdiction becomes conferred,
upon the Commissioner concerned, only vis-a-vis an order passed under the
proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 7 of the Act of 1961. Resultantly, the
subsequent thereto statutory coinages "call for the record of any
proceedings pending before, or order passed by, any authority subordinate
to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of
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the proceedings or order and pass such order in relation thereto as he may
deem fit" but are to be read in alignment with the said first segment (supra),
besides the first, and, the second components, are not to be segregated,
especially when neither the second segment, is candidly spoken to be an
exception to the first segment, nor the second component is expressedly
stated to be serving as a proviso to the first segment.
25. Therefore, the statutory expressions (supra), are such explicit
statutory expressions, which relate to the Commissioner concerned, while
exercising revisional jurisdiction, becomes enjoined to do so only vis-a-vis
an order passed under the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 7 of the Act
of 1961, besides also becomes enjoined to call for the records of proceedings
but relating to the passing of the said order. Moreover, the revisional
empowerment, to call for the records of any proceedings pending before, or
the order passed by any authority subordinate to the revisional authority, are
also statutory expressions, which relate to the proceedings appertaining to
the drawings of an ultimate order by the Assistant Collector concerned,
upon, the respondent in the eviction petition, who but employs the mandate
of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Act of 1961. In addition,
the said revisional empowerment extends also to the subjudice appellate
proceedings, as become drawn therefroms, and, as such are pending before
the Appellate Authority. Moreover, the ultimate orders passed on the
statutory appeal, by the authority subordinate to the revisional authority,
and, which arise from the orders passed by the Assistant Collector
concerned, under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Act of
1961, rather are but the orders or the proceedings, pending before, or the
orders passed by any authority subordinate to the revisional authority in
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terms of sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act.
26. In consequence, the second component of sub-Section (2) of
Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, thus only speaks about the power invested
in the revisional authority concerned, to call for the records of any
proceedings, which are but pending before, or the orders passed by an
authority subordinate to the revisional Court, which is thus the Appellate
Court concerned. The said pending proceedings or the orders passed by the
Appellate Court concerned, in respect whereof, the empowerment becomes
vested in the revisional authority, thus to summon the records thereof, rather
is an empowerment vested in the revisional authority concerned, which does
imperatively relate to the proceedings as become embarked upon, in an
appeal reared before the appellate authority, and, which generates from the
orders passed under the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 7 of the Act of
1961, thus by the Assistant Collector concerned.
27. It appears, that the above manner of making literal conjoint
interpretation of the relevant statutory provision (supra), besides on
employing the rule of ejusdem generis, thus to the considered mind of this
Court, but imparts a wholesome, and, combined signification qua both the
components of sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, wherebys
the entirety of the provisions, carried thereins becomes fully functional.
Reiteratedly, the said manner of interpretation is also made, on employing
the rule relating to literal interpretations being made to both the components,
as occur in sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, wherebys the
purposeful declared therein legislative intent, rather is not required to be
deviated from. Moreover, therebys both the segments become harmonized,
as such, there would be no redundancy either to the first, and/or, to the
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second component. The effect of the above, is that, the view adopted by the
Division Bench of this Court in Leela Ram's case (supra), is made on a
correct interpretation of the mandate, as occurs in sub-Section (1) of Section
7 of the Act of 1961, besides to the consequent thereto mandate, as occurs in
Section 13-B of the Act of 1961 whereas, the view taken in Rulia Khan 's
case (supra) is contrary to the legislative intent.
28. In nutshell, this Court concludes, that only when before the
Assistant Collector concerned, but within the domain of the proviso of
Section 7(2) of the Act of 1961, the respondent in the eviction petition,
rather has raised a disputed question of title, wherebys, he negates the
assertion of the Gram Panchayat concerned, to seek his eviction from the
disputed lands, and, leading to an order of eviction being passed, qua
thereupon alone against such a rendered order of eviction, rather a revision
petition is maintainable to the aggrieved therefrom, before the revisional
Court concerned. However, no revision petition is maintainable before the
revisional authority concerned, thus in the event if no question of title, rather
within the domain of the proviso to Section 7 of the Act of 1961, becoming
raised by the respondent, in the eviction petition, as in respect of the above, a
specific remedy of appeal in sub-Section (1) of Section 13-B of the Act,
rather is created.
29. If so, when in the proviso underneath sub-Section (1) of Section
13-B of the Act of 1961, there is an encumbrance of deposit of penalty
amount, upon the respondent, in the eviction petition, thus as a pre-condition
for maintaining the statutory appeal, whereas, the said proviso does not
occur underneath sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961,
thereupon too, there are but separate statutory empowerments which become
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vested in the aggrieved from an order of eviction passed in a simpliciter
petition cast under Section 7 of the Act of 1961, and, qua the respondent
therein taking to rely upon the apposite proviso to sub-section (1) of section
7 of the Act of 1961. Conspicuously, only in the latter situation, the remedy
if any to the aggrieved from the order of eviction passed by the Appellate
Authority concerned, is through a revision being preferred in terms of
sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961.
30. Now this Court is required to delineate the manner of objective
satisfaction being drawn by the Assistant Collector concerned, on the
respondent, in the eviction petition, raising a dispute with respect to the
entitlement of the Gram Panchayat, to seek the eviction of the respondent
concerned, from the disputed lands. On a plain reading of the proviso, as
occurs underneath sub-Section (1) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, it is
manifestly clear, that when in a response filed to the eviction petition, the
respondent raises a claim qua title inhering in him vis-a-vis the disputed
lands, but with a further statutory condition, that yet he is required to be
prima facie proving the said assertion, thus on the basis of the apposite
prima facie credible documents. Resultantly therefrom alone the Assistant
Collector concerned, is required to draw an objective speaking order, that
whether a substantial question of title is really involved, and, resultantly
therebys, he is required to decide the said question of title, in the manner as
declared in sub-Section (3) of Section 7 of the Act of 1961, provisions
whereof become extracted hereinabove.
31. Therefore, the apposite procedural mandate appertaining to the
employments of the regulatory procedural mechanisms, as relates to trial of
the civil suits by the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, are also required
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to be thus employed by the Assistant Collector concerned, when he proceeds
to, after making a finding that a question of title is really involved, thus try
the said question of title. Resultantly, but naturally when in the mandate
enclosed in sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, speakings
(supra) are made in the second segment thereof, segment whereof, is not
expressed to be a statutory exception to the prior thereto first segment.
Resultantly, the statutory coinages (supra), as become borne in the second
segment relate to the testings being made by the revisional authority vis-a-
vis the well adoption of the said regulatory procedural mechanisms, thus by
the Assistant Collector concerned, while his proceeding to decide the
question of title, as becomes raised by the respondent in the eviction petition.
32. In sequel, the underlined expressions (supra) which occur in the
second segment of sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, when
reiteratedly, do imminently relate to the adoptions of the apposite statutory
regulatory mechanism, even by the Assistant Collector concerned, while his
proceeding to decide the question of title, as becomes raised in terms of
proviso to Section 7 of the Act of 1961. In sequel, when during the course
of the apposite undertaken proceedings in respect theretos, thus there is a
purported clear departure from the employment of the above said procedural
mechanisms, which are required to be thus recoursed by the Assistant
Collector concerned, in his proceeding to engage himself in deciding the
question of title, as becomes raised in terms of proviso to Section 7 of the
Act of 1961, that therebys the proceedings relating to such made departures,
are the ones which become expressed in the underlined statutory coinages,
thus to invest in the revisional Court concerned, the jurisdiction to test the
propriety or otherwise of the making of such purported departures.
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33. Conspicuously, there is a difference between the
exercising of appeal, and, of revisional jurisdiction. The statutes investing
appellate, and, revisional jurisdiction, do so through separate statutory
provisions, which in the instant case, occur respectively in sub-Section (1)
and sub-Section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, as also in the
CPC, there are certain appealable orders, and, there are also reviseable
orders. Since only in respect of non-appealable orders, the High Court
exercises revisional jurisdiction conferred under Section 115 of the CPC or
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, when the
exercisings of the said vested jurisdiction, results in the calling for the record
of the proceedings, as become embarked upon in respect of the relevant
lis, rather by the Civil Courts or by the quasi judicial authorities.
Resultantly, on a similar analogy, the statutory coinages "call for the record
of any proceedings pending before, or order passed by, any authority
subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or
propriety of the proceedings or order and pass such order in relation
thereto as he may deem fit" do also relate to the revisional authority
becoming conferred with jurisdiction to call for records of the
proceedings as generate from the lis, whereins, in terms of the proviso
to Section 7 of the Act of 1961, a disputed question of title is raised
by the respondent in the eviction petition. However, if the said analogy is
departed, thereupon the fine distinction created in Section 13-B of the Act of
1961 inter se the appealable orders and the revisional orders, but necessarily
would be lost, besides the fine distinction created in the CPC in respect of
appealable orders and reviseable orders, and, the consequent thereto
empowerment respectively in the Appellate Courts and the Revisional
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Courts, but would also become completely ill-effaced. In sequel, the above
fine distinction is required to be maintained, but has not been maintained in
the verdicts recorded in Rulia Khan's case (supra), and, in Orion
Infrastructure Limited's case (supra).
34. However, when no question of title within the domain of the
said proviso became raised, nor also when any decision was required to be
made thereons by the learned Assistant Collector concerned. Therefore, the
petition, as cast under Section 7 of the Act of 1961, was a simpliciter
petition for eviction. If so, no revisional jurisdiction became conferred upon
the Commissioner concerned, in his maintaining the said petition, and, also
his through the impugned order deciding the same. As such, the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction by the learned Commissioner concerned, is non est,
wherebys the impugned order also consequently becomes non est.
35. In consequence, if no proceedings, as such, on the said raised
question of title became drawn, therebys no breach became caused to the
proviso to Section 7 of the Act of 1961, especially when, as such the said
assertion of title over the disputed lands, rather was most surmisingly raised.
Therefore, in the said situation, to the considered mind of this Court, there is
no exerciseable revisional jurisdiction invested in the Commissioner
concerned, to thus in terms of Section 13-B of the Act of 1961, rather
exercise revisional jurisdiction thereovers. The said revisional jurisdiction
rather is exerciseable, only when despite the documents to support the
assertion of title, becoming produced along with the apposite response made
to the eviction petition, thus by the respondent, yet the said documents
becoming untenably discarded, both by the Assistant Collector concerned,
and, by the Appellate Authority concerned. The above situation also does
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not exist in the present case, nor any revisional jurisdiction was exerciseable
on the revision petition.
36. Be that as it may, assuming that the revision petition (supra)
was a competently filed revision petition, therebys too, the revisional
authority was required to after making a detailed analysis of the
testification(s) rendered by the Local Commissioner concerned, thus to
locate thereins some grave pervasive infirmities, relating to his making grave
palpable breaches vis-a-vis the canons relating to the conducting of
demarcation of the disputed lands. If such grave pervasive infirmities
became located in the report of the Local Commissioner, and, which also
became proven by the Local Commissioner, through his stepping into the
witness box, during course whereof, rather his becoming successfully cross-
examined. However, even the said situation is not existing. As such, when
the report of the Local Commissioner became proven, therebys unless yet
some grave noticeable infirmities were located therein, by the revisional
authority concerned, thereupon may be the impugned order was vindicable.
However, when the supra infirmities rather remain not spoken in the
impugned order, therebys the impugned order, thus is an ill-informed order,
besides is not founded on any valid reason, rather for disconcurring with
either the verdict of eviction recorded by the learned Assistant Collector
concerned, and, subsequently also by the Collector concerned.
Final order
37. For all the above stated reasons, this Court finds merit in the
instant petition, and, is constrained to allow it. Consequently, the instant
petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 5.5.1999 (Annexure P-11) is
quashed and set aside. The order dated 15.12.1997 passed by the learned
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Assistant Collector concerned, and, also the order dated 28.7.1998 passed by
the learned Collector concerned, however are maintained and affirmed.
38. The miscellaneous application(s), if any, is/are also disposed of.
(SURESHWAR THAKUR)
JUDGE
(VIKAS SURI)
JUDGE
January 20, 2025
Gurpreet
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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