Mangat Ram And Ors vs State Of Haryana And Ors
2025 Latest Caselaw 1691 P&H

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Mangat Ram And Ors vs State Of Haryana And Ors on 3 February, 2025

Bench: Sureshwar Thakur, Vikas Suri

                              Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:015311-DB

CWP-9933-2015 (O & M)                                            -1-




      IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
                   AT CHANDIGARH.

                                          CWP-9933-2015 (O & M)
                                          Reserved on: 22.01.2025
                                          Pronounced on: 03.02.2025


MANGAT RAM AND OTHERS                                       .....Petitioners


                                 Versus



STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS                                ....Respondents


CORAM:      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESHWAR THAKUR
            HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS SURI

Argued by: Mr. Sandeep Sharma, Advocate
           Ms. Gitanjali, Advocate
           Mr. Rohan Moudgil, Advocate
           Mr. Jaspreet Singh, Advocate
           Mr. Deepak Mishra, Advocate
           for the petitioner(s).

            Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. A.G., Haryana with
            Mr. P.P.Chahar, Sr. DAG, Haryana and
            Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana.

       Mr. Pravindra Singh Chauhan,
       Advocate General, Haryana with
       Mr. Ankur Mittal, Advocate
       Ms. Kushaldeep Kaur Manchanda, Advocate and
       Ms. Saanvi Singla, Advocate
       for respondent - HSIIDC/HSVP.
                         ****
SURESHWAR THAKUR, J.

CM-14283-2024

The application is allowed subject to all just exceptions

and the photographs as annexed with the instant application are taken

on record as Annexure P-10.

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Main case.

1. The instant writ petition became remanded by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court vide order dated 21.02.2024. The operative part of the

said order is extracted hereinafter.

"...........Accordingly, the impugned orders are set aside and the matters are remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration of all the other issues on merits that have been raised in the respective petitions in accordance with law........"

2. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners argues,

that since the declaration as became passed under Section 6 of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1894"),

was so passed on 30.12.2014, thereby when the date of making of the

said declaration, thus occurred subsequent to the coming into force of

the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation And Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as

the "Act of 2013"). Therefore, he argues that no legal relevance can

become assigned to the issuance of a notification under Section 4 on

31.12.2013.

3. Therefore, he submits that the notification(s) (supra), are

required to be quashed, and, set aside, thus on the ground, that since on

the date of makings of Section 6 notification, the 'Act of 2013' had

assumed force thus, thereby the proceedings for acquisition were

required to be launched under the 'Act of 2013', than under the 'Act of

1894'.

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4. The above raised contention before this Court by the

learned counsel for the petitioners, is no longer res integra, as it

becomes completely answered by a verdict drawn by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in case titled as "Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure

Development Corporation Ltd. And others V Deepak Aggarwal and

others" to which Civil Appeal No.5947-5948 of 2022 arising out of

SLP(C) Nos.16631-16632 of 2018 became assigned. The Hon'ble Apex

Court in paragraph No.31 of the verdict (supra), paragraph whereof,

becomes extracted hereinafter, had thereins formulated the question of

law, thus for an answer being rendered thereons.

"31. Now, we will consider the other common questions involved in the captioned appeals. They pertain to the questions as to whether Section 4 notification issued under the L.A. Act prior to 01.01.2014 (date of commencement of 2013 Act) could continue or survive after 01.01.2014 and, as to whether Section 6 notification under the L.A. Act could be issued after 01.01.2014."

5. A reading of the hereinabove extracted formulated question

of law, reveals that the issue which engaged the Hon'ble Apex Court

appertained to whether the initiation of proceedings under the 'Act of

1894', commenced on the date of the making of a notification under

Section 4 of the said Act, or whether the initiation of acquisition

proceedings under the 'Act of 1894', commenced on the date of making

of a declaration under Section 6 of the 'Act of 1894'. It appears that the

reason for the drawing of questions of law (supra), arose from the

provisions occurring in Section 24(1) of the 'Act of 2013', provisions

whereof stands extracted hereinafter.

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"24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,--

(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or

(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed."

6. Moreover, the Hon'ble Apex Court was engaged in making

an interpretation of the phraseology "proceedings initiated under the

'Act of 1894', as occurs in Section 24(1) of the 'Act of 2013'. In

rendering an answer to the above question of law, the Hon'ble Apex

Court in paragraph No.32 thereof, paragraph whereof becomes

extracted hereinafter, had expostulated, that the initiation of acquisition

proceedings under the 'Act of 1894', thus occurs on the date of making

of a notification under Section 4 of the said Act, and, that the initiation

of acquisition proceedings under the 'Act of 1894', does not occur, on

the date of issuance of a declaration under Section 6 of the 'Act of

1894'.

"We think that while considering those questions we will have to bear in mind the purposes and the legislative history of the 2013 Act and also the intention of the legislature in drafting the same in the manner in which it now exists. We have already dealt with those aspects. One

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crucial aspect discernible from Section 24(1)(a) has also to be taken note of in this context. The combined effect of Section 24(1) and clause (a) thereof is that if land acquisition proceeding under the L.A. Act was initiated prior to 01.01.2014, the date of coming into force of the 2013 Act, and if it was not culminated in an award under Section 11 of the L.A. Act, then all the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation should apply to such acquisition proceedings. Thus, it is obvious that in case of non-passing of an award in terms of Section 11 of the L.A. Act where the acquisition proceedings have been initiated prior to 01.01.2014, all provisions under the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation alone would apply to such acquisition proceedings. In other words, it would mean that in such circumstances the land acquisition proceedings should continue, but all the provisions relating to the determination of compensation under the 2013 Act alone will be applicable to such proceedings, meaning thereby, the 2013 Act would come into play only at that stage. There can be no doubt with respect to the position that between the initiation of land acquisition proceedings by issuance and publication of notice under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act and the stage at which compensation for the acquisition calls for determination, there are various procedures to be followed to make the acquisition in accordance with the law. The question is when Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act makes it clear with necessary implication that all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation alone would be applicable to such proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act but, not culminated in an award, how the procedures are to be regulated during the intervening period till the

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proceedings reach the stage of determination of compensation. There cannot be any uncertainty on that aspect. The procedures to be undertaken and the manner in which they are to be regulated cannot remain uncertain. They are conducted either in the manner provided under the L.A. Act or in the manner provided under the 2013 Act. But then, in view of Section 24(1)(a), the provisions relating to the determination of compensation alone can be applied to such proceedings or in other words, there is only a restricted application of the provisions of the 2013 Act in relation to such proceedings. The inevitable conclusion can only be that what is applicable to the various procedures to be undertaken during the period up to the stage of determination of compensation are those prescribed under the L.A. Act. We have no doubt that without such a construction, the provisions under Section 24(1)(a) would not work out, in view of the restrictive application of the 2013 Act. It is in this context that the decision in Ambica Quarry Works' case (supra) assumes relevance. Any construction of the said provision without taking into the legislative intention, referred hereinbefore would defeat the legislative intention as also the very objects of the 2013 Act. Certainly, it would not be in public interest to allow such proceedings to lapse or allow the authorities to follow the procedures during such period according to their sweet will. A uniform procedure has to be followed in respect of such proceedings. The acquisitions initiated for public purposes should go on in a fair and transparent manner with a view to achieve the intent and purport of the 2013 Act and at the same time, the persons affected shall have definite idea about the manner in which procedures would be conducted. The Party 'B' would not be justified in describing such

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situations of necessity and the consequential application of provisions which are actually saved on account of the construction of Section 24 as an attempt to bring the words expressly employed in Section 24(1)(b) and absent in Section 24(1)(a), by indirect method to Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. The aforesaid conclusions and findings would make the contentions of Party 'B' that Section 4(1) notification issued prior to 01.01.2014 could not survive after 01.01.2014 and also that Section 6 notification under the L.A. Act could not be issued after 01.01.2014, unsustainable. In fact, all such procedures and formalities shall be continued till the determination of compensation by applying all the provisions for determination of compensation, under the 2013 Act. A contra-construction, in view of the restrictive application of the provisions to such proceedings during its continuance, would make the provisions under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act unworkable."

7. Moreover, while making the above interpretation to the

above statutory phraseology, which occurs in the 'Act of 1894', the

Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 32 carried in verdict (supra), thus

proceeded to declare, that if the notification under Section 4 of the 'Act

of 1894', is issued prior to the coming into force of the 'Act of 2013',

thereby if the award, which was otherwise to be drawn in terms of

Section 11, of the 'Act of 1894', thus is not drawn prior to the coming

into force of the 'Act of 2013', or is drawn on coming into force of the

'Act of 2013', yet the Acquiring Authority concerned, rather in terms of

the provisions extracted (supra), becoming endowed with or being

preserved a liberty, to yet proceed to make an award under the 'Act of

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1894', besides the making of an award under the 'Act of 1894', thus post

the coming into force of the 'Act of 2013', rather assuming force.

Importantly, yet the compensation being amenable to become

determined in terms of the statutory principles contemplated under the

'Act of 2013'.

8. In consequence, it has to be now determined, whether the

Acquiring Authority concerned, issued the notification under Section 4

of the Act of 1894, thus prior to the coming into force of the Act of

2013, inasmuch as, whether the said notification became issued prior to

01.01.2014, thus whereons the 'Act of 2013' assumed force and/or came

into operation.

9. In the above regard, it is not disputed, that the notification

as issued under Section 4 of the 'Act of 1894', was issued on

31.12.2013, and, when the date of issuance of the said notification, is

prior to the coming into force of the 'Act of 2013'. Therefore, in terms

of the verdict (supra), the acquisition proceedings became initiated as

such under the 'Act of 1894'. Consequently, the subsequently issued

declaration under Section 6 of the 'Act of 1894', even if the date of

making of the said declaration, was subsequent to the coming into force

of the 'Act of 2013'. Nonetheless, the trite factum of issuance of a

notification under Section 4 of the 'Act of 1894' rather on a date, but

prior to the coming into force of the 'Act of 2013', has the conspicuous

relevance and import, thus for thereby validating the subsequently

issued declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894.

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10. Furthermore, a perusal of reply on affidavit reveals that

the award of the instant acquisition proceedings could not be passed

owing to the interim orders passed by this Court, which were further

made absolute by this Court vide order dated 05.09.2017, whereby the

notification qua the petitioners was quashed in view of the full Bench

judgment rendered in case titled as Deepak Aggarwal and another Vs.

State of Haryana and others. Thereafter, the said judgment of the full

Bench of this Court became set aside by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case

titled as HSIIDC Vs. Deepak Aggarwal (Supra) and the instant writ

petition became remanded by the Hon'ble Apex Court vide order dated

21.02.2024 and the Hon'ble Apex Court directed to maintain status quo

regarding possession. It was in view of the above stay order in

operation till today, that the award could not be pronounced.

11. However, since the said non passing of award and non

assumption of possession of the subject lands was owing to the

interim/final orders respectively passed by this Court and the Hon'ble

Apex Court, therefore, it cannot be construed that the authorities have

not proceeded in accordance with law and/or the acquisition

proceedings become vitiated.

12. Reliance in this regard has been placed upon the verdict

rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as 'State of

Maharashtra Vs. M/s Moti Ratan Estate and Anr.' reported in AIR

2019 (SUPREME COURT) 4149, whereins it has been expostulated

that if there is any stay over the action or proceeding by a Court of law,

in one or the other matter arising from the selfsame acquisition

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proceedings in reference to Section 4 followed with Section 6 of the

Act, the authorities are said to be justified in the given facts and

circumstances to stay their hands and await the decision of the Court

and such a period during which there is a stay over the action or

proceeding by a Court of law in a matter, that has to be excluded for all

practical purposes, in computing the statutory period of two years in

passing of an award under Section 11 of the Act.

13. The import of the above expostulations, is that, the non

rendition of awards under the 'Act of 1894', when arises from stay

orders becoming granted by the Courts of Law, thereby the launching of

acquisition proceedings under the 'Act of 1894', thus would not become

lapsed, rather the Collector concerned, may in terms of Section 11 of

the 'Act of 1894' thus make an award.

14. However, in the instant case the Section 4 notification

became issued on 31.12.2013, followed by declaration under Section 6

of the 'Act of 1894' on 30.12.2014, therefore, in view of the settled

factual matrix rendered in judgment by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

HSIIDC Vs. Deepak Aggarwal case (supra), the provisions of Section

24 (1) (a) of the 'Act of 2013' shall apply to the instant case and the

determination of compensation shall be made in accordance with the

provisions of the 'Act of 2013'.

15. Therefore, the respondent concerned, is directed to pass

award under Section 11 of the 'Act of 1894' in respect of the acquired

lands but the determination of compensation be made in terms of the

'Act of 2013'. Furthermore, the petitioners are directed to forthwith

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hand over encumbrance free possession of the subject lands to the

respondent concerned.

16. Conspicuously also since it has been stated in the reply on

affidavit, already on record, that the subject lands are an integral

component of the layout plans, thereby when they are facilitating the

relevant public purposes. Consequently, when public purpose than the

ill individualistic interest of the petitioners is rather to be furthered.

Resultantly, this Court finds no merit in the instant petition, and, is

constrained to dismiss it.

Final Order of this Court.

17. In aftermath, this Court finds no merit in the writ petition,

and, with the above observations, the same is disposed of. The

impugned notification(s) are maintained and affirmed but as stated

(supra) the award be passed qua the subject lands under Section 11 of

the 'Act of 1894' but compensation be determined in terms of the 'Act of

2013'.

18. No order as to costs. Since the main case itself has been

decided, thus, all the pending application(s), if any, also stand(s)

disposed of.

(SURESHWAR THAKUR) JUDGE

(VIKAS SURI) 03.02.2025 JUDGE kavneet singh Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No

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