shall stand disposed of, as same involve similar questions of law. Another
bunch of writ petitions is also listed before this Court for hearing, raising one
or another question arising out of similar issues in reference to several reliefs
claimed by the petitioner(s)-oustees. The arguments have been heard in the
dealt with collectively in the present writ petition i.e. CWP-16389-2025,
findings recorded herein would be relevant for most of the writ petitions.
2. The outlined facts from the pleadings of the present writ petition
Acquisition Act, 1894 to develop Sector 24, Urban Estate, Ambala. By virtue
policies. On 05.11.2018, the respondent HSVP issued a public notice
oustee quota. The petitioner applied online on 24.12.2018 vide application No.
OUST0000003296 and deposited the requisite 25% earnest money (i.e.
Rs.50,000) (Annexure P-11), along with all other required documents.
Rs.21,500/- per square meter, was applied. The petitioner was asked to deposit
corresponding clauses i.e. Clause 5 and Clause 6 of the allotment letter dated
area of 41.28 sq. meters, being contrary to the oustee policies and the judgment
rendered by Full Bench of this Court in Rajiv Manchanda and others vs.
HUDA and another, 2018 (4) RCR (Civil) 508. The petitioner has further
prayed for directions to charge the rate applicable in 2018 i.e. Rs.21,500/- per
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the action of
charging the current price for the year 2025-26 i.e. Rs.58,172/- per square
09.05.2025 is arbitrary, illegal, unjust, non-transparent and discriminatory. He
arbitrarily charged the current price, thus penalizing the petitioner for the delay
caused by the respondents themselves. He further submits that the petitioner
sum within 180 days. While referring to Annexure P-14 i.e. the judgment
2019, titled as "Naresh Vs. State of Haryana and others" decided on
allowed to deposit the amount over a period of six years. Learned counsel also
petitions wherein no separate replies have been filed. While opposing the
of the allotment letter dated 09.05.2025 is misconceived. He further submits
that the petitioner must pay the current reserve price applicable in 2025 and not
the alleged 2018 rate. Furthermore, he points out that the advertisement issued
in the year 2018 did not specify any price, thus making the petitioner's reliance
on the 2018 rate list factually incorrect. He contends that the allotment letter
applicable in 2025 is justified and aligns with this Court's settled judgments.
The learned counsel relies on the decisions in "HUDA Vs. Sandeep and
others", 2012 (67) RCR (Civil) 691, "Raghbir Singh vs. HUDA and others"
stipulated in the advertisement pursuant to which allotment has been made. As
made as per the rate prevalent on the date of advertisement. He further submits
that the test is not of the prevalent rate, but of the rate being stipulated in the
reaches to the conclusion that rates prevalent at the time of advertisement are to
Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra). Learned counsel submits that the
being prescribed. As far as cost of plot/property is concerned, it is ever
policy, market rates are sometimes double the reserve price fixed for allotment.
question. Learned counsel again submits that the rate of interest prescribed for
assessing rate of interest as far as allotment price is concerned. The allotments
reduction in interest rate would prejudice the public exchequer.
judgment in Rajender Singh Yadav Vs. HUDA and others, passed in CWP-
10. We have heard learned counsels for the parties and have examined
replies on record. A plain reading of the pleadings and the material on record
reasonable rate of interest should be applied. These findings have attained
"50. Thus an oustee who is not allotted a plot although, he applied for
it, does not lose his entitlement to be considered for the allotment of a
plot in future under the same category. Even if an oustee does not apply
in response to the advertisement, he is not disentitled from submitting
an application for the allotment of a plot under the oustee category
subsequently. The price at which the allotment is to be made will be
dealt with next.
Is the oustee liable to pay the price fixed for allotment on the
date of acquisition of the oustee's land, the date of entitlement
for allotment under the oustee quota, the date of offer of
allotment under the oustee quota or the date of exercise of
option for allotment under the oustee quota?
51. Mr. Punchhi submitted that the price is the price prevalent when the
sector in which the oustee's land was acquired was first floated for
allotment. He further submitted that if the land was not floated for
residential purpose, the price at which the next sector was floated
nearest in point of time and location must be the applicable price. The
submission is not well founded. It is contrary to the judgment of this
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -16-
Court in Sandeep's case.
52. The answer to this question lies in the last sentence of paragraph-
53 of the judgment of this Court in Sandeep's case. Paragraph-53 reads
as under:-
"53. In respect of second question i.e. what is the
meaning of the words "normal allotment rate", the Court
found that as a matter of fact the land-loser has made an
application in the year 1990 for allotment of plot. A
direction was issued by the Court in the year 1992, but
the HUDA delayed allotment to the appellants. Therefore,
the rate for which plots were initially offered was ordered
to be charged. The said question has been answered
keeping in view the facts of the aforesaid case, wherein
application was submitted by an oustee, but still plot was
not allotted to him. The said judgment does not lay down
that the 'normal allotment rate' in all circumstances shall
be the date when the sector is first floated for sale. As a
matter of fact, the normal allotment rate would be the
rate advertised by the HUDA in pursuance of which
applications are invited from the general public and the
oustees, in pursuance of which the plots are allotted."
(emphasis supplied).
53. Paragraph-53 and in particular the last sentence thereof
stipulates that the normal allotment rate would be the rate advertised
by the HUDA in pursuance of which the applications are invited from
the general public and the oustees, in pursuance of which the plots are
allotted. Thus, the allotment rate would be the rate advertised while
inviting applications from the oustees and in pursuance of which the
plots are actually allotted. Thus, it is not merely the rate advertised by
the HUDA while inviting the applications from the general public and
the oustees which constitutes the normal allotment rate. There must be
an actual allotment pursuant thereto. In other words, it is only when
pursuant to the application for allotment, a plot is actually allotted,
that the normal allotment rate can be fixed and that rate would be the
rate stipulated in the advertisement inviting the said application. Thus
two requirements must be met. Firstly, there must be an advertisement
by HUDA inviting applications from the general public and the oustees
for allotment. Secondly, the oustee must be allotted a plot pursuant to
an application as per such advertisement. If these two requirements are
met, the normal allotment rate would be the rate stipulated in such
advertisement.
This is in consonance with paragraph-56(v) of the
judgment of this Court in Sandeep's case which reads as follow:-
"56. Thus, the present appeal as well as the other
connected matters are disposed of with the following
directions, in addition to the decision on the questions of
law discussed above:
(i) to (iii) xx xx xx
(v) That the price to be charged from an allottee shall be
the price mentioned in the public advertisement in
pursuance of which, the plot is allotted and not when the
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -17-
sector is floated for sale for the first time;
Paragraph-56(v) puts the matter beyond
doubt and sets at rest any controversy as regards the
interpretation of paragraph-53 and in particular the last
sentence thereof.
54. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioners, however, submitted that the first part of the last sentence,
namely, the words: "As a matter of fact, the normal allotment rate
would be the rate advertised by the HUDA in pursuance of which
applications are invited from the general public and the
oustees............" is correct and in consonance with the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Brij Mohan's case and in particular paragraph-22
thereof which we set out earlier. They, however, contend that the
concluding words in that sentence, namely, "...................in pursuance
of which the plots are allotted" are contrary to the judgment in Brij
Mohan's case and the judgment to that extent ought to be overruled by
us.
We are not inclined to do so as the judgment has been
approved by the Supreme Court.
The words in paragraph-53 "in pursuance of which the
plots are allotted" were obviously in recognition of the findings that
there cannot be a reservation of more than 50% including for the
oustees. If all the oustees' claims were to be satisfied first, it would not
have been necessary for the Division Bench to add this caveat. The
Division Bench recognized the fact that the plots under the oustee
quota may be allotted at a later stage or stages.
"55. Had we upheld the contention on behalf of the petitioners that the
price must be that which was stipulated on the first floatation of the
sector in which an oustee would have been entitled to the allotment un-
der the oustee quota, we would have balanced the equities by com-
pelling the oustees to pay interest on such price from the date of such
first floatation upto the date of payment in respect of the actual allolt-
ment. Otherwise, it would confer a windfall upon the oustees who
would have been entitled to obtain a plot at a price prevalent several
years earlier. We appreciate that even that approach would require fur-
ther adjustments for such oustees would in turn be entitled to contend
that they were deprived the use of the plots during the period for which
they are compelled to pay interest. It is not necessary, however, to dilate
further on this aspect as we find ourselves bound by the judgment in
Sandeep's case.
56. This judgment was followed by a judgment of a Division Bench of
this Court dated 26.08.2014 in Civil Writ Petition No.9969 of 2013
Raghbir Singh v. Haryana Urban Development Authority and others.
Another Division Bench of this Court by an order and judgment dated
18.09.2002 in Civil Writ Petition No.13548 of 2001 Bhag Singh and
others v. Haryana Urban Development Authority and others held:-
"The only contention raised by Shri Rupinder Khosla, counsel
for the petitioners, is that the petitioners are eligible and entitled
to be allotted a plot in Sector 21, Part-I, Panchkula or in any
other Sector in the said Urban Estate at the initial rate on which
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -18-
the plots were initially allotted when Sector 21 was floated. The
allotment of plot at the prevalent rate and asking for deposit of
10% earnest amount of the price of the plot prevalent as on
18.6.2000 is totally arbitrary and illegal. We find no substance
in the contention of the counsel for the petitioners. Admittedly,
for the first time, the policy for allotment of plots to the oustees
was framed on 10.9.1987. The petitioners are not covered by the
said policy, as their land was acquired prior to the said policy.
Subsequently, in view of the decision dated 11.8.1993 rendered
in CWP No.14708 of 1990, reported as Smt. Suman Aneja v.
State of Haryana and others, AIR 1994 P & H 56, a new policy
for those oustees whose land was acquired prior to the year
1987, was framed modifying the earlier policy regarding allot-
ment of plots to the oustees of the acquired land. According to
this policy, it was decided that where the land was acquired
prior to 10.9.1987, on which a residential Sector had been
floated and the plots are still available in that Sector, the oustees
claim shall be invited and they will have the prior right for allot-
ment of plots. In this policy, there is nothing which provides that
such oustees will be allotted the plots on the initial price when
the Sector was floated. Vide this policy, only a prior right to allot
the left-over plots from those Sector has been given to the ous-
tees of the acquired land, but for allotment of plot under this pol-
icy, they have to pay the prevalent marked price which has been
fixed for allotment to the general public. Only the priority has
been given to the oustees but they have to pay the prevalent rate
which has been fixed for allotment of these left-over plots. There
is no illegality and arbitrariness in the said policy. Rather, it will
be unjust enrichment of the petitioners if they are allotted the
plots at the rate prevalent in the year 1987. The respondents
have spent a lot of money for development of the roads, parks
and other facilities for the Sector. The petitioners filed the appli-
cations in the year 2000, after framing of the new policy. Their
applications were duly considered and the same were rejected
because they did not pay 10% of the earnest money, as per the
advertisement dated 21.8.2000. They have no legal right to
claim allotment of the plots on the price prevalent in the year
1987. Allotting of plots on the said price will rather amount to
giving undue benefits to the petitioners. There is no illegality or
infirmity in the impugned order dated 16.12.2000, passed by the
Chief Administrator, HUDA. In view of the aforesaid, we find no
merit in this petition and the same is hereby dismissed."
Thus the position in this regard is the same for oustees where
properties were acquired prior to 1987. We are in respectful agreement
as the judgment is inconsonance with the judgment of this Court in
Sandeep's case.
57. In the circumstances, an oustee including one whose land
was acquired prior to 1987 is liable to pay the price fixed in the adver-
tisement by which the applications are invited from the oustees and
pursuant to which advertisement the plot is actually allotted to the ous-
tee.
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -19-
58. Another aspect of this question also requires consideration.
It pertains to the price payable by an oustee who although entitled to
be allotted a plot on a particular date and could have been allotted a
plot on that date was allotted the plot much later. The answer to this
question would depend upon the circumstances in which the oustee was
not allotted a plot on the date which he was entitled to and could have
been allotted the same but was allotted the plot later. We have advisedly
stated the situation to be one where the allottee was not merely entitled
to be allotted the plot but also could have been allotted the plot. Where
for any reason the plot could not have been allotted, this question
would not arise.
59. Where the oustee is at fault or was for any reason responsi-
ble for the same, he must pay the price prevalent as stipulated in the
last sentence of paragraph-53 of the judgment of this Court in
Sandeep's case, namely, the price prevalent in the advertisement invit-
ing applications and pursuant to which the oustee was actually allotted
the plot. There is no reason why in such circumstances the oustee
should have the benefit of a price that was prevalent earlier, sometimes
even many years ago.
Where both the oustee and the respondents are at fault or were
responsible for the same or where neither is at fault for the same, the
same rule ought to apply. Even in such circumstances there is no war-
rant for permitting the oustee the benefit of a price that was prevalent
many years ago. There is no reason for excluding such cases from the
rule in the last sentence in paragraph-53 of Sandeep's case.
60. There is yet another situation that must be dealt with,
namely, where the respondents are entirely at fault. This is a situation
where the oustee was entitled to a plot on a particular date and it was
possible for the respondents to allot the plot on that date but they did
not do so entirely on account of their default and not on account of any
default on the part of the oustee. The ultimate allotment of the plot may
even result at the end of a protracted litigation. When a court passes an
order in favour of such an oustee, it infact holds that the oustee was en-
titled to the plot when he had made the application and was entitled to
the allotment on that date and the respondents were in a position to
handover the possession of the plot on that date but wrongly did not do
so. In such circumstances it follows that the oustee would be entitled to
the benefit of the price that was prevalent when he made the applica-
tion and pursuant to that application the respondents deliberately did
not allot the plot although they could have.
However, even in such a case, the oustee must pay reasonable
interest from the date on which he could have been given the possession
of the plot till the date he is actually given the possession of the plot,
for in such a case the oustee has had the benefit of the use of his money
during this period. We appreciate that such an oustee would have been
deprived during this period of the use of the plot. This further fine tun-
ing adjustment would require evidence and cannot conveniently be de-
cided in a writ petition."
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -20-
12. We have noticed that after passing of the judgment in Rajiv
Manchanda's case (supra) on 22.11.2017, the respondents had amended the
relevant clauses of the policy dated 11.08.2016 vide memo dated 08.05.2018 in
order to comply with the mandate of the judgment, except for the interest
component. Even the amended policy maintains a consistent position regarding
the allotment of plots as discussed in above-mentioned case i.e. either at the
rate prevalent on the date of application or rate stipulated in the advertisement,
rather than at the current market price. The relevant extract of the Policy dated
08.05.2018 is reproduced below:
"In partial modification of this office memo no. UB-A-5-2016/46608-
10 dated 11.08.2016 on the subject cited above.
Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran issued detailed guidelines
dated 11.08.2016 providing for terms and conditions for settlement of
oustees claims with a view to implement the judgment dated 25.04.2012
passed in LPA No.2096 of 2011 titled as HUDA V/s Sandeep and others
which has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP No.
27256 of 2012 filed by HUDA which was dismissed vide order dated
06.03.2014 and further the order dated 26.04.2012 passed by the
Hon'ble High Court in CWP No. 10941 of 2010 titled as Bhagwan
Singh & Others vs. State of Haryana & Others which has been upheld
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court when SLP No. 13375-388 of 2013 filed
by HUDA was dismissed vide order dated 24.11.2015 by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court.
Thereafter, number of litigations qua oustees claims have arisen
and Hon'ble Division Bench referred the oustees matter to the Full
Bench after framing questions of law. The Hon'ble Full Bench has
delivered judgment dated 22.11.2017 in CWP No. 22252 of 2016 titled
as Rajiv Manchanda vs. State of Haryana & Others. The matter has
been examined and it has been decided to amend clause no. 2, 3, 11
and 15 of the guidelines dated 11.08.2016 and to add clause no. 19 as
under:-
xx xx xx
D. In clause 15 of the guidelines, following clause may be added:
15. a. Where an application is made by an oustee in an
advertisement issued afresh, the price of plot that may be charged from
him if he is successful in draw of lots out of plots reserved for oustees
shall be the rate as advertised in new advertisement. In cases where the
allotment of plot could not be effected despite determination of his
eligibility, the prevalent price at the time of application by the oustee in
pursuance to an advertisement may be charged along with simple
interest @ 11% per annum till date.
It is clarified that eligibility for the purpose as aforesaid
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -21-
shall be treated as determined only when such an oustee completed and
satisfied all the formalities/ conditions as per the applicable policy.
xx xxxxxx"
13. Since the petitioner has challenged Clause No.5 and 6 of the
allotment letter dated 09.05.2025, it is also relevant to reproduce the same:-
".....5. In case you accept this allotment, please send your
acceptance by registered post alongwith an amount of
Rs.5,58,188/- duly credited to HSVP account within 30 days
from the date of issue of this allotment letter, which together with
an amount of Rs.50,000/- paid by you alongwith your
application form as earnest money, will constitute 25% of the
total tentative price. The payment shall be made through online
system by using I.D. Password of the plot.
6. The balance 75% amount is Rs.18,24,565/- of the
tentative price of the plot/building shall be payable by the
allottee within period of 180 days from the date of issue of
allotment and no facility of payment in installment will be
allowed. In case of failure so to do, allotment of site shall stand
cancelled without any notice."
14. Before stepping further, we need to go through the mandate given
in Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra) in respect of price fixation, where the
situations and circumstances have been discussed and concluded in paragraphs
53, 59 and 60 of the judgment. It has been held that in case the oustee is at fault
for any reason, he must pay the price prevalent as stipulated in the last sentence
of the paragraph 53 of the judgment of the Sandeep's case (supra), i.e. the
price prevalent in the advertisement inviting applications and pursuant to which
the oustee was actually allotted the plot.
15. It would be relevant to mention the last sentence of paragraph 53
of the judgment of this Court in Sandeep's case (supra) which has been
referred in paragraph 53 of the judgment in Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra),
wherein two conditions have been discussed:-
Firstly, there must be advertisement by HSVP (earlier HUDA)
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -22-
inviting applications from the general public and the oustees for allotment.
Secondly, the oustee must be allotted a plot pursuant to an application as per
such advertisement. The last sentence which has been referred in paragraph 53
mentions that "if these two requirements are met, the normal allotment rate
would be the rate stipulated in such advertisement."
16. The second situation qua the fixation of price has been discussed
and concluded as mentioned in paragraph 60 of the said judgment, whereby it
has been held that where the respondents are entirely at fault i.e where oustee
was entitled to a plot on a particular date and it was possible for the
respondents to allot the plot on that date but they did not do so entirely on
account of their default, and not on account of any default on the part of the
oustee. The ultimate allotment of the plot may even result at the end of a
protracted litigation. In such circumstances, the oustee would be entitled to the
benefit of the price that was prevalent when he made the application and
pursuant to that application, the respondent deliberately did not allot the plot
although they could have.
17. After analyzing these two situations, which have been discussed
and concluded in the aforesaid judgment, pursuant to which the mandate has
also been accepted and duly incorporated in the policy, by the respondent then
charging the current price through the impugned allotment letter, without any
reasoning, is not acceptable.
18. After going through the judgment in Rajiv Manchanda's case
(supra) and contents of the policy dated 08.05.2018, we find that charging of
the current price for 2025 i.e. Rs.58,172/- per square meter, duly calculated as
per the amount mentioned in the allotment letter dated 09.05.2025 is contrary
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -23-
to the said judgment as well as Clause 15-A of the Policy dated 08.05.2018
issued by the respondent-HSVP.
19. We shall now deal with the arguments advanced by learned
counsel for the respondent-HSVP. By placing reliance on paragraph 53 of the
judgment, the learned counsel has sought to justify the action of charging the
current price on the premise that as per the mandate of the judgment the
'normal allotment rate' would be the 'rate advertised' or stipulated in the
advertisement. However, a glaring inference can be drawn against the
respondents for having misinterpreted the judgment in Rajiv Manchanda's
case (supra) insofar as it relates to the charging of the current price, and for
seeking to justify their action by contending that this issue stood adjudicated by
the same. It appears to us that the respondents, by adopting an arm-twisting
approach, have selectively and conveniently interpreted the said judgment to
suit their own interests by advancing the logic that since no rate was advertised
at the time of issuance of the advertisement, they were entitled to demand the
prevailing current rate from the petitioner at the time of allotment. Such an
action is wholly unjustifiable and, prima facie, appears to be in disregard of the
mandate of the said judgment. The deliberate omission to disclose the price in
the advertisement, followed by an attempt to take advantage of such omission
to justify charging the current price cannot be countenanced. The conduct of
the respondents, therefore, is neither legally sustainable nor acceptable in law.
20. Apart from the judgments mentioned in para no. 6 of this
judgment, learned counsel for the respondents has cited the judgment passed by
the Coordinate Bench in CWP No.16857 of 2021, titled Rajender Singh Yadav
v. Haryana Urban Development Authority and others, decided on 03.10.2023.
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -24-
In the said case, a similar issue arose concerning the determination of the
current price in respect of allotment of plots under the defence quota. The
petition therein was filed challenging both the allotment price as well as the
levy of interest at the rate of 11% per annum for the intervening period. The
Coordinate Bench, while adjudicating the matter, upheld the allotment rate by
observing that the price of allotment could be charged at the advertised rate, in
terms of the judgment rendered in Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra).
21. In the said case, the Coordinate Bench referred to the order dated
28.09.2018 passed in the case of "Satyawan Vs. HUDA and others" in CWP-
7342-2018 as well as the joint written statement filed by the respondents,
wherein it was submitted that, while considering various decisions relating to
the controversy regarding the rate of allotment of plots under the defence
quota, the Chief Administrator, Panchkula had issued consolidated instructions
dated 01.09.2021. By virtue of the said instructions, it was decided that the
price would not be charged on the basis of the current rate, but instead the
advertised rate, in terms of the judgment in Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra).
The relevant extract of the judgment mentioned in para No.20 is reproduced
hereunder:
"3. During the pendency of the present writ petition, the respondents
issued fresh comprehensive instructions dated 01.09.2021 (Annexure R-
3), considering the fact that the rate of allotment was challenged by
various allottees in various cases. It was decided that instead of current
rate, the plots under the defence quota in similarly situated cases be
allotted on the advertised rate and interest may be charged for the
intervening period as per judgment passed in Rajiv Manchanda and
others Vs. Haryana Urban Development Authority and another 2018
(4) RCR (Civil) 508 at the rate of 11% per annum.
3.1 The Coordinate Bench vide order dated 28.09.2021 (Annexure R-1)
while disposing of Civil Writ Petition No. 7342 of 2018, Satyawan Vs.
HUDA and others directed the Chief Administrator, HUDA to
determine the allotment price keeping in view the Full Bench decision
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -25-
of this Court in Civil Writ Petition No.22252 of 2016 (Rajiv
Manchanda's case) (supra) decided on 22.11.2017.
4. Respondents No.1 to 3 filed a joint written statement submitting that
while considering the various decisions regarding the controversy of
rate of allotment of the plots under the defence quota, the Chief
Administrator, HSVP, Panchkula had issued consolidated instructions
dated 01.09.2021 whereby, it had been decided to charge the price not
on the basis of the current rate, but to charge the advertized rate and
interest at the rate of 11% per annum in terms of the judgment in Rajiv
Manchanda's case (supra) by the Hon'ble Full Bench of this Court.
The demand raised by the respondent was entirely as per instructions
dated 01.09.2021 (Annexure R-3) as such, and a prayer was made for
dismissal of the writ petitions.
5 The petitioner filed replication to the written statement filed by
respondents No.1 to 3 reasserting the stand taken in the writ petition
that he was entitled for allotment at the rate of price which was
originally fixed in the advertisement.
xx xx xx
10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents contended
that the consolidated instructions dated 01.09.2021 (Annexure R-3)
have been issued for charging the price of the plots from the defence
personnel in this matter on the basis of the decision dated 22.11.2017
in Rajiv Manchanda and others Vs. Haryana Urban Development
Authority and another and decision dated 08.03.2017 in CWP-5736-
2013, Krishan Kumar and another Vs. Haryana Urban Development
Authority and others and decision dated 28.09.2018 in CWP-7342-
2018, Satyawan Vs. Haryana Urban Development Authority and
others. The account statement dated 02.07.2021 (Annexure P-13) has
been made on the basis of the said instructions, as such, and the
petitioner is left with no grounds and the present petition is liable to be
dismissed.
11. The present case requires the determination of following questions:-
1. Whether the allotment price charged from the petitioner vide
impugned order dated 07.07.2021 (Annexure P-12) and account
statement dated 02.07.2021 (Annexure P-13) as per the
instructions dated 01.09.2021 (Annexure R-3) issued by the
respondents is in resonance with the decision of Satyawan's case
(supra), Krishan Kumar's case (supra) and Rajiv Manchanda's
case (supra)?
2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to parity on the basis of
decision in Chander Bhan Sharma's (supra) and Ishwar Singh's
case (supra).
Point No.1 & II
12. In Rajiv Manchandas' case (supra), the Hon'ble Full Bench of this
Court while answering various questions regarding the claims of
oustees for allotment of plots under Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -26-
2013, observed that an oustee may pay reasonable interest from the
date on which he could have been given the possession of the plot till
the date he is actually given the possession of the plot, even though,
where respondents are entirely at fault by deliberately not allotting a
plot to an oustee. It was further observed that though the oustee would
be entitled to benefit of the price that was prevalent when he filed the
application but he will have to pay the interest on that amount as the
oustee had the benefit of use of money during the period from the date
he could have been given the possession till the date he is actually
given the possession. Question No.8 formulated in the said petition
reads as under:-
"8. Is the oustee liable to pay the price fixed for allotment on the
date of acquisition of the oustee's land, the date of entitlement
for allotment under the oustee quota, the date of offer of
allotment under the oustee quota or the date of exercise of
option for allotment under the oustee quota?"
13. The observations of the Full Bench in Rajiv Manchanda's case
(supra) on the said question in para No.60 reads as under:-
"60. There is yet another situation that must be dealt with,
namely, where the respondents are entirely at fault. This is a
situation where the oustee was entitled to a plot on a particular
date and it was possible for the respondents to allot the plot on
that date but they did not do so entirely on account of their
default and not on account of any default on the part of the
oustee. The ultimate allotment of the plot may even result at the
end of a protracted litigation. When a court passes an order in
favour of such an oustees, it infact holds that the oustee was
entitled to the plot when he had made the application and was
entitled to the allotment on that date and the respondents were in
a position to handover the possession of the plot on that date but
wrongly did not do so. In such circumstances it follows that the
oustee would be entitled to the benefit of the price that was
prevalent when he made the application and pursuant to that
application the respondents deliberately did not allot the plot
although they could have.
However, even in such a case, the oustee must pay reasonable
interest from the date on which he could have been given the
possession of the plot till the date he is actually given the
possession of the plot, for in such a case the oustee has had the
benefit of the use of his money during this period. We appreciate
that such an oustee would have been deprived during this period
of the use of the plot. This further fine tuning adjustment would
require evidence and cannot conveniently be decided in a writ
petition."
14. On the basis of the decision in Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra),
the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 28.09.2018
in Satyawan's case (supra) while dealing with the similar controversy
regarding the rate of allotment to an army personnel directed the Chief
Administrator, HUDA to re-determine the allotment price in the light of
the observations made in Chander Bhan Sharma's case (supra) and
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Krishan Kumar's case (supra). However, the Hon'ble Division Bench
observed that the Chief Administrator, HUDA will also keep in view the
Full Bench decision of this Court in Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra)
which was decided on 22.11.2017.''
22. This Court has, however, noticed that no such instructions dated
01.09.2021, as referred to in the aforesaid judgment, have been placed on
record or brought to the notice of this Court by the learned counsel appearing
for the respondent-HSVP, but it is clear that respondent-HSVP had already
considered and dealt with the issue relating to the rate of allotment and had
amended the policy dated 11.08.2016 vide memo dated 08.05.2018 and
incorporated clauses pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in Rajiv
Manchanda's case (supra).
23. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further drawn the attention
of this Court to the Instructions dated 02.12.2024 which are contrary to the
policy dated 08.05.2018. Reference has been made to paragraph 3 of the said
Instructions, whereby the respondent HSVP issued directions mandating
specific disclosure of the current reserve price in the public advertisement. The
same is reproduced here below-
"3. The allotment shall be made on current reserve price and the
price be specifically disclosed in the public advertisement."
Even in aforementioned Instructions, the requirement of Rajiv Manchanda's
case (supra) was never complied with, wherein, as per the mandate of the said
judgment, it was incumbent upon the respondents to stipulate the price in the
public advertisement itself, but it was never said that same should be the
current price. Even though, the respondent-HSVP tried to follow the spirit of
the judgment but did it in a wrong manner, as the price prevailing at the time of
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advertisement or at the time of application was to be disclosed and not the
current price, as has been wrongly ordered vide instructions dated 02.12.2024.
24. The judgment passed in the Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra) was
delivered in the year 2017, even post that there has been no corrective change
in the respondents' approach and the same is apparent, where respondents have
deliberately issued the allotment letter dated 09.05.2025 (Annexure P-12) after
a delay of about seven years, charging the current price in clear derogation of
the mandate of the Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra) as well as the applicable
policy of 2018, and without furnishing any explanation whatsoever for the
inordinate delay from 2018 till 2025.
25. Learned counsel for the petitioner has annexed the rate list
Annexure P-9 for the purpose of drawing the attention of this Court to the
general rates fixed by respondent-HSVP for allotment in the specific areas
including the area which has been allotted to petitioner under oustee quota.
Therefore, when respondent-HSVP has issued a rate list though the same may
not have been in reference to the oustees, but it serves the purpose for
determining the prevailing price/rate at the time of application by the
petitioner, who is not at fault as the delay is attributed to the respondent-HSVP.
Therefore, respondents cannot take a plea that there was no prevailing price
rate at the time of advertisement or the application.
26. Further, the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the
respondents have already been considered and dealt with in the judgment
passed in Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra), wherein the issue of price has been
finally adjudicated.
27. In view of the above, we are constrained to hold that the act and
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conduct of the respondent-HSVP is wholly unjustified and such repeated
mistakes cannot be accepted. We also cannot lose sight of the fact that once the
respondent-HSVP, by virtue of the settled law in Rajiv Manchanda's case
(supra), had accepted adjudication on the issue relating to the rate of allotment
to be charged at the advertised rate or at the application, it is wholly
incomprehensible as to on what basis it subsequently demanded the current
price vide the impugned allotment letter dated 09.05.2025 (Annexure P-12).
Such conduct appears to be manifestly arbitrary and tainted with mala fides.
28. Now, the second question relating to the levy of interest at the rate
of 11%, which has been argued at length by both the parties, requires
adjudication. As referred to hereinabove, in two of the writ petitions forming
part of the present bunch, i.e CWP No. 21962 of 2025 and CWP No.35904 of
2025, the petitioners therein have specifically challenged the levy of interest by
the respondents @11%, terming the same to be exorbitant, and has sought
adjudication on the said issue, the same is required to be tested on the anvil of
the mandate laid down by the Full Bench in Rajiv Manchanda's case
(supra).
29. During the course of arguments, this Court specifically questioned
the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-HSVP with regard to
the justification for applying the said rate of interest, particularly in the context
of what constitutes "Reasonable Interest" in light of the mandate of the Full
Bench's judgment. In response, learned counsel once again placed reliance
upon the judgment rendered in Rajender Singh Yadav's case (supra) by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court, wherein it was held that the demand raised by
the respondent-HSVP towards payment of the advertised rate along with 11%
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interest was justified and did not warrant interference. The relevant extract of
the said judgment, insofar as it relates to the issue of interest, is reproduced
hereunder:
"6. After the written statement was filed, on 25.04.2022 the
following order was passed by this Court:-
"Though, vide these 08 petitions, the petitioners are
challenging the higher rate of interest as was initially
sought from them by the respondent-HSVP for allotment of
plots pertaining to an advertisement of the year 2010,
eventually it is seen that as regards the main issue, pursuant
to the order of this court (co-ordinate Bench) in Satyawan
vs. Haryana Urban Development Authority and others
(CWP No. 7342-2018 and a connected petition), decided on
28.09.2018, the respondents have already taken a decision
dated 01.09.2021, to keep the sale price in terms of the
same rate of land as was advertised, i.e. Rs.7,502/- per
square meter, but have also proposed to charge 11% interest
per annum (simple interest as per the instructions of
learned counsel for the HSVP), for the intervening period.
The operative part of the order of this court in Satyawans' case
reads as follows:-
"[6] We find some force in the contention, especially in the
light of the view taken by this Court from time to time
including in CWP-5736-2013, decided on 08.03.2017
(Krishan Kumar and another vs Haryana Urban
Development Authority and others).
While the petitioner would be liable to pay the revised price
due to enhancement in compensation, his claim regarding
allotment at the rate of 2014 deserves favourable
consideration by the Authorities. Since the Estate Officer,
Jind, has expressed his helplessness to do so for want of
competence, we direct the Chief Administrator, HUDA to re-
determine the allotment price of the petitioner in the light of
the observations made above and the judgments cited
hereinabove. The Chief Administrator, HUDA will also keep
in view the Full Bench decision of this Court in CWP-
22252-2016 (Rajiv Manchanda and others vs Haryana
Urban Development Authority and another) decided on
22.11.2017.
[7] Let an appropriate decision be taken within a period of
three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of
this order.
[8] Disposed of."
We find absolutely no reason to differ with the opinion of a
coordinate Bench but with learned counsel for the petitioner still
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -31-
wanting to submit that the interest being charged is far too high.
For learned counsel for the petitioner, as also the HSVP, to go through
the judgment of the Rajiv Manchandas' case (supra) in more detail, as
regards any specific rate of interest stipulated therein, adjourned to
04.05.2022.
xx xx xx
"In our opinion, if the rate of interest indeed has been
specified in Rajiv Manchandas' case by the Full Bench to be @
11% per annum, we would see no reason to differ with that; that in
any case being binding upon us, it being a decision of a larger
Bench; however, if that rate of 11% is not found to be specifically
stipulated, in our opinion interest would need to be charged from
the petitioners, as regards delayed payment, as per bank rates as
were prevailing between 2010 till the date of payment.
xx xx xx
15. Keeping in view the decision in Rajiv Manchanda's case
(supra), the demand made by the Estate Officer-respondent No.3
vide impugned order dated 07.07.2021 (Annexure P-12) for
payment of advertisement rate+11% interest as allotment price is
well justified and does not call for any interference.
16. Vide interim order dated 26.04.2022 passed by a coordinate
Bench of this Court while observing the decision taken by the
respondent-HSVP in pursuance to Satyawan's case (supra), it
was observed that the respondents have already taken a decision
dated 01.09.2021 to keep the sale price in terms of the same rate
of land as was advertized i.e Rs.7502/-per sq. meter, but have also
proposed to charge 11% interest per annum (simple interest as per
the instructions of learned counsel for the HSVP) for the
intervening period. It was observed that we find absolutely no
reason to differ with the opinion of a coordinate Bench but
petitioners were granted an opportunity, since it was argued that
the interest claimed is too high. In terms of the said interim order,
the petitioner could not show that the interest charged in the order
dated 07.07.2012 (Annexure P-12) is high or it is contrary to the
directions issued by Hon'ble Full Bench in Rajiv Manchanda's
case (supra)."
30. A careful reading of the aforesaid paragraph would reveal that the
Co-ordinate Bench proceeded on the premise that since the rate of interest at
11% per annum had been specified in Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra), the
same was binding. In that context, upon examining the contents of the
judgment passed by the coordinate bench in CWP No.16857 of 2021, we find
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -32-
no basis to conclude that the rate of 11% interest is in consonance with the
decision in Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra).
31. Rather, the Coordinate Bench while passing the interim order
dated 26.4.2022 in CWP-16857-2021 has clarified in the last paragraph at page
30, concerning the levy of interest as per bank rates and the same would be
helpful for the adjudication of the present issue.
32. Consequently, we respectfully disagree with the conclusion drawn
by the Coordinate Bench holding that payment at the advertisement rate along
with 11% interest as the allotment price was well-justified and did not call for
interference and are of the view that such a conclusion lacks justification,
particularly when the issue required detailed examination and reasoning before
recording final observations qua 11% rate of interest being the "Reasonable
Interest". Moreover, on the conjoint reading of the interim order dated
26.04.2022 passed in CWP-16857-2021, and of the observations made by the
Coordinate Bench in the final order dated 03.10.2023 of the writ petition, it
clearly indicates that if the rate of 11% interest is not specifically stipulated in
Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra), then the interest would be charged as per
bank rates prevailing between 2010 till the date of payment. Therefore, the
conclusion of the Coordinate Bench finalizing the rate of interest at 11% is
contrary to the Full Bench's judgment in Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra),
wherein only "Reasonable Interest" was held to be applicable.
33. In order to seek assistance on this issue, this Court had requested
the learned counsel appearing for the respondents to apprise it of all such
schemes and policies wherein different rates of interest have been prescribed.
In response, learned counsel has supplied copies of certain policies reflecting
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -33-
varying rates of interest, which reveals that the respondent-HSVP itself is
charging and applying different rates of interest, despite being a single
authority and framer of multiple policies and schemes. It is noticeable that
under various schemes, the rate of interest has been fixed at 5.5%, 9%, in
policy dated 08.05.2018 for oustees 11% and 12% etc. and the lowest reduced
rate is 5.5%. Moreover, there is no material placed on record to demonstrate
the rationale or basis for prescribing different rates of interest under different
policies and schemes. Therefore, it can be safely drawn that a selective and
arbitrary approach has been adopted by the respondent-HSVP in applying
varying rates of interest, depending upon it's own convenience and suitability
under different schemes and policies, including the policy dated 08.05.2018
and the same is in absence of any cogent reasoning or rational justification.
Such an approach is manifestly arbitrary and operates against the interests of
the petitioner-oustee(s). The relevant extracts of the said policies are
reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference.
"Subject: Interest on refund of earnest money of residential
Scheme.
02.09.2005
It is intimated that the Authority in its 95th meeting
held on 21.06.2005 has decided to pay interest @5.5% per annum
on the amount of earnest money for the period beyond six months
of the closing of the scheme, if the draw is not held and earnest
money is not refunded within a period of six months from the date
of closing of the scheme.
xx xx xx"
"Subject:- Amendment in the HUDA policy for the allotment of
plots/payment of interest on the deposited amount.
25.01.2007
" xx xx xx
It has also been decided that it will be made clear in the
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -34-
application form as well as allotment letter that HUDA will offer
the possession of the plot within a period of 3 years of allotment.
In case the possession of the plot is not offered within the
prescribed period of 3 years from the date of allotment, HUDA
will pay interest @ 9% p.a. (or as may be fixed by Authority from
time to time) on the amount deposited by the allottee after the
expiry of 3 years till the date of offer of possession. In this case
the allottee will not be required to pay the further instalments. The
payment of balance instalment will only start after the possession
of the plot is offered to the allottee.
xx xx xx"
"Subject: Regarding handing over of possession of plots
16.04.2009
" xx xx xx
3. Besides inviting litigations and adversely affecting the
credibility of the organization, delay in handing over of possession
has financial implications also, because interest on balance
instalments of any allotted plot accrues only after the date of offer
of possession. Moreover, the Authority in its 98th meeting held on
12.12.2006 has decided that in case the possession of the plot is
not offered within the prescribed period of 3 years from the date of
allotment, the allottee will have to be paid simple interest @ 9%
per annum (or as may be fixed by the Authority from time to time)
on the amount deposited by him after the expiry of 3 years of
allotment, and the allottee will be required to pay future
instalments only after the possession of plot/alternative plot is
offered. Instructions regarding the same were issued vide memo
no. HUDA-Acctts-Acctt-I-2007/2912-47 dated 25.01.2007. Estate
officers should review it on monthly basis and Administrators on
Quarterly basis. Administrators and/or Estate Officers shall be
personally held liable for payment of interest to allottees and also
loss of interest to HUDA if there are no sufficient reasons for not
offering possession."
Subject: Settlement of oustees claims-terms and conditions
thereof
11.08.2016
" xx xx xx
15. An oustee who has made an application for allotment of plot
under oustees policy on any previous occasion and said
application either is pending for decision or was rejected on any
ground and said rejection order was impugned before any court of
law or Authority or forum of any nature and matter has been
remanded back to the Authority for fresh decision, shall be
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -35-
informed of the decision in Bhagwan Singh's case and Sandeep's
case and may be advised to apply for allotment of plot in fresh
advertisement which will be issued after determination of
reservation and their earnest money may be refunded along with
interest @ 5.5 % per annum from date of deposit till date of
payment. However, where litigation is pending then the court of
law or authority or forum where it is pending may be informed of
the aforesaid decision and efforts may be made to get the
litigation disposed off in terms specified herein.
xx xx xx
17. The list of applicants shall be compiled within a period of 15
days of closing of the scheme and draw shall be held within a
period of 30 days of closing of scheme for advertised plots. The
eligibility of the oustees who are successful in draw of lots shall
be determined within a further period of one month. If any oustee
who is declared as successful in draw of lots is found ineligible as
per policy, then his draw shall be cancelled. The plot which will
become available on account of such cancellation of draw may
again be put to draw of lots out of remaining ousLees who were
earlier unsuccessful in the same draw. The earnest money of
unsuccessful applicants may be refunded thereafter. No interest
shall be payable on said amount if it is refunded within a period of
6 months from closing of the scheme otherwise interest 0/ 5.5 %
per annum may be paid on earnest money after expiry of 6 months
till date of payment.
xx xx xx"
"Subject:- Amendment in the HSVP Policy dated 25.01.2007
and 20.08.2019-Regarding allotment of plots/payment of interest
on the depositing amount.
xx xx xx
It was decided that HSVP will offer the possession of
the plot within a period of 3 years of allotment and in case the
possession of the plot is not offered within the prescribed period of
3 years from the date of allotment, HSVP will pay interest @9%
p.a. (or as may be fixed by the Pradhikaran from time to time) on
the amount deposited by the allottee after the expiry of 3 years till
the date of offer of possession. In that case the allottee wil not be
required to pay the further installments. The payment of balance
installment will only start after the possession of the plot is offered
to the allottee. These provisions were applicable only on those
plots which was to be allotted after 25.01.2007.
xx xx xx"
Policy dated 08.05.2018
35 of 46
CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -36-
xx xx xx
D. In clause 15 of the guidelines, following clause may be added:
15. a. Where an application is made by an oustee in
an advertisement issued afresh, the price of plot that may be
charged from him if he is successful in draw of lots out of plots
reserved for oustees shall be the rate as advertised in new
advertisement. In cases where the allotment of plot could not be
effected despite determination of his eligibility, the prevalent price
at the time of application by the oustee in pursuance to an
advertisement may be charged along with simple interest @ 11%
per annum till date.
It is clarified that eligibility for the purpose as
aforesaid shall be treated as determined only when such an oustee
completed and satisfied all the formalities/ conditions as per the
applicable policy.
xx xx xx"
"Subject: Amendment in the HSVP policy dated 25.01.2007 &
20.08.2019-Regarding allotment of plots/payment of interest on
the depositing amount. 30.05.2022
xx xx xx
It was decided that HSVP will offer the possession of the plot
within a period of 3 years of allotment and in case the possession
of the plot is not offered within the prescribed period of 3 years
from the date of allotment, HSVP will pay interest @9% p.a. (or
as may be fixed by the Pradhikaran from time to time) on the
amount deposited by the allottee after the expiry of 3 years till the
date of offer of possession. In that case the allottee will not be.
required to pay the further installments. The payment of balance
installment will only start after the possession of the plot is offered
to the allottee. These provisions were applicable only on those
plots which was to be allotted after 25.01.2007."
34. We have noticed yet another startling fact, which cannot be
ignored. Learned counsel for the petitioner has apprised this Court that, as per
the recent instructions dated 02.12.2024 issued by the respondent-HSVP
related to oustees, the same provide for levy of bank rate of interest by
respondent-HSVP up to the date of allotment on the rate mentioned in the
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -37-
advertisement. The relevant extract of the said policy is reproduced
hereinbelow-
"4. In case finalization of allotment takes time, beyond the time
lines herein above mentioned, for any reason whatsoever, in that
eventuality bank rate of interest be charged by HSVP till date of
allotment on the rate mentioned in the advertisement. This aspect
be also mentioned specifically in public advertisement to be
issued."
35. Despite that, since no such exercise has been undertaken and
admittedly once the respondent(s) themselves have mentioned in aforesaid
instructions to charge bank rate of interest, they now cannot take a 'U' turn by
incorporating 11 % as rate of interest in allotment letter. In absence of any
specific bank rate of interest, we are of the view that reasonable interest which
is liable to be charged from the petitioner should be the rate of interest
currently being applied by the respondent-HSVP @ 5.5% in other schemes and
policies framed by them. In our considered view, there appears to be no
discernible rationale attached while determining the reasonableness of the rate
of interest incorporated in policy dated 08.05.2018 rather the mandate of the
Full Bench judgment in Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra) has been
misconstrued and misintepreted by the respondents by twisting the same to
serve the state's own benefit while completely ignoring the larger interest of
oustee(s).
36. Now for the adjudication of the third question, whether as per
Clause 6 of the allotment letter, the stipulation of 180 days for payment of 75%
of the balance amount in lump sum is justified or arbitrary, as raised in four
writ petitions, i.e. CWP No.31492 of 2025, CWP-28344-2025, CWP
No.25716-2025 and CWP-32859-2025 forming a part of this bunch. In CWP
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No. 31492 of 2025, the petitioner therein has relied upon Annexure P-5, i.e. the
allotment letter dated 01.01.2018, wherein, in the case of similarly situated
oustee, the respondents have granted the option of six years' installments for
payment of the remaining 75% instead of 180 days. The relevant extract of the
said allotment letter is reproduced below:-
"6. The balance amount i.e. Rs. 1463922.50/- of the
tentative cost of the plot/building can be paid in lump-sum
without interest within 60 days from the date of issue of the
allotment letter or in 6 Yearly instalments of Rs.
243987.00/-. The first installment will fall due after the
expiry of one year of the date of issue of this letter. Each
installment would be recoverable together with interest on
the balance price @12% p.a. on the remaining amount. The
interest shall, however, accrue from the date of offer of
possession. In case balance 75% of the tentative price of the
plot is paid in lump-sum within 60 days from the date of
issue of allotment letter, the rebate of 5% in the price of plot
will be allowed."
37. Further, the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment
passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in CWP No. 13048 of 2019,
decided on 20.02.2023, titled Naresh v. State of Haryana and others, and has
submitted that in the said case, the Coordinate Bench granted the benefit of
payment of the price of plot within a period of six years, as per the policy of
the HSVP. It is further contended that the said judgment has attained finality, as
the same has not been challenged by the respondents. The relevant extract of
the same is reproduced herein below:
"Mr. Parveen Mehta, Advocate, has filed memorandum of
appearance on behalf of respondent/HSVP in CWP Nos.37891 of
38 of 46
CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -39-
2018, 34571, 32504, 32488, 31998, 31885 of 2019 and 20727 of
2022, which is taken on record.
Having heard the counsel for the parties and on going through the
order dated 22.04.2022 passed by the Administrator, HSVP,
Rohtak, in pursuance to the directions issued by this Court, we
find the order to be based upon the Full Bench judgment of this
Court in Rajiv Manchanda Versus Haryana Urban Development
Authority and another 2018 (2) PLR 422. The parameters, as have
been laid down therein, have been duly relied upon and
considered while passing the said order, therefore, we do not find
any ground for not agreeing with the same.
Since the petitioners, after the allotment of the plot to them, have
immediately approached this Court and the writ petition has been
pending all through, we are of the considered view that the
petitioners should be granted the benefit of payment of the plots
within a period of six years as per the policy of HSVP obviously
charging them the relevant interest for the said period. The
petitioners be informed about the payment schedule and the
instalments. The petitioners will pay the first instalment after a
period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the letter from the
respondents intimating them the instalment amount, which they
have to pay in pursuance to the order passed by this Court.
These writ petitions stand disposed of in above terms."
38. Upon perusal of the allotment letter dated 01.01.2018 referred in
para No.36 and of the aforesaid judgment, we are of the considered view that
the respondents have acted in a discriminatory manner by requiring payment of
remaining 75% amount within 180 days instead of permitting payment in six
annual installments. It has also to be noticed that the delay in allotment is not
attributable to the petitioner; rather, it is entirely attributable to the respondents.
In such circumstances, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of making the
payments in six annual installments and for the said purpose the relevant
interest would be 5.5% for the said period. Even in the Rajiv Manchanda's
case (supra), the delay attributable to the respondents was elaborately
discussed. The present case stands on identical footing. Once it was possible
for the respondents to allot the plot on the date when the petitioner had applied,
but the same was not done solely due to the respondents' default and not due to
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CWP-16389-2025 (O&M) & other connected matters -40-
any act or omission on the part of the petitioner-oustee, the petitioner cannot be
penalised for such a delay.
39. Such conduct amounts to a conscious attempt to circumvent a
binding precedent rather than to faithfully apply it. The impugned allotment
letter dated 09.05.2025 (Annexure P-12) is founded on a complete misreading
of the law and calls for strict compliance with the mandate of the judgment
passed in Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra) as well as the self-framed policy of
the respondent-HSVP dated 08.05.2018 in reference to price.
40. To strengthen our view, we draw force from the doctrine of 'stare
decisis' and term 'precedent'. A precedent is that which precedes or comes
before. Courts rely on precedents, namely earlier judicial decisions or laws that
furnish an example or rule guiding the adjudication of subsequent cases. The
binding force of judicial precedents is founded upon the doctrine of Stare
decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis--an abbreviation of the Latin maxim
'stare decisis et non quieta movere'- means "to stand by decided cases and
not to disturb settled matters." It is a well-recognised principle of legal
jurisprudence which rests upon the premise that the law governing society must
be certain, definite, and known. When the law is declared by a court of
competent jurisdiction authorised to construe it, such declaration, in the
absence of palpable error or manifest injustice, constitutes evidence of the law
until altered by a competent authority. The doctrine mandates that rules of law,
once clearly enunciated and settled by judicial pronouncement, should not be
lightly disregarded or departed from, but ought to be followed in similar cases.
Where a principle of law has attained finality through a consistent line of
decisions, it becomes binding on courts and the State alike. The doctrine thus
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ensures stability, certainty, and predictability in the legal system, enabling
citizens to regulate their affairs with confidence.
41. Similarly, this Court, in "Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana"
2002 (2) SCT 354, has held that once a judgment attains finality, all authorities,
including the State, are duty-bound to implement the orders effectively, in
comity with the law of the land. The relevant extract is reproduced hereunder:-
"10. Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution of India make the
judgment of the Apex Court binding on all courts. All authorities
including the State must implement the orders effectively in comety to
the law of the land. The constitutional mandate imposes an obligation
on the State to ensure enforceability throughout the boundary of India
of the orders passed by the Apex Court. Attempts to by-pass and
circumvent the orders of the Court could never achieve any object of
the State. On the contrary, it would certainly introduce an element of
discontement and frustration in its employees. In a large society like
ours, the steps taken on behalf of the State to eliminate unnecessary
litigation is essence of proper administration. The maxim boni judics
est causas litium dirimere even requires the Court to remove causes of
litigation. Such maxim is indented to further the principle of precedents
and is essential to maintain consistency in judicial pronouncements.
The command in judgments which attain finality must not only appears
to be respected, but should be enforced and implemented with respect
as 'lex nil frustra jubet'.
11. State has pervasive obligations to discharge in relation to
maintaining its expected standards of employer-employee relationship.
As already noticed, one of the important facets of such obligations is to
be reasonable and fair in granting service benefit to its employees in
accordance with service rules and the principles enunciated on
pronouncement of judgments by the Courts. When judgments attain
finality to which the State is a party, duty is casted upon the State to
grant relief to its employees who are similarly situated and on identical
facts. Benefit of such approach are many and it causes no disadvantage
to the interests of the State. It is not necessary for the State to require
each one of its employees to approach the Courts of law for grant of a
relief which the State ought to grant to the employees in normal course
of its administration, particularly, the cases of the kind afore-referred.
Such principles is well known and accepted for years now. By referring
to few judgments we would only predicate the principle with greater
emphasis of its application in the day-to-day affairs of the State. In the
case of Dr. (Mrs.) Santosh Kumari v. Union of India and others, JT
1994(7) SC 565 : 1995(1) SCT 527 (SC) the Hon'ble Apex Court held
as under :-
"The allotment of seats should go according to merit. It does not
depend upon who comes to Court and who does not. The matter
is one of principle and should not depend upon who comes to the
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court. A more deserving candidate may not have the means of
approach the Court."
12. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satyapal Singh and
others v. The State of Haryana and another, 1999(2) RSJ 377 also
observed as under:-
"The respondents as a welfare State should rather see to it that the
litigation in the Courts is minimised. After this Court or the Apex
court lays down the law, it should see to it that similarly situated
persons automatically get the same relief without resorting to
litigation."
xx xx xx xx
15. The cumulative effect of the above settled principles is that the State
must avoid discrimination in grant of service benefits to the members of
the same cadre identically situated. If the employees had not
approached the Court, but the judgments otherwise pronounced
relating to the same matter have attained finality, the State must show
its grace and in fact carry out its implicit duty to grant benefit to the
other members of the cadre.
16. Mechanical functioning must be substituted by reasonable and
purposeful approach. Where the State Government has lost its battle
repeatedly after filing special leave petitions as well as review petitions
before the Hon'ble Apex court, it would be desirable for the State to
retrace its steps than to proceed improperly in passing unjustified and
unsustainable orders. In the present case, the relief claimed by the
petitioners was squarely covered on facts and law by above judgments
and the State was expected to grant the same relief to the petitioners at
its own level, in all fairness. Such an approach would not only further
the object of healthy employer-employee relationship but would also
take away unnecessary burden of the Court arising from such frivolous
litigation. To say the least, it is inappropriate for the State to compel
the petitioners to approach the Court for redressal of their grievances.
It will be legitimate expectancy on the part of the employee that he
would be given the same relief which his co-employee similarly
situated has been granted. Must the State act unfairly by denying such
a claim, compulsion of the employee becomes the cause for
approaching the Court. Denial of justice despite service of justice
demand notice is a violation of basic rule of law on the part of the
department.
xx xx xx xx
19. Be that as it may, particularly in the afore-referred premises, we
still feel that it is the bounden duty of the Court to issue the following
directions to the State in the larger public interest and for proper
administration of justice:-
(i) Wherever the rights of the parties have been settled by a judgment of
the Court, the State has taken all remedies available to it in law against
that judgment even upto the highest court of the land and the judgments
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has attained finality, then the State must accept the judgment and
implement it in its true spirit and command. There is implicit obligation
on the part or the State to grant same relief to other members of the
cadre whose claim was based upon identical facts and points of law.
(ii) The State Government shall as expeditiously as possible in any case
not later than four months re-act and respond to a legal
notice/representation served upon it by any of its employees in
redressal of his grievance/grant of relief, which has been granted to his
co-employees similarly situated, in furtherance to the judgment of the
Court. Unless, for reasons to be indicated in the reply, the State feels
compelled to deny such relief. Needless to point out that denial must
neither be evasive nor intended to circumvent the orders of the Court.
(iii) In the event such an employee is compelled to approach the court
of law, whereupon the court awards interest and/or costs while
allowing such a petition, then the expenditure incurred by the State
including the costs/interest paid in furtherance to the orders of the
Court should be recovered from the erring officer(s).
(iv) The concerned quarters of the Government are expected to work
out the details in furtherance to the above directions and issue
pervasive but definite instructions to all its departments forthwith to
ensure compliance."
42. Following the same settled principles, we are of the firm view that
commands of law and judgments which have attained finality must not only
appear to be respected, but must be faithfully enforced and implemented, for
lex non frustra jubet. The State has pervasive and continuing obligations to
discharge in maintaining the standards expected of it while granting relief to
the petitioner-oustee(s). Once judgments attain finality, particularly where the
State is a party, a corresponding duty is cast upon it to grant the relief so
directed. The cumulative effect of the settled principles of law is that the State
must eschew discrimination in granting benefits to persons identically situated,
even if some of them have not approached the Court, where judgments relating
to the same subject matter have already attained finality. The State is expected
to act with fairness and grace and to discharge its implicit obligation to extend
similar benefits to other petitioner-oustee(s), especially in matters where the
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State has repeatedly failed in litigation. It would, therefore, be desirable for the
State to retrace its steps rather than persist in passing unjustified and legally
unsustainable orders.
43. In the present case, as also in the connected matters, we find that
despite the issues having been conclusively settled and authoritatively
pronounced by the Full Bench of this Court in Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra)
with regard to fixation of price and levy of reasonable interest, the respondent
HSVP failed to adhere to the mandate of the judgment in its true letter and
spirit, as it is nowhere mentioned that respondent HSVP is permitted to fix the
"current price" which is being charged. Further, the respondents deliberately
omitted to incorporate the rate of the plot in the public advertisement and
thereafter sought to justify such omission on untenable and artificial grounds,
whereas the price ought to have been disclosed at the very inception.
44. Further, without adopting any rational or objective criteria for
determining reasonable interest, the respondents conveniently imposed an
exorbitant rate of interest, evidently for financial gain, while completely
ignoring the legitimate interests of the petitioner-oustee(s). Such conduct is in
clear violation of the doctrines of promissory estoppel and stare decisis, which
the State is duty-bound to follow once the issues stand conclusively covered by
the binding judgment in Rajiv Manchanda's case and reiterated in subsequent
decisions.
45. What is even more surprising is that despite amending policies and
issuing instructions from time to time, many of which themselves
acknowledged these principles-the respondents have still failed to comply with
the settled legal position and has arbitrarily charged the current price and
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delayed the process of issuance of the allotment letter for approx seven years.
Such conduct on the part of the respondents is wholly unjustified, cannot be
appreciated, and deserves to be deprecated. In view of the same, as a punitive
measure, we are constrained to impose the costs of Rs.3 lakhs on the
respondent-HSVP.
46. Given the above discussion and in light of binding precedent in
Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra) and Clause 15-A of the Policy dated
08.05.2018 (qua price), the impugned Clauses 5 and 6 of the allotment letter
09.05.2025 (Annexure P-12) are hereby quashed being contrary and
discriminative. Consequently, present writ petition and other connected matters
are allowed with the following directions: -
(i) The respondents are directed to redetermine the price of allotment
pursuant to price prevailing on the date of the application/advertisement
in 2018 instead of current price as being charged, which is contrary to
the mandate of the judgment of Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra), and
shall issue a fresh allotment letter maintaining the rights and eligibility
of the petitioner oustee, which is not in dispute.
(ii) For the intents and purposes of "Reasonable Interest" as
stipulated in the case of Rajiv Manchanda's case (supra), the same shall
be at the rate of 5.5% instead of 11% and the period for making the
payment as per the mandate of the judgment in case of Naresh (supra)
would be 6 years and same shall be in equal installments along with
interest 5.5% per annum.
(iii) An amount of Rs.3,00,000/- as costs to be deposited with the Poor
Patients Welfare Fund, PGIMER, Chandigarh.
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(iv) The aforesaid directions shall be complied within 2 months from
the receipt of certified copies of this judgment. Till then respondents are
restrained from taking any coercive steps.
(DEEPAK MANCHANDA) (ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL )
JUDGE JUDGE
22.12.2025
vanita
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether Reportable : Yes/No
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