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Punjab-Haryana High Court
Karamvir vs Haryana Power Generation Corporation ... on 8 December, 2025
CWP-28411-2025 -1-
111
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CWP-28411-2025 (O&M)
Date of decision: 08.12.2025
Karamvir
... Petitioner
Vs.
Haryana Power General Corporation Limited and others
... Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR
Present: Mr. B.K. Bagri, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Vikrant Pamboo, Advocate
for the respondents.
*******
HARPREET SINGH BRAR, J. (ORAL)
1. Instant writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari seeking
quashing of the letter/memo dated 19.05.2025 (Annexure P-15), vide which
representation dated 25.03.2025 (Annexure P-13) submitted by the petitioner
for grant of service benefits/deemed date of appointment from the year 2014
was rejected and further to direct the respondents to grant the benefit of
deemed date of appointment from the year 2014 along with all the
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consequential benefits.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, inter alia, contends that
admittedly, the land owned by the family of the petitioner was acquired by
Arawali Power Company Private Limited for setting up a Thermal Power
Project in District Jhajjar in the year 2007. Subsequently, the Government of
Haryana notified the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy dated 09.11.2010
(for short 'policy'), as discernible from Annexure P-1. The said policy was
widely published with an aim to provide employment to one member of each
family, from whom more than 02 acres of land was acquired for the aforesaid
project. Further, since the petitioner was fully eligible for appointment in
terms of the policy (Annexure P-1), vide letter/memo dated 02.06.2014
(Annexure P-3), the Sub Divisional Officer (Civil), Jhajjar forwarded his case
for grant of employment to respondent No.3. It is further contended that vide
memo dated 18.06.2015 (Annexure P-4), name of the petitioner was
confirmed in the list of 23 applicants in addition to the list of 293 land
oustees.
3. Initially, petitioner's claim was rejected without assigning any
reasons. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner approached this Court by way
of filing a writ petition i.e. CWP-20274-2018, which was disposed of vide
order dated 08.08.2023 (Annexure P-11) with a direction to the respondents to
examine his eligibility for the employment opportunity in terms of the policy
(Annexure P-1). In compliance thereof, on 19.03.2025 (Annexure P-12), the
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respondents issued an offer of appointment to the petitioner for the post of
Peon (Field). The petitioner joined duty on the said post immediately.
Thereafter, on 25.03.2025 (Annexure P-13), he made a representation to
respondent No.1 seeking deemed date of appointment from the year 2014, at
par with his identically circumstanced counterparts, in terms of the
appointment letters issued to them (Annexures P-16 to P-24, respectively).
However, the representation dated 25.03.2025 (Annexure P-13) was rejected
vide impugned letter/memo dated 19.05.2025 (Annexure P-15) stating that it
was "not found feasible for acceptance".
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner refers to the written statement
filed on behalf of all the respondents-Corporation and submits that a different
yardstick has been adopted to assess the case of the petitioner. It was stated
therein that the date of appointment of other land oustees was deemed to be
from the date of recommendation of their cases because their individual share
in the acquired land was 02 acres or more, however, the individual share of
each member of the family of the petitioner was found to be less than 02
acres. Once the petitioner has been found entitled to employment and has
been offered appointment, he cannot be denied the same deemed date of
appointment, as granted to other similarly situated persons. As such, the
impugned letter/memo (Annexure P-15) has been issued without recording
any plausible reason making it arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
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5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation
opposes the prayer made by the petitioner and submits that that doctrine of res
judicata would operate in the present case as no claims regarding grant of
benefits of deemed date of appointment from the year 2014 was raised by the
petitioner in the earlier writ petition i.e. CWP-20274-2018. Further,
employment opportunity provided to the land oustees by the policy (Annexure
P-1) cannot be interpreted as a vested or enforceable right, as land acquisition
does not automatically entitle them to employment.
6. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the
first petition i.e. CWP-20274-2018 filed by the petitioner was disposed of
with a direction to consider his claim. As such, the respondent-Corporation
was obligated to decide all aspects including the issue of deemed date of
appointment.
7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after perusing
the record of the case with their able assistance, it transpires that in
compliance of the order dated 08.08.2023 (Annexure P-11) passed by this
Court in CWP-2074-2018, the respondents found the petitioner eligible and
suitable for employment. Resultantly, he was offered appointment to the post
of Peon (Field) in terms of the policy (Annexure P-1).
8. Admittedly, other identically circumstanced employees, as listed
in para No.17 of the paper book, have already been granted the benefit of
deemed date of appointment. Further, the material available on the record
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does not suggest that the case of the petitioner is distinct from that of his
counterparts, especially since their case was recommended to the competent
authority on 02.06.2014 (Annexure P-3) together.
9. If a distinction must be drawn, it must rest on a clear intelligible
differentia that bears a rational nexus to the objective sought to be achieved
by such distinction. In the absence of these essential characteristics, this
distinction would fall foul of the constitutional ethos and amounts to
discrimination. An arbitrary act strikes at the very heart of the mandate of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which not only includes equality
before law but also equal protection of law. Reliance in this regard can be
placed upon a judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3,
wherein, speaking through Justice P.N. Bhagwati, opined as follows:
"85. The last two grounds of challenge may be taken up
together for consideration. Though we have formulated the third
ground of challenge as a distinct and separate ground, it is really
in substance and effect merely an aspect of the second ground
based on violation of Articles 14 and 16. Article 16 embodies the
fundamental guarantee that Article 14 as there shall be equality
of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment
or appointment to any office under the State. Though enacted as
a distinct and independent fundamental right because of its great
importance as a principle ensuring equality of opportunity in
public employment which is so vital to the building up of the new
classless egalitarian society envisaged in the Constitution,
Article 16 is only an instance of the application of the concept of
equality enshrined in Article 14. In other words, Article 14 is the
genus while Article 16 is aspects. Article 16 gives effect to the
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doctrine of equality in all matters relating to public employment.
The basic principle which, therefore, informs both Articles 14
and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now,
what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle?
It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose J., "a way of fife",
and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or
lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to
truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so
Would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic
concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be
"cribbed cabined and confined" within traditional and
doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is
antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are
sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic
while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute
monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is
unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law
and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it affects any
matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of
Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State
action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They
require that State action must be based on valid relevant
principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must
not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations
because that would be denial of equality. Where the operative
reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing
from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant
but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible
considerations, it would amount to mala fide exercise of power
and that is hit by Articles 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of power
and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from
the same vice in fact the matter comprehends the former. Both
are inhibited by Articles 14 and 16."
(emphasis added)
10. Adverting to the matter at hand, the petitioner and 07 other
similarly situated persons were recommended by the Sub Divisional Officer
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(Civil), Jhajjar for grant of employment vide letter dated 02.06.2014
(Annexure P-3). The name of the petitioner also figures in the letter dated
18.06.2015 (Annexure P-4), whereby names of 23 land oustees were
recommended to the Deputy Commissioner, Jhajjar by respondent No.3-Chief
Engineer/Admn., HPGCL, Panchkula. Further, in the order dated 08.08.2023
(Annexure P-11) passed in CWP-12836-2018 titled as Vikul Jakhar and
others Vs. State of Haryana and others, a specific observation was recorded
by this Court that it is the 'family' that should have a holding of 02 acres or
more. Since the family of the petitioner satisfed that requirement and no other
member was granted employment in lieu of the same, he was eventually
appointed as Peon (Field) by the respondents, in terms of the policy
(Annexure P-1). When the respondents have appointed the petitioner, a
reasonable inference can be drawn that he was eligible since the very first
application. That being the case, there is no justification to deny him the
deemed date of appointment, as has already been granted to rest of the
applicants, who were considered for employment along with the petitioner.
11. Certainly, the act of acquiring of land would not automatically
entitle oustees to employment as a matter of right. However, where a policy is
specifically formulated to address the aspects of rehabilitation, the same must
be uniformly applied. If a deviation is necessary, it must be rooted in reason,
in consonance with the principles of transparency and fairness. While the
officers in-charge may possess certain discretionary powers, such discretion
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cannot be considered to be entirely unqualified. The democratic nature of the
State calls for adoption of a procedure, that is free from vices of arbitrariness
and discrimination. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India,
(1979) 3 SCC 489 has categorically held that while the State can choose
whether or not to engage in a relationship with an individual, the said choice
must have cogent basis and should not be tainted with the vices of
unreasonableness and arbitrariness in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. Speaking through Justice P.N. Bhagwati, the following was held:
"20. Now, obviously where a corporation is an instrumentality or
agency of Government, it would, in the exercise of its power or
discretion, be subject to the same constitutional or public law
limitations as Government. The rule inhibiting arbitrary action
by Government which we have discussed above must apply
equally where such corporation is dealing with the public,
whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or
otherwise, and it cannot act arbitrarily and enter into
relationship with any person it likes at its sweet will, but its
action must be in conformity with some principle which meets
the test of reason and relevance.
21. This rule also flows directly from the doctrine of equality
embodied in Article 14. It is now well settled as a result of the
decisions of this Court in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu,
(1974) 2 SCR 348 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,
(1978) 1 SCC 248 that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State
action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. It requires
that State action must not be arbitrary but must be based on
some rational and relevant principle which is non-
discriminatory : it must not be guided by any extraneous or
irrelevant consideration, because that would be denial of
equality. The principle of reasonableness and rationality which
is legally as well as philosophically an essential element of
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equality or non-arbitrariness is projected by Article 14 and it
must characterise every State action, whether it be under
authority of law or in exercise of executive power without
making of law. The State cannot, therefore act arbitrarily in
entering into relationship, contractual or otherwise with a third
party, but its action must conform to some standard or norm
which is rational and non-discriminatory. This principle was
recognised and applied by a Bench of this Court presided over by
Ray, C. J., in Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of
West Bengal (supra) where the learned Chief Justice pointed out
that 'the State can carry on executive function by making a law or
without making a law. The exercise of such powers and functions
in trade by the State is subject to Part III of the Constitution.
Article 14 speaks of equality before the law and equal protection
of the laws. Equality of opportunity should apply to matters of
public contracts. The State has the right to trade. The State has
there the duty to observe equality. An ordinary individual can
choose not to deal with any person. The Government cannot
choose to exclude persons by discrimination. The order of
blacklisting has the effect of depriving a person of equality of
opportunity in the matter of public contract. A person who is on
the approved list is unable to enter into advantageious relations
with the Government because of the order of black-listing -A
citizen has a right to claim equal treatment to enter into a
contract which may be proper, necessary and essential to his
lawful calling - It is true that neither the petitioner nor the
respondent has any right to enter into a contract but they are
entitled to equal treatment with others who offer tender or
quotations for the purchase of the goods.' It must, therefore
follow as a necessary corollary from the principle of equality
enshrined in Article 14 that though the State is entitled to
refuse to enter into relationship with any one, yet if it does so, it
cannot arbitrarily choose any person it likes for entering into
such relationship and discriminate between persons similarly
circumstanced, but it must act in conformity with some
standard or principle which meets the test of reasonableness
and non-discrimination and any departure from such standard
or principle would be invalid unless it can be supported or
justified on some rational and non-discriminatory ground."
(emphasis added)
12. In view of the discussion above, the present petition is allowed.
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Accordingly, the impugned letter/memo dated 19.05.2025 (Annexure P-15) is
hereby set aside and the respondent-Corporation is directed to grant the
benefit of deemed date of appointment to the petitioner at par with that of his
similarly situated counterparts, within a period of two months from the date of
receipt of certified copy of this order.
13. The pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
[ HARPREET SINGH BRAR ]
08.12.2025 JUDGE
vishnu
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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