Punjab-Haryana High Court
Huda Now Haryana Shehri Vikas ... vs Anita Rewal on 4 September, 2024
Bench: G.S. Sandhawalia, Meenakshi I. Mehta
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:115662-DB
115
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
LPA No.2122 of 2024 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 04.09.2024
HUDA now Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran and others
.....Appellants.
Versus
Anita Rewal
.....Respondent.
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S. SANDHAWALIA
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI I. MEHTA
*****
Present:- Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. A.G, Haryana with
Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana and
Ms. Kushaldeep Kaur, Advocate
for the appellants.
Mr. Rajiv Kataria, Advocate
for the respondent.
G.S. SANDHAWALIA, J.(Oral)
CM No.5017-LPA of 2024
This is an application filed on behalf of the applicants-
appellants for leave to appeal for grant of permission to applicant i.e.
Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran through its Administrator to file the
accompanying Letters Patent Appeal.
Keeping in view the averments made in the present
application, which is supported with the affidavit of applicant-appellant
No.1-Administrator, the same is allowed.
1 of 10
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:115662-DB
CM No.5016-LPA of 2024
This application has been filed on behalf of the applicants-
appellants for seeking condonation of delay of 258 days in filing the appeal
on account of the fact that they were not party-respondents in the writ
petition.
Notice in the application.
Mr. Kataria, accepts notice on behalf of the respondent-land
owner.
Keeping in view the averments made in the present
application, which is supported with the affidavit of the official of the
applicant-appellant No.1, we deem it fit to allow the same.
Accordingly, the application is allowed and delay of 258 days
in filing the appeal is condoned.
Challenge in the present Letters Patent Appeal is raised to the
judgment dated 16.11.2023 passed by learned Single Judge, whereby the
writ petition bearing CWP No.5461 of 2022 filed by the respondent land
owner was allowed.
2. Learned Single Judge, in principle, directed the respondents to
release the full amount of compensation in favour of the respondent, upon
calculating the statutory interest as payable under the provisions of the
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short 'the 2013 Act'), while
referring in particular to Section 80 thereof and to disburse the same within
2 of 10
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:115662-DB
a period of 08 weeks from the date of passing of the judgment.
3. Mr. Mittal has raised an argument, though academic purpose,
to the extent that whether the payment is to be made under the provisions
of the 2013 Act in view of the restrictive application given to Section 24
thereof by the judgment of the Apex Court in Haryana State Industrial
and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited and others Versus
Deepak Aggarwal and others, (2023) 6 SCC 512. Section 24(1)(a) of the
2013 Act reads as under:
"24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of
1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain
cases.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings
initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,--
(a) where no award under section 11 of the said
Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all
provisions of this Act relating to the determination
of compensation shall apply."
4. In principle, the interest had become payable to the
respondent-land owner on account of the fact that a sum of
Rs.5,82,25,592/- was released in favour of the respondent on 26.11.2021,
though the land had been taken over by the appellants on passing of the
Award on 02.08.2016 vide Rapat No.1067. So far the delayed payment is
concerned, there is no quarrel on the set proposition of law regarding the
entitlement of the land owner for the statutory rate of interest which is
analogous to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the 1894 Act').
5. The legal issue which is likely to arise in view of the
3 of 10
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:115662-DB
observations made by learned Single Judge is on account of the fact that
the notification was dated 30.12.2013 under Section 4 of the 1894 Act,
prior to the coming into force the 2013 Act w.e.f. 01.01.2014 and the
notification dated 06.08.2014 under Section 6 of the 1894 Act lead to the
Award (Annexure P-1) passed on 02.08.2016. It is not disputed that 100%
solatium has been granted vide the Award (Annexure P-1).
6. Thus, in sum and substance, the writ petitioner as such has got
all the benefits under the 2013 Act. Learned Single Judge has directed the
payment of the statutory rate of interest which has become payable. The
issue as to the determination of compensation has been discussed by the
Apex Court under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act in the above-mentioned
judgment. It is in these circumstances, it is submitted on behalf of the
appellants that the land owner cannot be permitted to say at a later point of
time that the Award had been passed under the provisions of the 2013 Act
and he is entitled for other benefits and once the determination has already
been done to which there was no challenge raised at any point of time and
only the benefits of interest have been sought by filing the writ petition.
7. The relevant paragraphs No.37 to 41 of the judgment passed
by Hon'ble Supreme Court, limiting the right to determination of
compensation under the 2013 Act has been highlighted, in Haryana State
Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited and
others Versus Deepak Aggarwal and others' case (supra) read as under:-
"37. Now, we will consider the other common
questions involved in the captioned appeals. They
4 of 10
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:115662-DB
pertain to the questions as to whether Section 4
notification issued under the L.A. Act prior to
01.01.2014 (date of commencement of 2013 Act) could
continue or survive after 01.01.2014 and, as to whether
Section 6 notification under the L.A. Act could be issued
after 01.01.2014.
38. We think that while considering those questions
we will have to bear in mind the purposes and the
legislative history of the 2013 Act and also the intention
of the legislature in drafting the same in the manner in
which it now exists. We have already dealt with those
aspects. One crucial aspect discernible from Section
24(1)(a) has also to be taken note of in this context. The
combined effect of Section 24(1) and clause (a) thereof
is that if land acquisition proceeding under the L.A. Act
was initiated prior to 01.01.2014, the date of coming
into force of the 2013 Act, and if it was not culminated
in an award under Section 11 of the L.A. Act, then all
the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the
determination of compensation should apply to such
acquisition proceedings. Thus, it is obvious that in case
of non-passing of an award in terms of Section 11 of the
L.A. Act where the acquisition proceedings have been
initiated prior to 01.01.2014, all provisions under the
5 of 10
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:115662-DB
2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation
alone would apply to such acquisition proceedings. In
other words, it would mean that in such circumstances
the land acquisition proceedings should continue, but all
the provisions relating to the determination of
compensation under the 2013 Act alone will be
applicable to such proceedings, meaning thereby, the
2013 Act would come into play only at that stage. There
can be no doubt with respect to the position that
between the initiation of land acquisition proceedings by
issuance and publication of notice under Section 4(1) of
the L.A. Act and the stage at which compensation for the
acquisition calls for determination, there are various
procedures to be followed to make the acquisition in
accordance with the law. The question is when Section
24(1) of the 2013 Act makes it clear with necessary
implication that all provisions of the 2013 Act relating
to the determination of compensation alone would be
applicable to such proceedings initiated under the L.A.
Act but, not culminated in an award, how the procedures
are to be regulated during the intervening period till the
proceedings reach the stage of determination of
compensation. There cannot be any uncertainty on that
aspect. The procedures to be undertaken and the manner
6 of 10
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:115662-DB
in which they are to be regulated cannot remain
uncertain. They are conducted either in the manner
provided under the L.A. Act or in the manner provided
under the 2013 Act. But then, in view of Section
24(1)(a), the provisions relating to the determination of
compensation alone can be applied to such proceedings
or in other words, there is only a restricted application
of the provisions of the 2013 Act in relation to such
proceedings. The inevitable conclusion can only be that
what is applicable to the various procedures to be
undertaken during the period up to the stage of
determination of compensation are those prescribed
under the L.A. Act. We have no doubt that without such
a construction, the provisions under Section 24(1)(a)
would not work out, in view of the restrictive application
of the 2013 Act. It is in this context that the decision in
Ambica Quarry Works' case (supra) assumes relevance.
Any construction of the said provision without taking
into the legislative intention, referred hereinbefore
would defeat the legislative intention as also the very
objects of the 2013 Act. Certainly, it would not be in
public interest to allow such proceedings to lapse or
allow the authorities to follow the procedures during
such period according to their sweet will. A uniform
7 of 10
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:115662-DB
procedure has to be followed in respect of such
proceedings. The acquisitions initiated for public
purposes should go on in a fair and transparent manner
with a view to achieve the intent and purport of the 2013
Act and at the same time, the persons affected shall have
definite idea about the manner in which procedures
would be conducted. The Party 'B' would not be
justified in describing such situations of necessity and
the consequential application of provisions which are
actually saved on account of the construction of Section
24 as an attempt to bring the words expressly employed
in Section 24(1)(b) and absent in Section 24(1)(a), by
indirect method to Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. The
aforesaid conclusions and findings would make the
contentions of Party 'B' that Section 4(1) notification
issued prior to 01.01.2014 could not survive after
01.01.2014 and also that Section 6 notification under
the L.A. Act could not be issued after 01.01.2014,
unsustainable. In fact, all such procedures and
formalities shall be continued till the determination of
compensation by applying all the provisions for
determination of compensation, under the 2013 Act. A
contra-construction, in view of the restrictive
application of the provisions to such proceedings during
8 of 10
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:115662-DB
its continuance, would make the provisions under
Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act unworkable.
39. Having decided the common questions as above
we are of the view that all the other issues involved in
the individual appeals have to be considered on their
own merits and subject to this judgment in respect of all
the stated common questions.
40. To conclude, we hold that for the purposes of sub-
section (1) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the
proceedings under the L.A. Act shall be treated as
initiated on publication of a notification under sub-
section (1) of Section 4 of the L.A. Act. We further hold
that when Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of
the 2013 Act is applicable, the proceedings shall
continue as per the L.A. Act. However, only for the
determination of compensation amount, the provisions
of the 2013 Act shall be applied.
41. We have already observed that other issues are
also involved in the captioned appeals besides the
common questions and issues which we have answered
in this judgment. Hence taking note of involvement of
other legal and factual issues in these appeals shall be
listed before appropriate Bench for disposal on their
own merits."
9 of 10
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:115662-DB
8. Mr. Kataria has fairly submitted that a sum of
Rs.1,85,00,000/- has been received by the respondent-land owner as
interest by seeking implementation of the judgment passed by learned
Single Judge and there is a contest to the extent that the said amount is
deficient.
9. Resultantly, we dispose of the present appeal by deleting the
words as such whereby reference has been made regarding the statutory
interest payable under the provisions of the 2013 Act in particular by
reference to Section 80 thereof and is substituted with Section 34 of the
1894 Act, in view of the consensus arrived at between the parties.
10. Needless to say that we have not adjudicated on the issue of
deficiency of the amount of interest payable since the matter is already
pending before the Contempt Court.
(G.S. SANDHAWALIA)
JUDGE
(MEENAKSHI I. MEHTA)
September 04, 2024 JUDGE
Yag Dutt
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes
Whether Reportable: No
10 of 10
