Raj Pal vs Market Committee And Anr
2024 Latest Caselaw 18730 P&H

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Raj Pal vs Market Committee And Anr on 22 October, 2024

Author: Sudeepti Sharma

Bench: Sudeepti Sharma

                                      Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:140956




RSA-2986-2001
         2001 (O&M)                                         -1-


           IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                        AT CHANDIGARH
                              -.-
                                  RSA
                                  RSA-2986-2001 (O&M)
                                  Date of Decision : 22.10.2024

Raj Pal                                                           ....Appellant

                         Versus

Market Committee                                                  ....Respondent

CORAM : HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUDEEPTI SHARMA

Present: Mr. Raman B. Garg, Advocate with Mr Mr. Mayank Garg, Garg Advocate for the appellant appellant.

Mr. Padamkant Dwivedi,, Advocate for respondent No.1.

-.-

SUDEEPTI SHARMA, SHARMA J.

1. The challenge in the present appeal is to the judgment and decree

dated 09.02.1998 whereby the appeal filed by the respondent respondent-defendant against the

judgment and decree dated 19.09.1997 filed by the plaintiff/appellant, was

allowed.

2. Brief facts of the the case as mentioned before the Civil Judge (Junior

Division), Jind are that the plaintiff/appellant was in the employment of Market

Committee, Julana as Sweeper on permanent post and the said M Market Committee ommittee

is Government Agency working under the Haryana State Agriculture Marketing

Board. The plaintiff/appellant plaintiff joined service as Sweeper in 1980 and continu continued ed on

the said post without interruption and was not offered any promotional post. The

plaintiff/appellant /appellant was placed under suspension on 4.8.1993 but later on reinstated

on 15.3.1994 by the defendant No.1 and his two increments were stopped with

cumulative effect. The plaintiff/appellant filed an appeal before the Chief

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Administrator of the H.S.A.M.P., Panchkula against the order of pun punishment ishment

passed by defendant No.1.

No.1. The said appeal was accepted and the order of

punishment was set aside by Chief Administrator on 30.8.1994. As a result of said

order, the plaintiff/appellant plaintiff became entitled to his salary which has been held up

during the period of suspension, suspension, i.e., salary from 1.8.1993 to 15.3.1994. Afte Afterr order

dated 30.8.1994 the defendant defendant did not commence any enquiry nor passed any order

against the plaintiff/appellant.

plaintiff . When the order of the committee through which the

committee had decided not to pay any any arrears of past period to the

plaintiff/appellant /appellant, had been set aside vide order dated 30.8.1994 of Chief

Administrator, the plaintiff/appellant become eligible for the arrears for pay for the

suspension period also. Again, as the plaintiff/appellant hass completed 8 years of

service in 1988, the plaintiff/appellant became eligible for one additional increment

as per Haryana Government policy from the year 1992 as made applicable to all

the employees of the market committee by the board but the said additional

increment was not granted to the plaintiff/appellant plaintiff/appellant, inspite of representation made

to the defendant. The plaintiff/appellant was also entitled to get first higher

standard scale of pay pay w.e.f. 1.1.1994 for having completed 10 years of satisfactory

service before 31.12.1993 31.12.1993 as per Haryana Government policy as enforced in

Market Committee but the pay of the plaintiff plaintiff/appellant was not fixed in higher

scale despite request made by him. The plaintiff plaintiff/appellant made representation on

29.5.1995 which was received by the defendant vide diary No.58 dated 6.6.1995

but the same was ignored deliberately. Legal notice under Section 31 of the Punjab

Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1961 was served upon the defendant through

counsel dated 10.1.1996. Period of said notice also expired but the defendant again

did not pay any heed to the request r of the plaintiff plaintiff/appellant and finally refused a

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week back from releasing the benefits. Defendant No. 2 is the dealing officer and

he deliberately refrained from doing his duty and so he was being impleaded as

defendant No. 2 for getting his responsibility responsibility fixed. When the plaintiff/appellant /appellant

met with refusal of the defendant on 23.12.1996 he was left with no option except

to file the civil suit.

3. Upon notice, defendants appeared and filed written statement wherein

apart from taking preliminary objections obj of maintainability of suit, suit being bad

for non-joinder joinder of necessary parties, plaint being not properly valued for the

purpose of court fees have controverted all the averments made in the plaint while

stating that although the appeal filed by the t plaintiff/appellant was accepted by the

Chief Administrator but the case was remanded back for taking necessary action

afresh after observing the procedure and the appeal was accepted only on the

ground that the punishment was awarded to the plaintiff/appellant without regular

inquiry.

4. Rejoinder to the written statement was filed wherein all the averments

made in the plaint were reaffirmed and those made in the written statement were

denied.

5. From the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed:-

1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to his salary and

allowances for the period from 4.8.1993 to 15.3.1994?

OPP.

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to an additional

increment after completing 8 years of service in 1988?

OPP.

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3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to First Higher

standard scale of pay w.e.f. 1.1.1994 for having

completed 10 years before 31.12.9370PD.

4. Whether defendant No. 2 is unnecessarily party?OPD

5. Whether the suit is bad for non non-joinder joinder of Haryana

State Agricultural Marketing Board Board?OPD.

6. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the

purposes of court fees and jurisdiction?OPD.

7. Whether the suit is not maintainable as the plaintiff

has other effecacious remedy?OPD.

8. Relief."

6. After hearing both the parties and the perusing the whole record, the

learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Jind allowed the suit filed by the appellant

on 19.09.1997.

7. The appeal preferred by the respondent against the judgment and

decree dated 19.09.1997 19.09. was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge,

Jind, vide judgment and decree dated 09.02.1998 09.02.1998. Hence, the present appeal.

SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES

8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned First

Appellate Court did not appreciate the facts on record and allowed the appeal filed

by the respondent.

9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent contends that the appeal

has rightly been allowed by the learned First Appellate Co Court.

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10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the whole

record of this case. Relevant portion of the judgment dated 19.09.1997 passed by

the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Jind is reproduced as under:

under:-

"Issue No.1.

6. Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the

plaintiff joined the market committee as permanent employee in

1980 and continuous on the said post without interruption. The

plaintiff was suspended on 4.8.1993 but was reinstated on

15.3.1994. When the appeal was made to Chief Administrator

Market Committee, Panchkula, the order of market committee

regarding stoppage of increment and pay of the plaintiff was set

aside, side, the copy of which is Ex.P1. When after the order of Chief

Administrator, no efforts were mad madee by the marketing board to

release the pay and increment of the plaintiff, then the plaintiff

served legal notice through Sh. J.B. Goel, Advocate and its

copy is Ex.P2 and postal receipts are Ex, P3 and P4. After the

order of Chief Administrator, Panchkul Panchkula, a, no enquiry was

started against the plaintiff till now. As such the plaintiff is

entitled to claim increment on completion of 8 years of service

and is also entitled to be placed in first higher standard scale of

pay for having completed 10 years of sati satisfactory sfactory service from

1.1.1994. PW2 Sat Narain Sharma stated that the plaintiff is

employee of market committee, Julana. He was appointed on

29.11.1980 as Sweeper on permanent post. He stated that till

now no action has been taken against the plaintiff reg regarding arding

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enquiry which was directed to be made aga against inst him by the Chief

Administrator, rator, Marketing Board, Panchkula by observing

regular procedure. He admitted that the plaintiff had given

representation Ex. P10 and legal notice Ex.P2 to their office.

He admitted ted that after charge charge-sheeting sheeting the plaintiff again, no

action has been taken till now and no decision has been taken

about the suspension period of plaintiff which was from

1.8.1993 to 15.3.1994 which wes resent by Chief

Administrador, Panchkula. PW2 Sat N Narain arain Sharma also stated

that according to service book one additional increment has

already been given to the plaintiff vide resolution dated

14.10.1992 and now the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any

other additional increment. Also plaintiff is not eentitled ntitled to be

placed among first higher standard scale of pay. PW2 Sat

Narain Sharma also stated that the decision about the

suspension period of the plaintiff taken by the marketing board

would be followed by the market committee, Julana and action

would be taken against the plaintiff accordingly. Learned

counsel for the plaintiff also relied upon Rai Kumar Vs. State of

Haryana (P.H.D.) 1997(3) S.C.T., wherein it was held that

"where the employee is reinstated pending enquiry without

prejudice to enquiry, his annual increments and salary for the

suspension period cannot be withheld merely on the ground

that an enquiry is contemplated against him."

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7. Learned counsel for the defendant submitted that DW2

Partap Singh in his statement stated that additional in increment crement

is given after completion of 8 years service in satisfactory

manner but enquiry regarding completion of 8 years of

satisfactory service of the plaintiff is still pending but he also

admitted that except the allegation that the plaintiff had

misused the market committee tractor without any permission

and violated the Government employees conduct Rules 1966, no

other dis-satisfaction isfaction was ever observed in the service of the

plaintiff and denied ed that they had stopped the pay and

increment of the plaintiff ff in order to hara harass him. He stated that

it is correct that the plaintiff is the employee of market

committee, Julana and he cannot be transferred anywhere as

such. On perusal of oral and documentary evidence adduced, I

am of the opinion that DW1 Partap SSingh ingh himself stated that

except the allegation framed against the plaintiff on account of

which he was suspended from 4.8.

4.8.1993 1993 to 15.3.1994, no other

dissatisfaction satisfaction was ever observed in the service of the plaintiff.

Therefore, it cannot be said that the pplaintiff laintiff has not rendered

the satisfactory service of 8 years continuously. This issue

regarding payment of salary and allowances for the suspension

period from 4.8.1993 to 15.3.1994 alongwith all the arrears

goes in favour of plaintiff and against the def defendant.

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ISSUE No. 2.

8. Learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that from the

evidence of DW1 Partap Singh, it is evident that the plaintiff

has completed 8 years of satisfactory service. During 1980 to

1988 no complaint was ever levelled against him. It is true that

the plaintiff ff was suspended on 4.8.1993 but it was only on the

ground that the plaintiff had misused the tractor of the market

committee, Julana and as such violated the Government ment

employees conduct rules. But Chief Administrator, Panchkula

reinstated the plaintiff after fter setting aside the order of market

committee, Julana and directed the market committee, Julana

to start fresh enquiry against the plaintiff but after that order no

action has been taken against the plaintiff till now. Learned

counsel for the defendant submitted that plaintiff completed 8

years of satisfactory service in 1988 but what was plaintiff

doing till the filing of the present suit on 22.1.1977. Learned

counsel for the defendant submitted that the claim of the

plaintiff regarding additional incre increment ment after completing 8

years of service in 1988 is clearly time barred because he

should have filed the suit for the said purpose before 1997

because by the Haryana Government policy of 1992 plaintiff

had become entitled to claim additional increment on the t

ground of 8 years of service. Learned counsel for the defendant

relied upon State of Punjab Vs. Babu Singh, Head Constable

(P&H) 1996(2) S.C. T. page 91, Punjab State Vs. Darshan

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Kumar, S.C. 1996(2) S.C. T. page 208, wherein it was held that

whose orderss of stoppage of increment are challenged after

expiry of 3 years, they cannot be quashed and Article 113 of

Limitation Act is attracted. Thus, in view of the authorities cited

above, the claim of the plaintiff that he is entitled to additional

increment on n the ground of completion of 8 years of service

vide Haryana Government policy of 1992 is clearly time

barred. Thus, this issue goes in favour of defendant and against

the plaintiff.

ISSUE No. 3.

Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the plaint plaintiff iff is

entitled to be placed in first higher standard scale of pay w.e.f.

1.1.1994 for having completed 10 years of service before

31.12.1993 as per Haryana Government policy. He stated that

the plaintiff had made representation on 29.5.1995 which is

Ex.P5 which was received in the office of defendant vide diary

No.58 dated 6.6.1995 but the defendant deliberately ignored the

same and did not concede to the request of the plaintiff.

Leerned counsel for the defendant submitted that there is no

law that a person on should be given both the benefits, first on

completion of 8 years of service and second on completion of

10 years of service, he can claim only one benefit. Learned

counsel for the defendant referred to Section 31 of Punjab

Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961, whereby the suit

should be brought within six months from the date of accrual of

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cause of action and as such, this relief is also time barred

Learned counsel for the plaintiff in answer sulmitted that in the

written statement defendant has sulmi sulmitted tted that the case of the

plaintiff is pre-mature mature on one side and on the other hand,

learned counsel for the defendant is saying that the claim of the

plaintiff is clearly time barred. He stated that the defendant

should take one attitude whether the suit is pre-matured matured or

whether the sit is time barred. Learned counsel for the plaintiff

submitted that they had made representation regarding the

same on 29.5.1995 but no reply was given to them. At least they

could have stated that the claim of the plaintiff was time barred

but nothing was received by the plaintiff. Learned counsel for

the plaintiff again submitted that as they had made the

represen- tation on 25.9.1995 their claim of being placed

among first higher standard scale of pay is not time barred

because ause cause of action had accrued after representation.

Learned counsel for the defendant submitted that the

suspension order of the plaintiff had been set aside because

regular procedure was not observed by the defendant and it

was not decided on merits. IIn n answer to that question learned

counsel for the plaintiff submitted that it was default of the

defendant and for their default the plaintiff should not be made

to suffer. Also when the defendant vas directed to start enquiry

against the plaintiff, the defendant did not start any enquiry

after the said order also till now. Learned counsel for the

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plaintiff again submitted that before filing of the present suit

they have also issued legal notice under Section 31 of Punjab

Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 through counsel on

10.1.1996. When the period of notice expired and no reply was

received by them then they filed the present suit and as such

their claim is within limitation. In view of the aforesaid

reasoning I am of the confirmed opinion that cla claim im of the

plaintiff of being placed in first higher standard scale of pay

w.e.f. 1.1.1994 for having completed 10 years of service is

within limitation because they had made representation on

29.5.1995 and again they had served legal notice on 10.1.1996.

As such their claim is within period of limitation and this issue

goes in favour of plaintiff and against the defendant.

ISSUE No.8 Relief:

12. In view of aforesaid reasoning the suit of the plaintiff

succeeds and the same is decreed with declaration to the effect

that the plaintiff is entitled to get his full pay and allowances

for the period from 1.8.1993 to 15.3.1994 and he has also

entitled d to be placed in first higher standard scale of pay w.e.f.

1.1.1994 for having completed 10 years of service alongwith

arrears of such benefits with interest at the rate of 18% per

annum with the direction to the defendant for computing and

releasing the due amount, alongwith costs of the suit. Decree-

Decree

sheet be prepared. File ile be consigned to the record room after

due compliance."

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11. Relevant portion of the judgment dated 09.02.1998 passed by the

learned First Appellate Court is reproduced as under:

under:-

"7. Counsel for the appellant has argued that the trial court

wrongly decreed the suit because section 31 of the Act requires

that every suit which may be instituted or against the th

Agricultural Marketing Board or Committee or against any

members or employee thereof, ereof, has to be instituted within six

months from the date of accrual of cause of action and also a

notice showing the intention to file such suit has to be served

before hand. In the present case notice was served but the suit

was filed much beyond the pperiod eriod of limitation as laid down in

section 31(2) of the Act. The said aspect was not considered by

the trial court. So far as denial of increment after completing

eight years of service is concerned, the trial court in any case

rejected the relief to the respondent respondent- plaintiff on the ground of

limitation, but limitation was taken as three years. In any case

taken from all angles the claim of the plaintiff qua said

increment is barred and, therefore, no interference is called for

in the result of issue No.2.

8. As regards issues No.1 and 3 the trial court was also

required to discuss the aspect of limitation as laid down in the

Act. The court while mentioning that the defendant had referred

to section 31 of the Act, all the same held that the defendants

did nott stick to one defence because at one time they were

asserting that the suit was pre pre-mature mature and at the other time they

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were asserting that it was time barred. This, however, was no

ground for holding that the suit was within limitation despite

specific law laid down in section 31 of the Act. It was for the

trial court to see the aspect of limitation even if a particular

defence to that effect had not been taken. Once section 31 was

brought to its notice, it was bound on duty of the court to see

whether such provisions of law did or did not apply to the

present case and whether the suit was within limitation. The

defendants had taken the plea of pre pre- maturity on the ground

that the matter of suspension was still not finally decided. That

aspect had nothing to do with the right of the plaintiff to file the

suit which he had to file in accordance with the provisions of

section 31 of the Act. He issued a notice under the said Act

being aware that such a notice was required. He thus, cannot

say that he was not aware re that the suit was to be filed within six

months from the date of cause of action. Even otherwise,

ignorance of law is no excuse.

9. It has come on record in the evidence of the defendants by

way of the statements of the official witnesses that the matter matt

has not yet been finally decided and that final report is still

awaited because the matter has been referred to the Board

concerned for finalization. That way the ple plea of the defendants

was justified that the suit was pre pre-matured.

matured. Unless the matter is

finally inally decided by the department, the plaintiff could not have

come to the court. Thus, relief granted to him under issues No.

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1 and 3 was also not justified because his suit w wass not filed as

per the provisions of Section 31 of the Act and also because the

matter has not yet been finally decided against him. The

findings on issues No. 1 and 3 are revised holding the same

against the respondent-plaintiff plaintiff for the reasons mentioned

above."

ANALYSIS OF RECORD

12. The admitted fact in this case is that Partap Singh, who was examined

as DW-1 1 stated that the plaintiff/appellant completed 08 years of satisfactory

service. He further stated that during the period from 1982 to 1989 no complaint

was ever recorded against the plaintiff/appellant /appellant. The appellant ppellant was suspended on

04.08.1993 on the ground that he had misused the tractor of Market Committee,

Julana and as such violated the Government Employees Conduct Rules but the

Chief Administrator, Panchkula reinstated the appellant after setting aside tthe he order

of Marketing Committee, Julana and directed the Market Committee to start a fresh

inquiry against the plaintiff/appellant plaintiff but after that no action was taken against the

appellant. The appellant retired from service on 31.12.2016.

13. A perusal of o the record further shows that the learned First Appellate

Court on the one hand decided issue No.1 against the appellant on the ground that

the matter regarding the suspension period of the appellant was not finally decided

whereas on the other hand it has been held that suit was premature since the final

report of the appellant/respondent was awaited. Learned First Appellate Court

further held that the relief granted to the appellant under Issue No.1 & 3 was not

justified because his suit was not filed as per the provisions of Section 31 of the

Act and also because the matter was not finally decided against him.

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14. This finding of the First Appellate Court is not acceptable to this

Court on the ground that on one hand, he has decided issues on merit merits and on the

other hand he is holding that the suit was barred by limitation and further that it

was premature and rather three contradictory observations/ observations/decisions decisions are taken in

one appeal.

15. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The judgment an and d decree

dated 09.02.1998 passed by the First Appellate Court is set aside and the judgment

and decree dated 19.09.1997 passed by the learned trial Court is upheld.

16. Decree sheet be drawn accordingly.

Decree-sheet

17. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of..

October 22,, 2024                                 (SUDEEPTI
                                                   SUDEEPTI SHARMA
                                                            SHARMA)
A.Kaundal                                               JUDGE

        Whether speaking/non-speaking
                speaking/non speaking : Speaking
        Whether reportable             : Yes/No
                                          es/No




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