Punjab-Haryana High Court
Sandeep And Others vs State Of Haryana And Others on 13 November, 2024
Bench: G.S. Sandhawalia, Meenakshi I. Mehta
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148314-DB
247-9
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CWP No.14219 of 2022 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 13.11.2024
Sandeep & others
...Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others
...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S. SANDHAWALIA
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI I. MEHTA
Present:- Mr. Sandeep Sharma, Advocate,
for the petitioners.
Mr. Ankur Mittal, Additional AG, Haryana with
Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana.
Mr. Ankur Mittal, Advocate with
Ms. Kushaldeep Kaur Manchanda, Advocate,
for the respondent-HSVP.
****
G.S. SANDHAWALIA J. (Oral)
The prayer in the present writ petition, filed by the six
petitioners under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, is for
seeking release of the acquired land on the strength of the Policy dated
14.09.2018 (Annexure P-10) issued under Section 101-A of the Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short 'the Act of 2013').
2. The petitioners are owners of the land bearing khasra
No.33//20 (5-8), 33//21 (3-0) as share-holders in village Kanhai District
Gurugram (for short 'the land in question'). The land in question was
1 of 9
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148314-DB
sought to be acquired by the State vide notification dated 20.04.1990
(Annexure P-2) issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(for short, 'the Act of 1894') and subsequent notification dated 18.04.1991
(Annexure P-3) under Section 6 of the Act of 1894. Apparently, the Award
was also passed on 23.03.1993 (Annexure P-4) whereby the land of the
petitioners was sought to be acquired for the public purposes, i.e
residential, commercial and institutional area and recreational zone and
open space in Sectors 44, 45 and 46 at Gurgaon and the land stood vested
in the State under Section 16 of the Act of 1894. The claim of the
petitioners is that they did not receive any compensation and they are in
physical possession of the land in question. The petitioners had constructed
the residential houses and shops in the land in question prior to the issuance
of the notification under Section 4 (Annexure P-2) of the Act of 1894 and
they are residing in the said residential houses. On merits, efforts have been
made to build up the case on the ground of discrimination without having
challenged the acquisition on merits initiated way back in 1993 and the
vesting of the land in the State under Section 16 of the Act of 1894.
3. It has been mentioned in the written statement filed on behalf
of respondents No.1 and 2 that the petitioners did not file objections under
Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 and the land, at the time of notification
under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, was found to be vacant, therefore, the
same was recommended for acquisition. It has further been averred that the
compensation of the entire acquired land was Rs.12,27,47,937.60/- had
been tendered at the time of announcement of the Award. A sum of
Rs.11,20,50,371.55/- had already been collected by the majority of the
landowners and only compensation Rs.1,06,97,566/- has not been taken by
2 of 9
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148314-DB
the landowners including the petitioners and the compensation amount of
Rs.1,95,022/- has already been sent to the ADJ Court under Section 31(1)
of the Act of 1894. The physical possession of the land had been taken vide
Rapat Roznamcha No.425 dated 23.03.1993 and the same was handed over
to Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran (HSVP). Therefore, the acquisition
proceedings stands completed for all intents and purposes and the land
stands vested in the beneficiary department, i.e HSVP.
4. The essentiality and viability aspect has been repelled by
making common averments by the State in its reply and the same reads as
under:-
"15. That it is respectfully submitted that in the case in
hand, the land surrounding the land in question is
acquired land and is in the possession of the answering
respondent. The land involved in the petition affects
the planning of Institution State. This clearly shows that
the land in question has been duly planned and is very
much essential for achieving the public purpose for
which the land was acquired. True copy of the layout
plan is annexed herewith as Annexure R-1 for the kind
perusal of this Hon'ble Court."
5. We have also examined the layout plan (Annexure R-1) in
question which would go on to show that the location of the land is very
much suitable for the institutional site. It is also pertinent to notice that on
earlier occasion, the petitioners had filed CWP No.24003 of 2016 titled as
Udey Singh and Others vs. State of Haryana & Others in which
petitioners Bishamber and Uday Singh (petitioners No.2 and 6 in the
present petition) were party including successor-in-interest petitioners
No.1, 3 and 4 of Charan Singh and only petitioner No.5-Sunil Yadav (in
3 of 9
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148314-DB
this petition) is the solitary reaper in this case. The order dated 13.12.2022
passed in the earlier round of litigation is as under:-
"It is informed that the validity of the acquisition
proceedings, questioned in the present petition, has
been upheld by this Court vide its judgment dated
31.08.2022 & 27.11.2020 in CWP-14184-2016 (Sanjay
and others v. State of Haryana and others) & CWP-
20284-2020 (Virender Singh and another v. State of
Haryana and others), respectively. Further, the Special
Leave Petition (C) No.21440 & 8342 of 2022, filed
against the said judgments, have since been dismissed
by the Supreme Court, vide orders dated 02.12.2022 &
07.11.2022, respectively.
Learned counsel appearing for the parties are ad
idem that the issue involved in the present case is
squarely covered by the decisions referred to above.
Accordingly, learned counsel for the petitioner(s)
submits that in such circumstances, he may be
permitted to withdraw the petition.
Ordered accordingly.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands
disposed of."
6. Learned counsel for the State submits that in 'Raghubir Singh
and another vs. State of Haryana and others', (2022) 4 SCC 728 it was
held by the Apex Court that the issue of non-viability or non-essentiality of
the land is to be decided by the Government as such and that in case, it
chooses to de-notify certain land, it is for the State to decide as such. In
such circumstances, the claim, at this belated stage, is not liable to be
entertained. Even the representation dated 01.06.2020 (Annexure P-11)
was moved by the petitioners for release of their land as per the Policy
4 of 9
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148314-DB
dated 14.09.2018 (Annexure P-10), much after the judgment dated
06.03.2020 in Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and others,
(2020) 8 SCC 129. The said aspect, thereafter, was re-considered by the
Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.16421 of 2021 'Ram Swaroop (dead)
through LRs & another Vs. State of Haryana and others' and the Apex
Court, thus, clarified that Section 101-A of the Act of 2017 does not give a
vested right to the landowner to seek denotification. It is not for this Court
to sit over the opinion of the competent authority, who have to ensure
effective town planning and whether the land is required, which stood
vested in the State once the Award was passed on 23.03.1993. Claim as
such is only on the ground that possession continues, which cannot be
sustained, since the petitioner apparently has continued to be in
unauthorized occupation, thereafter. The relevant observations read as
under:-
"8. Section 101-A of 2013 Act (as inserted in State of
Haryana) gives liberty to the State Government to denotify
such land, on such terms, as considered expedient by the
State Government, including the payment of compensation
on account of damages, if any, sustained by the landowner
due to such acquisition. Section 101-A is an enabling
provision with the State Government to denotify the land
vested with the State if it finds that any public purpose for
which land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 becomes unviable or nonessential. In other words,
the power is with the State Government on its satisfaction
that the land acquired has become unviable or non-
essential. No landowner has a vested right to assert that
the land acquired has become unviable or non- essential
mainly because the landowner continued to be in
possession by virtue of an interim order passed by the
High Court.
5 of 9
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148314-DB
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
11. The claim of the appellants for release of land on
account of Section 24(2) had been rejected by the State
Government on 12.09.2016. The writ petition against the
said order stands dismissed on 12.10.2020. Thus, the
present appeal is merely an attempt to continue to be in
possession of the land on one pretext or the other so as to
defeat the public purpose of acquisition of the land for
development and utilization of residential, commercial
and institutional area, Sector-51, Gurgaon (now
Gurugram). This Court in Raghubir Singh has held that
Section 101-A does not give a vested right to the
landowner to seek denotification or even that upon
denotification, the land in question must return to the
erstwhile owners only. The State Government is at liberty
to pass such order other than release of land in favour of
the landowners. 12. Therefore, the appellants cannot
compel an exercise of power by the State Government in
their favour as the appellants have no vested right to seek
denotification of the land. Consequently, the present
appeal is dismissed."
7. In Civil Appeal No.7634 of 2023 'Nandkishor Babulal
Agrawal Vs. The State of Maharshtra & others' decided on 10.11.2023,
challenge had been raised on the ground that the proceedings had lapsed
and resultantly, it was held that once the land stood vested with the State
authorities, the public purpose of the acquisition can be changed at a later
stage and there is no time limit within which the authorities are expected to
utilize the acquired land. Relevant portion of the said judgment reads as
under:-
"11. In our considered view, the High Court would be
extremely circumspect to issue a mandamus in the exercise
6 of 9
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148314-DB
of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, directing to release a lawfully acquired land
only on the premise that such land has not been utilized for
the public purpose for which it was acquired. There is no
gainsaying that once the land vests in the State or its
authorities, the 'public purpose' of its acquisition can be
changed at a later stage. All that is required is that such
land should be utilized for public purposes only. In fact,
there cannot be a time limit within which the authorities
are expected to utilize the acquired land. The
Municipalities or such other agencies are expected to have
long-term plans for regulated development of urban areas
and for that purpose, certain pockets of land are required
to be kept vacant as reserve pool to cater the future
needs."
8. Rather, observations in the earlier decision of the Apex Court
would be directly applicable in Leela Wanti and others vs. State of
Haryana and others, (2012) 1 SCC 66 wherein also, Para No. 493 of the
Land Administration Manual and Standing Order No.28 was referred to. It
was also noticed that apart from the gap of three decades between the
issuance of the notifications in the year 1976 and the filing of the writ
petition in 2007 would also invoke doctrine of laches for negating the
challenge to the acquisition of land. Accordingly, it was held that the State
cannot be debarred from using the acquired land for any other public
purpose and such an interpretation would be contrary to the language of
Section 16 of the Act. Relevant portion of Leela Wanti case (supra) reads
thus:
"16. A reading of the above reproduced Paragraph of the
Land Administration Manual nowhere suggests that the
7 of 9
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148314-DB
State Government is duty-bound to restore the acquired
land to the owners after the purpose of acquisition is
accomplished. It merely mentions that as a matter of grace
the Government is usually willing to restore agricultural
and pastoral land to the owners on their refunding the
amount of compensation. If Paragraph 493 is read in the
manner suggested by the learned counsel for the appellants
then in all the cases the acquired land will have to be
returned to the owners irrespective of the time gap between
the date of acquisition and the date on which the purpose
of acquisition specified in Section 4 is achieved and the
Government will not be free to use the acquired land for
any other public purpose. Such an interpretation would
also be contrary to the language of Section 16 of the Act, in
terms of which the acquired land vests in the State
Government free from all encumbrances and the law laid
down by this Court that lands acquired for a particular
public purpose can be utilised for any other public
purpose."
9. Interestingly, the instant petition was filed on 05.07.2022
during the pendency of the earlier petition and is not maintainable in view
of the observations of the Apex Court in Indore Development Authority vs.
Manoharlal and others, (2020) 8 SCC 129 pertaining to the description of a
relentless litigant.
10. Resultantly, keeping in view the above, the State has already
given its inclination regarding the viability of the land in question for being
developed as institutional site and the land stands surrounded by acquired
land. We then do not find any plausible reason to issue the afore-said
direction for the relief which is, now, claimed. The claim as noticed in the
present case would be covered by Ram Swaroop's case (supra) that it is
only an attempt to hold on to the land. Any sympathy to be shown on
8 of 9
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148314-DB
account of the construction raised necessarily has to be repelled as it is a
chance taken by the landowners to hold on inspite of the fact that they
never had challenged the acquisition proceedings but have raised
construction thereafter being share-holders of a larger chunk of land and
the other co-sharers having not raised any such grievance. In such
circumstances, we have no other option but to dismiss the present writ
petition. We refrain ourselves from imposing exemplary costs which this
Court would have resorted to in the normal circumstances.
11. We order accordingly. However, the petitioners are granted
time till 31.03.2025 to vacate the land in dispute. After the said date, State
will be free to take over the possession of the acquired property as the
status of the petitioners is now only of encroachers.
12. All the pending application(s) stand disposed of accordingly.
(G.S. SANDHAWALIA)
JUDGE
November 13, 2024 (MEENAKSHI I. MEHTA)
seema JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes
Whether Reportable: No
9 of 9
