Punjab-Haryana High Court
Ram Dulari vs State Of Punjab Through Secretary, ... on 6 November, 2024
Author: Lisa Gill
Bench: Lisa Gill
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:144624-DB
1
CM-6532-LPA-2024 in/and
LPA-2681-2024
111 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CM-6532-LPA-2024 in/and
LPA-2681-2024
Date of Decision: November 06, 2024
RAM DULARI .....Appellant
Versus
STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS ..... Respondents
CORAM:- HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE LISA GILL
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUKHVINDER KAUR
Present: Mr. Ravi Kant Sharma, Advocate and
Mr. Himanshu Sharma, Advocate for the appellant.
Mr. R.S. Pandher, Sr. DAG, Punjab.
****
LISA GILL, J.
1. This appeal has been filed challenging decision dated 08.11.2013
passed by learned Single Bench in CWP-10300-1993 which was filed by
petitioner alongwith number of others. There is delay of 3964 days in filing
this appeal.
2. Learned counsel for applicant-appellant submits that writ petition
in question was filed by the applicant alongwith 66 other persons. Matter was
heard with another writ petition i.e. CWP-10300-1993. Vide order dated
08.11.2013, CWP-10300-1993 alongwith CWP-7280-1993 filed by present
applicant and others, besides number of other petitions [(total of 70 writ
petitions)] were decided. Learned counsel for applicant submits that applicant
1 of 5
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:144624-DB
CM-6532-LPA-2024 in/and
LPA-2681-2024
retired from service on 31.12.2010. At that time, writ petition was pending
adjudication. Petitioner was never informed about the final outcome of writ
petition and she came to know about decision dated 08.11.2013 on
19.09.2024, when she met some of her colleagues. Immediately thereafter,
applicant took necessary steps and this appeal was filed on 07.10.2024. It is
vehemently argued that there is in effect no delay in filing of the appeal as
applicant was not ever made aware of decision dated 08.11.2013 in the writ
petition filed by her collectively with other persons. Moreover, LPA-199-
2014 arising out of controversy is still pending adjudication. Therefore, this
delay in filing the appeal should be condoned and the applicant should not be
shown the door only on this technicality.
3. Learned counsel for State has, however, opposed this application
while submitting that there is no explanation whatsoever for condonation of
such colossal delay. Dismissal of application as well as appeal is sought.
4. We have heard learned counsel for parties but do not find any
ground for condoning the delay of 3964 days in filing the appeal.
5. Learned counsel for applicant has been at pains to submit that
applicant was never informed about the outcome of the writ petition at any
stage, therefore, there is no question of any negligence on her part and neither
is the delay willful or intentional. Trite it is that the litigant has to be vigilant
and keep track of litigation. In the given circumstances, we do not find any
merit in the argument that applicant was not apprised of the decision of writ
petition filed by her. It was for her to be watchful and circumspect. There is
not even a whisper in the application to suggest that applicant at any point of
time had made any effort to find out the fate of said writ petition filed by her
2 of 5
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:144624-DB
CM-6532-LPA-2024 in/and
LPA-2681-2024
in 1993. Doubtlessly, in case an applicant is able to show sufficient and
reasonable cause, length of delay by itself, may not be material but delay
cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in
Union of India and Anr. versus Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through
his LR 2024(2) RCR (Civil) 571 referred to its earlier judgment in Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy
& Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 in para 33 as under:-
"33. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing
Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others,
(2013) 12 SCC 649, this Court made the following observations:
"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly
be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented,
non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for
condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise
injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in
their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to
the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied
in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the
technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled
for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation
of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or
litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof
should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because
3 of 5
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:144624-DB
CM-6532-LPA-2024 in/and
LPA-2681-2024
the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the
conception of 23 reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally
unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a
delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of
prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted.
That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the
second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating
to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a
total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds
urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant
not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with
fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the
technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of
judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and
not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a
collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines
taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be
drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner
harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone
4 of 5
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:144624-DB
CM-6532-LPA-2024 in/and
LPA-2681-2024
delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on
merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be
dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual
philosophy which is basically subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard
being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious
effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the
adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate
institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-
serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be
exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course,
within legal parameters."
6. It was held that reasonable diligence has to be forthcoming on the
part of the litigant. However, in the present case, we do not find any
explanation leave alone, sufficient or reasonable explanation, to explain the
delay in filing the present appeal.
7. No other argument has been addressed.
8. Accordingly, application seeking condonation of delay is
dismissed. Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed as being time barred.
(LISA GILL)
JUDGE
(SUKHVINDER KAUR)
November 06, 2024 JUDGE
Rts
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
5 of 5
