Punjab-Haryana High Court
Sunder Lal And Others vs State Of Haryana And Others on 7 May, 2024
Author: Vikas Bahl
Bench: Vikas Bahl
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:062955
CWP-10471-2024 -1- 2024:PHHC:062955
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
(108)
CWP-10471-2024
Date of decision: - 07.05.2024
Sunder Lal and others
....Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana and others
.....Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS BAHL
Present:- Mr. Bhisham Kumar Majoka, Advocate,
for the petitioners.
Ms. Rajni Gupta, Additional Advocate General, Haryana.
****
VIKAS BAHL, J. (ORAL)
1. Present petition has been filed under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari to
quash the impugned order dated 17.03.2023 (Annexure P-3) passed by
respondent No.2, with a further prayer for issuance of a writ in the nature
of mandamus directing the respondents to re-instate/re-enroll the
petitioners on the post of Home-Guard.
2. Brief facts of the present case are that the petitioners had
joined as Home Guards and as per their case, they were relieved from
service during the period from 2013 to 2018 and thereafter, they had
given a legal notice dated 21.03.2022 (Annexure P-1) and had filed a
petition bearing CWP-29965-2022, which was disposed of by a Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 23.12.2022 (Annexure P-2)
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with a direction to the respondents to take decision on the legal notice
dated 21.03.2022 (Annexure P-1) and pass a speaking order on the same.
In the said order, it was specifically stated that the same was being passed
without commenting on the merits of the case.
3. In pursuance of the said order, a speaking order dated
17.03.2023 (Annexure P-3), which is challenged in the present writ
petition, was passed. A perusal of the said order (Annexure P-3) would
show that it had been observed in the same that the petitioners had joined
their temporary duties voluntarily at various times and the concerned
department had already paid the amount to which the petitioners were
entitled and nothing was due towards the petitioners. A specific reference
was made to the number of days/months for which each of the petitioners
had worked. The relevant portion of the order, in which the said details
have been mentioned, is reproduced herein below: -
"According to record the aforesaid petitioners had performed
their duties on the following dates: -
1. Sh. Sunder Lal provided his temporary services to the
concerned department from 03.07.2010 to 07.07.2010, 01.09.2010 to
30.09.2010, 01.10.2010 to 31.10.2010, 10.10.2012 to 15.11.2012,
03.10.2023 to 11.11.2013.
2. Sh. Titu Singh from 14.01.2016 to 17.01.2016 in
Panchayat Election.
3. Sh. Vir Singh from 07.01.2016 to 10.01.2016 in
Panchayat Election.
4. Sh. Lalaram from 05.10.2009 to 31.10.2009,
01.11.2009 to 30.11.2009, 01.12.2009 to 15.12.2009, 01.06.2010 to
30.06.2010, 03.07.2010 to 07.07.2010, 01.07.2012 to 31.07.2012,
10.10.2012 to 15.11.2012, 01.07.2013 to 31.07.2013, 01.08.2013 to
31.08.2013, 03.10.2013 to 11.11.2013, 11.10.2014 to 15.10.2014.
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5. Sh. Jagan from 17.05.2010 to 20.05.2010, 03.06.2010 to
06.06.2010, 10.06.2010 to 13.06.2010, 30.09.2010 to 01.10.2010,
01.03.2011 to 31.03.2011, 01.04.2011 to 30.04.2011, 08.07.2012 to
17.07.2012, 10.10.2012 to 15.11.2012, 01.01.2013 to 31.01.2013.
6. Sh. Deepak from 07.01.2016 to 10.01.2016 in Panchayat
Election.
7. Nafeesh from 07.01.2016 to 10.01.2016 in Panchyat Election.
8. Javed from 07.01.2016 to 10.01.2016 in Panchayat Election.
9. Sajid from 07.01.2016 to 10.01.2016 in Panchayat Election
as per concerned office record and as per record.
10. No record of the Sh. Tejram has been found in the concerned
office by the name. So it can be said that Sh. Tejram did not join or
provide his services to the concerned department in any manner"
A perusal of the above would show that petitioners No.3, 7,
8, 9 and 10 had only worked for a few days. Even petitioner No.2 was
stated to have worked only from 14.01.2016 to 17.01.2016. It was further
observed that the home guards is a voluntary organization and almost all
ranks upto company level are volunteers and home guards are only
entitled for duty allowance as per the Act, Rules and Regulations
applicable and that the petitioners were never appointed/recruited by the
concerned department on permanent basis and their duties were
temporary. Reliance in the order was placed upon a judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in case bearing Civil Appeal No.2759 of 2015,
titled as "Grah Rakshak, Home Guards Wel. Asso. Vs. State of H.P. and
Ors.", to reject the case of the petitioners. It is the said order, which has
been challenged in the present writ petition.
4. A perusal of the impugned order would show that none of the
petitioners were stated to have worked beyond the year 2016. In para
No.2 of the writ petition, the dates of relieving of the petitioners from
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service are mentioned as below:-
Candidates Name Date of Relieving
Lalaram 2015
Jagan 2013
Sunder Lal 2013
Tejram 2014
Titu 2018
Vir Singh 2018
Deepak 2018
Nafees 2018
Javed 2018
Sajid 2018
5. No document has been annexed by learned counsel for the
petitioners to show that any of the petitioners had worked after 2016.
Even assuming some of the petitioners had worked up to 2018, then also,
there is an unexplained delay in sending the first legal notice dated
21.03.2022 as well as filing the first writ petition, which was filed at the
end of 2022 and also the present writ petition. No justifiable reason has
been given in approaching the Court after several years of the date of
relieving of each of the petitioners and thus, the present writ petition
deserves to be dismissed on the said ground alone.
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a
petition filed after an unexplained lapse of time should not be entertained
and mere filing of repeated representations or even directions to decide
said representations would not give rise to a fresh cause of action.
Reference in this respect may be made to the judgment passed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in "Chennai Metropolitan Water
Supply and Sewerage Board and others v. T.T. Murali Babu" reported
as 2014(4) SCC 108 in which one of the grounds for setting aside the
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judgment of the High Court was the fact that the petitioner therein had
approached the High Court after a delay of 4 years and it was observed by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it was the duty of the Court to scrutinize
whether such an enormous delay is to be ignored and the Hon'ble
Supreme Court came to the conclusion that interference by the High
Court after a lapse of 4 years was unjustified and that the writ petition
should not have been entertained.
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case "State of
Uttaranchal and another v. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and
others" reported as 2013(12) SCC 179 had observed that repeated
representations or reply to such representations cannot furnish a fresh
cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim and that the issue of
limitation or delay should be considered with reference to the original
cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order was
passed in compliance of the Court's directions and neither a court's
direction to consider a representation issued without examining the
merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will
extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches.
8. In "Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam and Anr. v. Jaswant Singh
& Anr." reported as 2006(11) SCC 464, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had
rejected the claim of the persons who were guilty of delay and had
approached the Courts after some years and had sought to raise the plea
that similarly situated persons, who had filed the writ petitions earlier,
had been granted the relief.
9. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "State of
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Uttaranchal's case (supra)" has further been referred to in the latest
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in State of West Bengal
Vs. Debabrata Tiwari and Others reported as 2023-SCC-Online-SC-
219. The relevant portion of the same is reproduced hereinbelow:-
"37. Whether the above doctrine of laches which dis-entitled
grant of relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle
the grant of relief to a person by the High Court in the exercise of its
power under Article 226 of our Constitution came up for consideration
before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M. R.
Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450. In
the said case, it was regarded as a principle that dis-entitled a party
for grant of relief from a High Court in the exercise of its
discretionary power under A Article 226Â of the Constitution.
38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this
Court restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in
the following words:
"9. ... the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not
ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and
the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the
Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High
Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its
writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is premised on a
number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a
belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to
cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train
new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after
unreasonable delay. it may have the effect of inflicting not only
hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It
was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights
in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the
High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such
jurisdiction."
xxx xxx xxx
40. Further, simply because the Respondents-Writ Petitioners
submitted their applications to the relevant authority in the year 2005-
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2006, it cannot be said that they diligently perused the matter and had
not slept over their rights. In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to
the decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh
Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, wherein the following observations
were made:
"19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that
even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of
representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it
does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of
action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission
of representation to the competent authority does not arrest
time."
10. It would also be relevant to take note of the judgment of the
Hon'ble Division Bench dated 07.07.2022 passed in LPA-1088-2018
titled as "State of Punjab and others vs. Shingara Singh and others"
and other connected matters. The said case was with respect to the Home
guard Volunteers who had worked in the State of Punjab and in the said
case two primary issues were framed. The first being with respect to the
maintainability of the writ petitions at belated stage after several years on
account of legal notices having been served and the directions having
been issued by the Court to consider the same and as to whether the claim
would stand barred by delay and laches or not. The second issue which
was framed was on the aspect as to whether the Home Guards have any
indefeasible right to be recalled for duty on account of certain persons
having been taken back or recalled. The Hon'ble Division Bench after
considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various
judgments including that of C.Jacob vs. Director of Geology & Min.
Indus. Est. and another reported as 2008 (10) SCC 115 as well as in the
State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava reported
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as (2015) 1 SCC 347 observed that the litigation had been initiated at a
belated stage and after considering the said aspect set aside the judgment
of the learned Single Judge who had entertained and allowed the writ
petitions inspite of delay. The relevant portion of the said judgment is
reproduced hereinbelow:-
"2. The present set of appeals arise out of the three different
judgments passed by three different learned Single Judges. The relief
has been granted vide judgment dated 23.02.2017 in CWP No. 23475
of 2015, Jarnail Singh vs. State of Punjab and others. Similarly, in
CWP No. 22640 of 2011, Shingara Singh and others vs. State of
Punjab and others dated 25.01.2018, the relief has been granted to
the extent that the learned Single Judge has directed the State to
consider the case of the petitioners in terms of cases of Shingara Singh
and Paramjit Kumar, who had been recalled on duty as Home Guards
Volunteers. The relief has been declined in CWP No. 19229 of 2018,
Joginder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and others alongwith
17 other cases on 06.06.2019.
4. Similarly, CWP Nos. 34587, 21455, 33866, 33579, 33572,
33571,33565, 33514, 33587, 33508, 32987, 21442, 12888 of 2019 and
672 of 2020 are also placed before us wherein, relief is sought for
reemployment as Punjab Home Guards.....
xxx xxx xxx
5. A perusal of the pleadings in CWP No. 22640 of 2011, out of
which LPA No. 1088 of 2018 has arisen, would go on to show that the
prayer was for absorbing and re-employing the 9 writ petitioners as
Home Guards Volunteers as they claimed that they have served for 1
year to 10 years from 1992 and also as Special Police Officers. Their
services had been terminated without following proper procedure and
without serving any notice....
xxx xxx xxx
11. Counsels for the Home Guards-writ petitioners have
accordingly argued that they were only seeking parity with persons who
have been recalled and, therefore, the orders of the learned Single Judge
allowing the writ petitions could not be said to be suffering from any
illegality which would warrant interference. Reliance was placed upon
the judgment in Sengara Singh and others vs. The State of Punjab and
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others, 1983 (4) SCC 225, wherein, reinstatement had been directed of
the Members of the Police Force.
12. Keeping in view the above, the following two issues
would arise for consideration:
(i) As to whether the writ petitions were maintainable at the
belated stage after 15 years, only on account of legal notices
having been served and directions issued by this Court to
consider the same and whether the claim stood barred by delay
and laches?
(ii) That on account of certain persons being taken back or
recalled would entitle the persons employed earlier as Home
Guards to have any indefeasible right as such to be recalled for
duty?
xxx xxx xxx
15. A co-ordinate Bench, of which one of us was a member,
G.S. Sandhawalia, J., had dismissed LPA No. 73 of 2021, Jagjit
Singh vs. State of Punjab and another on 30.11.2021 wherein also,
there was absence from 1994 after a service of less than 3 years. It had
been noticed that the order under challenge passed by the
Commandant General, Punjab Home Guard was dated 27.07.2020
whereby, the legal notice dated 06.11.2019 was being rejected in view
of the orders passed by the writ Court in CWP No. 984 of 2020 on
17.03.2020. The same was dismissed on 30.11.2021 while also taking
into account the judgment of the Apex Court in C. Jacob vs. Director
of Geology & Min. Indus. Est. and another, 2008 (10) SCC 115 that
the cause of action does not get revived. The relevant portion of the
judgment reads thus:-
"6. Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is
terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the
termination. But nearly two decades later, say in the year 2000,
he decides to challenge the termination. He is aware that any
such challenge would be rejected at the threshold on the ground
of delay (if the application is made before Tribunal) or on the
ground of delay and laches (if a writ petition is filed before a
High Court). Therefore, instead of challenging the termination,
he gives a representation requesting that he may be taken back to
service. Normally, there will be considerable delay in replying
such representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage of
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this position, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition
before the Tribunal/High Court seeking a direction to the
employer to consider and dispose of his representation. The
Tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or dispose of such
applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to the
other side), without examining the matter on merits, with a
direction to consider and dispose of the representation. The
courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen
deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that
a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation
does not involve any `decision' on rights and obligations of
parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction
to `consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the
exemployee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account
of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to `consider'. If
the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee
files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the
original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of
the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer
is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant
of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High
Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring
the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to
examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the
bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored.
7. Every representation to the government for relief, may
not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters
which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected
on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim.
In regard to representations unrelated to the department, the
reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the
department or to inform the appropriate department.
Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by
seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations,
cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead
claim.
8. When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to
consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee
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(person directed) examines the matter on merits, being under the
impression that failure to do may amount to disobedience. When
an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or
representation, in compliance with direction of the court or
tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor
amount to some kind of acknowledgment of a jural relationship'
to give rise to a fresh cause of action.
9. When a government servant abandons service to take up
alternative employment or to attend to personal affairs, and does
not bother to send any letter seeking leave or letter of resignation
or letter of voluntary retirement, and the records do not show that
he is treated as being in service, he cannot after two decades,
represent that he should be taken back to duty. Nor can such
employee be treated as having continued in service, thereby
deeming the entire period as qualifying service for purpose of
pension. That will be a travesty of justice. Where an employee
unauthorizedly absents himself and suddenly appears after 20
years and demands that he should be taken back and approaches
court, the department naturally will not or may not have any
record relating to the employee at that distance of time. In such
cases, when the employer fails to produce the records of the
enquiry and the order of dismissal/ removal, court cannot draw
an adverse inference against the employer for not producing
records, nor direct reinstatement with backwages for 20 years,
ignoring the cessation of service or the lucrative alternative
employment of the employee. Misplaced sympathy in such matters
will encourage indiscipline, lead to unjust enrichment of the
employee at fault and result in drain of public exchequer. Many a
time there is also no application of mind as to the extent of
financial burden, as a result of a routine order for back-wages."
xxx xxx xxx
17. The said principles, thus, would squarely apply to the
present litigation which has been initiated at a belated stage and
both the learned Single Judges have failed to advert to this fact. It
is also settled principle that Article 14 of the Constitution of India
does not apply in the negative context and there is no negative
equality and a wrong benefit cannot be allowed to multiply.
Reliance can be placed upon judgment of the Apex Court in R.
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Muthukumar and others vs. The Chairman and Managing
Director, Tangedco and others, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 140 wherein,
it was noticed that certain set of persons were already in Court
and a compromise was effected on the basis of which, claiming
parity, other petitions had been filed. Therefore, while rejecting
the said claim of parity, the SLP was dismissed where the benefit
had not been granted and allowed where the benefit had been
granted by setting aside the judgments of the Madras High
Court."
xxx xxx xxx
20. The Apex Court in State of Gujarat vs. Akshay
Amrit Lal Thakkar, 2006 SCC (L&S) 290, was examining the
issue of disengagement of the Home Guards. It was accordingly
held that the services were as such honourary and no civil
consequences were involved. A similar view was also taken in
Jiban Krishna Modal and others vs. State of West Bengal and
others, (2015) 12 SCC 74, wherein, also similar observations
came and it was held that the organization of Home Guards is a
voluntary organization and they could not be regularized in
service. Reliance was placed upon the earlier view in State of
Manipur vs. Ksh. Moirangninthou Singh and others, (2007) 10
SCC 544, that it was a voluntary citizen force and the view taken
by the Delhi High Court in Rajesh Mishra vs. Government of
NCT of Delhi, 2002 (4) SCT 249, was approved that there was
no master servant relationship and they are not civil servants.
The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the said case
had come to the conclusion that Home Guards could not be said
to be civil servants and applications could not be entertained
under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
xxx xxx xxx
22. In such circumstances, we are of the considered
opinion, by answering the questions above that the writ petitions
were reviving a dead cause which was burdened with delay and
laches and were not liable to be entertained by the learned Single
Judges. The view taken by the learned Single Judge in CWP No.
19229 of 2018, Joginder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab,
decided on 06.06.2019, is a more acceptable view since there is
no legal right as such of the writ petitioners whereby they could
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ask for consideration for being recalled as held by the Apex Court
that they are volunteers and not regular employees of the State. In
the absence of any such legal right, the learned Single Judges
were not correct in issuing the necessary directions. As noticed
above, the two learned Single Judges as such, while deciding the
cases in Jarnail Singh and Shingara Singh, have not taken into
consideration the status as such of the Home Guards and their
entitlements and their right as such to claim recall specially after
a period of over two decades. However, the said respondent has
also passed an order in three cases as such considering the claim
and rejecting the same on 31.05.2017 (Annexure R-2) which has
apparently also not been challenged. Even otherwise, we are of
the considered opinion that the said order has kept in mind the
factum of the status of the writ petitioners as such and even on
merits otherwise not found them fit as such to perform the duties
of constabulary having been out of service for the last two
decades. The public interest element has also been kept in mind
and the fact that they had absented on their own account and duly
discharged.
23. In such circumstances, we are of the considered
opinion that the reasons given as such are well justified and,
therefore, the writ petitions filed for similar relief are also not
liable to be allowed.
24. Accordingly, LPA Nos.1088, 1089, 1885, 1886 and
1887 of 2018 of the State are allowed and LPA Nos. 1567, 1571,
1573, 1599, 1624, 1656, 1814, 1815, 1818, 1673, 1754 and 1855
of 2019 of the writ petitioners stand dismissed and CWP Nos.
34587, 21455, 33866, 33579, 33572, 33571, 33565, 33514,
33587, 33508, 32987, 21442, 12888 of 2019 and 672 of 2020
stand dismissed."
11. A review petition was filed against the said judgment i.e.,
RALP-15-2022 which was dismissed vide order dated 11.11.2022. The
Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary no.4592/2023 filed against the said
judgment dated 07.07.2022 and 11.11.2022 was also dismissed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 13.03.2023.
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12. Thus, in view of the above-said facts and also in view of the
law laid down in the above-said judgments, the present writ petition
deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches alone.
13. Additionally, it would be relevant to note that it has been
observed in the impugned order that the petitioners were never
appointed/recruited in the concerned department on permanent basis and
were volunteers, who were called for a specific period only and were
entitled to duty allowance alone which had already been paid. The
petitioners have not been able to refer to any document or material, much
less appointment letter etc., to contradict the said finding. It had been held
in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in LPA-1088 of 2018,
the relevant portion of which, more so para No.20, has been reproduced
herein above, that the services of the home guards are honourary and no
civil consequences follow on their disengagement and that since the
organization of home guards is a voluntary organization, no direction
could be given to regularize their services. In this regard, reference may
be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grah Rakshak
(supra), in which, while dealing with the case of the appellant therein,
who had raised the plea that they had worked for 10-30 years without any
break and their services were required to be regularized, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court did not grant the relief of regularization and did not
interfere with the judgment passed by various High Courts rejecting the
said claim. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced herein
below: -
"4. The questions involved in these appeals are whether
Home Guards of States of Himachal Pradesh, Punjab and N.C.T of
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Delhi are regular appointees in the cadre/services of Home Guards and
if not whether they are entitled for regularization of their services.
5. The learned counsel for the appellants have taken the
plea that the appellants are working as Home Guards without any
break for about 10 to 30 years. Inspite of the same, they were not given
any benefits available to regular employees. They have neither been
granted regular pay scale, nor have their services regularized.
6. Per contra, according to learned counsels for the States,
the appellants were appointed as Home Guards volunteers, working on
honorary basis and hence are entitled only for duty allowance as per
the schemes i.e. Acts and Rules framed for the said purpose.
xxx xxx xxx
15. xxx xxx xxx However, such contention has been
opposed by the learned counsel for the State(s). They relied upon
another decision of this Court in State of Manipur and another v. Ksh.
Moirangninthou Singh and others, (2007) 10 SCC 544. In the said
case, the members of the Manipur Home Guards filed different writ
petitions in the Gauhati High Court inter alia praying that their
services be regularized in the Home Guards and that they be given
regular pay scales. In the said case, the Court noticed that Home
Guards have been constituted as a voluntary organization for service in
emergencies. Their initial appointment was for three years after which
it is at the discretion of the Commandant, subject to approval of the
Commandant General to reappoint a member of the Home Guards. The
Court further noticed that there was a age limit of 50 years. In the said
case, the Court held:
"7. We are of the opinion that in view of the Constitution
Bench judgment of this Court in Secy., State of Karnataka v.
Umadevi (3)1 this Court cannot direct regularisation in service.
Since the court has no power to direct regularisation, it also
follows that it has no power to direct grant of benefits payable to
the regular employees."
The Court further held:
"11. A perusal of the provisions of the Home Guards Act
and the Rules show that the Home Guards was meant to be a
reserve force which was to be utilised in emergencies, but it was
not a service like the police, paramilitary force or army, and there
is no right in a member to continue till the age of 55 years. We
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Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:062955
CWP-10471-2024 -16- 2024:PHHC:062955
approve the view taken by the Delhi High Court in Rajesh Mishra
v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi."
xxx xxx xxx
17. In the cases before us though some of the Home Guards
(Grah Rakshak) produced their appointment letters to show that they
are serving as Platoon Havaldar for 10 to 28 years, we find that they
have been enrolled and there is no appointment on regular basis.
xxx xxx xxx
22. In view of the discussion made above, no relief can be
granted to the appellants either regularization of services or grant of
regular appointments hence no interference is called for against the
judgments passed by the Himachal Pradesh, Punjab and Delhi High
Courts."
14. Even a perusal of Rule 21 of the Haryana Home Guards
Rules, 1980 shows that the service in the Home Guards is voluntary.
Further, no Rule, Regulation or judgment has been cited by learned
counsel for the petitioners in support of the prayer for directing the
respondents to re-instate/re-enroll the petitioners on the post of Home
Guards.Thus, the prayer of the petitioners for directing the respondents to
re-instate/re-enroll them on the post of Home-Guards is misconceived and
has no legal basis and deserves to rejected both on the ground of delay as
well as on merits.
15. Keeping in view the above-said facts and circumstances, the
present writ petition is meritless and thus, deserves to be dismissed and is
accordingly dismissed.
( VIKAS BAHL )
May 07, 2024 JUDGE
naresh.k
Whether reasoned/speaking? Yes
Whether reportable? Yes
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