Punjab-Haryana High Court
Jagir Singh vs State Of Punjab And Ors on 22 March, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:041765
2024:PHHC:041765
CWP-7049-2024 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
123 CWP-7049-2024
Date of Decision: 22.03.2024
Jagir Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and others ...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL
Present:- Mr. Parminder Singh Sekhon, and
Mr. Gaurav, Advocate for the petitioner
Mr. Aman Dhir, Deputy Advocate General, Punjab
***
JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (Oral)
1. The petitioner through instant petition under Articles 226/227 of
the Constitution of India is seeking setting aside of:-
i. order dated 17.06.2019 (Annexure P-1) whereby
Disciplinary Authority has awarded punishment of
dismissal;
ii. order dated 11.10.2019 (Annexure P-2) whereby Appellate
Authority has dismissed appeal of the petitioner; and
iii. order dated 03/04.08.2020 (Annexure P-3) whereby
revision petition of the petitioner has been dismissed.
iv. order dated 16.10.2023 (Annexure P-5) whereby second
appeal of the petitioner has been rejected.
1 of 5
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:041765
2024:PHHC:041765
2. The petitioner was working as Assistant Sub-Inspector with
respondent-department. An FIR No.16 dated 11.09.2017 under Sections 7,
13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 at Police Station Vigilance came
to be registered against him as he was apprehended red-handed while
accepting bribe of ₹10,000/- On registration of FIR, the petitioner was placed
under suspension and departmental proceedings were initiated against him.
Senior Superintendent of Police, Patiala vide order dated 17.06.2019
(Annexure P-1) dismissed the petitioner from service. The petitioner filed an
appeal before Inspector General of Police, Patiala, which was dismissed vide
order dated 11.10.2019 (Annexure P-2). Thereafter, he preferred revision
before Director General of Police, Punjab, who vide order dated
03/04.08.2020 (Annexure P-3) dismissed the revision petition.
3. The Trial Court vide judgment dated 30.08.2022 (Annexure P-4)
acquitted the petitioner in the above-said FIR. After his acquittal, he
approached Director General of Police, Punjab for reinstatement, who vide
order dated 16.10.2023 (Annexure P-5) dismissed the same. Thereafter,
petitioner filed review/mercy petition (Annexure P-6) before the Principal
Secretary, Home & Justice-III, Punjab, Chandigarh which is still pending
adjudication.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as per Rule 16.3
of Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (for short '1934 Rules'), the petitioner could not
be departmentally punished because he has been acquitted in the criminal
trial. The foundation of departmental proceedings and criminal trial was same.
The evidence led by the department in criminal as well as departmental
2 of 5
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:041765
2024:PHHC:041765
proceedings were same, thus, he could not be punished in view of his acquittal
in the criminal trial.
5. Per contra, learned State counsel submits that the petitioner was
departmentally punished prior to judgment of acquittal, thus, he cannot claim
benefit of Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules. He concedes that petitioner was
departmentally punished on account of registration of FIR and evidence in
both the proceedings were common.
6. I have heard the arguments of learned counsels for both sides and
perused the record with their able assistance.
7. The entire dispute revolves around interpretation of Rule 16.3 of
1934 Rules, thus, it would be inevitable to look at aforesaid Rule which is
reproduced as below:
"16.3. Action following on a judicial acquittal. -
(1) When a Police Officer has been tried and acquitted by a
criminal court he shall be not be punished departmentally on
the same charge or on a different charge upon the evidence
cited in the criminal case, whether actually led or not, unless -
(a) the criminal charge has failed on technical grounds;
or
(b) in the opinion of the Court or of the Superintendent
of Police, the prosecution witnesses have been won
over; or
(c) the Court has held in its judgment that an offence
was actually committed and that suspicion rests upon
the police officer concerned; or
(d) the evidence cited in the criminal case discloses facts
unconnected with the charge before the court which
3 of 5
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:041765
2024:PHHC:041765
justify departmental proceedings on a different charge;
or
(e) additional evidence admissible under rule 16.25(1)
in departmental proceedings is available.
(2) Departmental proceedings admissible under sub-rule (1)
may be instituted against Lower Subordinates by the order of
the Superintendent of Police but may be taken against Upper
Subordinates only with the sanction of Deputy Inspector
General of Police, and a police officer against whom such
action is admissible shall not be deemed to have been
honorably acquitted for the purpose of rule 7.3 of the Civil
Services Rules (Punjab), Volume I, Part I."
8. The acquittal from criminal proceedings does not automatically
entitle immunity from departmental action. A police officer may be subjected
departmental punishment despite acquittal in criminal proceedings as per
exceptions carved out in Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules. If acquittal is not based
upon exceptions carved out in Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules, a police officer is
entitled to immunity from departmental action.
9. The contention of the respondent that the petitioner was acquitted
after adjudication of departmental proceedings cannot be countenanced
because there would be discrimination if contention of the respondent is
accepted. On the same set of allegations, two employees in different districts
may be subjected to departmental and criminal proceedings or there may be a
case where on the identical set of allegations two employees in the same
district are subjected to department and criminal proceedings. In case, both the
employees are acquitted from the criminal trial and in case of one employee
departmental proceedings are still pending he would be entitled to benefit of
Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules whereas an employee against whom departmental
4 of 5
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:041765
2024:PHHC:041765
proceedings have already concluded would not be entitled to benefit of Rule
16.3 of 1934 Rules. It would be violative of fundamental right of equality
guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. The State cannot make hostile
discrimination.
10. From the perusal of impugned orders, it is evident that authorities
have not adverted with Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules while passing the impugned
orders. Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules is directly applicable to every departmental
proceedings as soon as criminal proceedings are dropped. The competent
authority is duty bound to ascertain applicability of Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules
in the departmental proceedings. As the Appellate Authority has not adverted
with Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules while passing impugned orders, the impugned
orders deserve to be set aside and accordingly set aside. To cut short the
litigation, instead of disciplinary authority, the appellate authority is directed
to pass a fresh order within three months from today.
11. This Court would hasten to add that if the appellate authority
decides to reinstate the petitioner, he shall not be entitled to back wages as
conceded by learned counsel for the petitioner.
(JAGMOHAN BANSAL)
JUDGE
22.03.2024
Mohit Kumar
Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether reportable Yes/No
5 of 5
