Punjab-Haryana High Court
Soma Rani vs Jaswinder Singh on 3 April, 2024
Author: Pankaj Jain
Bench: Pankaj Jain
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:046026
CRR-3913-2015 1
2024:PHHC:046026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
265
CRR-3913-2015
Date of decision : 03.04.2024
Soma Rani ...... Petitioner
versus
Jaswinder Singh ...... Respondent
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PANKAJ JAIN
Present: Mr. Ankur Mehta, Advocate for
Mr. A.S. Manaise, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Sandeep Arora, Advocate
for the respondent.
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PANKAJ JAIN, J. (Oral)
1. Challenge is the order dated 24.09.2015 passed by
Additional Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur affirming the judgment of
conviction dated 22.08.2014 passed by JMIC, Gurdaspur against the
petitioner.
2. Petitioner was summoned to face trial for offence punishable
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short 'the Act')
with respect to dishonouring of cheque of Rs.2 lakhs bearing No.981924
dated 18.03.2013. Both the Courts below after analyzing the evidence on
record came to the conclusion that the guilt of the petitioner stands
proved and held her guilty of offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Act.
3. Counsel for the petitioner while assailing the judgments
eloquently argued that the Courts below have wrongly disbelieved the
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defence of the petitioner. The petitioner led evidence to prove that out of
loan of Rs.2 lakhs, Rs.1,80,000/- was paid back and only Rs.20,000/- was
to be paid. The security cheque issued by the petitioner was misused by
the complainant. He submits that two witnesses namely Gurpreet Singh
and Ram Pal, MC appeared as DW-1 and DW-2 to prove the said fact,
yet the trial Court has completely brushed aside the evidence and held the
petitioner guilty.
4. Per contra, Mr. Arora submits that a well reasoned judgment
has been passed by the trial Court which has been rightly affirmed by the
Appellate Court. This Court while sitting in revisional jurisdiction under
Section 401 of the Code cannot re-appreciate the evidence on record.
5. I have heard counsel for the parties and have gone through
the records of the case.
6. In view of the stand taken by the petitioner, it stands
admitted that there was a transaction of Rs.2 lakhs. However, the
question is whether the defence raised by the petitioner with respect to re-
payment of Rs.1,80,000/- can be said to have been proved from the
testimony of DW-1 and DW-2. Having seen the testimony of both the
witnesses, counsel for the petitioner cannot dispute that none of them is
privy to the said transaction.
7. In view thereof, this Court does not find any error committed
by the Courts below in disbeliving DW-1 and DW-2 with respect to
payment back of Rs.1,80,000/-. So far as the parameters with respect to
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code are concerned, the
same have been well laid down by Apex Court in the case of
Bindeshwari Prasad Singh @ B.P. Singh and others vs. State of Bihar
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(Now Jharkhand) and another, 2002 AIR (SC) 2907, wherein it has
been held that:-
"12. We have carefully considered the material
on record and we are satisfied that the High Court
was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence on
record and coming to a different conclusion in a
revision preferred by the informant under Section 401
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (3) of
Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section
401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to
convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction.
The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation
on the powers of the revisional court, prohibiting it
from converting a finding of acquittal into one of
conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent
of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court
could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of
conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the
method of ordering a re-trial. It is well settled by a
catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court
will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order
of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the
interest of public justice requires interference for the
correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of
gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not
be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal
merely because the trial court has taken a wrong view
of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It
is neither possible nor advisable to make an
exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of
revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions
of this Court have laid down the parameters of
exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court
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under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. (See
AIR 1951 Supreme Court 196 : D. Stephens v.
Nosibolla; AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1788 : K.C.
Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh; (1973) 2 SCC
583 : Akalu Ahir and others v. Ramdeo Ram; AIR
1975 Supreme Court 1854 : Patakalapati Narayana
Gajapathi Raju and others v. Bonapalli Peda
Appadu and another and AIR 1968 Supreme Court
707 : Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh)."
8. Apex Court in Thankappan Nadar vs. Gopala Krishnan
(2002) 9 SCC 393, held as under : -
"6. In a revision application filed by the de facto
complainant against the acquittal order, the court's
jurisdiction under Section 397 read with Section 401 of
the Cr.P.C. is limited. The law on the subject is well
settled. Instead of referring to various judgments, we
would only refer to few decisions rendered by this Court.
In Akalu Ahir and Others v. Ramdeo Ram,(1973) 2 SCC
583 this Court has (in SCC pp.587-88, para 8) observed
thus:
"This Court however, by way of illustration,
indicated the following categories of cases which
would justify the High Court in interfering with a
finding of acquittal in revision:
(i) Where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try
the case, but has still acquitted the accused;
(ii) Where the trial court has wrongly, shut out
evidence which the prosecution wished to produce;
(iii) Where the appellate court has wrongly held the
evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be
inadmissible;
(iv) Where the material evidence has been
overlooked only (either) by the trial court or by the
appellate court; and
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(v) Where the acquittal is based on the
compounding of the offence which is invalid under
the law.
These categories were, however, merely illustrative
and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can
also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where
the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of
the acquittal."
The Court further observed: (SCC p.588, para 10)
"No doubt, the appraisal of evidence by the trial
judge in the case in hand is not perfect or free from flaw
and a court of appeal may well have felt justified in
disagreeing with its conclusion, but from this it does not
follow that on revision by a private complainant, the
High Court is entitled to reappraise the evidence for itself
as if it is acting as a court of appeal and then order a
retrial. It is unfortunate that a serious offence inspired by
rivalry and jealousy in the matter of election to the office
of village Mukhia, should go unpunished. But that can
scarcely be a valid ground for ignoring or for not strictly
following the law as enunciated by this Court.
(Emphasis added)"
9. As a result of the aforesaid, this Court does not find that the
view taken by the trial Court can be said to be erroneous.
10. Resultantly, present petition is dismissed.
(PANKAJ JAIN)
JUDGE
03.04.2024
Dinesh
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes
Whether Reportable : No
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