Punjab-Haryana High Court
Sarita vs State Of Haryana on 3 April, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:044997
CRM-M-1447-2023(O&M) -1-
2024:PHHC:044997
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
109 CRM-M-1447-2023 (O&M)
Date of Decision : April 03, 2024
SARITA .....Petitioner
VERSUS
STATE OF HARYANA .....Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP TIWARI
Present : Mr. Shivansh Malik, Advocate,
for the petitioner.
Mr. Bhupender Singh, DAG, Haryana.
KULDEEP TIWARI. J.(Oral)
CRM-13140-2024 &
CRM-9847-2024
1. The applications are allowed as prayed subject to all just
exceptions and the documents as annexed with the applications are taken
on record as Annexures P-6 to P-8.
CRM-M-1447-2023
2. Through the instant petition, the petitioner craves for
indulgence of this Court for his being enlarged on regular bail, in case
FIR No.233, dated 27.08.2020, under Sections 302 and 120-B of the IPC,
and under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959, registered at Police Station
Lakhan Majra, District Rohtak.
ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE PETITIONER
3. The case as set up by the prosecution agency is that on
27.08.2020 a dead body of an unknown person was found lying on the
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Jind-Rohtak road, near a canal, of village Chandi. On receipt of
information the prosecution agency proceeded to the spot, where the dead
body was found lying on the roadside and one motorcycle bearing
No.HR-15-E-0480, make TVS Star, CT, was parked nearby with the milk
drum attached to it. One Rakesh, brother of the deceased, was present at
the spot, who presented a written complaint that his brother Jai Bhagwan
(deceased), who was doing the work of supplying milk in village, on the
fateful day at about 8:15 A.M. he was going to Rohtak after loading milk
drums and when he reached on the spot of occurrence, he was shot dead
by some unknown person.
4. After three days of the occurrence the statement of wife of
the deceased was recorded, wherein, she raised suspension against the
present petitioner, alleging therein, that her husband (deceased) used to
collect milk from Sarita (present petitioner), and the petitioner became
friendly with the deceased for about one year, and for which, about 1/ ½
year ago, wife of the deceased (Preeti) had rebuked the petitioner, due to
which present petitioner-Sarita, nursed a grudge against them, and the
petitioner connived with her brother Davinder and son Ravi, and got the
deceased shot dead with a gun.
5. On the basis of the above statement, an offence under
Section 120-B IPC was added, and the present petitioner was arrested
alongwith her brother on dated 30.08.2020 itself.
6. As per the prosecution story, during investigation it
transpired that in fact co-accused-Ravi (since deceased), son of present
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petitioner, was in touch with one Deepak, who is already confined in
Tihar Jail, got him introduced with co-accused Mohit and Ankit, and
thereupon, Ravi (deceased son of the petitioner) on the fateful day, with
the help of Mohit and Ankit, committed the murder of the deceased-Jai
Bhagwan.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE
PETITIOER
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner in asking for the relief of
regular bail to the petitioner submits that the petitioner is only accused of
offence punishable under Section 120-B IPC.
8. He further submits that as per the prosecution story the main
assailant was Ankit, who opened fire upon the deceased-Jai Bhagwan,
who has been granted the benefit of regular bail by the learned trial Court
concerned, itself, owing to the reason that the weapon of offence, was
never sent to the FSL, or ballistic examination, and there was no
incriminating evidence to connect him with the crime.
9. He further submits that son of the present petitioner namely
Ravi, has died, during the pendency of this instant matter,
10. He further submits that except the disclosure statement of the
co-accused, and the apprehension raised by the wife of the deceased-Jai
Bhagwan, there is no other incriminating evidence available to connect
the present petitioner with the crime.
11. He also submits that the petitioner is a lady, and is behind
bars for the last 3 years and 6 months, and out of the total 61 prosecution
witnesses, only one has been examined so far, and she is not involved in
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any other criminal case.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED STATE COUNSEL
12. Per contra, the learned State counsel vociferously opposed
the asked for relief on the ground that the petitioner is the main
conspirator, as she nurtured grudge against the deceased-Jai Bhagwan,
and his wife, and in fact the petitioner, who instigated her son and her
brother to committee the alleged murder.
13. He has also placed on record a custody certificate qua the
petitioner, which is taken on record, and a perusal of the same reveals that
the petitioner has suffered incarceration of 03 years and 06 months, as on
today, and she is not involved in any other criminal case.
14. He also submits, on instructions imparted to him by the
police official, that challan was presented, and the charges have been
framed by the learned trial Court concerned, and further, out of the total
61 prosecution witnesses, only one has been examined till date.
ANALYSIS
15. "Bail is the Rule and Jail is an Exception". This basic
principle of criminal jurisprudence was laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, way back in 1978, in its landmark judgment titled "State
of Rajasthan V. Balchand alias Baliay", 1977 AIR 2447, 1978 SCR (1)
535. This principle finds its roots in one of the most distinguished
fundamental rights, as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. Though the underlying objective behind detention of a person is to
ensure easy availability of an accused for trial, without any
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inconvenience, however, in case the presence of an accused can be
secured otherwise, then detention is not compulsory.
16. The right to a speedy trial is one of the rights of a detained
person. However, while deciding application for regular bail, the Courts
shall also take into consideration the fundamental precept of criminal
jurisprudence, which is "the presumption of innocence", besides the
gravity of offence(s) involved.
17. In "Nikesh Tarachand Shah V. Union of India", (2018) 11
SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has recorded the following:-
"14. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab,
(1980) 2 SCC 565 at 586-588, the purpose of granting
bail is set out with great felicity as follows:-
"27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which
deal with the right to ordinary bail because that right
does not furnish an exact parallel to the right to
anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that as
long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of
Calcutta in Nagendra v. King-Emperor the object of
bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the
trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution
of the question whether bail should be granted or
refused is whether it is probable that the party will
appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that
bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. In two
other cases which,significantly, are the 'Meerut
Conspiracy cases' observations are to be found
regarding the right to bail which deserve a special
mention. In K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor [AIR 1931 All
504 : 33 Cri LJ 94] it was observed, while dealing
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with Section 498 which corresponds to the present
Section 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the
Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to
grant bail which were not handicapped by the
restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which
corresponds to the present Section 437. It was
observed by the court that there was no hard and fast
rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise
of the discretion conferred by Section 498 and that the
only principle which was established was that the
discretion should be exercised judiciously. In Emperor
v. Hutchinson [AIR 1931 All 356, 358 : 32 Cri LJ
1271] it was said that it was very unwise to make an
attempt to lay down any particular rules which will
bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that the
legislature itself left the discretion of the court
unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of
cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely
classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to
classify the cases and to say that in particular classes
a bail may be granted but not in other classes. It was
observed that the principle to be deduced from the
various sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was
that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the
exception. An accused person who enjoys freedom is
in a much better position to look after his case and to
properly defend himself than if he were in custody. As
a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled
to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own
case. A presumably innocent person must have his
freedom to enable him to establish his innocence.
28. Coming nearer home, it was observed by Krishna
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Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor
[(1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] that: (SCC p.
242, para 1)
"... the issue of bail is one of liberty, justice, public
safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist
that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a
socially sensitized judicial process. . . . After all, personal
liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering
lawful eclipse only in terms of procedure established by law.
The last four words of Article 21 are the life of that human
right."
29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration)
[(1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was observed by
Goswami, J., who spoke for the court, that: (SCC p. 129,
para 29)
"There cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter
of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case
will govern the exercise of judicial
discretion in granting or cancelling bail."
30. In AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (2d, Volume 8, p.
806, para 39), it is stated:
"Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion
of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large
extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular
case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of
the
accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the
jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary
inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond
would effect that end."
It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail
or not depends for its answer upon a variety of
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circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter
into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot
be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily
justifying the grant or refusal of bail."
18. Also, in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of
Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No.2271 of 2010, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has insisted upon striking a perfect balance of sanctity of an
individual's liberty as well as the interest of the society, in grant or
refusing bail. The relevant extract of the judgment (supra) is reproduced
hereinafter:-
3. The society has a vital interest in grant or
refusal of bail because every criminal offence is the
offence against the State. The order granting or
refusing bail must reflect perfect balance between the
conflicting interests, namely, sanctity of individual
liberty and the interest of the society. The law of bails
dovetails two conflicting interests namely, on the one
hand, the requirements of shielding the society from
the hazards of those committing crimes and
potentiality of repeating the same crime while on bail
and on the other hand absolute adherence of the
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
regarding presumption of innocence of an accused
until he is found guilty and the sanctity of individual
liberty.
19. This Court has examined the instant petition on the
touchstone of the hereinabove extracted settled and legal principle(s) of
law and is of the considered opinion that the instant petition is amenable
for being allowed.
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20. On the touchstone of the above legal proposition discussed
by this Court, it can safely be concluded that the present petitioner
deserves the concession of relief of regular bail, specifically on the
ground that; (i) the petitioner has suffered incarceration of 3 years and 6
months; (ii) the main assailant, who as per the prosecution was present at
the spot has already been extended the benefit of regular bail: (iii) despite
lapse of 3 years and 6 months only one witnesses has been examined out
of the total 61 prosecution witnesses, therefore, conclusion of the trial
would take a long time.
FINAL ORDER
21. Considering the fact that the petitioner is a lady, and she has
suffered incarceration of 03 years and 6 months, as on today, and out of
the total 61 prosecution witnesses cited by the prosecution, only 01 has
been examined till date, this Court deems it fit and appropriate to grant
the concession of regular bail to the petitioner, during the pendency of
trial. Therefore, without commenting upon the merits and circumstances
of the present case, the present petition is allowed. The petitioner is
ordered to be released on bail, on furnishing of bail bond and surety bond
to the satisfaction of concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate/trial Court/Duty
Magistrate.
22. All pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(KULDEEP TIWARI)
April 03, 2024 JUDGE
dharamvir
Whether speaking/reasoned. : Yes/No
Whether Reportable. : Yes/No
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