Mursualin @ Bhuru vs State Of Haryana
2024 Latest Caselaw 6794 P&H

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Mursualin @ Bhuru vs State Of Haryana on 2 April, 2024

                                  Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:046730




107+215                       2024:PHHC:046730
     IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                  AT CHANDIGARH
                                 CRM-12134-2024 in/and
                                      CRM-M-63471-2023
                           Date of Decision : April 02, 2024

MURSUALIN @ BHURU                                           .....Petitioner

                                     VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA                                            .....Respondent

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP TIWARI

Present :     Mr. Gaurav Datta, Advocate,
              for the applicant/petitioner.

              Mr.Abhinash Jain, DAG, Haryana.

KULDEEP TIWARI. J.(Oral)

CRM-12134-2024

1. The application is allowed as prayed, subject to all just

exceptions.

CRM-M-63471-2023

2. Through the instant petition, the petitioner craves for

indulgence of this Court for his being enlarged on regular bail, in case

FIR No.271, dated 21.08.2023, under Sections 186,332,353,307,

379,411,483,420 of the IPC, and under Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms

Act, registered at Police Station Asaudha, Jhajjar.

3. The prosecution agency was set into motion on a secret

information, wherein, it was informed that Ashif, Sehadab, Mursualin

alias Bhuru and Gurfaan, were involved in the act of stealing animals

from the villages, and they also used to keep illegal weapon. In case raid

is conducted, they can be apprehended red handed. Accordingly, raid was

conducted by the police party and naka was also laid to nab the accused.

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However, in order to avoid the arrest, the driver of the vehicle (canter),

ran away from the spot, and not only that one of the accused opened fire

upon the raiding team, which hit on the police vehicle. It is also

transpired from the perusal of the FIR (supra) that the police had to

respond with fire shots in order to arrest the present petitioner and other

co-accused.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though the

petitioner was apprehended on the spot, however, he was empty handed,

and the pistol which as per the allegations used in the crime, was

recovered from one of the co-accused namely-Ashif, who was also

arrested alongwith present petitioner.

5. He further submits that though the petitioner is involved in

13 other criminal cases, however, in all these cases, he was involved

after his arrest in the present case.

6. On the other hand, learned State counsel has vociferously

opposed the asked for relief, and submits that petitioner and co-accused

had an audacity to open fire upon the police persons, which fortunately

hit the police vehicle, otherwise, they had intention to kill the police

officials, who were performing their official duty.

7. This Court has heard the learned counsel for both the parties

concerned, and has gone through the entire case file.

8. "Bail is the Rule and Jail is an Exception". This basic

principle of criminal jurisprudence was laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, way back in 1978, in its landmark judgment titled "State

of Rajasthan V. Balchand alias Baliay", 1977 AIR 2447, 1978 SCR (1)

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535. This principle finds its roots in one of the most distinguished

fundamental rights, as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of

India. Though the underlying objective behind detention of a person is to

ensure easy availability of an accused for trial, without any

inconvenience, however, in case the presence of an accused can be

secured otherwise, then detention is not compulsory.

9. The right to a speedy trial is one of the rights of a detained

person. However, while deciding application for regular bail, the Courts

shall also take into consideration the fundamental precept of criminal

jurisprudence, which is "the presumption of innocence", besides the

gravity of offence(s) involved.

10. In "Nikesh Tarachand Shah V. Union of India", (2018) 11

SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has recorded the following:-

"14. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 at 586-588, the purpose of granting bail is set out with great felicity as follows:-

"27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which deal with the right to ordinary bail because that right does not furnish an exact parallel to the right to anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra v. King-Emperor the object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which,significantly, are

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the 'Meerut Conspiracy cases' observations are to be found regarding the right to bail which deserve a special mention. In K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor [AIR 1931 All 504: 33 Cri LJ 94] it was observed, while dealing with Section 498 which corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which corresponds to the present Section 437. It was observed by the court that there was no hard and fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 498 and that the only principle which was established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously. In Emperor v. Hutchinson [AIR 1931 All 356, 358 : 32 Cri LJ 1271] it was said that it was very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any particular rules which will bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the court unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes. It was observed that the principle to be deduced from the various sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody. As a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case. A presumably innocent person must have his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence.

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28. Coming nearer home, it was observed by Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor [(1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] that: (SCC p. 242, para 1) "... the issue of bail is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitized judicial process. . . . After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of procedure established by law. The last four words of Article 21 are the life of that human right."

29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) [(1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was observed by Goswami, J., who spoke for the court, that: (SCC p. 129, para 29) "There cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case will govern the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or cancelling bail."

30. In AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (2d, Volume 8, p. 806, para 39), it is stated:

"Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end."

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It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail."

11. Also, in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of

Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No.2271 of 2010, the Hon'ble Supreme

Court has insisted upon striking a perfect balance of sanctity of an

individual's liberty as well as the interest of the society, in grant or

refusing bail. The relevant extract of the judgment (supra) is reproduced

hereinafter:-

3. The society has a vital interest in grant or refusal of bail because every criminal offence is the offence against the State. The order granting or refusing bail must reflect perfect balance between the conflicting interests, namely, sanctity of individual liberty and the interest of the society. The law of bails dovetails two conflicting interests namely, on the one hand, the requirements of shielding the society from the hazards of those committing crimes and potentiality of repeating the same crime while on bail and on the other hand absolute adherence of the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence regarding presumption of innocence of an accused until he is found guilty and the sanctity of individual liberty.

12. This Court has examined the instant petition on the

touchstone of the hereinabove extracted settled and legal principle(s) of

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CRM-M-63471-2023(O&M) -7- law and is of the considered opinion that the instant petition is amenable

for being allowed.

13. Be that as it may be, considering the fact that the petitioner

was apprehended from the spot of occurrence, but empty handed, and

there is no allegation against the petitioner that the opened fire upon the

police officials, and further the petitioner has suffered incarceration of

more than 6 months, as on today, this Court deems it fit and appropriate

to grant the concession of regular bail to the petitioner, during the

pendency of trial. Therefore, without commenting upon the merits and

circumstances of the present case, the present petition is allowed. The

petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, on furnishing of bail bond and

surety bond to the satisfaction of concerned Chief Judicial

Magistrate/trial Court/Duty Magistrate.

14. However, it is clarified that if in future, the petitioner is

found indulging in commission of similar offences, as are involved

herein, the respondent-State shall be at liberty to make an appropriate

application seeking cancellation of regular bail, as granted by this Court.

Moreover, anything observed here-in-above shall have no effect on the

merits of the trial and is meant for deciding the present petition only.

                                                       (KULDEEP TIWARI)
April 02, 2024                                             JUDGE
dharamvir


               Whether speaking/reasoned.         :       Yes/No
               Whether Reportable.                :       Yes/No




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