Punjab-Haryana High Court
State Of Haryana vs Kuldeep Singh Alias Kippa And ... on 14 March, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
256
CRA-AS-22-2022(O&M)
Date of decision: 14.03.2022
STATE OF HARYANA
....Appellant
Versus
KULDEEP SINGH @ KIPPA AND ANOTHER
...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD S. BHARDWAJ
*****
Present : Mr. Kanwar Sanjiv Kumar, Assistant Advocate General, Haryana
for the appellant.
*****
VINOD S. BHARDWAJ. J.
1. The present appeal has been filed against the judgment dated
07.02.2018 passed by Additional Sessions Judge Sirsa in CIS No.223-SC of 2017
in case FIR No.75 dated 16.08.2017 registered under Sections 392 and 379-B of
the IPC at Police Station Rori District Sirsa.
Briefly the facts of the case are summarized as under:-
i. On 16.08.2017, complainant-Ramesh Kumar S/o Makhan Lal moved an
application to the police on the allegation that when he was coming on his
motorcycle at about 11/11:30 p.m. on 15.08.2017, after repairing motor of
the tube-well and had reached near the house of Mohan Singh son of
Gurdev Singh, two boys stopped his motorcycle. They were armed with
pistol and danda. The boy who was armed with pistol pointed out his pistol
on his shoulder and asked him to leave the motorcycle. The other boy
armed with danda had taken out Rs.14,500 from his pocket. Thereafter,
they went away on the motorcycle of the complainant. Both the said boys
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were known to him by face but he could not tell their name. They were
residents of village Mattar. Upon enquiry, the names of the said boys came
to be known as Kipa Singh son of Natha Singh and Baggi son of Nachattar
Singh both Majbi Sikh. The FIR in question was accordingly registered.
ii. The respondents-accused persons were arrested in the case and motorcycle
in question along with sum of Rs.7500/- was recovered from accused Kipa
Singh alias Kuldeep and Rs.7000/- from accused Baggi alias Mangat Ram.
The pistol as well as danda that had been allegedly used in the commission
of offence were also taken into possession.
iii. The prosecution examined as many as five witnesses to prove its case. It is,
however, essential to point out that the complainant, while appearing as
PW-1, did not support the case of the prosecution and was declared hostile.
The complainant failed to identify the respondents to the accused persons
who had snatched his motorcycle. PW-2 Jagga Singh was also declared as
hostile on the request of the public prosecutor and did not support the case
of the prosecution.
iv. After conclusion of the prosecution evidence, the statement of the accused
was recorded under Section 313 CrPC and all the incriminating evidence
was put to them to which they pleaded innocence and false implication. No
evidence in defence was however led by them.
v. Upon consideration of rival submissions advanced by the contesting parties,
the Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa noticed that the FIR under Section
379B read with Section 34 IPC had been registered on the allegations of
forcible snatching of the motorcycle as well as Rs.14,500/- by two boys,
whom the complainant could identify but whose names were not known.
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The complainant while appearing as the PW-1 and the witness PW-2 have
stated that the respondents-accused were not the persons who had
committed the offence and have failed to identify them as the person who
committed the offence. The same becomes crucial and significant because
the complainant had claimed to identify the assailants. They were declared
hostile as they did not support the case of the prosecution. Resultantly, the
Additional Sessions Judge concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the
guilt of the accused persons beyond a shadow of reasonable doubt and thus
extended a benefit of doubt to the respondents-accused and acquitted them
of the charges levelled against them.
2. Shri Kanwar Sanjiv Kumar, learned State counsel has assailed the
judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa by vehemently arguing that
recovery of motorcycle as well as the sum of Rs.14,500/- has been affected from
the respondents-accused persons and it is not in dispute that the motorcycle in
question belongs to the complainant. Hence, the circumstantial evidence in the
form of recovery based on the disclosure of the respondents duly established the
link of the commission of the offence to the respondents-accused persons.
3. I have heard learned State counsel and have gone through the facts of
the instant case as also the judgment of the trial Court with his able assistance.
4. The case of the prosecution was founded on the identification of the
accused persons by the complainant. It was specifically stated by the complainant
that two persons, whom the complainant could identify but whose names were not
known, had snatched the motorcycle as well as the amount of Rs.14,500/- from the
complainant. Names of the assailants were given by the complainant later on-
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leading to arrest of respondents. The complainant as well as PW-2 Jagga Singh
have however not supported the case of the prosecution and have deposed that the
respondents facing trial were not the assailants who had snatched the motorcycle
as well as cash. Further, insofar as recovery of Rs.14,500/- is concerned, the same
cannot be claimed as a recovery to link the respondents to the commission of the
offence. For proving identification of the currency notes the numbers of the notes
which are distinctive feature had to be mentioned. Invariably, there is no
description of either of the denomination of the currency or currency numbers, as a
result whereof, it cannot be conclusively held that the currency recovered from the
respondents was in fact the currency notes that were snatched away from the
possession of the complainant.
5. The same thus leads to the recovery of motorcycle. The offence in
question was committed on account of forcible snatching of the motorcycle. The
identification of the respondents-accused having itself been denied as being not
the assailants, the circumstances under which motorcycle came in possession of
the respondents were to be explained by the prosecution and such a burden cannot
be put on accused. It is also not forthcoming from the case of the prosecution that
the recovery of the motorcycle was effected from any place that was exclusively in
the knowledge of the respondents and that it had been concealed from public view.
Besides, no independent witness has been associated by the Police in effecting the
said recovery.
6. The burden to prove that respondents-accused had in fact committed
the offence lay upon prosecution State and the commission of the offence under
Section 392 and 379-B IPC cannot be assumed merely on the basis of recovery of
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the allegedly snatched motorcycle. Being in possession of stolen/snatched property
does not ipso facto lead to a conclusion that the respondents-accused had in fact
committed offence punishable under Section 392 and 379-B of IPC. There is no
charge against the respondents for offence under section 411 IPC and even though
the same cannot be said to be a lesser charge of the offences tried, no such case
has been set up by the prosecution. A mere recovery, that is not supported and
substantiated by any evidence indicating that the persons from whom the recovery
had been affected were in fact the persons who had committed the offence, would
be insufficient to attract a judgment of conviction against the persons who are set
up to face trial. The obligation lies on the prosecution to prove its case beyond a
shadow of reasonable doubt. A conviction of an accused cannot be made on the
basis of preponderance of the probabilities or even a grave suspicion. It is well
settled position in law that suspicion, howsoever grave, does not substitute for the
need to prove the case. The recovery, is at best, a suspicious circumstance. Once
the identity of the respondents-accused is specifically denied by the complainant,
despite claiming in his FIR to the effect that he would be able to identify the
assailants who had taken away his motorcycle, his deposition assumes
significance.
LEGAL POSITION IN APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITTAL
7. The same now leads to the scope of interference by the Court while
hearing appeal against acquittal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the matter
of M. G. Aggarwal versus State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200, the relevant
part is extracted as under:
"(16) Section 423(1) prescribes the powers of the appellate
Court in disposing of appeals preferred before it and clauses
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(a) and (b) deal with appeals against acquittals and appeals
against convictions respectively. There is no doubt that the
power conferred by clause (a) which deals with an appeal
against an order of acquittal is as wide as the power conferred
by clause (b) which deals with an appeal against an order of
conviction, and so, it is obvious that the High Court's powers in
dealing with criminal appeals are equally wide whether the
appeal in question is one against acquittal or against
conviction. That is one aspect of the question. The other aspect
of the question centres round the approach which the High
Court adopts in dealing with appeals against orders of
acquittal. In dealing with such appeals, the High Court
;naturally bears in mind the presumption of innocence in
favour of an accused person and cannot lose sight of the fact
that the said presumption is strengthened by the order of
acquittal passed in his favour by the trial Court and so, the fact
that the accused person is entitled to the benefit of a
reasonable doubt will always be present in the mind of the
High Court when it deals with the merits of the case. As an
appellate Court the High Court is generally slow in disturbing
the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court, particularly
when the said finding is based on an appreciation of oral
evidence because the trial Court has the advantage of watching
the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence. Thus,
though the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal
against acquittal are as wide as those which it has in dealing
with an appeal against conviction, in-dealing with the former
class of appeals, its approach is governed by the overriding
consideration flowing from the presumption of innocence.
Sometimes, the width- of the power is emphasized, while on
other occasions, the necessity to adopt a cautious approach in
dealing with appeals against acquittals is emphasised, and the
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emphasis is expressed in different words or phrases used from
time to time. But the true legal position is that however
circumspect and cautious the approach of the High Court may
be in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it is undoubtedly
entitled to reach its own conclusions upon the evidence
adduced by the prosecution in respect of the guilt or innocence
of the accused. this position has been clarified by the Privy
Council in Sheo Swarup v. The King Emperor and Nur
Mohammad v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 151.
(17) Some of the earlier decisions of this Court, however, in
emphasizing the importance of adopting a cautious approach
in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it was observed that
the presumption of innocence is reinforced by the order of
acquittal and so, "the findings of the trial Court which had the
advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence
can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling
reasons": vide Surajpal Singh V. The State Similarly in Ajmer
Singh V. State of Punjab, it was observed that the interference
of the High Court in an appeal against the order of acquittal
would be justified only if there are "very substantial and
compelling reasons to do so.') In some other decisions, it has
been stated that an order of acquittal can be reversed only for
"good and sufficiently cogent reasons" or for "strong reasons".
In appreciating the effect of these observations, it must be
remembered that these observations were not intended to lay
down a rigid or inflexible rule which should govern the
decision of the High Court in appeals against acquittals. They
were not intended, and should not be read to have intended- to
introduce an additional condition in clause (a) of Section 423
(1) of the Code. All that the said observations are intended to
em-phasise is that the approach of the High Court in dealing
with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious because
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as Lord Russell observed in the case of Sheo Swarup, the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused "is not
certainly weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his
trial." Therefore, the test suggested by the expression
"substantial and compelling reasons" should not be construed
as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in every case. That
is the effect of the recent decisions of this Court, for instance,
in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Harbans Singh v.
The State of Punjab; and so, it is not necessary that before
reversing a judgment of acquittal, the High Court must
necessarily characterise the findings recorded therein as
perverse. Therefore, the question which we have to ask
ourselves in the present appeals is whether on the material
produced by the prosecution, the High Court was justified in
reaching the conclusion that the prosecution case against the
appellants had been proved beyond a reason-able doubt, and
that the contrary view taken by the trial Court was, erroneous.
In answering this question, we would, no doubt, consider the
salient and broad features of the evidence in order to
appreciate the grievance made by the appellants against the
conclusions of the High Court. But under Article 136 we would
ordinarily be reluctant to interfere with the finding of fact
recorded by the High Court particularly where the said
findings are based on appreciation of oral evidence.
8. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the matter of
Nagbhushan vs. State of Karnataka, (2021) 5 SCC 212, as under:
"7.2 Before considering the appeal on merits, the law on the
appeal against acquittal and the scope and ambit of Section
378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an
appeal against acquittal is required to be considered.
7.2.1 In the case of Babu v. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189,
this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an
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appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In
paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under:
12. This Court time and again has laid down the
guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the
judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court.
The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a
judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are
possible, though the view of the appellate court may be
the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of
acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire
evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to
whether the views of the trial court were perverse or
otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled
to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the
trial court had failed to take into consideration
admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration
the evidence brought on record contrary to law.
Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be
a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide
Balak Ram v. State of U.P (1975) 3 SCC 219, Shambhoo
Missir v. State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC 17, Shailendra
Pratap v. State of U.P (2003) 1 SCC 761, Narendra
Singh v. State of M.P (2004) 10 SCC 699, Budh Singh v.
State of U.P (2006) 9 SCC 731, State of U.P. v. Ram
Veer Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102, S. Rama v. S.Rami Reddy
(2008) 5 SCC 535, Aruvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206,
Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC
98 and Ram Singh v. State of H.P. (2010) 2 SCC 445)
13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227,
the Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) "... the
High Court should and will always give proper weight
and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the
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trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a
presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he
has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the
accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness
of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact
arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing
the witnesses."
14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been
followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State AIR
1954 SC 1, Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC
216, M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC
200, Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar (1970) 2 SCC 450,
Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412,
Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P(2002) 4 SCC 85 and
State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755)
15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC
415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under:
(SCC p. 432, para 42) "(1) An appellate court has full
power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the
evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such
power and an appellate court on the evidence before it
may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact
and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and
compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds',
'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions',
'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail
extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal
against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
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nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with
acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review
the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that
in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in
favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under the fundamental
principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person
shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused
having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the
basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by
the trial court."
16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC 450,
this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the
appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the
trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in
mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the
presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court
must give due weight and consideration to the decision of
the trial court as the trial court had the distinct
advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses,
and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of
the witnesses.
17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368,
the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this
Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) "20. ...
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an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with
even if the court believes that there is some evidence
pointing out the finger towards the accused."
18. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271, this
Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which
the Court would be justified in interfering with a
judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The
circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28)"(i) The
High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view
of law by ignoring the settled legal position;
(ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to
evidence and documents on record;
(iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing
with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave
miscarriage of justice;
(iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and
unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the
record of the case;
(v) This Court must always give proper weight and
consideration to the findings of the High Court;
(vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in
interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and
the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal." A
similar view has been reiterated by this Court in
Dhanpal v. State (2009) 10 SCC 401.
19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that in exceptional cases where there are
compelling circumstances, and the judgment under
appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can
interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court
should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the
accused and further that the trial court's acquittal
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bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference
in a routine manner where the other view is possible
should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for
interference." (emphasis supplied)
7.2.2 When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held
to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in
paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under:
"20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held
to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by
ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into
consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The
finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against
the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously
defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality.
(Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn (1984) 4
SCC 635, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing
Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312,
Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE 1994 Supp. (3) SCC
665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad (2001) 1 SCC 501,
Aruvelu v.State (2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala
Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P.(2009) 10 SCC 636)."
(emphasis supplied)
7.2.3 It is further observed, after following the decision of this
Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police
(1999) 2 SCC 10, that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of
no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no
reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be
perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is
acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions
would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be
interfered with.
7.3 In the case of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka,
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(2019) 5 SCC 436, this Court again had an occasion to
consider the scope o Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference
by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. This Court
considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952
onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under:
"31. An identical question came to be considered before
this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228. In
the case before this Court, the High Court interfered
with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial
court on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on
record. However, the High Court, while reversing the
acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the
learned trial court while acquitting the accused.
Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court
observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p. 233)
"10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the
order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to
reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come
to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would
give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge
if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of
the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the
present case where the Sessions Judge has made an
absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and
clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the
case."
31.1 In Sambasivan v. State of Karala (1998) 5 SCC 412,
the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by
the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on re-
appreciation of the entire evidence on record, however,
the High Court did not record its conclusion on the
question whether the approach of the trial court in
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dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the
conclusions arrived at by it were wholly
untenable.Confirming the order passed by the High
Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal
passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied
that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial
court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this
Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction
passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of
conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed
in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416) "
8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to
ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the
aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court
has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by
this Court in Ramesh Babula Doshi v. State of Gujarat
(1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on
the question whether the approach of the trial court in
dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the
conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable,
which alone will justify interference in an order of
acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-
considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions
raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se
justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We
think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of
the court which is considering the validity of the
judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the
order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to
satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing
with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions
arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and
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whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from
those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court
judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is
obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment
should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court
comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial
court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be
held that the interference by the appellate court in the
order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case
the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as
of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the
acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above
discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of
the trial court in this case."
31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Karala (1999) 3
SCC 309, after observing that though there is some substance
in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the
reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of
acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction
passed by the High Court after having found that the approach
of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was
not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned
Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This
Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not
justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while
acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully
entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own
conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the
eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial
court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not
at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of
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the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous
and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with
an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge.
31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807, in para 5, this
Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 809-10)
"5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the
appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one
of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside
on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the
prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the
judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion,
it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in
an appeal under Section 417 Cr.PC came to the
conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal
was perverse it could not set aside that order.
It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the
High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to
review the entire evidence and to come to its own
conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-
established rule that the presumption of innocence of the
accused is not weakened but strengthened by the
judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had
the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses
whose evidence have been recorded in its presence.
It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide
powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against
an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against
an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the
presumption of innocence with which the accused person
starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate
stage and that the appellate court should attach due
weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded
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the order of acquittal.
If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping
those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary
conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been
vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at
the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State AIR 1952 SC
52; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. AIR 1953 SC 122) In
our opinion, there is no substance in the contention
raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was
not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming
to its own conclusions.
31.4. In K.Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1979) 1 SCC
355, this Court has observed that where the trial court
allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects
creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a
view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the
obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest
of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to
ridicule." (emphasis supplied)
9. Thus, the position which emerges from a perusal of the law as settled
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court through its catena of judgments in matters
pertaining to appeals against acquittal can be summarized as under:-
a) Powers of High Court in dealing with criminal appeals are equally
wide whether the appeals are against conviction or acquittal.
b) In dealing with appeal against acquittal, the High Court bears in mind
that the presumption of innocence is strengthened.
c) As an appellate Court, the High Court is generally slow in disturbing
the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court, particularly when the
said finding is based on an appreciation of oral evidence because the
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trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the
witnesses who have given evidence.
d) That the interference of the High Court in an appeal against the order
of acquittal would be justified only if there are "very substantial and
compelling reasons to do so".
e) The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of
acquittal in a case where two views are possible, even though the
view of the appellate court may be the more probable one.
f) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons',
'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted
conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail the
extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal.
Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language'
to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with
acquittal, than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence
and to come to its own conclusion.
g) The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if
the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant
material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible
material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against
the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic
as to suffer from the vice of irrationality.
CONCLUSION:
10. It is hence well settled that the Appellate Court would not normally
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set aside a judgment of conviction on the basis of its difference of opinion from
that of the trial Court unless the opinion of the trial Court suffers from illegality,
perversity, infirmity or gross mis-appreciation of evidence. I am of the opinion that
there is no illegality, impropriety or perversity in the judgment passed by the
Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa in extending the benefit of doubt to the
respondents-accused and discharging them in the said case.
11. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed and the judgment of the
Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa is affirmed.
(VINOD S. BHARDWAJ)
JUDGE
April 14, 2022
S.Sharma(syr)
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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